Desert Storm at Sea: What the Navy Really Did
Marvin Pokrant. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1999. 352 pp. Charts. Notes. Bib. Index. $59.95 ($56.95).
Reviewed by Rear Admiral Fred Lewis, U.S. Navy (Retired)
In this second volume of a two-volume work describing naval operations during the Gulf War (the first is Desert Shield at Sea [Greenwood, 1999]). Marvin Pokrant has produced a painstakingly detailed account of the Navy's role in Desert Storm. This is the work of an analyst and not a historian. Pokrant does, however, dissect for the informed and knowledgeable reader in serial fashion each aspect of a highly complex, multidimensional period of combat on and from the sea—where many of the events described were happening in parallel. His treatments of the Joint Force Air Component Commander issue, the ill-preparedness of the Navy to operate under this doctrine, and the position of the U.S. Air Force either to conform to the doctrine or not play in their sandbox are illuminating. Throughout the book the author is merciful in that his use of the analyst's stocks in trade—tables and charts—are kept to a minimum and those that are used enhance the reader's understanding.
The author was uniquely positioned to analyze and comment on the events of that period because he was attached to the staff of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command (NavCent), and evidently was present at most briefings, meetings,'and tactical discussions. Not only did he have access to data related to sortie rates, ordnance expenditures, casualty reports, planning efforts, and weapons effectiveness, he also was able to observe closely the personal interactions up and down the chain of command as this "joint" campaign unfolded. It is in this human dimension that Pokrant either unintentionally or with forethought provides his most valuable service to posterity—and to our understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of any joint operation whose component commanders are widely separated.
The author describes a series of supporting elements that he terms "instruments for jointness:' One of these "instruments" states that in order for joint operations to be effective, "trust and mutual respect among officers of all services, especially those in command" are essential. Indeed, we all were led to believe that in this most highly successful campaign such was the case, according to the component commanders in the afterglow of victory. And yet, the author comments that "in going over the events of Desert Shield and Desert Storm, we are struck by how often trust, or lack of same, determined whether joint operations were effective."
Pokrant points to numerous factors that contributed to less-than-ideal interpersonal relationships between the commander-in-chief and his component commanders and their staffs, especially NavCent. One of those factors was the location of component command headquarters. Two of the key players—Army General Norman Schwartzkopf and Air Force Lieutenant General Charles Horner—were located in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, while the others-Vice Admiral Stanley Arthur and Marine Lieutenant General Walter Boomer-were located at remote sites (Arthur at sea on board the USS Blue Ridge [LCC-19], and Boomer with his Marines south of Kuwait). There were good reasons why NavCent was on board the Blue Ridge in the Persian Gulf, but in hindsight Admiral Arthur, according to the author, now believes that his headquarters should have been in Riyadh. This geographical separation and the inability to communicate face to face were major factors in the development of misunderstanding. Another important factor was that "General . . . Schwartzkopf did not appear to trust the Navy to obey orders," and that his "lack of knowledge of naval operations probably hurt, as did his apparent lack or interest in naval operations:
Despite these difficulties and some interservice rivalries, Desert Storm was a resounding success. NavCent forces made major contributions to Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and all NavCent personnel performed magnificently with courage, skill, and dedication. Pokrant leads the reader to the inescapable conclusion that the standout leader of this operation clearly was Vice Admiral Arthur. He was the only component commander faced with multi-dimensional threats above, on, and below the sea while operating in an environment where he frequently faced the challenges of unclear and sometimes conflicting guidance. Yet through it all he did his duty, carried out the commanderin-chief's plan, and acquitted himself with honor.
From his unique vantage point on the NavCent staff, Pokrant's thorough research has helped him construct an excellent account of naval operations in Desert Storm. This volume is an important reference document and is a necessary addition to the library of any serious student of naval matters.
The Oceans
Ellen J. Prager and Sylvia A. Earle. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000. 314 pp. Photos. Appendix. Index. $24.95 ($22.45).
Reviewed by Captain Don Walsh, U.S. Navy (Retired)
From the 1940s through the 1960s, there was the original The Oceans: Their Physics, Chemistry and General Biology. First published in 1942, this 1,100-page, 20-chapter classic was a must for every oceanographer's library. I got my copy in the early 1960s, when it still was in print. It provided a fairly complete survey of oceanographic knowledge of that time. The rapid advancement of ocean sciences in the 1960s, however, made "the book" increasingly obsolete. But many copies still are around; it's hard to part with an old friend.
Certainly this review is not about that long out-of-print book. The Oceans of today, however, serves a purpose similar to the first one, though for a different audience. It puts between two covers a tour d'horizon about the sciences of the sea, what we know about them, and how we learned it.
Authors Dr. Ellen Prager and Dr. Sylvia Earle are well-known ocean scientists and skilled writers. Both have the gift of explaining complex ocean-related concepts and issues to lay audiences in a way that makes the difficult seem simple. This book is written for the lay reader concerned with the natural world around us. It is not a dull textbook.
The Oceans is divided into three sections: "Oceans of the Past," "The Seas of Today," and "Waves of the Future." Within each section there are a series of short, almost free-standing chapters. The middle section, the most extensive part of the book, tells us about each of the fields that make up the interdisciplinary science we call oceanography.
On a larger scale the authors virtually take us from the birth of our planet, its oceans, and its atmosphere to forecasting the oceans of tomorrow. It is a 4.5-billion-year journey in only 300 pages! For most writers this would be a daunting task, but Prager and Earle do it quite well without skimping on many of the details.
There are 51 illustrations spaced throughout the book and an insert section of 18 color plates. Unfortunately, the book does not have a single list of either the illustrations or plate images. An appendix at the end of the book provides 94 references for "Sources and Suggested Reading." This section could have been made much more useful if the cited publications had been organized in the same way as the sections of the book. Finding the right reference would be much easier.
If you want the broadest possible background on the oceans, this is the book for your library. Here you can learn about the sciences of the sea; global climate and the sea; ocean resources; and international policy issues affecting uses of the sea. Read this one and—whether you live in St. Louis or San Francisco—it will make you hungry for more knowledge about the World Ocean and how it affects all of us.
Friendly Fire: The Accidental Shootdown of U.S. Black Hawks Over Northern Iraq
Scott A. Snook. Princeton, NJ: Princeton, 2000. 257 pp. Photos. Notes. Bib. Index. $35.00 ($31.50).
Reviewed by Colonel Hays Parks, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)
On 14 April 1994, two U.S. Air Force F-15C fighters operating in the northern Iraq no-fly zone in support of Operation Provide Comfort shot down two U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters flying in support of the same combined task force. Scott Snook, a serving U.S. Army officer assigned as a professor in the department of behavioral sciences and leadership at the U.S. Military Academy, offers his analysis of that incident.
Given the author's branch of service, an initial reaction to his effort might be one of interservice skepticism. The author successfully negotiates this potential conflict, however, by offering a dispassionate summary and analysis that contribute to an understanding of this particular incident and the overall problem of friendly fire.
Following a summary of the overall situation prior to the shootdown, the author identifies the participants: overall command and control; an E-3B AWACS; the UH-60 Black Hawks and their pilots; and the F-15C fighters and their pilots. He then leads the reader through the "deadly dance" that resulted in the downing of the Black Hawks and the death of the 26 crew and passengers.
Snook relies upon his background in organizational behavior to analyze the incident in the chapters that follow. To do so, he begins with a summary of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board's findings and the statements subsequently issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The identified or acknowledged errors, omissions, and failures included: the F-15 pilots misidentified the Black Hawks; the AWACS crew failed to intervene; the Black Hawks and their operations were not integrated into task force operations; and the identification-friend-or-foe systems failed. The analysis is conducted at the individual, group, organizational, and technical-system level in the chapters that follow before conclusions are reached on lessons learned.
This is a good—but incomplete—book. The author identifies certain factors that contributed to this tragedy, but lets them go before their analysis is completed. He asks a fundamental question: How could two highly trained and experienced Air Force pilots operating under visual flight rules, with unlimited time and no existing threat, fail to identify properly two U.S. helicopters? His answer is a partial, if unsatisfactory one—identifying elements without necessarily reaching firm conclusions.
One of the book's problems is its almost exclusive reliance on official documents, including the official investigation. Official documents are important not only for what they say but also for what they fail to say. While the author identifies as one factor a competition between F-15 and F-16 pilots operating in support of Operation Provide Comfort to down an Iraqi helicopter operating in the no-fly zone, no mention is made of pressure from Washington to achieve this. He describes the experience of the two F-ISC pilots and some shortfalls, such as insufficient helicopter recognition training. Others (physical and administrative, such as frequent rotation of aircrews into the theater) are neither identified nor addressed adequately.
A second problem is the author's limited or incomplete frame of reference. A critical aspect is an understanding of the rules of engagement. Purportedly because of their classification, the author eschews their analysis and discussion. Rules of engagement could have been analyzed and discussed at an unclassified level. Similarly, near misses in enforcing the Iraqi no-fly zones have been common. AWACS aircraft incorrectly have cleared Navy fighter aircraft to engage civilian airliners and U.S. Air Force C-5 aircraft misidentified as Iraqi fighters. Navy pilots' insistence on positive visual identification prevented other tragedies. This pattern of misidentification is not mentioned. He discusses the psychological response of the F-15 pilots to seeing what they wanted or expected to see, but barely mentions other scenario-fulfillment incidents, such as the heavily investigated and documented 3 July 1988 downing of an Iranian airliner by the USS Vincennes (CG-49).
Finally, he touches briefly on Air Force resolve that the fighter pilots would not be court-martialed for their actions. Air Force concern over the potential effect of a court-martial on judgment calls by fighter pilots operating in a high-risk combat environment is legitimate. But this was not the case on 14 April 1994. The title reflects the author's error: this was not an "accidental" shoot down. Two Air Force pilots failed to follow their rules of engagement and caused the death of 26 persons. The author accepts the Air Force's decision without considering alternative arguments or distinguishing this from other friendly fire incidents. Failure to assign or accept responsibility itself may be an organizational problem that could lead to future tragedies.
Friendly Fire is an excellent, though incomplete, analysis of an incident from which there is much to learn.