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After a near mid-air collision, one squadron used TQL methodologies to deal with the problem of “too many helos.” Statistical data showed that, while there were spikes in usage, there were many periods when the field was grossly underused. Easy adjustments in training schedules obviated the need for more draconian measures.
Following 200 years of incremental change in the ways we manage and lead, total quality leadership (TQL) may be the first truly revolutionary change in the way we conduct the Navy’s business. But will it work at the tip of the sword? Will it work in the fleet?
Initially, the lead organizations for TQL implementation in the Navy were large support outfits, such as Naval Supply Centers, Naval Aviation Depots, and Intermediate Maintenance Facilities. Quality was improved, costs reduced, functions streamlined. Still, these successes in the fleet support infrastructure had the potential to retard, rather than hasten, effective TQL implementation in the fleet. It was too easy for fleet operators to think these shore- based organizations had little relevance or applicability to real fleet problems.
TQL Near the Unit Level
To make TQL work at the unit level,
Navy leaders developed connectivity between statements of intent by the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations and what is happening at the ship or squadron level. A unit commander who is committed to making TQL work is perhaps the key ingredient, but closely following is the next-level commander, who establishes an environment in which these ideas can flourish and people can implement change in a thoughtful way.
Soon after the CNO’s initial TQL Memorandum to Flag Officers was promulgated, these ideas coalesced at one aviation functional wing. The wing commander, recognizing the power of leadership by example, first used his own staff to implement TQL. He and his staff undertook extensive TQL training, went through the catharsis of flattening their organization, and accepted the turbulence that so often accompanies change.
Buoyed by this positive experience, the wing commander then selected several squadrons as prototype units to begin TQL implementation. Criteria for selection were size, deployment cycles, stability, and the commanding officer’s (CO’s) time on board—COs near the end of their tours would not be there long enough to see TQL implementation through. The wing commander then invested heavily in intensive and extensive training for each of these squadrons, beginning with the squadron CO and the upper and middle khaki management.
As this training got under way, the wing commander—whose personal staff was now into its second year of TQL implementation—brought key people from each prototype squadron into the wing infrastructure, to assist in solving some wing-wide problems. They then could return to their squadrons with some concrete idea of how the TQL process worked and how it could be used to solve real fleet problems.
One project he used was key to accelerating TQL acceptance at the unit level: A near mid-air collision at an outlying helicopter operating base caused great alarm at all levels of command and led to a welter of intuitive, knee-jerk suggestions about fixing the problem. The only point of agreement was that there were “too many helos there.” So, the wing commander used his own staff and supplemental squadron personnel to form an executive steering committee, a quality management board, and a process action team to deal with the problem of “too many helos.”
The process action team, armed with clear guidance from the executive steering committee, took a systems approach to the problem. They insisted on obtaining hard statistical data to define the problem. What they received was detailed information kept (but never before used) by the control tower at that field that showed that while there were many “spikes” in field use, there were a large number of periods when the field was grossly underused. The net, statistical result proved that a slightly more balanced field usage could increase the margin of safety dramatically. Not all helo squadrons could predict precisely when they might need to use the field, but several large squadrons were able to shift the days or times they conducted replacement-pilot training flights at that field. This alleviated the safety problem and obviated any need for more draconian measures. Today, more than two years after the original event, the outlying field has had no more near-misses.
TQL at the Unit Level
The final and most critical step in positioning for success of TQL at the unit level is getting fleet units to use this process to solve real problems. Armed with support at the wing-commander level, provided with access to ample and excellent training, and given the opportunity to participate in problem-solving using the TQL methodology, one squadron devised an effective plan:
► Sell the TQL concept to the entire squadron: The squadron commander took a lot of time to explain TQL to his unit and to develop connectivity with things that were familiar to them. In his first presentations, he whispered “something new” but strove to find discrete examples of TQL-like processes (e.g., Quality Assurance Division trend analysis for aircraft parts failure) that already were part of squadron life.
► Obtain a commitment from the wing commander: The squadron commander realized that the time and effort required to move his squadron in the direction of fully implementing TQL would divert the attention of many of his key personnel— especially department heads, key division officers, and maintenance department chief petty officers—from their normal duties. Beyond the day-to-day activities of launching, recovering, and maintaining aircraft, a large part of their efforts were directed toward preparation for a seemingly endless cycle of inspections, particularly those conducted by the wing commander. Accustomed to measuring success by inspection scores and grades, these key senior people could not be easily convinced to stop focusing on this old measure of effectiveness unless something changed fundamentally. That change had to be some respite from the inspection cycle, and securing this concession from the wing commander was a key factor in allowing the squadron to focus on TQL.
y Make a commitment to TQL training: We train continuously in the Navy, and layering another batch of training on a busy squadron had the potential to bog things down. The successful squadron had to make a firm, long-term commitment to stick with TQL training, even if it meant accepting slightly decreased readiness rates, reduced availability of key personnel, slower throughput rates for new pilots, and other short-term negatives. Sticking with this training not only made the unit better able to implement TQL, but also demonstrated a commitment to the idea and the process. y Select the right people to help implement TQL: Commitment from the top is not enough to ensure that a unit buys into TQL. A few key people must be charged with making it happen. In this case, the squadron commander had to reach deep into the organization to find two individuals who balanced a zeal for TQL with a common-sense approach to the day- to-day requirements of running a squadron.
>■ Get a win: With the stage set and faced with a choice of tackling some large and very real squadron concerns or focusing on a very small problem, the squadron commander chose the latter in order to get a win. He needed to win the “battle of the first salvo.”
TQL in the Unit
The first problem this unit tackled with TQL techniques was one designed to get a win and push the unit along the path to further TQL implementation. It needed to be a discrete area with a definable solution—not something vague like “improving quality of life.” It needed to have a high degree of unit identification, something that a great number of people got involved in. It needed to be something that involved all levels of the chain of command, and, finally, it needed to be an area that was subject to good data collection and reduction.
In this case, the commander didn't have to look far. One of the most basic things a squadron does is launch aircraft. This large squadron, with a big student population, typically launched up to six aircraft at 0800 each morning. Or at least they attempted to launch them. Noticing that not a great many aircraft were flying at 0801, the squadron commander began to have statistics kept regarding each aircraft’s launch time. They showed that rarely did any aircraft launch on time. In pre-TQL times, these data would have been dumped into the executive officer’s lap and then the hunt for the guilty would have begun, with each part of the squadron blaming the others (“Maintenance control didn’t have the paperwork done,” “The plane captains hadn’t finished servicing the aircraft yet,” “The pilots arrived at the aircraft too late,” etc.).
Now, however, the command had developed an effective way of using the data as a first step in improving the process rather than as a hammer to use when the process didn’t work. In this case, a process action team (PAT) with representation from all groups (pilots, line personnel, maintenance control, and others) was empowered to develop better statistics to get at the root causes of the problem.
The squadron PAT looked at the entire process and gathered some very basic statistics about the efforts to launch these aircraft on time. For the 0800 launch each morning, the process started the night before, with plane captains servicing and inspecting each helicopter, and ended with a fully manned aircraft rolling out of the chocks. Although the PAT discovered numerous ways to make the process function more effectively, they used their statistics to discover where the maximum degree of leverage existed to fix the process.
The squadron PAT discovered that there were two hours allotted between the time the flight crews first assembled for their initial briefing until the aircraft launch time. The standard sequence of events was:
► Air crews assemble and receive weather brief
y Air crews meet and conduct NATOPS flight brief
y Pilots review maneuvers for the flight y Air crews review aircraft discrepancy books
► Paraloft issues flight gear to air crews y Air crews take gear out to assigned aircraft
y Air crews begin preflight inspection of aircraft
► Aircraft startup and systems checks
► Aircraft launch
The sequence seemed eminently logical and had worked for the squadron’s entire corporate memory. Using their statistics, the PAT found that the median time that the air crew began their preflight inspection was 35 minutes prior to launch time, a full hour and 25 minutes after the initial briefing. This put the launch time at risk if the air crew found even a minor maintenance problem and often caused the launch time to be missed if a technician had to be called to check a fluid level or field a question on an aircraft that was fully ready to go. The immediate result of the efforts of the PAT was that the squadron changed the prelaunch sequence of events to conduct aircraft preflight inspections immediately after the initial air crew briefing. This allowed maintenance personnel to remedy any problems while the air crew was conducting their NATOPS brief and drawing flight gear. After that fix, launch times were met with ease.
TQL at the fleet unit level can work. This was just one example. It takes time, it takes commitment, but it can work if it is approached as a real solution to real problems and not as just another Navy program that must be implemented—or else.
Captain Galdorisi is Commander, Amphibious Squadron Seven. He previously commanded the Cleveland (LPD-7) and LAMPS Mk III squadrons HSL-41 and HSL-43. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Naval War College, and MIT’s Program for Senior Executives.