The war in Kosovo is over. At least that is what the media and politicians say. If it is indeed over, the public should be told that America can look forward to several decades of providing occupation troops called peacekeepers.
But what if it's not over? What if it's just halftime? The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is now taking revenge . . . kidnapping and killing . . . a return to the behavior that originally started the problem. How many Serbs are going to ground, intending to attack KLA units or, for that matter, NATO units that get in the way? Will the KLA really disarm? Will NATO eventually become an obstacle to ethnic Albanian aspirations? Will those who initiated and supported the bombing when Kosovars and Serbs were the casualties stay the course if the NATO occupation forces find themselves involved in a ground war? Or, as their predecessors did in Vietnam, will they cut and run?
It is too early to answer the questions, but not too early to start thinking about the ramifications of what we have done. And the thinking should be based upon the one element that has proven to be a surprisingly scarce commodity, the truth.
Many facets surrounding the NATO air war were as clear or clearer in the Balkans than here: the amateurish piecemeal campaign; the early removal of ground forces as an option; the expectation that Slobodan Milosevic would cave in a few days; the "We are not making war on the Serb people" propaganda; the true history of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans; what happens to regional commerce when bridges are bombed into the Danube; the bizarre deployment of the Apache helicopters; and the fact that the refugee crisis did not begin until the bombing started, to name but a few. In time, the historians will get to these things and more. Meanwhile, military professionals and their political masters in Washington would be doing their duty to the nation by addressing and acting upon at least five matters of strategic significance:
- False advertising is a bad idea. The widely proclaimed capability to fight two nearly simultaneous regional wars has been proven publicly to be what most serious observers knew it to be—a myth. If the armed forces' structure is to be based on the two-regional-war capability, then the planning, programming, and budgeting must be done with professional integrity, not the mouthings or acceptance of politically based lies.
- If you run with the dogs, you can get fleas. Little more than a year ago, the U.S. Department of State declared the KLA to be a terrorist organization involved in, among other things, drug smuggling operations. Yet ultimately, the KLA provided targeting information for the bombing campaign and U.S. air power was liberally employed, providing air support to the KLA units. Now we see whispers in the news that KLA members are accusing their leaders of having attained high positions by assassinating rivals, and there appears to be a difference of views concerning the future role of the KLA. The KLA may become the source of new problems and we may wish that we had used higher selection standards in choosing allies. In short, the KLA must be disarmed and disbanded—not "demilitarized."
- Beware of the Bear. Instrumental in the peace negotiations, initially stiffed by NATO in terms of a postwar role, and eventually in control of Pristina's airport, the Russians have emerged, at least for now, as perhaps the war's biggest winners. They have watched the eastward expansion of NATO, an expansion that can easily and understandably be construed as having no good military purpose other than that of threatening them. Their condemnation of the bombing was harsh by any standard, prompted at least in part by watching a defensive alliance that suddenly had gotten offensive. Now the Bear sits in the middle of southern Europe, a potential major player who is far from toothless. He also is far from stable.
- Beware of NATO. NATO's original raison d'etre ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. It's that simple. If NATO is to continue with American support, including providing the preponderance of its warfighting capability, then NATO's purpose, etc., should be the subject of public debate. That has not happened. Instead, politicians publicly accord NATO a status formerly reserved for sovereign states—an excellent ploy when the objective is political cover and a terrible disservice to the citizens who pay for the organization and provide its troops. If NATO's role is to change and it is to become an offensive alliance primed to intervene in internal disputes or in conflicts between other nations, then the subject should be openly debated and the American public given a chance to weigh in.
- The test has yet to come. Despite recent recruiting and retention difficulties, the All Volunteer Force (AVF) has provided America its most capable peacetime military force in history. Having fought in several skirmishes, Desert Storm, and what one observer has called "NATO's aerial drive-by shooting" (an Internet comment attributed to retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor), the AVF has not been tested in a major casualty-producing war. Would Americans have volunteered if the war in Kosovo had been fought on the ground and produced significant casualties? Will they volunteer if the peacekeeping force starts taking casualties? In both cases, the answer is "No"—at least not in the numbers required. Those who contemplate using the AVF liberally, in expanded combat roles responsive to the desires of the international community, would do well to ponder the results of going to war only to find that the American public refuses to provide the warriors.
We have a wall in Washington inscribed with the names of 55,000 Americans who died because Washington failed. We don't need another one. While the situation in the Balkans is still under some semblance of control, the nation's civilian and military leadership must use Kosovo as a cradle of truth and address the nation's military future.
Major General Lynch, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), an infantryman who fought in Vietnam, was Proceedings' Author of the Year for 1995.