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Recent world events have underscored a need for interservice cooperation in the pursuit of carrying out U.S. Foreign policy. While each service, in turn, has acknowledged the need to develop ‘Jointness,’ limited measures have been taken at the Fleet and field levels to enhance and promote greater understanding and to allow closer operational ties. One key example is the sharing of tactical information over data links. Each service has developed link systems along separate lines, and although there are cases in which those systems interface directly (most notably, AWACS into Link 11), for the most part each system functions on its own. Integrating different link systems has been included as an afterthought to design, making interoperability difficult at best.
Our current data-link systems do not work acceptably in a joint environment, and they cannot provide reliable data flow across the large operating areas we monitor. They are not flexible enough to maintain a high-quality local picture while attempting connectivity in a difficult environment, because the focus is often shifted to a single participant at the cost of other units that rely on link data for control and survival. Link operators are left to battle among themselves to provide a marginal tactical picture, generating friction and even hostility toward other operators. The real problems lie in the laws of physics, as they relate to the operation of our contemporary systems: We cannot do the job with what we have. A lack of data integration at-the tactical level undermines the goal of jointness.
We must consider options that develop link interoperability at a level that guarantees greater operational closeness in the future: during daily operations around the globe. The recently completed Bottom Up Review highlighted a need for greater joint C4I capabilities. The ongoing development of theater- level enhancements to air-defense systems undoubtedly will increase the need for a large-area tactical-data picture. The data-link systems used today will not support effective tactical employment of long-range surface-to-air missiles. The current J6 initiative, C4I For the Warrior, envisions a worldwide command-and-control network in which every service can share all-source information.
At issue is a lack of joint tactical data sharing, not a lack of ability to gather tactical data. Each service develops its own tactical data picture, and all too often, one service knows the identity or intentions of a radar track, while others struggle to
assemble the missing puzzle pieces over a different link. In a scenario for which no single source or service holds the entire answer, valuable time will be wasted at higher levels while searching for it. Consider an egressing Navy strike that has been under AW ACS control and has become lost because of efforts focusing on other priorities, such as hostile raids. Geographical communications constraints prohibit the AWACS from responding to the Navy link, and the returning strike package continues toward its carrier without the proper actions being taken by the AWACS controller. As the strike continues homeward, extra effort will be applied to identifying them and to ensuring that they are not being pursued. Perhaps the combat air patrol (CAP) will expend extra fuel on them, intercepting to reduce the likelihood that they could fire a cruise missile should they turn out to be bogeys. The possibilities for disaster at this point are real: We might attack the returning strikers in error—or worse, be caught with our pants down by bad guys from another angle. Either way, resources are wasted unnecessarily on basic procedure.
These risks can be reduced only by practicing joint operations on a regular basis. We don’t operate joint links with all services often enough, and this results in too much time wasted in resolving the same issues every time joint operations are conducted. Every Navy operator who has linked with AWACS, Patriots, or Hawks can attest to how long it took to establish connectivity and how difficult it was to make a link work effectively.
Somehow, every time a battle group or another service unit turns over the relearning process starts again—seemingly from scratch. Further complicating matters, we too often try to link without having key players meet face-to-face. This establishes a weak rapport based only on painful lessons. A true solution requires a thoughtful effort to minimize wasted time by building trust and understanding between the services. This must begin by educating operators about the capabilities of the other services. The logical extension comes in conducting regular joint exercises and operations, with a genuine effort placed on rapid response and operations. These skills can be developed only by ensuring that all players are comfortable operating a joint link, which requires personal interaction and standardized procedures.
Currently, a “joint link” means that at one time or another, more than one service participates in the radio network we call Link 11. This does not always mean that a constant, useful flow of information exists for the consumers of link data. More often than not, it means just the opposite. Examination of locations where joint link operations are conducted reveals no standard method; the norm has become; "This is how we’ve always done it,” regardless of whether “it” works or not. Each operating area has developed a method, and units in-chopping make their procedures conform to the area. Unfortunately, the methods developed usually benefit only the predominant service element, and do not work when forces are suddenly multiplied in response to a crisis situation—as aptly demonstrated by Operation Desert Storm link operations.
Real-time tactical information display has grown to be one of the most important decision-making aids in our operations, yet we struggle to provide a picture because of ill-conceived planning. This need not be the case, however. Lessons learned in engineering and damage control apply directly; Develop a standard procedure that is repeatable, yet flexible and resilient enough to be used in dynamic situations. Shipboard damage- control and casualty-control procedures are systems of basic steps that can be combined to manage a wide variety of challenging situations. Nearly every ship implements these procedures, with slight variances; an experienced engineer or repair- locker officer could perform effectively on any ship similar to his own. This shows that any number of challenges can be met with a single set of management tools.
This philosophy could be used in operational communications as well. There are many similarities to be found in operating joint links in different regions of the world. With a standardized architecture for data-link operation, connectivity can be established rapidly with forward-deployed forces. Next, issues of data management will arise; not every service has a need or an ability to process the massive amounts of data generated by contemporary radar systems. Today, most joint links never get far enough past the connectivity hurdles to allow any substantial focus on data management.
Other latent issues will be those of coordinating, tracking, and identification. As expected, units operating in the same littoral area will hold many mutual tracks. Common sense dictates a need to identify every track quickly, but each service uses its own criteria and methods. Combining these efforts would create a synergistic effect, leading to a more accurate tactical picture and improved ability to act decisively in a changing environment.
How do we combine these efforts? It requires direct communication and an architectural standard, as well as a method of rapid deployment and integration into links presently operating. Those requirements could be met by an extension of the Joint theater commander’s tasking and personnel through the creation of a Joint Data Fusion Center (JDFC). This idea tasks a small, technically and tactically competent staff with coordinating and managing link data flow between each participating service. For highest effectiveness, each service would be represented, with access to all link data generated by every in-theater link. Service representatives would act to speed connectivity, deal with data- management issues, and track identification by coordinating face- to-face with the other services. This would eliminate the long, broken conversations held over radio circuits during the always frustrating efforts to solve connectivity problems. Each service could speak to its respective players, coordinating jointness in a personal, hands-on manner.
Conceptually, the JDFC idea is simple, but will it work with the equipment we already have? The answer is a qualified “Yes.” There is antiquated equipment available (e.g., U.S. Air Force FPU/ASIT vans, U.S. Army PADIL/TADIL converters) which could be used on a limited basis, but these methods rely on outdated computers that were not up to the task even when they were first deployed. A better solution would be to develop software for a work station or desk-top computer local area network system. An extension to the current Flag Data Display System (FDDS/NTCS-A), now installed in many staff spaces, provides a natural building block. A JDFC could be located within the staff control center, or it could be operated remotely, forwarding tracks via satellite. This would be a low-cost modification, and the benefits would far outweigh the cost of development.
Using FDDS/NTCS-A would require minimal development because of the existing Link 11 interface capabilities. The key new functions required are an ability to select and transmit tracks from one link to another and to convert data from one link type to another. An interface card for each participating link would be required, and the software to select and transmit tracks could be added to the current FDDS/NTCS-A build. Each JDFC work station would be a participant in its represented link or receive tracks via satellite, radio frequency (RF), or land line from a companion work station at the remote location. The additional tracks supplied to each link by the JDFC would be generated by reading the databases of the other participating links and selecting those desired. Each link would require a staffed JDFC work station, the requisite input/output card and software, and connection in a local area network to other JDFC work stations.
Use of a JDFC would allow each service to operate a tactical-area link in a manner best suited to their needs, while facilitating data sharing between links. The speed of the current workstations would allow this without adversely affecting link performance. The forward participating unit (FPU) systems currently in use do not allow this flexibility or control, and drive critical net-cycle times to unacceptable levels. In addition, FPU systems do not allow enough track flow tailoring; when a database becomes saturated with tracks, there is no way to know which tracks are not being received by the other link players.
This is a potentially lethal situation, which can be avoided with track filters and area filters incorporated into JDFC software.
Realization of the JDFC concept would allow both land- and sea-based command options as well as a smooth transition to joint operations. Other benefits would include an ability to forward a tactical picture via satellite, RF, or landline worldwide; an ability to control track flow between systems with different track file limits; and the possibility of upgrading entire track data suites of present systems with an exponentially more capable and faster system without abandoning older systems. In a war at sea, large battle groups could operate two or more links simultaneously, tailoring data to various levels of combat system capabilities and needs.
The development of an outgrowth to an existing system would fill an important interoperability gap, while allaying fears of developing and deploying an entirely new tactical data system. The frustrations of JTIDS exemplify how complex this task can be. The JDFC concept shows how a simple enhancement can serve not only as an interim but also as a transitional, growth- oriented solution to the problem of creating more complex data- sharing systems. Each service could continue using the equipment it has developed, and the addition of another participating unit in each link (where applicable) would allow full access to the entire spectrum of data generated. Certainly, the JDFC concept does not have all the bells and whistles envisioned in JTIDS—but it is simple, cheap, and effective. Our present link systems are slow and limited in capability, but have valuable features that will not easily be replaced—primarily an ability to link directly with foreign services. The question of whether we need more capability at the cost of starting over or just a better way to integrate what we already have is important to consider in these economically difficult times. Implementing the JDFC concept would provide the realization of the data link integration envisioned by the C41 For the Warrior concept.
Lieutenant Gabrielson is a surface warfare office* and is currently studying Operations Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
Desert Storm Taught Us Something
Kevin E. Pollock
At the heart of most of the antiair warfare (AAW) lessons from Desert Shield and Desert Storm is the way the Navy communicated with its sister services in a joint littoral arena.
The Air Tasking Order (ATO). The most critical information product exchanged between Coalition units in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) was the U.S. Air Force’s ATO, which outlined the particulars for the following day’s fixed- wing flights.
It assigned Mode II identification friend or foe (IFF) codes to all missions and included the aerial refueling schedule for all Air Force and Marine Corps tankers. All of this was important to naval units operating in the Persian Gulf, specifically the Battle Force Air Resource Element Commander (BFAREC) and the Force AAW Commander (FAAWC), in planning the entire AAW day identifying early possible gaps in tanking coverage.
The Navy’s problems with the ATO during Desert Shield- Desert Storm have been well documented in these pages: pieces or sections were often missing, and the entire product usually did not arrive until well after that day’s scheduled start time. The solution, again well documented, was to distribute it using fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. We obviously need a better system and much has been done to improve the situation. In future campaigns, however, we must have a reliable information exchange system to distribute the ATO, or products like it.
Data Links. The most important information-exchange system in a littoral setting provides real-time data-link information for tactical applications. The term “real-time,” however, reflects naval link philosophy. The Air Force does not operate that way, but rather exchanges its air picture, provided primarily by an E- 3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, with important ground stations via a strategic link. The AWACS runs the whole show, while land-based radars are responsible only for reporting tracks in certain geographic locales called track production areas (TPAs).
In contrast, Navy battle force Link-11 operations strive to keep net cycle time (NCT) as low as possible, ensuring theat the tactical information exchanged is as current as possible. Furthermore, the Navy relies on 360° reporting from units in correlating the entire air picture.
These different philosophies clashed at the land-sea interface