October 1949 congressional testimony, specifically from senior Navy officials, sent a shock wave across the entire country. The proposed carrier United States had been cancelled on 23 April, the B-36 bomber was cast as the primary offensive weapon in the U.S. arsenal, and until the Korean War, naval aviation would be struggling for survival. The U.S. Air Force "won" the debate known as the "Revolt of the Admirals."
"The early months of 1949 were to bring new men, new organizational structures, new turns of controversy to civil-military relationships," noted Walter Millis in his study Arms and the State. Service unification, tighter budgets, more expensive weapon platforms, and the Cold War all altered the U.S. civil-military relationship. The argument the Navy presented to the House Armed Services Committee in October 1949 was incongruous, emotional, and based primarily on refuting the Air Force's position. On the other hand, the Air Force argument was coherent and polished. Simultaneously, however, senior Air Force officials relied heavily on an inadequately tested theory of air power as the foundation of national defense. In fact, the Air Force strategic bombing doctrine was found wanting in significant areas after the results of World War II had been assessed; yet few of its senior leaders acknowledged its flaws. In addition, the Navy's amateur public relations effort appears to have been rooted in an inability to comprehend the primacy of public opinion regarding budget battles in the newly formed Department of Defense. The competition that spurred the revolt survives to this day.
In November 1943, Army General George C. Marshall called for postwar unification of the Departments of War and the Navy. His action led to what became known as the "unification debates" and the eventual passage of the National Security Act of 1947. This created a unified National Military Establishment, a National Security Council (NSC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and an independent Air Force. The core of the new system was the NSC, comprised of the President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, and representatives from the three services. These civilian officials, advised by the CIA, would present policy recommendations on national security to the President for approval. The military establishment as well as the State Department then could act upon these policies if adopted.
The system as originally implemented had recognized flaws. First, the NSC did not provide adequate policy guidance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Second, unity of command, one of the primary reasons for unification in the first place, was weakened by the procedure that allowed the service secretaries to appeal directly to the President and bypass the Secretary of Defense. Third, because of service loyalties and rival strategic theories, the JCS was unable to resolve technical differences.
As a result, on 10 August 1949, an amendment to the National Security Act of 1949 was signed into law. Three changes to the law were pertinent. First, the National Military Establishment was superseded by a Department of Defense (DoD), which was to have unqualified "direction, authority, and control" over national security. Second, the service secretaries were removed from the NSC, and their bailiwicks were downgraded from "executive" to "military" departments. Third, the position of the Chairman of the JCS (CJCS) was established officially as a non-voting member of the JCS. The Chairman was responsible for presiding over the JCS and was made a statutory advisor to the NSC. The "unification act" of 1947 and its subsequent amendments were to establish a more efficient system of national security, but at the time of the revolt of the admirals, misunderstandings of how the system was to operate were significant. These ran deepest in the Navy.
Naval leadership failed to recognize that the Secretary of Defense could have such influence on budget and strategy matters. As John C. Ries surmises in his work Management of Defense, Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson exercised his power completely. Within one month of assuming his duties, he instituted "Consolidation Directive No. 1," implementing what was interpreted widely as a gag order on the military. The Navy's failure to silence internal critics of unification created serious repercussions with Johnson. For example, he voiced his displeasure and stated that he wanted to "knock some heads together" after Navy Captain John G. Crommelin made statements to the press criticizing unification. Second, Johnson's decision to cancel the proposed carrier United States on 23 April 1949, without consulting either Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan or the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, was a clear example of the Navy's miscalculation of the new Defense Secretary's willingness to wield power.
The Navy also misinterpreted the function of the CJCS. Army General Omar N. Bradley, appointed as the first Chairman in August, charged the Navy with insubordination and disloyalty during the revolt. As General Bradley said in his testimony, "when he stood against the Navy," it was because, he believed, "the Navy was wrong," not because he was prejudiced against their ideas. With interservice conflicts raging in the Pentagon, the changing strategic environment of the late 1940s heightened national security concerns further.
The wartime alliance between the West and the Soviet Union showed unmistakable rifts even prior to the defeat of Nazi Germany. And by 1946, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was referring ominously to an "iron curtain" separating Eastern from Western Europe. A year later, President Harry S. Truman's doctrine, committing the United States to oppose the spread of communism, was promulgated. For U.S. defense planners, however, the crucial event in the opening stage of the Cold War occurred in September 1949, when U.S. intelligence surmised that the Soviet Union had tested an atomic weapon. This event served to focus domestic attention on national security during the fall of 1949.
Air Force Doctrine
By 1949, Air Force doctrine—with its origins traced to Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell, and Hugh Trenchard—was committed exclusively to strategic bombing. The Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) expanded on the principles Douhet laid down in his work, Command of the Air, to develop Army Air Corps doctrine in the interwar period.
The ACTS expanded on Douhet's ideas with the "industrial web theory," which rested on five principles:
1. Great powers rely on industrial and economic systems.
2. There are critical points within those systems that can be bombed.
3. Massed air strikes can penetrate air defenses without unacceptable losses.
4. Victory through air power can be achieved.
5. If enemy resistance persists, it may be necessary to attack the "national will" by attacking cities.
Despite the fact that The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys found strategic bombing moderately effective at best in both major theaters of war, senior Air Force officials blamed failures on inadequate resources and efforts diverted to support surface operations. The Air Force contended that the atomic bombs dropped on Japan validated its existence. Moreover, rationale for an independent Air Force relied heavily on the theory that a strategic-bomber force could win wars cheaply and autonomously. For these two reasons, some air power enthusiasts considered World War II to be an aberration, at least as far as updating doctrine was concerned. The Air Force was committed to the strategic-bombing doctrine developed prior to World War II, and with the B-36 as its "battleplane" to deliver atomic bombs, victory could be achieved, it claimed, without large U.S. losses.
The main Air Force argument in support of the B-36, compared to the proposed carrier United States, was cost, both in lives and money. Through some convincing—albeit creative—calculations published in Reader's Digest, Air Force advocates contended that the cost of one super carrier and its task force was equal to 500 B-36s and exposed 242 times as many men to danger. As Jeffrey Barlow notes in his Revolt of the Admirals, Air Force arguments rested on three themes. First, air power had become the nation's dominant military force. Second, the Air Force was the only proper exponent of air power. And third, strategic bombardment was the most important function of an air force.
Navy Doctrine
By 1949, the Navy had developed a comprehensive doctrine for force-projection by employing naval aviation. At its center was the aircraft carrier. By the end of World War II, naval aviation had proved itself in a variety of missions. These missions, broadly termed "strike," included attacking enemy convoys, providing air support to amphibious operations, bombing coastal logistics bases, and strategic bombing of inland targets. Seek-and-destroy missions against enemy surface forces, coupled with submarine attacks, cut off Japan's sea lines of communication to such an extent that its logistics system was crippled by 1944. Both fighter and close support for amphibious operations, starting with the landings on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942, were critical to both prongs of the advance through the Pacific. The attack by 30 waves of carrier planes against the well-protected logistical base at Truk in February 1944 illustrated the flexibility and lethality of the carrier. The bombing missions by carrier planes against Japanese airfields located inland on Formosa demonstrated the Navy's strategic-bombing capability.
The authors of the Strategic Bombing Survey in the Pacific War, all civilian, were neither Air Force nor Navy supporters. Their conclusions, however, bore a striking resemblance to naval aviation doctrine as it had evolved during the war. The survey concluded with five "signposts" on future uses of air power:
1. Control of the air is an essential ingredient to any surface action.
2. Control of the air necessitates the coordinated effects of ground, sea, and air forces.
3. Air control does not equate to total denial of the air to the enemy.
4. There are limitations in the ability of aircraft to affect the outcome of a surface action.
5. An enemy's sustaining resources can be depleted by "sustained and accurate attack against carefully selected targets."
As Captain Arleigh A. Burke, a future CNO, explained in October 1949, protection of sea lines and the capability to project power from the sea were absolute necessities to national defense. Moreover, the only way to achieve this "command of the sea" was through a strong Navy. As Vincent Davis notes astutely in his work The Admiral's Lobby, the Navy recognized the dangers of their "rigid, narrow, and absolutist thinking" prior to World War II. As a result, post-World War II service doctrine could be described in one word—flexibility. This flexibility could be guaranteed only by constructing larger carrier-based bombers, improving carrier and task force defense, and acquiring the capability to deliver nuclear weapons from a sea-based platform.
Air Force Leadership
In contrast, the Air Force had strong, unified leadership, and perhaps more important, "sold" its plan to the people better than the Navy. The first Secretary of the Air Force, W. Stuart Symington, had served as the Assistant Secretary of War for Air during World War II. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force during the revolt of the admirals was General Hoyt S. Vandenberg. These two leaders, as well as their subordinates, supported one another fully, and no "cracks" appeared in the chain of command. Furthermore, the Air Force, from its inception—unlike the Navy—tied its independence to overall service unification and a Department of Defense. As a result, it supported any unification effort and came across as the "reasonable" actor in the conflict with the Navy.
Navy Public Relations
The Organizational Policy and Research Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-23) spearheaded the Navy's public relations efforts. Officially, OP-23 was to "familiarize itself on all matters pertaining to unification" and advise the CNO and other senior officers on those matters. Established on 23 December 1948, OP-23 was headed by the highly respected Captain Burke and supported by a staff of 11 officers and 17 enlisted men. But most often the perception was that it was obstructing unification rather than supporting it. The New York Times reported a perception that OP-23 was "going beyond" its official purpose of unification compliance. Newsweek described it as the Navy's "underground propaganda machine" and charged it with seeking to destroy the Air Force B-36 bomber program. Similarly, The Washington Post reported the Air Force view that OP-23 was nothing more than a "propaganda outfit set up to fight unification, strategic bombing, and the B-36." From its inception, OP-23 enjoyed little credibility as a public-relations organization.
Air Force Public Relations
Preaching that its aircraft represented a new all-purpose military weapon system, air officers threw off the traditional restraints that fettered Army and Navy officers and fought for their ideology with "zeal, enthusiasm, and the fiercest sort of civilian lobby." Because he was the outspoken Air Force protagonist, Symington was the logical public-relations leader within the young service.
By spring 1949, the Air Force public-relations machine had matured into an extremely effective tool, garnering support both in Congress and with the public. For example, it was careful to be straightforward and stress only the documentable operational impact of Air Force achievements. If an unofficial source released inflated Air Force capabilities, however, no one in the Air Force would deny them. If the press inflated a Navy achievement, though, the Air Force jumped on the inaccuracy immediately. And, of course, timing was critical.
In March, the Air Force pulled off a major coup. The around-the-world flight of the B-50 using in-flight refueling techniques, the announced ability to strike 70 strategic targets in the Soviet Union, and the claim that the B-36 exceeded designed capabilities all served to dilute the impact of the Navy's concurrent amphibious exercises in the Caribbean. These subtle efforts secured support for Air Force arguments, illustrated by the views of Representative Clarence Cannon, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, when justifying the cancellation of the carrier United States. "We must hit within one week after the war starts and it can be done only by landbased planes such as we now have."
The Revolt of the Admirals
Several individuals were frustrated that the Air Force press campaign for the most part had gone unanswered by the Navy. One was the special assistant to Under Secretary of the Navy Dan A. Kimball, Cedric Worth. In May 1949, Worth released two copies of an "anonymous document" to Glenn Martin and Representative James E. Van Zandt (R-PA), a member of the House Armed Services Committee. This highly explosive document made claims of serious improprieties in the B-36 program and cited 55 allegations of wrongdoing in its procurement by Secretary Johnson and Secretary Symington. The anonymous document given to Van Zandt was the catalyst for the Hearings before the House Armed Services Committee on Unification and Strategy. On 9 June 1949, the following agenda was approved:
1. Establish the truth or falsity of all charges made by Mr. Van Zandt and by all others the committee may find or develop in the investigation.
2. Locate and identify the sources from which the charges, rumors, and innuendoes have come.
3. Examine the performance characteristics of the B-36 bomber to determine whether it is a satisfactory weapon.
4. Examine the roles and missions of the Air Force and Navy (especially Navy Aviation and Marine Aviation) to determine whether or not the decision to cancel the construction of the aircraft carrier United States was sound.
5. Establish whether or not the Air Force is concentrating upon strategic bombing to such an extent as to be injurious to tactical aviation and the development of adequate fighter aircraft and fighter aircraft techniques.
6. Consider the procedures followed by the JCS on the development of weapons to be used by the respective services to determine whether or not it is proposed that two of the three services will be permitted to pass on weapons of the third.
7. Consider all other matters pertinent to the above that may be developed during the course of the investigation.
The August Hearings
The anonymous document spurred two separate hearings before Congress. The first set, held in August, dealt only with the first two items on the agenda, and the Air Force was exonerated of all charges. When the document surfaced, Symington wasted no time in leading the effort to refute the claims. He considered the document a personal attack and began writing a rebuttal immediately. This point-by-point argument eventually became the essence of his August testimony before Congress. Perhaps more important, he appointed W. Barton Leach, a Professor of Law at Harvard and a reserve Air Force colonel, as the "Coordinator-Director" of the Air Force defense team. The hearings took place from 9-12 and 2225 August, and because of flawless preparation, "no inconsistencies or contradictions capable of exploitation appeared in the testimony." On 24 August, the day after the Secretary testified, Worth took the stand and, after admitting authorship of the anonymous document, validated Johnson's claims of innocence in the B-36 procurement process. With the claims made by the previously anonymous "Worth Document" disproved, the hearings recessed until October.
September
Two significant September events fueled the fire of the Air Force-Navy dispute. First, on 10 September, Captain Crommelin, a highly respected combat naval aviator, called reporters to his home and attacked unification. He stated that the Navy and naval aviation were being "nibbled to death" by the JCS and the DoD. He also claimed the Navy's fighting spirit was "going to pot. In response to Crommelin's outburst, on 14 September Secretary Matthews issued a statement to senior Navy leadership, stating that "officers who wished to express views on the matter should transmit them to him through the appropriate channels." Vice Admiral Gerald F. Bogan felt compelled to respond officially to the Matthews statement. The Bogan memorandum, along with endorsements by Admirals Radford and Denfeld, as required by Navy procedure, conceded in essence a morale problem throughout the Navy. In what was reported by the Associated Press as truly "cloak and dagger" fashion, the second trigger event of September occurred, when Crommelin released this correspondence to all three wire services, hoping to force Congress to resume the unification hearings.
Whether or not Captain Crommelin's actions influenced the decision to resume the hearings in October 1949, rather than in January 1950 as was originally intended by the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Representative Carl Vinson (D-GA), is uncertain. Regardless, the Navy was to get its day to testify before Vinson's committee. The revolt of the admirals had begun.
From 6-17 October, 26 witnesses testified to make the Navy's case, while the Air Force rebutted with only Secretary Symington and General Vandenberg on 18-19 October. The JCS, the Army, and the administration were represented beginning with General Bradley on 19 October. The hearings ended on 21 October with the testimony of former President Herbert Hoover.
The Navy
Secretary Matthews opened the Navy's case. As Time observed, "the revolt pushed aside the Navy's civilian head, who had blandly assured the House Armed Services Committee that Navy morale was good," and the magazine went on to describe how Matthews was "treated to loud and sardonic laughter" by the assembled naval aviators. Matthews charged Vice Admiral Bogan and Captain Crommelin directly with "faithlessness" and "insubordination" for their opposition to unification. Nothing indicated any coordination between Matthews and the remaining Navy witnesses, but he did seem to recognize the route the officers were to follow in their testimony. He did not attempt to hide his disdain. Battle lines were drawn, and Matthews came down on the side of Secretary of Defense Johnson and, by extension, the Air Force.
Not only were the naval aviators entering the hearings without the support of their civilian head; CNO Admiral Denfeld was content to sit back and let a subordinate coordinate the efforts of the Navy's case. The perception that he supported the decisions to cancel the United States and disallow the Banshee and B-36 fly off, whether true or not, was accepted commonly among naval aviators. The admirals' revolt was led by the "brilliant fighting commander" and long "outspoken opponent of unification," Admiral Radford. He focused his testimony on the inadequacy of the B-36 and, more important, the weaknesses of the "atomic blitz" theory of warfare. He also addressed the lack of attention the Air Force had paid to tactical and fighter aircraft development.
The remainder of the Navy witnesses from 8-11 October supported Radford's testimony on technical grounds. The testimony was well-researched and credible, with the exception of Commander Eugene Tatum. Tatum presented evidence, based upon the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that questioned the lethality of nuclear weapons. Even if nothing more destructive than the original weapons were being developed, Tatum's arguments simply were not plausible.
On 12-13 October, the Navy brought in its "big guns." Fleet Admirals Ernest J. King, Chester W. Nimitz, and William F. Halsey all testified as did a procession of lower ranking World War II heroes. The specifics of their testimony were not particularly striking, but they reinforced Radford's views so One facet of their testimony was unique and cannot be discounted totally. These men enjoyed a certain credibility and respect of the nation because of World War II.
The surprise witness for the Navy was Admiral Denfeld. Everyone expected that the CNO would ally himself with the JCS, of which he was a member, but when he took the stand, he sided with his fellow naval officers. He accused the JCS of making uninformed and "arbitrary" decisions. All participants were surprised at Denfeld's testimony. Naval aviation supporters erupted in applause, Secretary Matthews hurried from the room speechless, and JCS Chairman Bradley tore up his prepared statement in disgust when Denfeld finished speaking.81
A Gallup poll conducted on 15 October showed an overwhelming 74% of voters favoring the Air Force's role in future war, with only 6% the Army's and 4% the Navy's.82 Public perception of the Navy's testimony appeared in the 17 October issue of Newsweek In direct contrast to Admiral Radford's testimony, it provided evidence from independent observers that Navy morale was fine. The magazine then summarized the Navy case in telling fashion: "It is sometimes difficult to figure precisely what the Navy recalcitrants want, however. Sometimes they attack the whole idea of strategic bombing as Admiral Radford did. And sometimes they simply say they can do it better." Secretary Johnson also was quoted: ". . . let the Navy airmen sound off. Once they've done so, they'll become reconciled to their new role in national defense."83 Evidently, Johnson's inference was that the reconciliation would entail the Navy's acceptance of its position as something other than the "first line of defense."
Air Force Magazine, an obviously biased publication, did, however, frame some pointed questions based upon the Navy's testimony: "What drives a distinguished group of admirals to denounce strategic bombing while pleading for the means with which to conduct it, to find the A-bomb immoral in the hands of the Air Force but quite moral in the hands of the Navy?" Time amplified this view: "Even so staunch a friend of the Navy as The New York Times Annapolis-trained military analyst Hanson Baldwin wrote that he himself did not consider the cutbacks in the Navy program disastrous." He added dryly: "Some of the Navy's interest in morality as applied to strategic bombing seems new-found."
The remainder of the testimony weakened further the already faltering Navy position. Of particular note was General Bradley. He stated that he saw no future need for an island-hopping campaign or large amphibious capabilities, and more important, strategic bombing was "our first-priority retaliatory weapon." Bradley made no attempt to hide his contempt for the Navy's methods during the case, and he accused senior naval officers directly of poor leadership, disloyalty, and being "completely against unity of command and planning." Time noted: "From a military standpoint he had all but blasted the Navy admirals' case. And before the week was out, torpedoed by other non-Navy men, the Navy's arguments were little more than just afloat."
The Air Force
Secretary Symington presented the Air Force rebuttal, and he enjoyed the unwavering support of Chief of Staff Vandenberg. Both men's testimonies were limited in scope and complementary, and both relied heavily on their August testimony. The congruence of Air Force leadership and its polished presentation cast the service as the reasonable actor during the revolt. As Phillip S. Meilinger notes in his work, Hoyt S. Vandenberg—The Life of a General, the General remained cool and level-headed throughout the revolt. In fact, to ensure that the rest of the Air Force remained similarly unemotional and out of the spotlight, Vandenberg went so far as to assign press officers to handle all public statements by two of the Air Force's most outspoken members, Lieutenant Generals Curtis LeMay and George Kenney.
Conclusions
More and more, the Navy image became that of a bunch of complainers concerned only with their pet programs. It appeared that the Navy simply was upset with the realization that it had lost its place as the "first line of defense." The Philadelphia Inquirer best captured the mood, as reported by the popular press: "The Navy brass can contribute to national safety by dropping their guerrilla warfare against the other services and endeavor by forthright, constructive criticism to improve on defense strategy." The Washington Post added: "A real meeting of minds can not be achieved until both sides are willing to play on the same team, and right now the burden of proof is on the Navy." And Newsweek concluded that the Navy criticized the "global strategy" worked out by the JCS, but it offered no alternative of its own. In sum, the Navy's testimony cast naval aviators in a shadow of public doubt regarding their true intentions. The Navy was making claims that the system was broken but offered no viable solution.
The Navy lost the "revolt of the admirals." It did not lose the conflict because its doctrine was weak. In fact, naval aviation doctrine, and by extension naval doctrine, was sound and based in principles validated in combat. Likewise, the Navy did not lose because Air Force doctrine was particularly sound. Air Force doctrine was neither tested fully nor validated in World War II and contained major flaws in 1949. The Navy did lose the battle because of leadership failures and a lack of appreciation for public perceptions in the changing environment of the post-unification military.
Lieutenant Commander Lewis is assigned currently to the Joint Warfare Analysis Center, Dahlgren, Virginia. The preceding is an edited version of a paper that won the Dean’s Award for Research Excellence in Total Force Issues from the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.