Some national security affairs authorities say that the number one issue facing the U.S. military is to transform itself to fight the next war rather than the last one. Participation in the debate through fora like Proceedings is not only welcome, but to my mind, required. If you haven't thought about and don't have an opinion about what future capabilities your generation of warfighters needs to survive and win on the battlefield, then you have to be satisfied with what you will be given—more of the same.
Students of history have described the current state of the world as a strategic pause—a bit of a breathing space in the long marathon. Trouble is, since most of us are busier than ever, it is difficult to accept this theory. Proponents of the theory consider the period since the end of the Cold War similar to that between World Wars I and II. Trust me, any reading of history would show the U.S. military was more constrained for resources in the 1930s than it is now, and just about as busy. That said, our predecessors managed to take the time and find the resources to experiment.
Regardless of our commitments, it is imperative that we take advantage of this period to consider what kind of transformation we want. There is widespread interest in this question in Congress, in the Department of Defense, in the leadership of all the services, in industry, and elsewhere. A quick review of the history of military transformations shows several trends:
- Most often, a cataclysmic failure or catastrophic defeat provided the impetus for change.
- Revolutions frequently were carried out by the underdog.
- Very often, the originator of the innovation did not capitalize on it—someone else did.
- The true military value of a transformation often was controversial and in doubt up until the time it was proven in war.
- Truly innovative changes in military operations took years, if not decades, to achieve.
Given our success to date, and no catastrophe impelling change, how do we gain support for innovation? There is but one answer: leadership.
A small but vocal group in Congress is concerned that the U.S. military is too wedded to our careers, organizations, and platforms to do anything more than make partial product improvements from one generation to the next. They are pressing us to think bigger and longer range. They are, in fact, doing more than pressing us; they are on the verge of legislation to mandate it. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff need no such urging. Strong supporters of innovation, they have put their offices, their minds, and their money into a series of subtle, but profound steps to foster innovation in technology, doctrine and organizations.
Here is just one of them. Based on the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, the President directed that U.S. Atlantic Command change its name to U.S. Joint Forces Command effective 1 October 1999. The purpose for this name change was to call attention to a much more significant change that accompanies it: from being one of the five regional war fighting commanders-in-chief (CinCs) to a more functional role of leading the transformation of the joint community into the future. Our span of responsibility includes training, doctrine, experimentation, interoperability and, of critical importance, joint requirements. When you think about a CinC, you instinctively think about his area of responsibility (AOR): CinCPac (Pacific) is responsible for Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia; CinCCent (Central Command) is responsible for Iraq and Iran; and CinCEur (Europe) is responsible for Bosnia and Kosovo. At U.S. Joint Forces Command, we like to say the future is in our AOR, and I submit to you that it may well be that the future is every bit as important as any geographic location.
Let me mention just two aspects of this mission. First, we are talking about the joint world here. The services have robust programs looking at their own futures requirements in all the same areas: doctrine, tactics, training, and equipment. Until now, no one was specifically tasked to develop and champion joint requirements. Systems were always optimized to meet service requirements and sub-optimized for joint requirements. The joint world is a small part of the overall experimentation and requirements process. Ninety percent or more of all development and experimentation done in the Department of Defense is, and will continue to be, services-led. But the joint piece is critical, for it tends to bind all the other capabilities together.
Second, if you and I made a list of those military capabilities where joint requirements should have serious consideration, even a dominant consideration, we would make essentially the same list. Areas such as command and control, theater air and missile defense, combat identification, and logistics come to mind.
What is my point? We need a robust debate about the future and you should be a part of it. This is your future we're playing around with here. I wish we were having something like the old battleships vs. carriers debate going on in the pages of Proceedings. I wish we were debating more loudly the arsenal ship, the Navy's requirement for low-observable manned aircraft, the Marine Corps' operational maneuver from the sea and its current experiments into urban warfare. I wish you were debating smart-ship manning levels, the place of antisubmarine warfare in the pecking order of things, sea-based national missile defense, and a bunch of others. We should be debating my premise: are we really at a strategic inflection point in history?
Now is the time to engage in the formulation and debate of new ideas. We need your ideas and intellectual energy.
Admiral Gehman is Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. He previously served as the 29th Vice Chief of Naval Operations.