By encouraging the warriors’ early, direct, and sustained participation in the design process for LPD-17, the Navy hopes to deliver an adaptable and affordable means to serve Marine Corps expeditionary needs.
An amphibious ship glides silently into the littoral. She is ready to launch advanced amphibious assault vehicles; her flight deck is “green” to receive MV-22 Ospreys. This LPD-17 has full data-link capability and integrated voice communications with the amphibious ready group and joint task force commanders as she approaches the splash point. Her combat-system team stands poised to defend the ship, using her vertical launch system. Elsewhere on board. Marines prepare to launch for their clandestine special-operations mission, which will succeed in part because of a ship design that is based on the overall employment of a ship in battle.
With increasing fiscal conservancy and growing worldwide operational complexity, the war fighter’s early, direct, and sustained participation in the design process is critical. Such an “ownership” approach, involving the Navy ship-acquisition team and operational users, is being pioneered in the Navy’s LPD-17 Ship Acquisition Program by Team 17. This “Design for Ownership” concept defines the owners as the operators, the maintainers, and the trainers and recognizes the need to build the next generation of surface combatants toward the realities of supporting future global naval expeditionary operations. By reengineering the traditional ship-acquisition process. Team 17 can deliver an operationally ready ship that is technologically adaptable, supportable, and affordable over its 40-year service life.
Earlier ship acquisitions have employed systems engineering principles to include the operator, but often these efforts would gear up precisely when the design, integration, and construction phases were entering a period of minimal flexibility—four to seven years after contract award. In contrast. Team 17’s process relies on mission teams to define the overall operational context for a new surface combatant. The mission teams include representation all the way across the shipbuilding-customer base: the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Marine Corps, the fleet commanders, other services, and the organizations that regularly study questions of war fighting. More specialized development and support teams, composed of representatives from the systems commands and design agencies, contribute by translating operational context into specific shipbuilding technology. Coordination is facilitated by a “virtual team” approach, which uses computer technology to link geographically dispersed work centers for continuous interaction.1
Design for Ownership extends reengineering to study the warfare areas in which a ship must perform. Because it is conducted in terms of information flow and processing, this study offers the advantage of concentrating on the key warfare-related activities that the ship must support. The initial workshop already has taken place—in September 1995 at the Navy Post Graduate School Monterey, where the key processes inherent in the LPD-17 design were identified. These processes then became the focus of Team 17.
Specific mission requirements describing the LPD-17’s role in contemporary naval expeditionary and joint operations help define the specific subjects for study. The war fighter’s participation in this process definition is essential to the ultimate effectiveness of the detail ship design and total ship systems integration. Because a total ship systems integrator is included on the shipbuilder’s team, the ship’s design and integration occur concurrently, before the start of construction.
Given a tentative operational requirement for the LPD-17 dating back to 1988 and an uncertain but technologically demanding future, it is imperative to have the war fighters’ participation before steel is cut. The intent is not to create an independent requirements process; the objective of these efforts is to ensure that the engineering solutions to the operational requirements document are robust, flexible, and enduring. The existing approach tends to view determining requirements as a beginning; instead, it must be a continuum.
Amphibious Warfare and the Role of the LPD-17
Times have changed since the Navy and Marine Corps launched the first modem amphibious campaign at Guadalcanal, with a force primarily made up of converted merchant hulls. Amphibious warfare has evolved from large-scale assaults to flexible, quick-reaction, surgical-type operations conducted by leaner, more powerful mobile forces. With future missions likely to include containing or defusing crises in their early stages, today’s amphibious forces must be capable of a relatively short-notice response. They also may act as the enabling force or, when used properly, as part of the larger strategic effort.
Larger, modern amphibious operations probably will be executed within the context of a joint operation, integrated into a joint task force structure. Doctrine for these operations, summarized in Joint Publication 302, divides them into four broad categories: assaults, raids, demonstrations, and withdrawals. Strategic necessity and technology, however, have altered the conduct of amphibious warfare much as they have all military operations.2
In considering the nature of the missions most likely to be undertaken by our naval expeditionary forces, the most significant change in our posture has been the development of the special operations capable Marine expeditionary unit (MEU[SOC]). MEU(SOC) tactics have shaped the posture of our forward-deployed amphibious forces to meet the demands of our current strategic milieu and have prepared the amphibious ready group to undertake 20 specialized missions most representative of the operations likely to be tasked.3 (See table 1.)
The next decade will see further refinement and change to these ideas as the Marine Corps readies itself for the 21st century.
The nature of expeditionary warfare and supporting amphibious operations dictates the role of an amphibious ship in these operations as several distinct but intertwined functions: transport, command platform, and operating base. As a transport, the ship will move the highly trained MEU(SOC) force, allowing for ongoing warfare skills training, routine maintenance of sophisticated equipment, and adequate stowage. Every amphibious ship plays a role in directing amphibious operations, whether providing navigational direction or intelligence and communications support, so the ability to operate as a command platform is critical. Finally, the ship also must act as a mobile operating base, generating medical, aviation, repair, and logistics support for embarked and deployed Marines.
Given these functions, the Navy’s proposed LPD-17 class will play a key role in the amphibious ready group of the future. Touted as the replacement for the LST, LKA, LSD, and older LPD, the LPD-17 will be a multipurpose ship capable of landing approximately 700 Marines by landing craft or helicopter. Congress has accelerated the ship by two years to offset dwindling amphibious ship totals. The LPD-17 is needed sooner rather than later to meet the Navy and Marine Corps amphibious lift requirement, but the effort still must be carried out properly.4
The LPD-17 is not being regarded solely as a replacement in kind, but rather as a rare and vital opportunity to rethink and restructure for the future. Design specifications demand a focused and tangible vision, defined in more tactical terms than the square-cube-weight requirements already set out in initial design. In conceptualizing the LPD-17’s future, the touchstone is an ability to provide integrated support to distinctive and significant combat maneuver element operations—not just to build a hull.
Mission: The Three Axes
Translating future naval expeditionary warfare requirements into ship acquisition goals is accomplished through the coordinated efforts of full-time Navy and Marine Corps representatives on Team 17. Their efforts are integrated along three separate but parallel axes: command-and-control challenges, the increasingly complex technical functions that underline future amphibious operations, and the threat-driven weapon systems that must be installed on tomorrow’s ships. These three primary concerns provide an operational direction, which in turn drives the acquisition effort.
The established operating requirements for LPD-17 are the key performance parameters within which the ship and its installed systems must fit. Extensive modeling and simulation are being used to ensure this fit. These design efforts require a different perspective on the physical dimensions of ship size and capability from that usually taken by engineers and naval architects. Troop berthing capability, for example, instead of being measured in number of bunks and lockers, must be gauged by the number of Marine rifle companies assigned to the expeditionary unit.
LPD-17 aviation requirements are not considered just as helicopter “spots,” but as the deck, magazine, and fuel requirements to sustain various aircraft types operating together in an integrated air assault plan. This same logic applies throughout the considerable cargo, vehicle, and well-deck capacities being sketched in for LPD-17. In short, the ship is being designed as a war-fighting system. Overall design requirements therefore are tailored technical to tactical.
C4I Mission Requirements. Deployed amphibious ready groups are trained to a standard calling for execution of a MEU(SOC) mission within six hours of receipt of an execution order. This idea was revalidated with the rescue of Captain Scott O’Grady by the 24th MEU embarked in the Kearsarge (LHD-3) during operations in Bosnia earlier this year. The C4I necessary for executing these types of missions is now seen by both Fleet and joint commanders as vital for amphibious ships.
To accommodate future joint and combined operations and missions conducted by widely dispersed, small, independently operating teams, the LPD-17’s tactical role will require access to many of the systems being fielded under the Global Command-and-Control System:
- Air planning, including participation in the air tasking order process
- Logistics planning, both within Navy channels and for embarked units
- Collaborative planning efforts, particularly those with higher service and joint headquarters
- Intelligence data, including information support with access to national-level sources for planning delicate and specialized missions
Given the connectivity requirements, band-width restrictions, and the space limitations inherent in ships, LPD-17 will have to have a specifically tailored C4I suite. At its foundation will be the Joint Maritime Command Information System, which will provide the ship’s gateway to the Global Command-and-Control System. More specialized joint systems, some yet to be developed, also will need to be integrated into the ship’s C4I systems.
LPD-17 Amphibious Warfare Systems Requirements. Amphibious warfare systems are those installed to support the movement of the landing force from the ship to its mission ashore. These include cargo storage space and handling equipment; well-deck, aviation, vehicle- storage, and medical facilities; troop messing and berthing; and administration and maintenance spaces. As a cornerstone of future amphibious ready group capability, LPD-17 must have as its centerpiece the latest amphibious warfare systems. What the Design for Ownership process provides is the blueprint by which these features are integrated into the ship, early in its design.
Conceptually, an amphibious operation can be divided into two stages. The first, launching the initial operation, is arguably the most stressful for the ship’s systems. Because of tactical timing ashore, assault craft, helicopters, troops, and vehicles must move in order and on time, following a complex script. Speed is a vital resource that the ship’s design must conserve and enhance: automated handling equipment can load faster; a too-narrow passageway or flight deck can delay the entire operation.
The second stage has a different set of priorities that must be accounted for in LPD-17’s design. If landing forces are to be leaner and more powerful, operate as self- contained arm teams over a wide and dispersed area, and move from ship to objective without the traditional buildup ashore, they will require modern systems to support them—medical, logistical, repair, etc. Building this support into amphibious shipping is particularly critical in the expeditionary environment, where it often is difficult—sometimes impossible—to build a supporting infrastructure ashore. Certainly, joint interoperability becomes a key factor during this stage, as exemplified by operations in Somalia and Haiti, where U.S. Army helicopters operated off amphibious ships.
Designing and integrating the LPD-17’s major capabilities—such as the well deck, flight deck, and propulsion plant—drive the top- level design, and extensive modeling and simulation are being used to see these systems into the future. To ensure interoperability and sup- portability, LPD-17 and the advanced amphibious assault vehicle are being developed in tandem. The LPD-17 will rely on air-cushion landing craft for its surface assault capability and so will require cargo and maintenance systems compatible with these craft. In addition. LPD-17 must have the flexibility to support the MV-22 Osprey. These advances are both pivotal and representative, characterizing the changes in tactics that LPD-17 will see during its 40-year service life; they must find their way into ship design.
Table 1: MEU(SOC) Missions
- Raids
- Limited Objective Attacks
- Noncombatant Evacuation
- Shows of Force
- Reinforcement Operations
- Security Operations
- Mobile Training Teams
- Civic Action Operations
- Tactical Deception
- Fire Support Control
- Counterintelligence Operations
- Initial Terminal Guidance
- Signal Intelligence Operations
- Tactical Recovery of Aircraft
Equipment & Personnel
- Recovery Operations
- Specialized Demonstration Operations
- Military Operations in Urban Terrain
- In-extremis Hostage Rescue
- Forward Arming and Refueling Point
- Airfield Seizure
LPD-17 Weapon Systems Requirements. Without question, the combat power of an amphibious ship is the embarked Marine landing force with its ability to project power ashore. In the increasingly dangerous operational space of the littoral, with its compressed battle space and limited reaction time, every ship also will need a self- defense capability. The loss of any amphibious ship could result in mission failure, so tomorrow’s amphibious ships must be designed and integrated to respond to attacks that might penetrate the cruiser’s and destroyer’s protective shield. The baseline combat system planned for the LPD-17 includes the rolling airframe missile (RAM), Nixie AN/SQL-25 antitorpedo defense, and AN- SQL-32/chaff electronic countermeasures systems. Planned product improvements for the class include adding the evolved Sea Sparrow missile and Mk 41 vertical launch systems.
The Design for Ownership approach for LPD-17 will be evident in the ship’s combat system suite, for the same data used by the ship’s C41 systems will support her Weapon systems as well. The key to making this happen will be a complete fiber optic system—the Shipwide Area Network (SWAN)—that connects all shipboard equipment and sensors, distributing information to fight the ship or to conduct operations.
Of course, any design based on the ship’s mission requirements essentially will be a collection of trade-offs, and this is where the war fighter plays a crucial role. For example, the planned vertical launch system will occupy approximately the same amount of space as would a 30- 40 man troop berthing space, an exchange that provides an enhanced self-defense capability at the expense of a SEAL or heavy weapons platoon. Involving the war fighter in the design process will foster an enlightened discussion of these trade-offs, forging a decision that will have greater merit for the operator.
Keeping the Focus on the War Fighter
The Design for Ownership commitment ensures that the design, total ship systems integration, construction, testing, and life-cycle support processes are in the best Possible alignment with the CNO’s operational requirements document. With that commitment and through the marvel of modeling and simulation, few—if any—changes should be necessary when steel is cut. Taken to their fullest development, these concepts should result in a ship that is affordable and adaptable to technological or threat advances.
In a recent article in the Marine Corps Gazette, Lieutenant General Charles Wilhelm wrote, “Expeditionary is having an innovative mind-set, ready to engage in original thinking to solve problems, large and small. Unexpected missions generate unexpected problems, problems which seldom have ready-made solutions. The expeditionary warrior is expected to solve problems with the tools at hand, not those that are necessarily right for the job." The ship designer and builder must have this same mind-set. Through the Design for Ownership approach, the LPD-17 will enter the fleet warrior friendly, remain so over its long service life, and serve as the right tool for the Marine Corps’ expeditionary warrior.
1 ’The “team" concept in ship design process as outlined here and fully described by Durein and Pollard in their article, "Total Ship System Engineering. A Gang Of Six Initiative. NSWC. Dahlgren, Va."
2 The amphibious ready group is built around an amphibious squadron of three to five amphibious ships with a Marine expeditionary unit embarked. Three ARGs are forward deployed at any one time, each capable of supporting the 2.200 Marine MEU for 15 days.
3 The MEU is built along the Marine air-ground task force concept with a battalion landing team ground combat element, a composite air squadron air combat element, and a combat service support unit.
4 LCdr. Stephen Surko, USN, “LPD-17 . . . Arriving." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1995, pp. 43-44; and “Forcible Entry Tied to Ship Replacement Effort,” National Defense Magazine, October 1995, pp. 38-39.
Admiral Picotte served in a variety of billets during a 35-year naval career, including as a radarman, duty in explosive ordnance disposal, as commanding officer of four surface ships, and as the first commanding officer of the Wasp (LHD-1). Culminating his career as Commander. Amphibious Group Two, he executed forward presence and expeditionary warfare missions in Somalia, Haiti, Cuba, Mediterranean, and in the Adriatic. Admiral Picotte currently is employed by American Systems Corporation supporting the development of LPD-17. Captain Gauthier, a 1969 graduate of the Naval Academy, served three tours in destroyers prior to transferring to the restricted line in 1979. Since that time, he has been involved in the design and construction of five ship classes, ranging from early design through life-cycle support. He has served as Aegis cruiser production officer, director of Surface Combatant Shipbuilding Programs (ASN1RD&A)), executive assistant to Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, chief of staff of the Aegis Shipbuilding Program, program manager PMS-380, and program manager for LPD-17.