China's long-term strategic plans may have less to do with armed confrontation, and more to do with the slow, careful construction of power "by other means." An understanding of the Eastern philosophy of warfare and the mind of the modern Middle Kingdom—from their perspective—can be aided by an understanding of an ancient game of strategy: Wei-Chi.
A game of the highest stakes began several years ago—a game that involves us—but only one of the players knows the rules. For thousands of years, a game of skill and strategy has been played in the Eastern world. The game pits two opponents against one another on a board with a 19-by-19-line grid representing unconquered territory. Each player places stones on the grid intersections in a struggle to control the most territory. The first moves, on the edges, represent moves closest to the shores and islands in an effort to establish bases from which to spread. These strategic centers become the basis for building spheres of influence that support large regions or masses. The victor, the one who possesses the most territory, begins it all from the sea. Wei-chi (pronounced way-chee) is more than just a game, however; it is central to understanding the Eastern perspective of war. Wei-chi defines political behavior in a strategic sense, and it provides a valuable tool for developing strategies consonant with opposing an Eastern mindset.
First played in China in the 24th century B.C., Wei-chi taught strategy to warriors and kings. National champions received the title, "First Hand of the Empire." It endures as a game with the same eminence to the present day; most consider it more challenging strategically than its Western equivalent, chess. Chairman Mao Tse-Tung required all of his officers to study Wei-chi and become proficient. Even through a score of dynasties and changes in territorial borders and leadership, Chinese culture remains remarkably consistent—a culture steeped in the principles of Wei-chi.
A victory achieved through diplomacy and building spheres of influence is the ultimate victory. This philosophy of war, common in Eastern views and often cited from the writings of Sun-Tzu, has been recognized in Western thought only since the writings of Clausewitz (i.e., war is a continuation of policy). War—the real-life Eastern analogue of Wei-chi—begins with words through diplomacy, and may take generations to reach fruition. Words may not always convey a specific meaning or truth, but they serve a purpose in advancing the grand strategy. Similarly, war does not necessarily include the clash of steel blades. With a growing defense budget officially at $7.5 billion in 1995 that may account for only 10% of its actual defense spending, the modern People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) soon will possess the necessary steel for much grander operations. We must look at the board; the stones of the current game already are being played.
"Building Territory Peacefully"
These words, spoken by Chinese President Jiang Zemin during his visit to the United States in 1997, reflect the diplomatic goals of Chinese foreign policy. They were delivered strategically during a period of unprecedented economic growth and concurrent territorial expansion.
Chinese thinkers of the pre-Qin days (over 2,000 years ago) advanced the doctrine `loving people and treating neighbors kindly are most valuable to a country.
This is a reflection of the aspiration of the Chinese people for a peaceful world where people of all countries live in harmony. Today, the Chinese people who are committed to modernization need more than ever a long-term international environment of peace and a favorable neighboring environment.
Wei-chi consists of three fundamental elements: territorial expansion; attacking; and defending. The primary objective—obtaining the most territory—begins peacefully. Conquering territory ("masses" in the game's parlance) eventually requires military support. The methods of attacking and defending territory require great skill and practice. China is building masses and developing spheres of influence today, and it has been very successful to date in building them without the use of force. Hong Kong has returned peaceably, and Macau will revert to Chinese rule this year. China also claims contested territories within the South China Sea: the Spratly Islands.
Historically, Chinese naval strategy has concentrated on defensive measures for the protection of the mainland. Recently, the term "active defense" has shifted the focus of their naval strategy outward—becoming a strategy that looks to the open oceans in the year 2050 and beyond. China's defensive area typically included coastal Chinese territories, Taiwan, and nearby islands, and the ability to defend against an attack from the sea long enough to place an army in position ashore. That strategy evolved to include active naval roles in conducting any necessary actions at sea—especially in the areas encompassing the coastal islands of the first echelon (such as the Philippines) and the second echelon (such as the Spratly Islands). The new vision includes a 400nm reach within the next decade, and a complete blue-water capability within the next generation. This strategy will involve a necessary change in China's force structure and naval capabilities.
China intends to maintain Taiwan as a national territory. The use of force is an acceptable option to conclude that rapprochement. But, in keeping with thousands of years of strategy, Taiwan appears an unlikely place to begin a conflict at sea. Diplomacy currently is winning the day, and China has steadily and systematically isolated its island neighbor. There remain only 26 nations that recognize an independent Taiwan—and none of those are major world powers. Concurrently, China continues to develop Taiwanese economic dependence on the mainland while opening talks on a number of cross-strait issues. In retrospect, Taiwan's possible future reconciliation may prove the perfect example of a successful Chinese approach to victory without bloodshed.
Strategic planning has focused on a potential conflict over Taiwan for so long, we must consider what may come next. Having achieved success in reclaiming first-echelon territory, Chinese naval strategy will look to second-echelon goals. In Wei-chi, obtaining territory is all-important. Gaining territory requires strong bases nearby and political spheres of influence that provide support, but it also requires a military capability to move the forces into the territory desired. China claims the Spratly Islands in their entirety; there are four other nations (not including Taiwan) that refute those absolute claims: the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei.
With the Taiwan situation well in hand, we should expect China's naval efforts to surge into the next echelon; a progression limited only by China's ability to provide active defense. The requisite naval force to conduct battle in the second echelon region, however, does not yet exist.
China will not begin an aggressive campaign for the control of the Spratlys until they possess air superiority over the region. The vastness of the more than 100 tiny islands and reefs—and their distance from the mainland—suggest that this superiority would originate from carrier-based aircraft. In fact, China has been studying carrier operations actively and began purchasing aircraft carriers and carrier-capable planes over the past several years. PLAN hopes to build and deploy its own carriers early in the next century. Last spring, a senior military delegation from China flew onto a U.S. carrier and observed flight operations at first hand.
What happens if and when diplomacy fails with sufficient military capability in place to achieve the aim? Will the Philippines sit by peacefully and continue to let China build outposts on disputed islands? Will Vietnam extend its recently begun border discussions into issues of the South China Sea? If diplomacy fails, is it in our national interest to wage an active offense in the Western Pacific? What are the lessons of history that could help in such situations?
Chairman Mao, one of the first Eastern strategists to study Carl von Clausewitz, incorporated his Western studies into writings with the Eastern perspective on war. It is worth studying recent history to learn how the elements of Wei-chi that involve bloodshed, attacking, and defending have relevance for future conflicts.
Attacking Enemy Territory
In Wei-chi, the player protects his masses on all sides; this is critical to avoid being surrounded. He avoids wasting resources where battles already have been decided, and he conducts multiple attacks and defenses simultaneously to keep the enemy off balance. Although the game originated in China, Japan has played the game for centuries as well. Japan's strategic moves in World War II provide useful illustrations to understand and predict possible scenarios involving the South China Sea. Many historians believe that the Japanese entry into World War II came because of failed efforts in diplomacy and ineffective policies to support their economic ambitions. In the light of Wei-chi, the early strategic moves of Japan and the role of attacking may be illuminated.
In the game of Wei-chi, masses must be established at the furthest reaches of one's ability to protect them. Players then work inward, strengthening forces and extending conquests. Typical opening moves include asserting influence in the territory near the enemy first. Pearl Harbor was such a place. The attack there—seemingly bold and outside of the Japanese area of influence—served a purpose in sustaining the mass (i.e., Japanese conquests) thousands of miles away. The progressive conquest of islands in the Pacific then became a matter of attempting to connect the masses in a sequence of moves to provide mutual support.
When control of an island could be achieved easily and would support the survival of the conglomerate territory of Japan, it was pursued. If control of an island could not be achieved (or clearly had become a lost hope in battle), then it was ignored. The Eastern warrior philosophies of initiative, speed, surprise, boldness, and deception all played a vital role in executing Wei-chi, but these tactics came secondary to the overall strategy of deciding when to attack and when to defend. Determining when to attack is as important in the game as determining where an attack may occur or what island may be important to sustain a campaign. After the opening move at Pearl Harbor, many of the other attacks became clear to create necessary stepping stones for logistics support or troop movements. If a large U.S. presence already had been in place on those islands, would Japan have attacked?
Guadalcanal provides an example of the strategic importance underpinning the attack in Wei-chi. There were other islands in the Solomons campaign that could have been ignored because Japanese efforts to sustain them were unsuccessful (such as Rabaul on New Britain). But Guadalcanal was "alive" (a word ascribed to a mass that is capable of sustaining itself and, potentially, other nearby territories) and required subjugation by U.S. forces as a critical element to our campaign. However, U.S. forces on Guadalcanal did not receive sufficient resources, and Japanese reinforcements on the opposite side of the island led to a prolonged U.S. attack. Both our failure to provide adequate resources and our inability to choke off the enemy's support cost American lives and violated the concepts of Wei-chi. Do we have the right mix of naval forces to conduct an attack on Guadalcanal today—on both sides of the island? Will logistics keep the battle alive while additional drives spread over thousands of miles elsewhere? Can we get the Marines ashore and fight sea battles simultaneously in all three dimensions of naval engagements?
Defended or Defenseless?
Equally important to determining where to attack is the decision to defend territory already gained or to defend the forces about to move into a required territory. Following principles of Wei-chi, this should be considered in light of the territory's contribution to connecting or sustaining masses. If the defense does not contribute to the larger effort, it is unnecessary. On several occasions, Japan chose not to defend its positions.
The attack on Tarawa is a classic example of an unnecessary attack conducted against a target that was undefended strategically. In the lexicon of Wei-chi, Tarawa already was dead. The Japanese largely abandoned their efforts in Tarawa along with their troops there. The U.S. attack served no purpose, and achieved none of the aims set forth previously. The Japanese view of Tarawa's importance was demonstrated graphically by their failure to send in any reinforcements or supplies. What was the objective in taking Tarawa? In retrospect, the decision to wage a battle simply because of territorial occupation was too narrow. If the enemy views the territory as effectively dead and it does not serve the furthering of his objectives, it can and should be avoided.
In another case, the United States executed this principle correctly—but for the wrong reasons. Rabaul—wisely bypassed with 90,000 Japanese troops and 300 aircraft—had not been deemed unimportant, but rather too expensive to attack. Again, evidence suggests that the Japanese already stopped reinforcing and providing defense for Rabaul, and a U.S. attack would have been unnecessary. How will these decisions be made in the future?
Finally, the U.S. attack on Okinawa was meaningful and consistent with the apparent Eastern thought at the time. Okinawa, well-defended and supplied, was certainly considered a part of the Japanese sphere of influence. At the edge of their Pacific campaign, it was of vital importance that U.S. forces close the rear areas of Japanese support. In the decision to attack a defended territory, how will the United States fare over the coming decades? Is there a coherent national strategy that underlies the strategic importance of Western Pacific territories to the United States? What is their importance to China? Will the decisions to defend or attack be based upon an Eastern or Western perspective of value?
Winning Wei-chi Today and in the Future
Certainly, there is great value in learning about the cultural perspective of a growing world power. China contains the world's largest population—approaching 1.5 billion people in ten years. Learning the complexities of a game played by the citizens and inculcated in their way of life from childhood must be considered an important aspect of developing our own strategies. Analyzing the battles and campaigns of World War II in light of this perspective will provide lessons necessary to prepare for any future contest of a similar nature. When these lessons are assimilated, the questions posed here may not find favorable answers. Several applications deserve attention in addition to the game study proposed above:
Strategic Vision. A strategic vision must be developed that considers long-term objectives of not only the United States, but any potential adversaries with a long-range strategy as well. China's claims to the Spratlys and plans for a naval capability to control them must be contemplated in our own extended planning. If China has a 50-year plan, then we ought to consider one as well.
Forward Basing. If the national strategic plan determines that stability in the Spratlys is desirable and conflict is likely, then we must view the region as a mass in Wei-chi. The only way to exert influence over a territory from an Eastern perspective is to surround it, debilitate its influence, and establish one's own sphere of control. A battle for the Spratlys may not begin there. Basing considerations should include outlying areas that would be logical stepping stones from any U.S. position. Consideration should be given to basing in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and even India.
Education Priority. Our increasingly complex Navy requires well-educated sailors. A formal education may not produce genius, but it does foster original thought. While programs exist to facilitate enlisted educational advancement, commensurate career time is unavailable. The Navy would benefit in many regards, with increased opportunity and incentive to complete educational milestones. Reenlistment bonus credit hours or longevity sabbaticals provide just two options to boost the opportunities available to our Navy's backbone. Some core courses that could be offered at all bases, such as Naval Heritage and Naval Strategy and Tactics, would capitalize on the exchange of ideas offered by formal schooling.
Modernization and Technology Jump. Sharing technology is unavoidable. China and all Eastern nations will benefit from the last 20 years of development and research with only a fraction of the effort and time required to implement these leaps. Bill Gates signed a $5 billion contract with the PRC last year to develop an information technology infrastructure that undoubtedly will provide military applications. China will experience a technology jump while we continue to evolve existing systems. If we hope to achieve continued long-term superiority, existing technology and future technology must be divorced.
Tactical Considerations. While the strategic view of Wei-chi is important, a plethora of tactical lessons also present themselves. Stones placed on the grid by the players equate to movement of forces—a movement from the sea. Employing submarines, ships, and aircraft as an integrated, flexible, and fluid team still requires much operational improvement. "Forward . . . From the Sea" provides the framework, but little thought has been exercised to the applied lessons of land warfare and maneuver, and how sea-based assets will serve as scouts (submarines, RHIBs, LAMPS, and SEALs), skirmishers (patrol craft, armed helicopters, and armed RHIBs), infantry (armed LCACs and light ships), cavalry (tactical aircraft and armed helicopters), and heavy artillery (cruisers and destroyers). The current and projected mix of our naval forces leans heavily toward tactical employment of the latter category, but it is capable of much more.
Sun-Tzu and many of his contemporaries emphasized the value of knowing one's opponent. In Wei-chi, this is vital; in war, this may mean the difference between life and death for thousands of sailors and Marines. We must study the culture of any potential opponent. We should pray for peace, promote diplomatic resolutions, and plan for war. Wei-chi provides a mechanism to foster the understanding required—learn it, play it, and execute it.
Lieutenant Commander Capen is on the staff of Destroyer Squadron 21.