Second Honorable Mention, Marine Corps Essay Contest
The Naval Expeditionary Task Force would have integrated the carrier battle group directly into amphibious operations, but the concept stumbled over the dilemma of who would be in charge. It's time to resuscitate the idea and resolve the command issue.
A funny thing happened between the publication of ". . . From the Sea" in 1992 and "Forward... from the Sea" in 1994. Much of the promised increase in operational unity between the two services of the Department of the Navy—the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps—did not occur.
Today, in both doctrine and service strategies, the Marine Corps and the Navy are farther away from each other than they were in 1992, and possibly since 1945. Though both profess to be focused on littoral warfare, they view the implications of the "shift to the littorals" very differently.
The Marine Corps—through the development of operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS)—is focused on sustained operations of forces on land, but based on and supported from the sea; and the Navy appears merely to have modified its traditional blue-water naval operations so as to be practical within closer range of land. The Tomahawk attacks, carrier wing air strikes, and sanction-enforcement operations that have constituted Navy operations in support of land warfare may indeed have had a direct influence on events ashore, but none of these functions is fundamentally different—advances in technology aside—from those anticipated in the Cold War-era Maritime Strategy. From this view, it would appear that the Marine Corps is ahead of the Navy in optimizing its organization and doctrine to the new strategic landscape.
At the same time, network-centric warfare (NCW), which some consider the Navy equivalent to OMFTS, appears to be more a technological advancement to the data links developed for maritime engagements than a concept for maximizing firepower in the littorals. Again, the apparent disconnect between an operational concept that emphasizes the exchange of data in support of long-range power projection and one that emphasizes ship-to-objective maneuver leaves the impression of a gap in naval service priorities.
This gap would be less disturbing but for the fact that the Department of the Navy's current strategic vision, ". . . From the Sea," espouses a doctrinal integration of the two naval services, so as to "provide for smooth integration of Naval Forces into joint operations at any level," to "close the gap between the air-land battle and amphibious warfare," and to "translate operational maneuver from the sea into naval doctrine." As a basic principle, ". . . From the Sea" states that "integration on the battlefield starts with integration of doctrine and training."
Rise and Fall of the Naval Expeditionary Task Force
Symbolic of this integration effort, the naval services began in 1992 to use the term "Naval Expeditionary Forces" to refer to the overall combat organization of the Navy-Marine Corps team. Rhetorically, the Navy and Marine Corps now were "wedded to a common operational effort that will take place in the same arena, against the same kind of forces, in a common contest, not for control of the high seas but for dominance of the battlefield ashore."
To achieve such a common operational effort in actual conflict obviously requires a combat organization of integrated capabilities. Since 1945, this has not quite been a practical reality at sea. World War II brought forth the specialized ships and equipment for a highly effective amphibious force, but with this specialization came a division in the operational mode of the surface fleet. The birth of the "'gator Navy" gave the Marine Corps a relatively modern portion of the fleet dedicated to the amphibious mission, but it also meant that amphibious forces were formally perceived as a separate—and largely second rate—part of the blue-water naval establishment. With the exception of gunfire support, training and operations of the amphibious fleet were for many years conducted in isolation from both carrier aviation and the mainstream cruiser-destroyer force. Carrier battle groups became the primary striking organization of the fleet, and—with rare exception—trained and deployed with little interaction with amphibious ready groups.
As ships became increasingly complex, Navy officers, too, became more specialized, making the separation between combatants and 'gators more apparent. The ambitious surface warrior would be careful to maintain his fast-rising status by serving exclusively in the mainstream cruiser-destroyer force—the "real Navy." If assignment to an amphibious warship could not be avoided, it was completed swiftly, hopefully as a once-in-a-career experience. This cultural divide mirrored and reinforced the increasing operational divide.
". . . From the Sea" threatened to overturn these divisions. If the Navy was to operate in the littorals in direct support of the Marines, the core of naval activity no longer would be the carrier battle group, but the amphibious ready group. With the building of the Whidbey Island (LSD-41) and Harpers Ferry (LSD-49) classes of dock landing ships and the massive carrier like Wasp (LHD-1)-class amphibious assault ships, the prestige and desirability of amphibious assignments began to grow. In 1992, the Navy's Bureau of Personnel sent cruiser-destroyer experienced officers as executive officers and subsequently commanding officers of amphibious ships in an attempt to cross and reduce the cultural divide. Joint force exercises were designed to more closely tie strike, war-at-sea, and amphibious operations into a command structure unified at the numbered fleet level, although actual deployment patterns still mitigated this nominal unity.
The culmination of unity in fleet operations occurred through the conceptual development of a new organizational structure: the Naval Expeditionary Task Force (NETF). The NETF was to replace both the carrier battle group and amphibious ready group in forming "a core naval force for major regional conflicts." As described by one of its architects, "circumstances may require a particular mix of ships, systems, force units and weapons, but notionally the following ships and aircraft would make up a task force: 1 CV/N (1 carrier wing), I large-deck amphibious ship (LHA or LHD), 2-3 smaller amphibious ships, 6-9 surface combatants (with TLAM [Tomahawk land-attack missile]), 2 SSNs (with TLAM), logistics support, maritime patrol aircraft (land based). We designed the NETF to provide four capabilities: power projection; battlespace dominance; command, control and surveillance; and sustainability."
The NETF appeared primarily to be a combination of a traditional carrier battle group with a traditional amphibious ready group with a Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) embarked, but the primary change was one of focus—the carrier battle group would be integrated directly in amphibious operations, presumably the central operation in littoral warfare. This led to the command dilemma that proved to be one of the most intractable elements of the change—and a prime element in the downfall of the NETF concept.
The dilemma revolved around the restructuring of the relationship between the Navy Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and the Marine Commander, Landing Force (CLF).6 The command relationship between the two and the particulars of the shift in control of forces were developed through World War II experience and codified in doctrine. But if there no longer was a separate amphibious task force, what was the actual authority of the CATF? After debate and experimentation, the CATF's authority was assigned to the NETF commander (normally a Navy two-star), but much of the control over the amphibious ships was delegated to an Amphibious Warfare Component Commander (a Navy captain administratively assigned as Amphibious Squadron Commander).
The CLF (normally the Marine colonel commanding the Marine expeditionary unit), meanwhile, would be retitled Land Force Component Commander, and be under the operational control of the NETF commander. This was a radical departure from the traditional coequal status of the CATF and CLF, and raised a series of Marine Corps concerns. These concerns were muffled largely by the perception that coequality would be maintained by the delegation of CATF authority back to the Amphibious Warfare Component Commander.
Unfortunately, this new command organization ran into the roadblocks of service cultures even before conclusion of its introduction. By the time "Forward ... From the Sea" appeared in 1994, naval task organizations once more were broken into clearly delineated carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups. In fact, there is not a single mention of the Naval Expeditionary Force or Naval Expeditionary Task Force in "Forward ... From the Sea." Since then, naval service doctrine has continued to diverge, as highlighted by the dissolution of the Norfolk-based Naval Doctrine Command in late 1998. Today, carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups deploy separately.
Could NETF Work Today?
There is no reason to doubt the efficiency of the NETF in littoral operations. All of its elements would be required for a successful combined-arms assault. Similarly, carrier battle group assets would be required to conduct OMFTS in a potentially hostile environment. From a functional perspective, the requirements for an NETF have not gone away.
Today, the Navy-Marine Corps team has an ironic organizational problem. The shift to a littoral focus and the development of OMFTS make the traditional water/land separation of authority between the CATF and CLF impractical. The reseparation of the carrier battle group and the amphibious ready group from the NEF/NETF, however, presumably reinstated the CATF as the independent operational commander of the amphibious force at sea and cut off the integrated fire support and ship logistics that could help to make OMFTS a reality in a conflict scenario.
For its part, the Marine Corps views OMFTS as a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF)-dominant operation whose control properly belongs to the commander of the Marine component. From the Navy perspective, OMFTS—though not clearly understood by most Navy officers—is an operation being conducted from ships at sea and therefore is most properly commanded by an officer whose expertise is ships.
But if the CATF has no effective control over all the maritime combined arms required for the operation—and has to call on the battle group to provide the support needed for both defensive and offensive operations of the amphibious task force—he becomes largely a "paper commander" who is responsible merely for safe navigation and embarkation of the amphibious ready group.
The CLF, meanwhile, bears responsibility for establishment and support of forces ashore. This will require supporting fires from the carrier battle group. So who does the CLF call on for Navy support—the CATF who has no direct control over that support? Or does he become the supported commander communicating directly with a supporting commander who controls the actual support—i.e., the battle group commander? And if the CLF deals directly with the battle group commander, which appears a necessity to ensure timely and precise fires, what exactly is his relationship to the CATF? To achieve an OMFTS configuration for shipping, does the CLF give orders concerning navigation and embarkation to the CATF? Is the CLF in reality the amphibious ready group commander? And if so, what does he know about maneuvering ships?
If the Navy-Marine Corps team is to conduct effective littoral warfare, we need to solve the command question.' We could:
Ensure that joint task force exercises and other predeployment exercises require full integration of carrier battle group and amphibious ready group assets, and trust that an effective, if idiosyncratic, command arrangement will develop. On the surface, this proposal would carry the greatest disadvantage: the command relationship may disintegrate when hard decisions on the disposition of joint assets are required. There are, however, historical examples of successful results. Its advantage is flexibility.
Reinstate the Naval Expeditionary Task Force under control of the battle group (Navy) composite warfare commander. The advantage here is that it is a unified naval task force designed for the specific function of establishing forces ashore. From a Navy perspective, the battle group commander is now the real CATF, and thus the CATF once again has control over the entire amphibious operation. The disadvantage is that the battle group commander would lack expertise in land warfare, presumably most difficult part of littoral operations.
Reinstate the Naval Expeditionary Task Force with a Marine expeditionary force commander (Marine) as the composite warfare commander. A Marine NETF commander would ensure expertise in land warfare, but not in at-sea operations.
Provide the amphibious ready group with organic fire support; command, control, and surveillance; and sufficient aviation assets to make assignment of a supporting carrier battle group unnecessary. An increase in the amphibious ready group's firepower would be of benefit to a Navy falling short of ships to cover commitments. Affordability would be an issue, however, if we tried to retain the current mix of naval assets.
Use a joint task force (JTF) organizational structure and allow the JTF commander (any service) to exercise operational control over the carrier battle group, amphibious ready group, and Marine expeditionary unit. This may reflect the reality of jointness, but it does little to resolve the tactical command problem of operating naval units.
Recognize that the Navy-Marine Corps team cannot, as a practical matter, achieve all the efficiencies and increased effectiveness outlined in ". . . From the Sea, "and let the naval services pursue their separate visions of littoral warfare. This has the advantage of acknowledging today's gradual divergence in naval doctrine. Presumably, the carrier air, cruiser-destroyer, and submarine components of the Navy would concentrate on developing long-range strike capabilities as prime elements of littoral warfare, while amphibious ships would concentrate on supporting OMFTS and could be complemented by organic Marine and other service (Air Force, Army, and Coast Guard) assets. But, ultimately, we might lose the uniquely expeditionary nature of the Navy-Marine Corps team.
Most Radical But Most Practical?
In an environment of scarce defense resources, a fair criterion by which to evaluate these proposals is to ask which best combines cost-effectiveness with military effectiveness. This leads inevitably to what may be the most culturally radical, yet most practical, solution: allow a Marine general officer to command the NETF—including the carrier battle group—or alternate command of the NETF between Marine general officers and Navy flag officers specially trained in both OMFTS and war at sea.
But where could we get such commanders? Very few Navy officers know anything about small-unit land tactics. Comparatively larger numbers of Marine officers know how to conn a ship, but they mainly are Naval Academy graduates who bring with them the experience of midshipman summer cruises.
What if all line officers had at least one cross-naval service tour in their careers? Instead of a split tour between ships, a Navy lieutenant (junior grade)—with an exposure to The Basic School—could follow up an initial tour as gunnery officer afloat with a tour as platoon commander. At the same time, the Marine first lieutenant, experienced in the maintenance requirements of an advanced amphibious assault vehicle company, might—after intensive weeks at Surface Warfare Officers School—do well as main propulsion assistant of a gas turbine plant. Selected officers might continue this cross-service training into their department head or company commander tours.
Opponents of this radical form of naval jointness will point to the need for an extensive training pipeline that might interfere with the development of basic warfare specialty skills. Yet, the jointness requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation are hardly less onerous in that regard. Arguable, the proposed naval officer training would be vastly more effective in developing actual joint warfighting expertise than the current system in which joint duty generally means staff or administrative duty. A future "Goldwater-Nichols II" that encourages and provides for joint duty credit through cross-service training within the Department of the Navy might even be in our nation's best interest.
Other critics might charge that cross-service training simply cannot provide the requisite expertise. Obviously, a Marine general whose blue-water experience was confined to qualification as underway officer of the deck would not have the same knowledge of battle group operations as a Navy admiral. Or would he? Naval aviators without extensive surface ship experience are assigned to command deep-draft vessels as a step toward carrier command. Submarine admirals whose battle group experience may be confined to staff assignments routinely hold fleet command. Surface warfare officers who have never touched the controls of a combat aircraft command carrier battle groups. Cruiser-destroyer experienced admirals routinely fill the position of Commander, Amphibious Group. There is no reason that a particularly skilled leader could not command both land and sea forces in the role of NETF.
It also is conceivable that a blue-suited amphibious warfare expert could be assigned the position of CLF. And in the interim, while an appropriate cross-naval service training pipeline and assignment path are developed, it may be that the position of NETF commander could best be filled by a Navy officer with considerable amphibious experience and previous amphibious command—as such position is most likely to lead to "natural" expertise in sea land warfare.
The Navy-Marine Corps team is on a doctrinally divergent course that carries it away from the focus of ". . . From the Sea." To stem this tide, the NETF concept should be reexamined for applicability in the joint littoral environment and cross-naval service command should likewise be explored. Joint task force commanders are expected to command a multiplicity of forces in combat; there is no reason that officers with the same maritime roots cannot do likewise, whether maneuvering from the sea or on the land.
Formerly the commanding officer of the USS Harpers Ferry (LSD-49), Captain Tangredi is senior military fellow of the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.