Helicopter Rambos—A Fatal Combination
By Captain Brian V. Buzzell, U.S. Navy (Retired)
One clear message in the lessons learned from Operations Earnest Will (Persian Gulf), Praying Mantis (Libya), and Desert Storm (Persian Gulf-Kuwait) generated a requirement to give fleet commanders an armed helicopter with a capability against ships, small boats, and coastal targets. This was not a new requirement but an exercise in expediency born of the frustration that the Penguin missile had not yet entered service.
Although using Penguin missiles against some targets would have been overkill, present proposals to arm the SH-60B LAMPS III series helicopters with the short-range, technically unproven Hellfire missile could turn out to be a costly mistake.
The proposal is predicated on only two arguments:
- The Navy needs an organic capability against small, fast patrol craft armed with weapons capable of interfering with Navy operations in the littorals.
- Since battle groups already have organic SH-60s, they should be equipped with Hellfire, a low-cost, off-the-shelf weapon.
But are these arguments valid? Is it prudent to risk a $40 million weapons platform, the ship’s crucial forward-deployed sensor, in a littoral environment when other (cheaper) operationally proven platforms are available to do the job? And why, after two sustained live-fire engagements where the results were devastating to the enemy, has the U.S. Navy chosen the most expensive course of action to satisfy a perceived gap in capability?
Ignoring years of fleet experience and the conclusions of earlier threat analyses, the Navy is pushing ahead with a new seaborne armed-helicopter initiative that departs radically from the LAMPS 111 (SH-60B/R) approved Block I and Block II upgrades that incorporated the Penguin antiship missile. Furthermore, the proposed add-on of the short-range forward- looking infrared (FLIR)/Hellfire weapon suite rejects a battle proven, cost-effective combination of ship, LAMPS III, and U.S. Army FLIR/Hellfire-equipped OH-58D Kiowas—a team proved during Operation Earnest Will and Operation Desert Storm.
In 1984, the Department of the Navy validated a 1979 Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet Operational Requirement to arm the LAMPS III with a forward-firing antiship weapon. Available weapons—Maverick, Sea Skua, Exocet, Hellfire, and Penguin—were all analyzed. Established criteria included:
- Stand-off range to ensure helicopter survivability
- Open-ocean and littoral effectiveness
- Adequate warhead
- All-weather, fire-and-forget capability
- Non-decoyable passive seeker
- Compatible with emerging U.S. Navy insensitive munitions specification
Primarily based on threat analysis and the ability to keep the LAMPS III helicopter out of harm’s way, the Penguin was selected.
What has changed to make the Hellfire missile so attractive? It has been called a great peacetime weapon because the pilots get to shoot a lot of practice missiles. Is this “Rambo” attitude to be the motivating factor for selecting a weapon that neither ensures sufficient target damage nor guarantees helicopter safety?
The LAMPS III weapon system was purchased in the 1980s at significant cost for antisubmarine warfare and ocean antisurface warfare (ASuW). It has been such a success that its missions now include airborne early warning and a host of other tasks. Block I and Block II upgrades were approved to improve its capabilities against newer, more capable threats, including small, fast, armed small craft in the littoral.
During Operation Desert Storm, Vice Admiral Stanley Arthur, U.S. Navy, then Seventh Fleet Commander, successfully employed a combination of Hellfire- equipped U.S. Army OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters and Royal Navy Lynx helicopters armed with Sea Skua missiles to destroy enemy small craft and fixed off-shore platforms that threatened the fleet. These small, versatile helicopters were coordinated by LAMPS Ills acting as airborne command-and-control stations in a manner similar to U.S. Air Force airborne early warning and controls system (AWACS) E-3s.
Commander Thomas Cirillo, U.S. Navy, LAMPS III detachment officer-in-charge on board the USS Jarrett (FFG-33), commented on the success of the Army/Navy team against an Iraqi Silkworm missile site, after fixed-wing strikes had failed, in a September 1992 Proceedings article [“Learning from the Army,” pages 99-101]: “The Jarrett's OH-58Ds and LAMPS Ills |were] to reconnoiter the island and destroy the sites if they could be found .... What two days of tactical aviation raids had failed to destroy was thus eliminated by [Hellfire-] armed helicopters in less than 20 minutes.”
Table 1 Missile Performance Comparison | ||
Performance | Penguin (AGM 119B) | Hellfire (AGM 114 A/B) |
Launch weight | 815 pounds/Warhead 265 pounds | 107 pounds/Warhead 18 pounds |
Operational range | 3 to 18 nautical miles | 4.3 nautical miles |
Guidance | All passive (Inertial navigation system/infrared seeker | Semi active laser (i.e. helicopter active) |
Firing envelope | Radar designate | Line of sight (Down the bearing) |
Lock before launch | No | Yes |
Standoff range | Yes | No |
All-weather capable | Yes | No |
Fire-and-forget | Yes | No |
Target compatibility | Armed patrol craft/destroyers | Boghammers—unarmed patrol craft |
Enhanced ship ASuW capability | Yes, force multiplier. Compatible with Harpoon and Tomahawk | Minimal, not compatible with other ship armament |
Program status | Operational | IOC est. 1998-2001 |
Post-Desert Storm combined training among U.S. Army Kiowa Warriors, LAMPS Ills, and Navy ships has not been sustained. The inability to institutionalize the solution to a very real requirement led the Navy to act independently to request funding to procure an in-house, cost-effective, off-the-shelf capability.
There are two issues when comparing Penguin and Hellfire capabilities: weapon versatility and delivery-platform vulnerability. The Penguin was developed to operate against a wide range of open-ocean and littoral targets. There are many targets—frigates and larger—that the LAMPS III could counter with the Penguin from extended ranges, in contrast with the Hellfire’s lesser capabilities. Note that Hellfire is limited to attacking lightly armed inshore patrol craft, smaller boats, and stationary targets.
A reasonably current order-of-battle of naval forces that U.S. naval forces might conceivably confront includes few that are within the Hellfire’s capabilities. In view of the limited number of suitable Hellfire targets compared to the significantly higher number and value of Penguin targets, is the U.S. Navy sailing in the wrong direction?
LAMPS IIIs carrying Penguins are less vulnerable to attack for the following reasons:
- The Penguin’s operational range allows the launching aircraft to stay well outside the range of all hand-held surface-to-air missiles or radar-guided gun systems. This is not true for Hellfire. (See opening illustration, page 89.)
- Penguin’s present targeting system is long-range and all-weather. LAMPS III Block II upgrades will enhance stand-off classification capability with Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR). Forward- looking infrared systems, in contrast, are neither long range nor all-weather. The Hellfire system has limited stand-off capability against even small, lightly armed patrol craft.
- The Penguin is a completely passive, fire-and-forget weapon; Hellfire relies on semi-active homing and requires the launching helicopter to transmit until missile impact.
The Penguin missile may seem to be an overkill in selected scenarios, but the tradeoff between stand-off ranges, survival of the helicopter, and the ability to counterattack argue in its favor.
Hellfire has become an expedient solution because the Penguin apparently has grown to seem too expensive—as a result, however, of a myopic evaluation of the alternatives.
In 1990, the U.S. and Royal Norwegian navies signed a contract for 193 Penguins. That year, the missile successfully completed its Technical and Operational Evaluations. The original program called for 33 Penguin-capable Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates with a normal load of four missiles per ship. While Penguin procurement has been halted after delivery of 101 missiles, the total number of Penguin-capable combatants has increased to 80 to 95 ships to support a planned availability of 188 Penguin-capable SH-60R helicopters. It is clear that the actual Penguin requirement is considerably more than the original 193 missiles.
Today, the Penguin is fully operational with the fleet. A recent post-deployment report stated: “In summary, the opportunity to operate with Penguin in a real world environment over the course of a 6 month deployment greatly enhanced the ships ASUW [antisurface warfare] posture, particularly when tasked to perform surface operations in the littoral environment. We believe Penguin should routinely find a place aboard future deployers and that the armed helo concept should be a priority for surface combatant ship classes.”
The Navy’s Enhanced Weaponization Kit will equip the HH-60 and SH-60 series helicopters with Hellfire missiles, FLIR, and an M-240 machine gun. The SH-60 Block II retrofit will give LAMPs Ills a Hellfire capability. Tasks to be scheduled before the system attains an initial operational capability in about 1998 include:
- Development of a gimbaled FLIR/ laser designator
- Development or adaptation of a new missile launcher
- Certification of the SH-60 weapon system integration
- Procurement and introduction of training systems
- Procurement of 1,300 Hellfire AGM- 114B missiles
The missile buy remains an unfunded requirement and projected total program cost is $181 million.
Is this plan cost-effective? Is this really off-the-shelf? The answer is no. The Navy should use these funds instead to purchase additional Penguin missiles to meet fleet operational and training requirements.
Before putting Hellfires on the SH-60 series aircraft, the U.S. Navy should come up with satisfactory answers to some tough questions:
- Is short-range tactical support of the fleet a valid mission for the LAMPS III? Is this really mission creep with the next fatal step a requirement to fly this aircraft over land?
- Has a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis been completed? What are the trade-offs between sending a $40 million weapon system, armed with a short-range missile against a motor launch (Boghammer), oil derrick, patrol boat equipped with hand-held missile systems, or radar- guided, small-caliber gun systems? Platform vulnerability is critical. How does the loss of the helicopter relate to mission degradation for a ship’s total weapons systems offensively and defensively?
- Why not use available Army assets? Is it wise to disregard the lessons learned and operational expertise gained in actual combat conditions to experiment with an important organic capability? The Army is purchasing approximately 365 Kiowa Warrior OH-58Ds at an average cost of $7 million each; 180 are operational today. This is low-cost, off-the-shelf capability.
- Why not use Hellfire-equipped U.S. Marine Corps AH-1W Cobras?
- Why not let the Center for Naval Analyses study the issue before millions of unrefundable dollars are spent?
These questions and many more have apparently been left unanswered in the rush to arm our Navy seaborne LAMPS Ills. Placing short-range weapons on LAMPS helicopters was not the right decision in the 1980s. It is even less right today.
Captain Buzzell works at Technologies Strategies Alliances. From 1985 through 1988. he was the Program Coordinator for LAMPS I/1II, Penguin Missiles, and Unmanned Air Vehicles. During Operation Earnest Will, he helped develop the operational concept for employing Navy SH-60s and Army OH-58Ds together.
Blue and Gold Can Play for the Surface Force
Lieutenant Commander Nick Olmsted, U.S. Navy
International and domestic pressures limit the number of available assets the U.S. Navy can deliver to present and future conflicts. Continuing commitments overseas and still-unknown but potentially higher requirements for rapid reaction forces in various comers of the world are stretching a “right- sized” military. In this international landscape, the Navy will continue to play an active role in U.S. foreign policy.
At home, intense budgetary battles and deficit-reduction measures are placing extraordinary pressure on the Pentagon. The lead time and enormous investment needed for construction of a modern warship intensify the Navy’s predicament. A recent presentation by the Director of the Surface Warfare Division, Rear Admiral A.J. Krekich (N86), endorsed a surface force of 135-165 cruiser/destroyer/frigate warships, but only 118 are in active service. (See Table 1.) Hoped-for new construction and juggled decommissionings may fill this gap over several decades. Until then—and assuming these ships do get built—how can the surface navy fulfill its commitments without exhausting its people?
The answer: borrow an idea from our submariners and place Blue and Gold crews on key warships. What is needed most: more warships, or more warships on station? The recent reorganization of the surface force into core aircraft carrier battle groups, deploying destroyer squadrons, the Western Hemisphere Group, and two non-deploying Naval Reserve frigate squadrons identifies the units that could be selected for this program. The concept would not work with carrier battle groups or with amphibious task forces because their weapons—air wings and Marines—could not be stretched to meet this concept.
We can divide and expand commands into Blue and Gold crews following major overhauls or new construction break-ins to rotate every three to four months. Destroyer squadron deployments would last eight months, followed by eight months in homeport for maintenance, upkeeps, and training. (See Table 2.) In effect, we can leave the weapons on station for a longer period, while swapping crews at regular intervals. After this concept proves itself and is active with sufficient numbers of warships, we could increase operating tempo to as much as two-to-one with minimal added strain on the two crews. Resultant benefits will include:
- Improved quality of shipboard life. A fixed on/off crew cycle would truly unite families for half the time, compared to the duty and underway days for ships in homeport, under the present system. The Navy would see a reduction in shipboard-related stresses on families and a morale boost as Sailors take full advantage of a less-punishing schedule. Direct by-products will include:
- Improved fleet performance through longer tours, which will deepen the corporate knowledge afloat. Chief petty officers and leading petty officers will truly become ship-wide experts.
- Opened officer pipelines. More CO, XO, and department-head billets will not only relieve pressure in the entire surface line community but also will allow longer officer tours in these key warfighter billets. All hands will benefit dramatically from longer command tours.
- Cost savings ashore. The “extra” Sailors required would be found by a reduction in military shore-support billets. Rather than increase Navy manning, civilians could take over more administrative and training pipeline jobs, with a significant long-term cost benefit. Blue/gold crew relief will allow the Navy to place a higher percentage of Sailors in front-line warships.
- Reduced cost to provide warships on station for longer periods. In order to maintain one deployed warship continuously on station, one either can task Blue and Gold crews on two ships, or deploy four crew on four ships under the present system. Which is cheaper? Which crews are better trained and have more on-station experience?
- Warships tailor-made for the maritime action group (MAG) concept, carrier and amphibious task forces are central to current operations, but often, detached warships or MAGs fulfill presence and other types of missions while the big-deck ship is tethered to a local hot spot. Blue and Gold warships also would provide continuity between big deck-task force rotations.
- Vastly improved training while off-crew and decreased distraction while on-crew. Most crew training can be done during the off cycle—required and pipeline schools, dedicated team training, multiship tactical integration. Crews would arrive on board certified, trained, and rested, while a four-month crew duty cycle maintains operator proficiency on the platform.
- Crew stability during deployments. Report-and-detach periods and administrative leaves would be scheduled for the off-crew.
- The Navy will be able to afford a lower warship acquisition rate and still meet national security requirements.
- Sea time and attention will help keep these warships in top condition. Like for so many complex systems, constant use will be positive. Warship life will be expended while deployed rather than during extensive exercises and training.
Challenges of this concept include:
- Training: The surface force must construct and administer facilities building on existing assets (hot plants, combat systems trainers, etc.) to provide realistic training and simulations for off-crews, combined with innovative methods to hone the warfighting skills of a crew that is detached from its warship. Computer-based simulations can hone decision-making, but specific procedures, crew performance under extended watchstanding periods, and seamanship evolutions are harder to simulate. Afloat training groups would need to modify the tactical training strategy, as well as decouple crew and hull certifications in engineering. Designation of one or two of these warships, commanded by a senior captain and staff as force training ships under the afloat training group (ATG), would be a significant step.
- Maintenance. One might think these warships would become tired and worn, but increased attention can keep this problem manageable. The off-crew can monitor consolidated shipboard maintenance program (CSPM) status and help supply/parts acquisition for the on-crew., and their turnover process may actually improve equipment readiness; the most thorough inspectors are the oncoming crew. Watch the sparks fly the first time a division delays taking custody because of a previously unknown problem!
- Construction of berthing facilities for off-crew single members, especially junior Sailors.
- Manning and detailing new billets, while converting shore jobs to civilian positions. If 50 ships adopt this system (assume crew complement of 300), 15,000 shore billets could be civilianized.
- Cycle mismatches and crew swap would complicate coordination and command and control for deployed commanders. Hiccups can be minimized by maintaining accurate and up-to-date turnover files (on-crew) and message traffic (off-crew), and by tailoring off-crew training for the specific mission assigned to the warship. Scheduling crew swaps concurrent with mid-deployment maintenance availabilities can aid a smooth turnover, maintenance tracking, and command and control. Why can’t a four- ship destroyer squadron deploy, join the carrier battle group or amphibious ready group as an escort group, remain on-station while the battle group outchops, and be relieved after eight months by another squadron?
- Destroyer squadron staff manning. Do they swap with the ship or provide the C2 continuity for eight months and then rotate staff during homeport periods?
- Modification of helicopter detachment deployments/manning to meet new deployment cycle.
- Direct application of ballistic missile submarine lessons may not work because battle group operations and tactics are inherently more complicated than lone ballistic missile submarine deployments. Nonetheless, submariners can ease implementation of this concept.
This is not a firm analysis of this concept—either by cost, or tactical benefits—but it proposes one solution to the problem of rising demands on fewer and fewer warships. Much thought still needs to be applied, but if the Navy truly must respond to each crisis in the world, then perhaps fiscal and real-world constraints demand such a solution.
Commander Olmsted is the prospective combat systems officer of the USS John Hancock (DD-981). He was an Olmsted Scholar in Lausanne, Switzerland and has served on the USS Ticonderoga (CG-47), and USS Ponce (LPD-15). He wishes to acknowledge the contributions and original ideas of Lieutenant Willie Stigler, Lieutenant Meridith Moe, and Lieutenant Commander Lannie Lake.
Canadian Task Group: New Dimension to an Old Concept
By Lieutenant Colin McKeown, Canadian Navy
During World War II, the Royal Canadian Navy, working in small task groups, concentrated on convoy escort duties. In the three decades that followed, Canadian naval defense doctrine was based principally on countering the considerable Soviet submarine threat, and the Canadian task group centered around the aircraft carriers HMCS Magnificent and then HMCS Bonaventure. When they were paid off without replacement after 1970, the task group concept essentially went dormant—as did our antiair warfare capabilities. We trained our sailors and officers strictly for a war in the Atlantic working with allied forces.
Recent operational experiences have underlined the need for Canada to develop a viable, nationally supported, self-contained task group capable of dealing with threats in both deep and littoral waters. The 1994 Defence white paper refers to the deployment of a task group in support of Canadian, alliance, and contingency operations and reaffirms the Navy’s commitments to protecting Canadian sovereignty, participating in collective defense agreements, including NATO and NORAD, and preserving world stability through multilateral operations and peacekeeping missions. The Canadian government also has directed the Navy to liaise with naval forces from Latin America and Asia Pacific, to further understanding and promote good relations.
In addition, an evolving maritime mission—to “maintain balanced, combat capable, general purpose naval forces”—coupled with greatly strengthened maritime resources—12 new Canadian patrol frigates. Tribal-class destroyer modernization, and 12 maritime coastal defense vessels—caused planners to reevaluate tactical employment concepts. No longer will Canadian resources always be assigned or integrated into coalition or allied task groups. Future operations could see Canadian naval and air units working together—without other nations’ participation—in a full range of tasks in operations around the globe.
The task group is a time-tested approach to employing naval forces and is practiced by most maritime nations, including the United States, France, Great Britain, Germany, and Spain. Our previous experience in World War II working with Royal Navy task groups was limited to antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and some antiair warfare (AAW). The new concept would demand more flexibility and a more equitable sharing in all warfare disciplines. The current Canadian task group (CATG) illustrates the many benefits this concept will yield.
Components of the CATG
The integral components of the CATG are:
► A command element consisting of the task group commander and his staff, usually embarked in a Tribal-class destroyer, all of which have enhanced-C3 capabilities.
- Two Canadian patrol frigates, which have been designed to maximize their ASW and antisurface warfare (ASuW) abilities and therefore usually will be assigned these tasks.
- One Tribal-class destroyer. Because of its SM 2 (Block III) missile system and associated sensors, it normally will be assigned AAW.
- For the near term, one Annapolis-class or improved Restigouche-class destroyer, both of which have considerable ASW detection systems.
- One fleet replenishment vessel, which will be assigned as refueling-at-sea and logistics coordinator.
- Embarked Sea King helicopters. The variant will depend on the anticipated mission and subsequent employment.
- A squadron of as many as six Aurora maritime patrol aircraft.
- One Oberon-c\ass diesel-electric submarine, depending on the mission, operating area, and availability.
In addition, the following resources may be accessible, depending on mission requirements:
- Minesweepers. Once the new maritime coastal defense vessels are operational, plans will be devised to incorporate their mine countermeasures potential into CATG tactics.
- CF-18, C-130, and CE-144 aircraft. Fighter and airborne early warning aircraft trained in maritime tactics will be assigned depending on mission requirements, time/distance variables, and airfield availability. In-air refuelers such as the C-130 could prolong air-cover time for the CATG.
Like any effective task group, the CATG relies on a complementary mix of offensive and defensive capabilities that results in a total force greater than the sum of its parts.
Antiair Warfare
The recent Tribal modernization gave the four Iroquois-class destroyers a moderate AAW capability against most threats. The Standard Missile System (SM 2 Block III) in conjunction with the DA 08 radar allows the CATG to engage up to two targets at a time within the area defense envelope. The Halifax-class frigates are fitted with an excellent air search radar, the SPS 49. Each Canadian patrol frigate is fitted with 16 Sea Sparrows, which can be used to provide some protection to a second unit. Both classes are fitted with guns (either 76 mm or 57 mm), which give a limited capability against aircraft and sea-skimming missiles. Plessey Shield Chaff and infrared launch systems in conjunction with the Phalanx close-in weapon system afford most ships a reasonable antiship missile defense.
Antisubmarine Warfare
The CATG commander has a potent mix of weapons and sensors at his disposal with which to combat a submarine threat. The Halifax-class is fitted with an excellent passive towed array system that allows for long-range contact reporting. This class also has AN/SQS 505 hull-mounted sonar, which eventually will be replaced by the AN/SQS 510 for short- range passive/active tracking. The Iroquois and improved Restigouche classes possess the AN/SQS 505 in both hull- mounted and variable-depth versions. The older Annapolis-class ships are fitted with the same detection systems as in the Halifax class. All ships use the Mk 46 torpedo and are fitted with Nixie towed array for torpedo self-defense.
The Oberon-class submarines, after final modernization, will be fitted with Plessey Triton Type 2051 passive/active sonar, BAC Type 2007 flank array, and Hermes Electronics towed arrays. Mark 48 torpedoes with active/passive homing heads are provided for use against submarines and surface units. The diesel- electric’s main limitation is its restricted speed and consequent dependence on accurate prepositioning to maximize its effectiveness.
The Sea King helicopters embarked in all CATG ships extend the effective screening range of the task group considerably. Their passive capabilities, using ASQ-13 dipping sonar work well in conjunction with surface units’ towed arrays. Unfortunately, the Sea Kings’ potency is diminished by their considerable age and concomitant high maintenance requirements. Aurora aircraft, the CATG commanders’ long-range eyes and ears, provide effective submarine tracking and limited over-the-horizon targeting capabilities.
Antisurface Warfare
The introduction of the Harpoon missile into the Canadian Navy finally gave tacticians an effective and lethal weapon with which to engage opponents at long range. Because of budgetary constraints, only the Canadian patrol frigates have been fitted with this system. With only eight missiles per frigate, commanding officers must carefully weigh their options when faced with a potential conflict. With the number of antiship missile defense systems fitted to today’s warship, a multiple missile launch usually is required to defeat defense systems. The SM 2 in the Tribal class possesses some surface-to-surface capability, though it is somewhat restricted in targeting. The fitted 57-mm and 76-mm guns are designed primarily for AAW but can be brought to bear on surface targets. They have excellent rates of fire but are confined by small range capabilities. All ships are equipped with .50 caliber machine-gun mounts for use against air and surface targets, though their principal function is maritime interdiction.
The new Canadian task group was tried in 1995 during NATO exercises Strong Resolve and Linked Seas. In addition, it was used successfully in a joint context during the Canadian maritime exercise MARCOT ’95. Preliminary feedback from these exercises has highlighted several lessons to be learned.
First, the CATG must be kept at high readiness and be prepared to deploy at short notice for sustained operations. Sustainability will be through two conduits. The first is a well-equipped and adequately stored replenishment ship assigned to each task group; the second is a forward logistics support site that will be deployed to the theater of operations. Currently, the Canadian Navy is supplying a replenishment vessel to Standing Naval Force, Atlantic, for operations in the Adriatic and a forward logistics support site is working in Italy. Future large-scale, joint and combined exercises will provide the opportunity to truly test both.
Another area of concern is communications. This will present a constant challenge to the task group because of limited resources and availability of working frequencies. Careful and prudent allocation of frequencies is essential to preserve effective command and control.
Rules of engagement (ROEs) will vary depending on the mission. Normally, the CATG will deploy under Canadian national ROEs (maritime or joint), unless it chops to another command such as NATO. Quick and timely issue of ROEs will be crucial to the CATG commander, who must formulate correct and accurate instructions to his commanding officers to avoid unintended engagements or improper use of force.
Eventually each coastal commander will have a CATG on his or her respective coast (Halifax and Esquimalt). The CATG probably will experience bumps along the road to a final product, but future refinement and continuous development of this concept will ensure that this national asset will be an effective and efficient tool of national policy.
Lieutenant McKeown currently serves as National Exercise Planner in Maritime Force Atlantic Headquarters and is a part-time student at Saint Mary’s University.