Doctrine is getting a lot of attention in today's Navy—for good reason. For one thing, the ability to apply sound doctrine correlates with the Navy’s ability to carry out its missions with its smallest force since the 1930s. The employment of sound doctrine also correlates with the Navy’s ability to use diverse assemblies of high-tech weapons coherently—particularly in short-fused combat scenarios.
Not surprisingly, most of the considerable discussion on the subject has focused on the future. After all, doctrine is designed to help the Navy meet future challenges. But efforts to divine the future often obscure what can be learned from the past. In this regard, an examination of the career of Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson can be very instructive.
Although Nelson’s naval environment at the close of the 18th century was a far cry from today’s, much can be learned from his combat record, including lessons that relate to doctrine. Perhaps most important, Nelson provides an opportunity to examine doctrine in relation to combat, which helps to bring the discussion up to what most would agree is the most important function of doctrine: providing clear and consistent guidance for combat. Studying Nelson also provides an opportunity to consider one of the most controversial questions involved in the development of sound doctrine: Is doctrine conducive—or inimical—to aggressiveness and innovation in combat?
Clearing an Initial Hurdle
In any discussion of doctrine, it is important to establish how the term is being used. One difficulty, for example, is that the word doctrine often is loosely interchanged with the word tactics, or even strategy. In a recent article. Dr. James Tritten defines doctrine in a number of ways, but perhaps the two core elements he establishes are that doctrine (1) includes “shared beliefs and principles that define the work of a profession,” and (2) is “an expression of how the military profession thinks about warfare, and how it acts.”1
Two additional characteristics of military doctrine were illuminated recently by Rear Admiral Frederick Lewis, when he described one of the U.S. Naval Doctrine Command’s “capstone” publications. Naval Warfare, as “not prescriptive” and “fundamentally conceptual.”2
And finally, to bring a definition of doctrine up to the combat level, a recent magazine commentary on maneuver warfare by U.S. Marine Corps Major Wayne Breakfield noted that military planning must include an expression of a commander’s intent and must identify what is important and why.3 Admiral Arleigh Burke put it in broad terms when he wrote, “There is not time in battle to give orders. People must know what they do before they go into battle.”4
By combining these points, we can establish a working definition of combat doctrine:
A combat doctrine expresses the comprehensive approach to combat tactics that operating units will employ. It includes general intentions and primary objectives. It provides overall guidance for handling combat situations not covered by explicit instructions. It is a formalized guide for both coherent action and initiative. It is a principal criterion for combat decisions.
With that definition in mind, it is possible to address several relevant questions about doctrine and Nelson.
- Was Nelson influenced by a British Royal Navy doctrine?
- If so, what were the elements that influenced him?
- Did he establish a combat doctrine for his subordinates?
Doctrine in Nelson’s Navy
Most naval historians agree that military doctrine in the Royal Navy began with Henry VIII, evolved through Nelson’s era, and continues to the present.5 When Nelson fought his three most famous battles—at the Nile in 1798, Copenhagen in 1801, and Trafalgar in 1805—the Royal Navy had established doctrinal guidelines that applied directly to combat. It also was a time when acceptable departures from the previously rigid doctrinal requirements—including strict adherence to the line-ahead formation in combat—began to change.
For example, in 1796, Admiral Sir John Jervis, commander of the Royal Navy’s Mediterranean fleet, issued fighting instructions that included breaking the enemy’s line-ahead to precipitate a general melee. There were also a number of noteworthy battle successes resulting from aggressive tactics that influenced both fleet and unit combat doctrine during Nelson’s time, including Admiral Viscount Duncan’s victory over the Dutch at the Battle of Camperdown in 1797—where Duncan was aggressive in using two columns to split the Dutch line—and Jervis’s 1797 victory over the Spanish at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent—where creating a melee was a key to success.
It was at this latter battle that Nelson took an action that violated Jervis’s line-ahead order, but that made Jervis’s obvious goal of breaking into the Spanish formation realizable. To Jervis’s credit, he followed Nelson's action with a signal for all captains to maneuver as necessary to exploit the situation Nelson created.
It is clear that both Jervis, who had a reputation for requiring strict adherence to his orders, and Nelson, who had a reputation for departing from orders, realized that it was more important to pursue, the larger objective of bringing the Spanish fleet to close combat than to maintain a formation that was allowing the Spanish to escape.
For Nelson, the major fleet action at Cape St. Vincent was a defining event. He grasped the tactical situation and focused on his commander’s overall objective. As a result, despite his unauthorized departure from his position in the British line- ahead formation, his tough fleet commander praised him for his actions. Nelson’s career-risking action, plus his conspicuous personal courage in boarding and capturing two Spanish ships in hand-to-hand fighting, brought him considerable public acclaim.
In addition to the breaking of the enemy’s line, other elements of a combat doctrine were operative in the Royal Navy during Nelson’s career. These included the use of detached fleet segments for tactical purposes, providing latitude to subordinate flag officers, and fighting a “smashing” battle at no more than a few hundred yards—rather than the "disabling” fight at much longer range preferred by the French. The introduction of Popham’s Telegraphic Signals in 1803 also made it easier for combat commanders to use the somewhat increased tactical flexibility of Nelson’s time.
Author Geoffrey Bennett captured the combat spirit of the era when he wrote, “The way was cleared for Nelson, especially when he gained the further freedom provided by Popham’s signal book, to employ the tactics that gained such decisive results in the several major fleet actions in which he was engaged between 1796 and 1805.”6
If, as history indicates, many of Nelson’s combat tactics were driven by existing Royal Navy doctrine, and many of the elements of the doctrine that he employed were not radically innovative, what did he bring to the combat scene that is worth studying? Focusing on Trafalgar—his most noteworthy success—provides interesting answers to that question.
Linking Doctrine to Combat Victory
How did Nelson connect Royal Navy doctrine to the circumstances at Trafalgar? One of the most important ways was by being sure that his flag officers and captains clearly understood, not only the specific tactics to be employed, but his general intentions as well. This he did with frequent face-to-face meetings and a written memorandum dated 9 October 1805. In what remains a classic expression of a core element of a personal combat doctrine, Nelson wrote in that document, “Something must be left to chance; nothing is sure in a sea fight ... in case Signals can neither be seen or perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his Ship alongside that of an Enemy.”7
Other elements of Nelson’s memorandum drew specifically from Royal Navy doctrine. For example, he confirmed that his second-in-command, Vice Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood, was to exercise his own initiative in carrying out his commander’s intent: “The Second in Command will, after my intentions are made known to him, have the entire direction of his Line to make the attack upon the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed.”8 This section of the memorandum also reinforced that portion of Nelson’s personal combat doctrine requiring the total defeat of the enemy.
So thorough were the instructions to Nelson’s flag officers and captains at Trafalgar that he felt the need to send only one general signal once the battle was joined. Transmitted at the beginning of the fighting, it said simply, “Engage the Enemy More Closely.” Based on Nelson’s 9 October memorandum and other briefings and written communications, it is difficult to argue that Nelson did not employ significant elements of the Royal Navy’s combat doctrine and communicate his own combat doctrine to subordinates. This view of the victor at Trafalgar contrasts with the view of some that Nelson was a brilliant improviser who ignored both doctrine and orders to achieve his victories.
The Extra Dimension
Nelson’s planning for the Battle of Trafalgar, however, was not simply a matter of applying doctrine. It was a matter of combining his ability to grasp the essence of a tactical situation, a thorough knowledge of Royal Naval doctrine, and—finally—to think and plan beyond doctrine. In a letter to Lady Emma Hamilton, Nelson used the term “Nelson Touch” when commenting on his battle plan for Trafalgar. He also called the plan “new” and “singular.”9
Although much of Nelson’s Trafalgar plan drew from existing doctrine, it was what went beyond doctrine that could be said to be singular—the “Nelson Touch.” For example, instead of relying on a “general chase” that normally would have been ordered once an enemy formation had been penetrated, it went into considerable detail about what should be done once a melee had been achieved.
Nelson’s Trafalgar plan was special in another respect. It violated the proscriptions against allowing the enemy to “cross the T” and actually attacked the enemy in that dangerously vulnerable position. The key to this part of the plan was that it was unexpected and probably was the swiftest way to create the pell-mell battle Nelson sought.
Nelson understood the usefulness of doctrine in preparing a battle plan. However, he also understood the importance of being both aggressive and innovative, the importance of maintaining flexibility once combat started, and the value of relying on well-briefed subordinates to deal with the unpredictable events of combat. Nelson recognized that doctrine was a means to an end, and used it that way.
The Final Requirement
Nelson not only did not ignore doctrine, he used it effectively—and in combination with aggressiveness and innovation—at Trafalgar. But it is important also to understand that his warfighter’s personality was essential to his success. Nelson’s well-earned reputation as an aggressive leader who would risk his life and career for victory and who relied heavily on his juniors was an exceptional motivator in combat. If there is a quintessential idea concerning doctrine that emerges from Trafalgar, it is that doctrine combined with a warfighter’s personality adds up to victory in combat.
1 Dr. James J. Tritten, “Naval Perspectives on Military Doctrine,” Naval War College Review, (Spring 1995): 22-38.
2 RAdm. Frederick Lewis, USN, “Is There a Doctrine In the House?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1994, pp. 23, 24.
3 Maj. Wayne Breakfield, USMC, Comments on ‘Taking Maneuver Warfare to Sea,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1995, p. 27.
4 Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, USN, After Action Reports, No. 411-1.
5 Tor a detailed history of doctrine in the British Royal Navy see, James J. Tritten. Doctrine and Fleet Tactics in the Royal Navy, U.S. Naval Doctrine Command Report, November 1994.
6 Geoffrey Bennett, Nelson The Commander (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1972), p. 91.
7 The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Nelson With Notes by Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas (London: Henry Colburn, 1846), pp. 89-92.
8 Ibid., p. 89.
9 Ibid., p. 60.
Admiral Callo, a Yale NROTC graduate, is a free-lance writer on naval, travel, and business subjects.