Since 1995, the U.S. Coast Guard has been deploying high-endurance cutters for three to four months to the Persian Gulf, where they operate with multinational task forces supporting maritime interception operations within the U.S. Fifth Fleet operating area. The USCGC Morgenthau (WHEC-722) deployed first, followed in 1998 by the USCGC Chase (WHEC-718).
These operations ensured strict compliance with U.N. sanctions that require all cargo to and from Iraq to be inspected and verified. It is difficult, often dangerous work, requiring inspectors to scale cargo containers often stacked three-high on 600-foot merchant vessels.
In late 1998, the Coast Guard took a dramatic step toward greater interoperability with a carrier battle group (CVBG) and realization of a true "National Fleet" by assigning the Seattle-based USCGC Midgett (WHEC-726) to Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group One, as part of the USS Constellation (CV-64) Battle Group. The Midgett had been selected as a substitute for an Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class guided-missile frigate. The Battle Group also included the Canadian frigate HMCS Regina.
This deployment marked the first time since World War II that a Coast Guard cutter had deployed as a full member of a battle group from work-ups in the Southern California Operation Area through the deployment's conclusion in mid-December. The Midgett coordinated directly with the battle group's staff on everything from logistics to aviation support.
During the west-bound transit and the very early portion of the actual Persian Gulf patrol, the Midgett joined the USS Peleliu (LHA-5) Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), which included the USS Ogden (LPD-5) and USS Rushmore ((LSD-47) under the command of Commander, Amphibious Squadron One. The 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) was embarked.
During this 40-day portion of the deployment, the Midgett successfully conducted underway replenishments with the Peleliu—several times under challenging sea conditions. Often, hundreds of embarked Marines were topside during these replenishment-at-sea operations. Many said it was the first time they had seen a cutter up close.
From initial work-ups and exercises to pier-side drills, the Midgett's 170-person crew trained and deployed side-by-side with their Navy counterparts. The Coast Guard augmented the crew with a Coast Guard Reserve public affairs specialist to help capture the events of the deployment. In addition, in the spirit of the battle group team, the USS Arthur W. Radford (DD968) loaned the Midgett two operational specialists to round out the Coast Guard cutter's combat information center watch bill.
This deployment, with all its successes, growing pains, occasional frustrations, and lessons learned, can serve as a foundation for future extended Navy/Coast Guard operations. Further, it has provided an outstanding venue for the Coast Guard to reinforce its national defense roots.
Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, states: "The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team. . . . Effectively integrated joint forces expose no weak points or seams to enemy action, while they rapidly and efficiently find and attack enemy weak points. Joint warfare is essential to victory." These sentiments apply in spades to the cutter's integration into the Constellation Battle Group and the Peleliu Amphibious Ready Group. The deployment was a significant stride toward greater integration.
Both services learned a great deal from this deployment. Though both have distinctive characteristics, they also share a host of commonalties. What did the Midgett bring to the battle group?
For starters, extensive experience conducting visit, boarding, search, and seizure (VBSS) operations. By the very nature of its day-to-day mission, the Coast Guard has inherent expertise in maritime boarding tactics, techniques, and procedures. Coast Guard proficiency throughout the world in both narcotic and migrant interdiction operations is unmatched. During the deployment, the cutter's crew completed 55 queries of vessels operating within the Persian Gulf and conducted 16 boardings.
Further, the cutter completed a hazardous and challenging escort of a tug and barge combination, which had been intercepted while attempting to smuggle illegal oil out of Iraq. The six-day escort from the northern to the southern Persian Gulf benefited from the Coast Guard crew's marine safety expertise (several crew members had served at U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Safety Offices) to assess the seaworthy nature of the vessels barge.
In addition, the crew provided tailored VBSS training to all but one ship in the CVBG and ARG. One of the cutter's crewmembers had spent five years with a Coast Guard tactical law enforcement training team, while the operations officer was a former officer-in-charge of a law enforcement detachment. Both proved invaluable in providing personal defensive tactics training on each of the Navy combatants. The Midgett crew also provided instruction in evidence gathering and search techniques. Each Navy ship tailored sessions to individual needs, which allowed the Coast Guard to contribute across the battle group, and permitted battle group crews to interact with their Coast Guard counterparts in smaller groups.
In addition to maritime interception operations, the cutter also was employed extensively in regional engagement activities with allies within the Gulf. The Midgett participated in Exercise Red Reef with the Saudi Arabian Navy and the Peleliu ARG, and in Khunjar Hadd, a multinational exercise with participants from Oman, France, and the United Kingdom. As a multimission, maritime, military service with law enforcement, humanitarian, and regulatory roles and missions, the Coast Guard is well suited for maritime engagement roles.
The advantage of using the cutter in an engagement role was obvious: the navies within the Persian Gulf operate in much the same manner as the Coast Guard, e.g., at-sea boardings, interdiction of smuggling, and operating patrol craft and small watercraft in the littoral (inshore, coastal ,and offshore environs). The cutter's helicopter (an HH-65 from Coast Guard Air Station San Francisco) extended the ambassador role, conducting operations on board Omani, French, and British warships. Praise was universal for the cutter's role in engagement.
What did the Midgett and the Coast Guard in general gain from this deployment? Better understanding of the similarities between the nation's two maritime services. The deployment allowed the Midgett's crew to train in a primary Coast Guard mission area—defense operations—under real-world conditions. These included an opportunity to use data link and electronic support measures (ESM) systems extensively, participate in carrier and amphibious group operations, and gain experience in operating in three different numbered fleets (the Third, Fifth and Seventh) with three operations orders.
The joint deployment highlighted the Navy's increasing use of its Information Technology for the 21 st Century (IT)-21 capability to exploit SIPRNET, the Pentagon's classified Internet protocol system, which is the preferred medium for communicating with shore units and among ships within the battle group. The Midgett had a SIPRNET capability using the international maritime satellite (INMARSAT), but several configuration issues constrained the crew from surfing the classified Internet without great cost and an extremely slow speed. Today, most operational Navy commands update operational information around the clock on the SIPRNET web sites. Achieving this IT-21 core capability will be a key requirement for the Coast Guard to be interoperable with joint forces into the future.
This deployment has taught both the Coast Guard and the Navy a tremendous amount about each other. Perhaps the greatest lesson is that both services complement each other—the Coast Guard, with its engagement and law enforcement expertise (plus the littoral expertise gained from operating patrol boats and small boat stations), and the Navy with its power projection and strike capability. This combination makes an ideal team for operations such as maritime interception operations in the Fifth Fleet area of responsibility. The cutter's deployment has produced another tangible result: it has reduced the differences and reinforced the similarities between these two great maritime services. All of this should lead to closer coordination in efforts to develop and implement the National Fleet.
Lieutenant DiRenzo was Coast Guard liaison to the Constellation Battle Group for the deployment, serving on the staffs of Cruiser Destroyer Group One and Destroyer Squadron Seven. A Naval Academy graduate qualified in surface/submarine warfare, he commanded the USCGC Jefferson Island (WPB-1340).