Landmines have become an emotional issue. But in trying to save innocent victims around the world, activists have forgotten the American infantryman.
Even today, a snow-covered field evokes a wondering about schu-meinen hiding underneath." So wrote, 53 years later, the officer who commanded a rifle company from November 1944 to May 1945 during the drive into Hitler's Germany. Retired Army General F. J. Kroesen still remembers the landmines.1
In a New York Times column of 28 March 1996, retired Marine Lieutenant General B. E. Trainor, a rifle platoon leader in the 1st Marine Division during 1952, echoed the same thought about the Korean War. "To this day, I cannot walk across an open field without an eerie feeling that death lurks in the tranquillity." Landmines, he added, ". . . both threatened and saved my life."2
God alone knows how many Army and Marine infantrymen who served in Vietnam have found themselves, years later, giving close scrutiny to a hedge or path, subconsciously looking for a trip wire or other signs of mines and booby traps.
The emotions that World War II, Korean War, and Vietnam War veterans harbor differ little, if at all, from those felt by the first American troops to encounter landmines. That misfortune hit soldiers of General William Tecumseh Sherman's army during the march from Atlanta to the sea. On 8 December 1864, an officer's horse triggered a "torpedo." The horse was killed, the officer maimed, and men who had charged the mouths of cannon were repelled by this new form of warfare. Sherman wrote, "This was not war, but murder, and it made me very angry." It made him so angry that he used Confederate prisoners to initiate the first "demining" operation in history. The hapless prisoners were made to, ". . . march in close order along the road, so as to explode their own torpedoes, or to discover and dig them up."3 Apparently, Sherman was the first to introduce noncombatants to mine warfare; he was not the last.
Landmines, like so many other technological advancements first considered inhumane, became an accepted part of warfare . . . another occupational hazard of the infantryman. So long as death or maiming were confined to the combat soldier or Marine, there was no outcry. That all changed when, during the latter part of this century, warring factions on several continents began using antipersonnel landmines to target and terrorize civilian populations. In Sherman's words, this was ". . . not war, but murder. . . ." There is no question that it still is unconscionable. There also is no question that something must be done. There have been high-profile attempts to do just that.
Norway's Nobel Committee awarded the 1997 Peace Prize to Jody Williams, along with the International Committee to Ban Landmines, the activities of which Williams coordinated. Britain's Princess Diana supported the ban, and her untimely death resulted in heightened publicity for the effort. There was worldwide criticism when, in September of 1997, the United States rejected a landmine ban treaty that had been negotiated in Oslo and intended for a December signing in Ottawa.4 Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) promised legislation to force the ban on the U.S. military; the President's wife urged signing the ban, "as an appropriate way to memorialize Princess Diana,"5 and in a recent administration "one-eighty," the National Security Council reportedly has circulated a draft Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) designed ". . . to force the United States into de facto compliance with the Ottawa Convention."6 This would be the Ottawa Treaty by another name—and without Senate ratification.
It should have been possible to examine the issues by: establishing the scope of the problem; determining our level of responsibility, if any; and finally, presenting solutions that are consistent with the growing tendency to send American troops in harm's way throughout the world. Unfortunately, it was not that simple. Emerging were such phenomena as: exaggerations and lies; an empty treaty; non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and others who used the former to promote the latter; and a less than fully engaged Pentagon.
Where Are the Mines?
News accounts and press releases of governments and non-governmental organizations routinely state that the mine problem exists in roughly 70 countries. A 1997 map published in the periodical Red Cross/Red Crescent refers to "more than 70 countries" and highlights each.7 Most of the 70 are less-developed nations that have endured—or still are enduring—some form of civil or guerilla warfare. In terms of geographic areas, the problems are located in: Central America; the west coast of South America; a majority of the nations on the African continent; the Middle East; the Persian Gulf states; the Balkans; nations bordering the former Soviet Union; and Southeast Asia, including the Republic of the Philippines.8
Discussion of each country would be impossible; however, examination of a few would be instructive, since millions of the mines in question have been placed where they do no harm to civilians. For that, or other reasons, counting these nations among the 70 is misleading. For example, the Republic of Korea is shown as having a mine problem. It does not. It has a North Korea problem, and uses millions of mines to protect itself (and the 35,000 or so U.S. troops stationed there) from another invasion ordered by an unstable North Korean government. Finland also is shown as a troubled area. The Finns, capitalizing on memories of invasions past, use minefields to guard their borders with Russia and, at least for now, have no intention of changing.9 Israel also is identified one of the 70, and indeed, there are old minefields on Israel's Golan Heights, but those areas are fenced and clearly marked.10 Finally, the People's Republic of China is shown as a major problem area, as well. The Chinese do not participate in international landmine-banning conferences, treaties, or actions and should not be counted as a nation having civilian mine casualty problems that require international attention.
Even casual examination reveals that a claim of 70 problem countries is an exaggeration. What would a detailed analysis produce? In a paper prepared for a Marshall Legacy Institute conference, retired Canadian Army Major General John A. MacInnis, a former Chief of the U.N. Mine Clearance and Policy Unit, conducted just such an analysis.11 Eliminating nations capable of caring for themselves—such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, and China—General MacInnis established a definition of "mine action" that extends beyond demining. Working from a base of objectives addressing medical problems, socio-economic factors, and demining, General MacInnis used five criteria for intervention, including the local combat situation. He concluded that "approximately 10" countries are ready for international assistance now and "less than 20" require and are receptive to assistance. The 70 thus becomes 30.
How Many Mines?
On 16 May 1996, citing more than 25,000 people per year killed or maimed by the devices, President Bill Clinton appeared to announce that he was joining an international effort to ban antipersonnel landmines.12 The White House Press Secretary's "fact sheet" noted that there are an "estimated 100 million landmines in place today."13 A year to the month later, British Information Systems reported that, "the Red Cross estimate that there are 120 million mines laid across the world, and that they kill or maim someone every 20 minutes."14 A mere month later, Arms Control Today, a publication of the Arms Control Association, hiked the ante by discussing "a weapon whose numbers exceed 150 million."15 In the fall of 1997, publishing a series of "mine facts," the Los Angeles Times returned to the 1996 numbers of "more than one hundred million mines planted in 70 countries," adding that the mines kill or maim "at least 26,000" people annually. However, the article then went on to render the entire problem unsolvable by noting that, while about 100,000 mines are removed each year, "2 million more are planted."16 Of interest is the fact that, despite the increasing numbers of mines, the published numbers of casualties remains unchanged. If the Los Angeles Times report is accurate, 1,900,000 mines are added each year. One would think that, if 100 million mines cause 26,000 casualties per year, then 20 to 50 million more mines, growing in number by nearly 2 million per year, would claim even more victims.
At least a partial answer to that riddle was published in the 1 September 1997 issue of Time.17 Using the standard figure of "more than 2,000" casualties per month, the article questions the numbers of mines. In a reasoned effort to draw attention to removing the mines now in the ground, Time cites the 100 million mines figure but adds, ". . . recent surveys are causing a drastic downward revision: in Bosnia the estimate has been reduced from 3 million to fewer than 1 million; in Cambodia, estimates have dropped from 8 million to 4 million, and are expected to fall further."18
Now retired, Army Lieutenant General Dan Schroeder commanded the Joint Task Force (JTF) deployed in 1994 to support the non-governmental organizations providing aid and humanitarian assistance in Uganda, Rwanda, and eastern Zaire. In the capital of Rwanda, antipersonnel mines had been sown at cultural features and other places where the public could be expected to assemble.19 The Joint Task Force's mine responsibilities were confined to marking the mined areas and reporting the locations to the non-governmental organizations. Counting the mines was a function of U.S. State Department representatives, a standard practice.
During the mid-1990s, when on active duty, Army Colonel Dan Layton was assigned to the State Department's Office of International Security and Peacekeeping Operations and was involved in the State Department's worldwide mine-counting efforts.20 Discussing the methodology used, Colonel Layton noted that the routine procedure was to send a cable to the senior State Department representative in a given nation, asking for the estimated numbers of mines. Adding that the resulting numbers were corroborated by U.N. agencies, he believed that the numbers were understood to be "without question, approximations."21 How the numbers were derived and corroborated in each country—with the exception of Bosnia—are questions that remain unanswered.
Bosnia was different. Intelligence agencies attempted to estimate the numbers of mines. According to Colonel Layton, the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency "did the best they could with what they had" and estimated 3 million mines.22 General Schroeder, who witnessed the Bosnian mine counting, states that the numbers were derived by questioning members of the former warring factions.23 For reasons of their own, the former antagonists grossly overstated the numbers and the widely published 3 to 6 million mine figure is, as Time has noted, an exaggeration.
Afghanistan provides another instructive example. Paul Jefferson, a retired British Army officer and former deminer (in 1991, he lost his vision and right leg to an antipersonnel mine in Kuwait), writes that in 1989 he and a colleague read a U.N. paper reporting 35 million mines in Afghanistan. Simple arithmetic indicated that, if the report was correct, the Soviets had installed 10,000 mines every day of their occupation. Studying Soviet logistics capabilities and other factors, they concluded that, at most, there were 10 million mines.24 But the United Nations accepted the 35 million figure and it is still used, despite the fact that deminers working in Afghanistan since have concluded that the total number of mines is about 600,000.25
As a final example, the United Nations reports two million mines in Mozambique. Yet Mike Croll, an ex-Royal Engineer who headed that nation's demining effort, estimates the figure at between 350,000 and 400,000. The U.N. official responsible for funding has said, "We won't go for that—won't get through to people. I'm going for two million."26 Exaggeration, now institutionalized, has become a lie. How many times and in how many places are the numbers, known to be false, still used to shock and gain attention? How many lies are being told?
What Difference Does It Make?
Do the numbers of nations and mines make any difference? Yes, in fact, they do make a huge difference.
The Nobel Peace Committee's vote, the Ottawa Treaty, Senator Leahy's efforts, and the possibility of a White House interest in a Presidential Decision Directive all are based on grossly inaccurate information—and they do nothing about the problems caused by the mines in the ground today. Despite all the feel-good posturing, sound bites, and one-liners, innocent people will continue to be killed or maimed by landmines for years to come.
The exaggerated numbers have brought attention, but in the process, they have portrayed a problem too big to solve. They do the following harm:
- Demining efforts do not receive the levels of support and resources, including money, that should be applied to the one course of action that will neuter the mines in the ground today.
- Crucial focus, attention, and resources are diverted from the efforts of organizations such as the Marshall Legacy Institute of Alexandria, Virginia. The Institute has studied (on scene), understands, and is striving to repair the socioeconomic harm done by the mines now in the ground.27
- If compliance with the Ottawa Treaty or some similar directive is issued to the Pentagon, the armed forces of the United States—which, as will be shown, are not part of the problem—will be forced to develop and produce replacement systems for the more sophisticated self-destructing antipersonnel mines. In effect, they will be required to find technologies that will work in a worldwide variety of climates, terrain, and vegetation in order to replace existing adequate weapons. The results are predictable: Unnecessary risks to troops; an application of resources to develop mine replacements when what is needed is an improved means of locating and neutralizing mines; and, of course, the waste of more taxpayer money.
The Role of America's Operating Forces
A questionnaire was distributed to two dozen U.S. Marine and Army ground combat veterans of wars ranging from Korea to Desert Storm. This survey was not scientific and was not intended to provide statistically meaningful results. The purpose was to record the observations of officers who had served in a variety of areas at levels ranging from platoon leader to Commander-in-Chief of the Special Operations Command.
The Korean War, which eventually stagnated into trench warfare, saw a greater use of antipersonnel mines than subsequent conflicts. Commercially produced mines were laid in plotted fields to defend front-line positions and were signed over or shown to replacement units. Home-made "booby traps" routinely were used by front-line troops. These were removed periodically and whenever units changed location.
The use of commercially produced antipersonnel mines and home-made devices dropped significantly during the Vietnam War. The Claymore mine had been introduced, and in command-detonated form it became the mine of choice, particularly to trigger ambushes or to protect night defensive positions. In all cases, respondents reported that the Claymores were recovered before a unit departed. About half the respondents reported no use of home-made mines (e.g., hand grenade in a ration can). Those who did also reported retrieving or destroying the ordnance in place. Minefields in this war were used to defend some headquarters and other major installations. The minefields were formally established, plotted, and recorded.
Some of those questioned had experience with long-range reconnaissance or special operations patrols. These patrols, operating in areas under enemy control, had more than the normal need for antipersonnel mines, especially Claymores. Limited in what they could carry, they could not afford to leave mines behind when displacing, and did not do so.
The trend in declining use of antipersonnel mines continued during Desert Storm, although the level of decline may prove to be an anomaly. It is more than doubtful that, in future conflicts, an opponent will remain idle and merely watch while the United States assembles an overwhelming force and then attacks. While Saddam Hussein watched during the prelude to Desert Storm, U.S. forces did not use mines. As stated by retired Lieutenant General John Yeosock, then-Commanding General of the U.S. Third Army, ". . . we told Saudi officials we would not [use antipersonnel mines]".28
The agreement with Saudi officials did not apply to special operations patrol actions in the desert behind Iraqi lines. The patrols were tasked to find Iraqi Scud missile-launching sites and stop the launchings. Retired Army General Carl Stiner, then-Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command, cited the use of Claymore mines and self-destructing CBU-87 Gator mines for "night defensive purposes."29 His thoughts were echoed by retired Army General Wayne Downing, who, at the time, commanded the Joint Special Operations Task Force operating in the desert. General Downing also added that the Gator mines were "highly effective" and "paralyzed Iraqi movement to Scud launch sites."30 Both stated that Claymore mines were retrieved by the patrolling units before they departed the area.
Those who were queried left no doubt that the American units or commands with which they served used mines in a responsible, professional manner. No evidence to the contrary was found during research, and it is doubtful that any ever will be found. The doctrine, training, and equipment of America's operating forces eliminate them as part of the problem.
The Military Leadership's Position
On 10 July 1997, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and each of the ten Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs) signed a letter to Senator Thurmond protesting landmine-ban legislation then being drafted by Senators Leahy and Chuck Hagel (R-NE). Among other things, the letter noted that the legislation would "unnecessarily endanger U.S. military forces. . . ."31 At about the same time, military officers moved through Congress, briefing staffs and elected officials. Did the effort reflect an alert Pentagon in action? Not exactly. The move to ban landmines had been ongoing for years, but was not aggressively challenged by the Pentagon until 1997. Nevertheless, it is the duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide military advice based on military considerations, and that seems to have been done
The Ottawa Treaty
The Ottawa Treaty, signed by roughly 100 nations, bans the manufacture, use, and export of antipersonnel landmines. Despite the hype surrounding the signing, the treaty solves none of the current problems. It is a treaty that cannot be verified or enforced. Anyone can make a landmine; anybody can turn a profit selling landmines. Who is going to monitor landmine manufacturers in China, Russia, Iraq, Iran, and other nations that did not sign the treaty? How will it be done? Who believes that guerilla and other irregular forces will not continue to use mines as force multipliers? Who is going to stop them and how?32
Why should the United States, a nation that does not contribute to the problem and one that puts its armed forces in harm's way on a worldwide basis, sign such a treaty? That question was put to Tim Reiser, a member of Senator Leahy's staff. The response was, "without U.S. participation [there would be] no international ban."33 If the history of treaties reliant on the good will of despots and authoritarian regimes means anything, there will be no international ban—with or without U.S. participation.
Non-Governmental Organizations
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are legion in terms of both numbers and purposes. Many perform services ranking on a par with Doctors Without Borders, an organization recognized with admiration by General Schroeder for its work in Rwanda and elsewhere. But all is not perfect. Some of these organizations (e.g., Greenpeace) have an anti-U.S. bias; some have people who are anti-American activists; and some have agendas inimical to U.S. interests.
Nobel Peace Prize winner Jody Williams had ties to El Salvador's communist guerillas and has made no secret of her part in an anti-U.S., pro-communist agitation operation.34 During a Cable News Network "Crossfire" program of 10 October 1997, when asked about American forces risking their lives, Williams responded that, "A soldier is only one part of larger society."35 The inference is that the American fighting man may be less important than others. Should American taxpayers' money support such positions? In the case of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Center for Security Policy director Frank Gaffney believes that roughly 30 million U.S. taxpayer dollars were used to mount the public relations campaign supporting the landmine ban.36
Beyond the annoying issue of helping to fund some anti-American organizations, is the custom of giving non-governmental organizations parity with governments. "Unelected and unaccountable NGOs are treated as equal partners in the preparation of international agreements."37 The issue is one of sovereignty and the battle is not yet joined. The New York Times has written that non-governmental organizations are beginning to focus on small arms ammunition.38 The Kyoto Global Warming Treaty is another pet of the non-governmental organizations and one that deserves a hard look, not only from the viewpoint of its impact on the U.S. defense establishment but also because of the threat it poses to our national sovereignty. There are whispers about other campaigns, aimed at stigmatizing other weapons and then pummeling governments with publicity designed to have the weapons banned. Unfortunately, those weapons will not be banned everywhere.
Future Actions
The first order of business is to defeat any further attempts to have the United States bound by the Ottawa Treaty or any variant of it. That much is owed to the American taxpayers and to the troops who will be asked to risk their lives in future military actions. Rather than signing a useless ban and working to find replacement weapon systems, efforts should be devoted to developing better ways to detect and neutralize mines.
Concurrently, it is incumbent upon the United States, the Free World leader, to organize an international effort designed to solve the problems that are in and on the ground today. There is no need to work through a bloated U.N. bureaucracy. The United States should organize to work with those who deal directly with problem solutions—the deminers and humanitarian institutions such as the Marshall Legacy Institute, Doctors Without Borders, and others. Many of the nations now suffering were formerly colonies of Great Britain and France. By virtue of that background knowledge, their advanced technical expertise, and modern support infrastructure, Great Britain and France could join the United States in what General Schroeder terms a "division of labor," whereby each of the three leads the humanitarian assistance effort in specific countries. Taking a page from the U.N. book, the "donor state" approach to financing could be employed and the financial burden spread beyond the three nations leading the effort.
The Pentagon—a collective call sign for the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the service headquarters—must become more aware of the campaigns mounted by non-governmental organizations. The Pentagon must become active and aggressive; otherwise, these organizations will be driving the defense train—as has been the case far too long with landmines.
Finally, the U.S. Congress, particularly the Senate, must become more mindful of the treaty preparation and negotiation status accorded non-governmental organizations. This goes beyond the Senate's constitutional responsibilities. Sovereignty has become an issue.
Major General Lynch, an infantryman, served with the 2nd Battalion, 26th Marines, in Vietnam. He wrote, "LZ Margo . . . The Dead Went Last," Proceedings November 1995, pages 52-57—and also won the magazine's Author of the Year Award that year.
1. Kroesen Interview, 22 January 1998. back to article
2. Bernard E. Trainor, "Land Mines Saved My Life," The New York Times, 28 March 1996, p. 25. back to article
3. Memoirs of General William T. Sherman By Himself (Indiana University Press, 1957) Vol. II, p. 194. (Originally published in 1875). back to article
4. Associated Press, "Clinton rejects land mine ban without limits," Sarasota, Florida Herald-Tribune, 18 September 1997, p. 3A. back to article
5. "Back From The Brink: Center Commends President Clinton For Rejecting A Defective, Unverifiable Landmine Ban," Center for Security Policy Press Release No 97, p. 141, 18 September 1997. back to article
6. Letter from Senator Jesse Helms to The Honorable John D. Holum, The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 11 February 1998. back to article
7. Mary-Anne Andersen, "Taking action: the War on Landmines," Red Cross, Red Crescent, Issue 2 -1997. back to article
8. Ibid. back to article
9. Charles Krauthammer, "Mines needed on the front lines," Sarasota, Florida Herald-Tribune, 13 September 1997, p. 13A. back to article
10. Author's observations during 1993 and 1996 visits. The minefields are located on the reverse slope when facing Syria. The mines were apparently hastily laid by Syrian forces trying to consolidate gains prior to Israeli counterattacks. back to article
11. John A. MacInnis, "Mine Action: Towards a Framework for Co-Ordination," Draft Discussion Paper, 3 March 1998. back to article
12. "New U.S. Land Mine Policy," Defense Issues, Vol II, Nr 40. back to article
13. "U.S. Announces Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy," Fact Sheet, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 16 May 1996. back to article
14. Press Release, "New UK Policy on Landmines," British Information Services, 23 May 1997. back to article
15. Jim Wurst, "Closing In On a Landmine Ban: The Ottawa Process and U.S. Interests," Arms Control Today, Vol 27, Nr 4, June/July 1997, p. 15. back to article
16. Norman Kempster and Craig Turner, "Anti-mine activist, group win Nobel Peace Prize," Los Angeles Times, re-printed by the Sarasota, Florida Herald-Tribune, 11 October 1997, pp 1A and 14A. back to article
17. Terry McCarthy, "Crusade Against Mines," Time, 1 September 1997, p. 46. back to article
18. Ibid. back to article
19. Schroeder Interview, 22 January 1998. back to article
20. Layton Interview, 6 March 1998. back to article
21. Ibid. back to article
22. Ibid. back to article
23. Schroeder Interview, 6 March 1998. back to article
24. Paul Jefferson, 'Why Diana is wrong," Electronic Telegraph, 8 February 1997, Opinions Section. back to article
25. Paul Jefferson, "A Political Minefield," The Wall Street Journal, 15 October 1997. back to article
26. Jefferson, "Why Diana is wrong." back to article
27. Layton Interview, 6 March 1998. back to article
28. Questionnaire completed during January 1998. back to article
29. Interview of 22 January 1998. back to article
30. Questionnaire and Interview of 2 February 1997. back to article
31. "Celestial Navigation: Pentagon's Extraordinary '64-Star' Letter Shows Why The U.S. Cannot Agree To Ban All Landmines," Center for Security Policy, Decision Brief No. 97-D97, 14 July 1997. back to article
32. "The Ottawa Landmine Ban: Hardly 'Historic,'" published by The Center for Security Policy as Decision Brief No. 97-D 187 on 4 December 1997, provides an outstanding description of the treaty's flaws and some factors relative to the publicity it received. back to article
33. Interview, 11 February 1998. back to article
34. Frank Gaffney, Jr., Director of the Center for Security Policy, Interview 21 January 1998. back to article
35. Frank Gaffney, Jr., "An aging flower child's crusade," the Washington Times, 15 October 1998. back to article
36. Gaffney Interview. back to article
37. Gaffney Interview. back to article
38. Raymond Bonner, "Buoyed by Treaty on Land Mines, Foes Take Aim at Small Arms," The New York Times, 7 January 1998. back to article