Over the past 57 years, in venues stretching from Naval War College gaming floors to screens of interactive Internet simulations, historians have scrutinized the strategies and fought and refought the Battle of Midway. This was the turning point of World War II in the Pacific and arguably one of the most important sea battles in the history of warfare. Yet elements of the battle, many of which remain doggedly wrapped in wisps of mist, still surprise strategists of all stripes.
One of those hidden stories is that of Commander Stanhope C. Ring, commander of the USS Hornet (CV- 8) Air Group. On the morning of 4 June 1942, when U.S. and Japanese air fleets first opposed each other full-strength at the onset of the battle, Commander Ring held the responsibility for coordinating the attack of the Hornet's fighters, dive-bombers, and torpedo bombers—a full one-third of U.S. naval striking power that day.
But the Hornet's dive-bombers and fighters never found the Japanese carriers that morning. Her torpedo bombers, led by Lieutenant Commander John Waldron, became separated from Ring, chanced upon the Japanese formation, and were repulsed by Japanese defenders in a brave but uncoordinated attack that failed to score a single hit. More than half of the Hornet Air Group failed to return to the ship, many of them crash-landing in the water, out of fuel, others landing on Midway Island. After only four hours, in the U.S. Navy's most important battle of the 20th century, the Hornet was stripped of the majority of her striking power, with nothing to show for that loss.
Under Ring's direction, the Hornet could fling more than 50 aircraft simultaneously at the enemy, but her air group had the least combat experience of any of the carriers, U.S. or Japanese, that morning. Ring had orchestrated an aggressive training regimen for his aviators since the Hornet's commissioning just seven months before, but important training time had been lost, because her naval aircraft had been secured below decks when she was selected to carry Lieutenant Colonel James H. "Jimmy" Doolittle's raiders for their April raid on Tokyo.
At this early stage of the war, the U.S. Navy still was perfecting its carrier strike tactics. In a coordinated attack against an enemy fleet, air-group doctrine called for TBD Devastator torpedo bombers to sweep in low with their ship-killing heavy torpedoes. Dauntless dive bombers would scream down from 15,000 to 20,000 feet in attack sections timed simultaneously to hit the port, starboard, and bow of their targets. And swift Wildcat fighters would blunt the attack of Japanese Zeroes. When Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance issued his strike orders at 0700 on 4 June, the Hornet launched her entire air group to execute this coordinated attack. Ring flew in a special command section of aircraft to lead the overall attack.
The Hornet's actions on the critical morning of 4 June long have been the subject of conjecture and Monday-morning-quarterbacking, with a dichotomy of opinion rising over the years that has added to the drama of the controversy.
Gordon W. Prange, author of the comprehensive Miracle at Midway, was critical of the Hornet's tactics. He cited Spruance's battle report to Admiral Chester Nimitz and interviews with two surviving squadron officers as the basis for his criticism.1 Lisle Rose, in The Ship That Held the Line, also was critical of the air group for its performance on the first day of the battle.2 But Prange and Rose never spoke with Ring, and their reconstructions of events reach conclusions based, in part, on a flawed "Hornet Action Report" or memories dulled with age.
Closer to the truth may be the fact that Admiral Marc Mitscher, an icon of naval aviation and skipper of the Hornet at the time, rose consistently in support of Ring's actions during the battle. He requested Ring specifically as his chief of staff in Patrol Wing Two following Midway and for his battle staff in the Solomons. He held Ring in such high esteem that he presented Ring his captain's shoulder boards when Ring was selected later for promotion. Mitscher's closeness with Ring emphasized another facet of Ring's personality. Mitscher's biographer wrote that, "Mitscher disliked yes-men, shrinking violets and garrulousness. He wanted positive people on his staff, and usually eliminated officers who had to qualify their every statement. He preferred idea men, especially those who would contest him when they thought their ideas were better than his own."3
Formal Navy reaction to Ring's actions during the battle also supported the actions of the Hornet Air Group commander consistently. Ring received the Navy Cross personally from Nimitz for leading successful attacks on Japanese Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's forces during the remaining days of the Battle of Midway, was selected ultimately for the command of three carriers and a carrier division, and climbed the ranks steadily to vice admiral.
Numerous theories have been advanced to explain the Hornet's inability to engage during the critical 4 June attack: Errors in navigation must have been made, say some; the tactical attack plan designed by Captain Mitscher of the Hornet and Ring was faulty; U.S. multi-carrier coordination doctrine had fundamental weaknesses; or just that Ring's luck was unusually bad. Here, Ring's "lost letter" cites none of these explanations. Instead, he attributes the debacle to poor communications, an inexperienced air group, and his flawed estimate of the situation. In other words, Ring was the victim of the classic ingredients of the "fog of war."
Ring's family found his "Lost Letter of Midway," and it came to light only recently. It is dated March 1946, a time far enough removed from the battle to guarantee reflection and proper perspective, yet not too distant to hazard the possibility of errors in memory. The original manuscript is written in a bold, confident longhand. The text is nearly flawless, with but five editorial corrections across 22 pages of handwritten recollections. Ring's syntax draws heavily on a naval officer's proclivity for short, direct thoughts, its sentences purposely uncluttered with adjectives and modifiers. It is an intriguing mix of historical record and personal reflection, including specific reference to individual pilots and broad observations, such as the sighting of large groups of Japanese survivors still adrift two days after the battle.
None of the principal historians of the battle ever interviewed Ring.4 In the most recent analysis of the battle (see The Ship That Held the Line), Lisle Rose had difficulty tracking Ring's perspective, concluding: "Group Commander Stanhope Cotton Ring…remains a cloudy figure more than half a century later."5 In Miracle at Midway, Gordon Prange stated: "No doubt Ring had good reasons for his course of action, although to the best of our knowledge he never made a public explanation."
Now, after more than 50 years, the "Lost Letter of Midway"—faithfully reproduced here uncorrected and unedited—is effectively Stanhope Ring's "public explanation," serving to correct, or at least explain, the historical record of that epic sea battle. (Vice Admiral Ring's words appear in bold italic.)
28 March 1946
There has been much written about the Battle of Midway and in many respects there has been a startling lack of accuracy. This is an attempt, almost four years after the action, to set down in black and white my best recollections of what occurred.
Hornet and Enterprise [CV-6] had been operating together during May 1942. The Battle of Coral Sea had been fought without our participation. We were guarding against a Japanese advance toward Australia or the Solomon Islands. Extensive daylight searches were run but it appeared to me that we were making no great effort to deny to the enemy knowledge of our presence in those waters. As a matter of fact, Japanese reconnaissance planes were known to have made contact with our force.
The Enterprise and the Hornet had returned to Pearl Harbor on 25 April after Doolittle's Raid. After five days they were under way again, streaking south to reinforce the Lexington (CV-2) and the Yorktown (CV-5) in the Coral Sea but arrived too late to participate in the battle. The two carriers covered the withdrawal of the damaged Yorktown back to Hawau and then were ordered there themselves on 16 May, as Nimitz began to gather his forces for Midway.
Probably as a result of interception of Japanese "high command" traffic, both Hornet and Enterprise were suddenly ordered to return to Pearl Harbor. We proceeded at high speed maintaining air searches enroute.
We remained in the Pearl area for a very short period—about twenty-four hours as I recall—and then sailed for the vicinity of Midway.
The Enterprise and the Hornet reentered Pearl Harbor on 26 May, mooring to berths at Ford Island by midday. After refueling and replenishing furiously, the Enterprise cast off lines at 1110 on 28 May and made her way slowly out the narrow channel. The Hornet followed in her wake 20 minutes later. Together the two carriers formed Task Group 16 under the command of Rear Admiral Spruance. By early evening they had recovered their air groups and had passed through the Kauai Channel, fashioning a course toward a rendezvous position north-northeast of Midway Island, some 1,100 miles distant from Oahu.
Early on the morning of 4 June we received word that the Japanese attacking force had been located and that initial attack on Midway had been made. Course from Hornet's position to the enemy was plotted and immediate preparations made to launch the Air Group.
It was decided to launch the entire group as a striking force and to adhere strictly to the doctrine of radio silence. VT Squadron 8 was to proceed at low level. VB-8, VS-8, accompanying fighters of VF-8 and the Group Commander were to proceed at high level (20,000 ft). Nearly one and a half hours were consumed in Group rendezvous after launching. All airplanes maintained moderate altitude (below 5,000 ft) until after rendezvous of the Group was effected.
Naval squadron nomenclature of the period emphasized the relationship between squadron and carrier. Thus, squadrons assigned to the Hornet (CV-8) were numbered with an 8. VF indicated a fighter squadron, VB a dive-bombing squadron, VT a torpedo bombing squadron, and VS a scouting squadron. During the battle, VF-8 consisted of 27 F4F-4 Wildcat fighters commanded by Lieutenant Commander Samuel G. Mitchell; VB-8 had 19 SBD-2 and -3 Dauntless bombers commanded by Lieutenant Commander Robert R. Johnson; VS-8 had 18 SBD-1, -2 and -3 Dauntlesses commanded by Lieutenant Commander Walter R. Rodee; and VT-8 had 15 TBD-1 Devastator torpedo bombers commanded by Waldron.6
On the morning of 4 June, Spruance boldly ordered the launch of a "full load" by the Hornet and the Enterprise air groups against the Japanese carriers that already had launched an attack against Midway at first light. Strategically, this proved to be the correct decision, as it struck the Japanese at the most critical moment with the maximum number of aircraft, but it took more than an hour to complete the launching (about half the planes had to be brought up from the hangar deck). The Hornet commenced launching at 0702 and completed at 0806.7
The projected intercept position of the enemy was based on a 0603 contact report from a U.S. patrol bomber (PBY) and a belief that the Japanese formation would continue on a southeast heading toward Midway Island and into the wind to recover its returning strike group. This proved to be an accurate assessment by Spruance's staff, however the efficient Japanese completed recovery of their aircraft earlier than projected and turned 90° left toward the northeast to close the reported position of the U.S. carrier task force. No scout had reported this major change in the enemy's movement, but even if it had, U.S. forces were operating in radio silence and word probably would not have been passed. to the already airborne strike groups. The Hornet's and the Enterprise's strike aircraft were heading to an intercept position in the open ocean predicated on the Japanese course and speed detected at 0603—a position the Japanese never would occupy after their course had been changed toward the U.S. carriers.
Departure from Hornet was taken on pre-estimated interception course, Group Commander leading. High altitude elements commenced their climb.
Within thirty minutes after departure from Hornet, scattered cumulous clouds intervened between high and low elements. Speed of high elements was regulated in an attempt to remain above the invisible VT-8.
"Regulating" the formation's speed in this manner undoubtedly was not as fuel-efficient as other tactics would have allowed and opened Ring to criticism, especially in light of the subsequent loss of aircraft, some because of fuel exhaustion. Prange analyzed this action by Ring, concluding that Ring had ordered the formation to stretch his aircraft into a scouting line, better to detect the enemy. Historian Walter Lord commented that Captain Mitscher—undoubtedly with Ring's knowledge and concurrence—had ordered a coordination plan that sent his slower-flying torpedo planes ahead of the rest of the group. The faster bombers and fighters would climb to rendezvous over the Hornet, while the torpedo planes headed directly to the enemy. All aircraft then would attack together. Rose makes a compelling case that VT-8 was the last squadron launched that morning from the Hornet, underlining the requirement for careful group coordination by the air group commander. Ring makes clear that he based his decision to regulate speed primarily on a desire to stay in contact with his torpedo planes to make a coordinated attack on the enemy formation.8
Upon arrival at the line between the last reported position of the enemy and Midway Island, since the high group had made no contact, I decided that I should proceed on the assumption that the enemy was closing Midway and directed the course of the high element accordingly.
It is appropriate at this time to interject my understanding that Enterprise Group was favored with later information of the whereabouts of the enemy than was Hornet Group. Although communications in 1942 were most unreliable between air and surface craft, even though Hornet might have broken radio silence to keep the Group informed of the latest developments, there was no assurance that such information would have been received by the Group. As a matter of fact, I do not believe that Hornet received the reported new position of the enemy. Therefore my change of Air Group course to the south was based entirely on my estimate of the situation (which proved faulty) and not on definite information of the enemy movements.
Clearly, Ring's decision was wrong. He had reached the expected point of interception, which had been calculated based on enemy position information, course and speed nearly three hours old. As the Hornet's group was approaching on a nearly perpendicular course to the Japanese position of intended movement (PIM), Ring was faced with the classic dilemma of turning either right (in the event that the enemy's speed was less than that reported or in the event that the Japanese had turned away from their objective of Midway Island) or left (with the assumption that the Japanese would be pressing their attack vigorously on the island). With no updated tactical data from the Hornet or Spruance, Ring was forced to make a decision that many would characterize as 50/50, made worse by the perpendicular relationship of Ring's approach to the Japanese advance. If Ring chose wrong (as he did), he would have no chance to reorient a new search with his limited remaining fuel.
VT-8 and Enterprise Group made contact with the enemy, north of the point at which I turned south. Again, reliable communications should have permitted direction of the high elements of the Hornet Air Group to the point of contact.
Hornet Group proceeded south until smoke from Midway was sighted. At that time it was apparent that immediate return to the carrier was necessary if landings aboard were to be effected, since fuel supply was running low.
Walter Lord made an interesting observation in quoting Waldron's last ready-room briefing to VT-8 shortly before the strike: "Commander Waldron gave them a few final words. He said he thought the Japanese ships would swing around once they discovered U.S. carriers present; they would not go on to Midway as everyone seemed to think. So don't worry about navigation; he knew where he was going. 'Just follow me. I'll take you to 'em.'"9
As a squadron commander, Waldron undoubtedly was aware of Mitscher's and Ring's plans to intercept the Japanese carriers that morning. Waldron's allusion to favoring a course of action different from what "everyone seemed to think" (meaning probably Mitscher and Ring) is an insight into Ring's apparent mindset before takeoff.
Great reliance was placed on the YE homing beacon. I switched radio at the time to the homing frequency but Enterprise was all that could be heard. The letter signal received, compared to the YE letter chart furnished us by Hornet prior to takeoff, convinced me that something was wrong. It later developed that Enterprise and Hornet were on different YE homing codes and that the change in code prescribed by CTF in Enterprise had not been received by Hornet Because of the obvious discrepancy in Enterprise YE signal received as applied to the YE homing chart of Hornet, I disregarded the YE signal and attempted to change course of the group toward the dead reckoning position of Hornet VS-8 under Lt Cdr. Rodee followed me in my change. VB-8 under Lt Cdr. Johnson appeared to follow the false course indicated by YE signal and was followed by VF-8, Lt Cdr. Mitchell. I left VS-8 and attempted to rally the departing aircraft of VB-8 and VF-8 in order to lead them back to Hornet, but I could not catch them. When I finally gave up the chase VS-8 had disappeared from sight and VB-8 was apparently headed for Midway. I then resumed my dead reckoning course to intercept Hornet, proceeding singly at 20,000 ft. Since oxygen supply was failing and I began to notice the effects of lack of oxygen, I dropped gradually to 10,000 ft.
Eventually, I sighted aircraft below me and noticed water landings of at least two airplanes.
After about 4.5 hours in the air (and having assured Parker, my radioman, that a water landing could be easily effected); I sighted the white wakes of a Task Force at high speed. Further investigation revealed it to be our own force. I made a wide approach to arrive within the "recognition sector"; Hornet turned into the wind and received me aboard. VS-S had landed; VB-8, VT-8 and VF-8 were missing. It later developed that VT-8 had, with the exception of Ens. [George H.J Gay been lost in an attack on the Japanese carriers. Lt Cdr Waldron leading the squadron had courageously and in the face of certain destruction led his command in a torpedo attack against the enemy. VB-8 had (with the loss of two planes) landed at Midway. VF-8 had apparently landed at sea, out of fuel.
I was shaken at the realization of such losses and will admit that I was in poor condition to take the air in a renewed attack on the Japanese carriers which had, by then, been located. About one hour after my landing the remaining aircraft of the Group were ordered launched for the next attack.
Both Rodee and I were spotted on the hangar deck so, when launchings were suddenly terminated after the aircraft on the flight deck had taken off, the "Group" command devolved upon Lt. Stebbins of VS-S. He did a magnificent job of locating and attacking the enemy forces and is wholly deserving of all the credit for the success of the operation as far as Hornet Group was concerned.
According to Morison, the Hornet launched an attack group of 16 dive-bombers at 1603, but they arrived too late to help the Enterprise dive-bombers dispatch the last surviving Japanese carrier, the Hiryu. They dove on two of the escorting cruisers, scoring near misses. Lieutenant Edgar E. Stebbins amassed an excellent combat record during the war, advancing to command Air Group Five on the Yorktown (CV-10).10 Lisle Rose reported Ring's presence in this attack erroneously in The Ship That Held the Line, then compounded his error by alluding to a story that Ring had returned early with "his bomb still snugly secured aboard his aircraft."11 Ring's "lost letter" does not appear to support this.
It is my recollection that launching was stopped after the planes on the flight deck had taken off because of the reported approach of enemy aircraft. At any rate, it was at about this time that Yorktown was attacked. Damage to that carrier required landing part of Yorktown air group aboard Hornet One of the planes of that group; the pilot having been wounded in the foot, made a bad landing, his right wheel collapsed and the airplane slewed toward the island. The pilot had failed to turn off his gun firing switch and as the deck crash occurred the 50 cal guns cut loose, firing into the island. Several of our personnel, including Lt. Royal Ingersoll were killed and several were wounded. Later in the afternoon, a second Yorktown pilot landed with firing switch on, but the plane made a normal landing the resultant firing passed safely along the flight deck and not into the ship. It was at the start of this second firing that Capt Mason (makee-learn Captain and prospective relief for Capt Mitscher) knocked me flat on the deck of the port wing of the bridge to escape the possible line of fire. I don't know whether his thoughtful but rough treatment was more of a shock than the actual firing or not.
Our attack group returned before dark and gave glowing accounts of the damage done to the enemy.
The Task Force retired during the night, in an easterly direction. I believe that it was during the forenoon of the 5th of June that we received flyable airplanes of VB-8 that had landed the day before at Midway. Airplanes of VF-8 that accompanied the initial attack group were unaccounted for, but several days later all but two of the pilots were recovered by PBYs.
Reports concerning the enemy were meager on 5 June, but in mid-afternoon contact report was received on an enemy carrier "disappearing to the westward into a front." Hornet and Enterprise Air Groups were launched to search and attack. We searched to the extreme range of 325 miles from Hornet but discovered nothing except one light cruiser. On the way out on the search we flew over the scene of 4 June attack on Japanese CVs and observed many survivors in the water.
Since the search for the carrier proved negative we returned to attack the CL which was about 275 miles from our task force. Although AA fire was neither excessive nor uncomfortably accurate, the dive bombing attack was a fizzle. I never saw a ship go through such radical maneuvers at such high speed as did that Jap. We completed our attack shortly after sunset and started the long trip home.
Their target was the destroyer Tanikaze, which had been dispatched by Nagumo to guarantee the scuttling of the Hiryu and to save survivors. Lord wrote: "Commander Motorni Katsurni (commanding officer of the Tanikaze) was one of the best in the business; he maneuvered the destroyer Tanikaze with enviable skill as the American bombs rained down from above. All those bombs on one destroyer. Yet Katsumi managed to dodge everything. The only damage came from a fragment of a near-miss that slashed through his No. 3 turret; it set off an explosion that killed all six men inside."12
Group doctrine had called for individual return rather than complete rendezvous. This was a mistake, perhaps, in the absence of air opposition, but under the circumstances was essential since diminishing fuel supply precluded wasting time and fuel to get the group together, Ens. White of VS-8 joined me on the return trip.
Hornet Group had never qualified in night landings aboard, which fact would be expected to cause some concern under the circumstances. Actually, the night landings were themselves made without incident or difficulty. One plane of VS-8, Lt. Davis pilot, ran out of gasoline in the groove and made a water landing, but personnel were picked up by plane guard destroyer.
It proved fortunate for me that Ens. White had joined company because when I lowered my wheels preparatory to landing, he by frantic signaling to me got across the idea that only one wheel was extended. My first thought was that a fragment of shell from the AA fire of the cruiser had damaged a hydraulic line but after a bit of violent maneuvering both wheels extended properly.
There was a general mix-up of pilots that night. Some Enterprise crews landed aboard Hornet and some of our people landed aboard Enterprise. Despite the possible presence of Japanese submarines, Captain Mitscher had illuminated the ship in order to get us all back. There was no one lost in the operation nor were any injuries incurred. Duration of flight: 4.3 hours.
In large measure, U.S. carrier pilots were untrained in night carrier landings. Morison called the return landings that night "one of the first successful night landings in our carrier combat history." Both Captain George Murray of the Enterprise and Captain Mitscher of the Hornet had illuminated their ships with running lights and searchlights, despite the danger of nearby Japanese submarines.13
During the forenoon of 6 June we received a contact report on an enemy force, distant about 150 miles, retiring to the westward. Hornet Air Group was launched to search and attack.
On the way out toward the enemy, I received a CW message from Hornet stating that enemy force might consist of cruisers rather than carriers as first reported. In as much as we believed that all enemy carriers had been sunk on 4 June this made sense and since we did not expect air opposition to our attack we cruised at medium rather than high altitude (approximately 14,000 feet).
During these operations "first name" calls were used, so that when VB-B which was on the left flank of our scouting line, sighted the enemy, Lt. Cdr Johnson called on the voice radio: "Stanhope from Robert, enemy below on port bow." As an indication of how alert the Japanese were, in a very short time the following message in very oriental tone came over the air: "Stanhope from Robert, Return to base."
In executing our dive bombing attack, everyone did much better than he had the day before, when buck fever probably had us. Hits were registered on each of the two large cruisers (Mogami class) and the escorting destroyers were bombed and strafed. On the way back to Hornet, I detoured about 25 miles to the southward to see if any other enemy were in the area. None was sighted.
Both targets were heavy cruisers, the Mogami and the Mikuma, but they had no air cover and operated with reduced maneuverability. The day before, The Mogami had collided with the Mikuma, smashing her own bow, restricting her speed to 12 knots, and causing both she, the Mikuma, and two destroyers to lag behind the general Japanese retirement to the west. At least two hits were recorded in the first attack, one penetrating the Mogami's Number 5 turret, killing the entire turret crew.
When I returned aboard after about 3 hours flying it developed that the radio in my plane was not functioning properly. Hornet had not received my report of attacking the enemy nor had I received their dispatches requesting information as to the latitude and longitude of the Group attacked. Capt. Mitscher decided, therefore, that I should not accompany the final attack group which was being readied for takeoff. Unfortunately, Ens. Griswold, a very promising pilot of VB-8 had been lost during the morning attack, probably the victim of AA fire. Other aircraft of the Group were slightly damaged by AA fire.
While Hornet Group was preparing for the second launch, Enterprise Group attacked a cruiser task force. It is not definitely known whether it was the same force Hornet had attacked or not.
Hornet's second attack was even more successful than the first and the group had the satisfaction of witnessing a terrific explosion aboard one of the cruisers. Later intelligence indicated that Mikuma was sunk as a result of this attack.
The second attack scored hits on the Mikuma and the destroyer Arashio. The Mikuma sank that night, and the Mogami limped to Truk for temporary repairs. Prange wrote mistakenly in Miracle at Midway that the second strike was under Ring's command.14
At this point, fuel in escorting destroyers was running dangerously low, darkness was approaching, and CTP decided to break off the engagement. We had lost Yorktown, Hammann [DD-412], VT-8, and many other pilots but the Japanese had suffered heavily. Undoubtedly the cream of their naval aviation was destroyed in the sinking of their four carriers. We felt then (as was later proved) that we had dealt the Japanese a decisive defeat.
1. Spruance reported that: "Hornet dive bombers failed to locate the target and did not participate in this attack (of 4 June). Had they done so, the fourth carrier could have been attacked and later attack made on Yorktown by the carrier prevented."
2. Lisle A. Rose, The Ship That Held the Line (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. 1995), p. 158.
3. Theodore Taylor, The Magnificent Mitscher (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1954), p. 142.
4. Primary Midway histories include: Samuel Eliot Morison's multi-volume History of United Stales Naval Operations in World War II (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1949) with Volume IV devoted to Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions; Gordon W. Prange, Miracle at Midway (New York: McGraw Hill, 1982); Walter Lord, Incredible Victory (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1967); Thomas B. Buell, The Quiet Warrior, A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987); John Lundstrom, The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984); and Rose's The Ship That Held the Line.
5. Rose, p. 85.
6. Morison, Vol. IV, p. 9 1.
7. Ibid, p. 109.
8. Lord, p. 141.
9. Ibid., p. 139.
10. Rose, p. 141.
11. Ibid., p. 142.
12 Lord, p. 270.
13 Morison, Vol. IV, p. 149.
14 Prange, p. 342.