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Expansion of the Ready Reserve Force is critical to maintaining the sealift to support our national military strategy—here, equipment is loaded out in preparation for the Gulf War. But as the number of U.S. merchant mariners declines, who will be available to man these ships?
Sealift is essential for the successful execution of the U.S. military strategy. For the Gulf War, the United States pushed hundreds of thousands of troops and millions of tons of war material into the Persian Gulf. By the time the last of weapons and logistics stocks had been removed from the theater, the Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations had stressed the Coalition’s strate-
R. FERGUSON
gic mobility assets to their limits. Airlift and prepositioned stocks were vital contributors, but as in past wars on foreign shores, sealift ultimately moved about 95% of everything needed to achieve success in the war.1
The single largest source of sealift for the Gulf War was assets owned by the U.S. government. And the Department of Defense Mobility Requirements Study—which developed logistical and war-fighting requirements for potential regional crises, ranging from another major conflict in Southwest Asia to small contingencies in Latin America—has recommended that the Department of Defense add to its inventory 20 large, medium-speed, roll- on/roll-off ships (LMSRs) and two container ships by 1998.2 An afloat prepositioned package of two million square feet on nine of these LMSR merchant ships was suggested for deployment by 1997. Three million square feet of surge sealift capability for Army heavy divisions
F
maintained in a high state of readiness on the other 11 LMSR merchant ships is recommended by 1998. Finally, the report stated the need to expand the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) from the current 96 ships to 142 ships and “to increase the readiness of the fleet. . . .This fleet will be adequate to deploy, within eight weeks, the decisive force required for the United States to prevail in a major regional contingency.”3
It is significant that the Mobility Requirements Study provides considerable detail on expanding the fleet of government ships but provides only vague generalities on how these ships should be manned or from what source. Unfortunately, as the importance of the Ready Reserve Force grows, the number of U.S. merchant mariners available to man these ships is declining, as they retire or follow U.S. merchant ships to foreign flags or shores.
Strategic Sealift Elements
Strategic sealift falls into three categories. The first is prepositioning, which includes three squadrons of maritime prepositioning ships, each containing the equipment necessary to outfit a full Marine expeditionary brigade. Additional afloat prepositioned ships carry Army and Air Force equipment and ammunition and a Navy field hospital. Each of these prepositioned ships is fully manned and ready for immediate deployment.
Eight fast sealift ships, the second element, transport the equipment of the Army’s 24th Mechanized Division. In reduced operating status, these ships are manned by skeleton crews of about ten mariners and are tasked with a 96-hour reporting period to their outload port.
The Ready Reserve Force is the third component of the U.S. government’s strategic sealift fleet. This public fleet of 108 vessels, maintained by the Maritime Administration (MarAd), is in an inactive state, with planned activation times of 5, 10, or 20 days.4 No crews are identified. MarAd has plans to contract shipping companies to operate and man these vessels with U.S. mariners.5
Both prepositioned ships and fast sealift ships are routinely ready to deploy quickly. The same cannot be said of the RRF. In fact. Operation Desert Shield demonstrated that few of the early Ready Reserve Force breakouts met the five-day window. On average, it took about nine days for each of the first 17 RRF ships activated. Only 12 of the first 44 ships (27%) met their assigned readiness window of 5, 10, or 20 days; of the other 32, 20 missed their target by at least five days. Of the next 27 RRF ships to be activated, 6 (22%) were on time, and 14 missed by more than five days.6 Recent experience in Haiti suggests some improvement, but this was a relatively small breakout and may not be a true measure of whether problems suggested by previous figures have been corrected.
Ready Reserve Force Problems
There are two interrelated problems with respect to the Ready Reserve Force: overall control and management and manning.
► Management. An important military asset such as the Ready Reserve Force should be under the authority and responsibility of the appropriate functional military commander-in-chief—in this case, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command. This unified commander works for the Secretary of Defense, which logically implies the transfer of the management of the RRF from MarAd to the Department of Defense. Specific management of the fleet would be executed by the Transportation Command’s naval component, the Military Sealift Command, whose commander would ensure appropriate fleet numbers, availability, breakout, and manning. Operationally, an RRF vessel is transferred to the Military Sealift Command once activated; therefore, this proposed administrative alignment offers DoD direct control of its strategic sealift assets.7 Acceptance of such a logical realignment is a starting point for solving the RRF manning problem.
> Manning. The U.S. Merchant Marine industry is in a state of steady decline. Captain Warren Leback, past chief of the Maritime Administration observed, “The number of active seafarers has declined about 40 percent in the last decade in response to decreased job opportunities. MarAd and DoD agree that, within the next decade, we will reach a point when there will be an insufficient number of trained officers and seamen working in the deep-sea American merchant marine to crew the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships in an emergency.”8 If the nation is to depend upon strategic sealift, the manning issue must be addressed.
The Third Report of the Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense in 1988 stated that by the year 2000 there would be a deficiency of 4,383 personnel to man a 96- ship Ready Reserve Force fully.'4 Additional recent studies support the manpower shortage. The number of licensed and unlicensed operators is expected to decline by almost 60% from 1990, resulting in a total merchant marine manpower pool of roughly 15,000 in the year 2000.10
How significant is the RRF manning problem? It is estimated that in 1993 approximately 45% of the active sailing merchant marine manpower would be required to man an activated RRF. If the U.S. Merchant Marine shrinks to the lowest projections, the demand for crews for the RRF would exceed active sailing crews on U.S.- flag ships by a ratio of about 8 to 1." The U.S. maritime industry today cannot support a surge in manpower requirements of the magnitude witnessed in the Gulf War. “Putting less than half of the emergency fleet in service has nearly exhausted the nation's supply of merchant mariners,” said then-Transportation Secretary Samuel Skinner in the fall of 1990, as Operation Desert Shield accelerated.12 In fact, the Coast Guard was forced to relax certain licensing and training requirements to ensure that an adequate supply of mariners was available for the RRF.13
Ready Reserve Force Manning Options
Several options for dealing with the future Ready Reserve Force manning problem are worth considering: ► Relying on Foreign-Flag Shipping. The United States sailed 359 merchant marine assets in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Of these ships, 212 were charters—of which 180 were of foreign registry. Hiring foreign ships is not a new concept, and for the Gulf War, relying on foreign shipping worked. Still, there are major concerns.
The primary concern always will be whether other countries will make their shipping available. The Gulf War was supported by an exceptionally broad-based international coalition—but even then, many foreign sealift assets were not made available. The Japanese, with a fleet of more than 2,500 vessels that includes 425 RO/RO ships, offered little support.15 Significantly, the United States found itself competing for ships with the United Kingdom which, also short of national merchant shipping, found foreign charters necessary.
Foreign shipping can be part of the solution, but it is clearly not the entire answer. Foreign merchant ship owners—or their crews—may be unwilling to transit into a combat zone. Merchant shipping, designed to be commercially competitive, may not be compatible with
> Revitalizing the Merchant Marine. Various proposals have been made that might assist in revitalizing the U.S. Merchant Marine.14 Given the divided nature of the maritime industry, as well as the need for both congressional legislation and federal money, there seems little reason to be optimistic that a significant reversal of the decline will occur. At best, long-term projections suggest that the industry will decline more slowly than most predict. The sober conclusion has to be that the merchant marine is unlikely to be a dependable source for manning the RRF on a surge basis in the future.
military requirements. Specialized ships, such as crane ships and large RO/RO ships, must be immediately available to support the United States. Prompt crisis response means having surge assets under Department of Defense control—hence, the government’s Ready Reserve Fleet. ► Developing a Merchant Marine Reserve Program. The third alternative for manning the RRF would be to develop a merchant marine reserve program administered and manned by the Naval Reserve. In fact, such a program has been in existence since 1925. It was developed to provide a cadre of merchant marine officers familiar with Navy procedures and tactics but actively sailing on U.S. merchant shipping.
There are approximately 3,000 licensed officers in the Merchant Marine Reserve Program.16 Most hold 2nd or 3rd licenses and lack sea time to be completely qualified to sit for a 1st or chief engineer’s license. About 1,000 of them are actively sailing. Statistics are not available, but it is logical to assume that many of these officers are not sailing on U.S. vessels and would, therefore, be available for mobilization. Since only 32 U.S.-flag ships were chartered for operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, a recall or mobilization of reserve mariners who are actively sailing would hardly incapacitate the industry.17
There are more than 200 qualified masters and chief engineers in the Merchant Marine Reserve program. Assigning these personnel to the RRF—besides providing officers for a considerable number of RRF ships—would introduce a significant core of experience. Extra Naval Reserve officers could be shifted into this program or accessed through direct commissioning of merchant mariners who have the requisite qualifications and who want to contribute.
Unlicensed mariners would comprise the rest of the RRF crews. The Naval Reserve can provide for these individuals as well. With appropriate training, the typical Navy boatswain’s mate/quartermaster or boiler techni- cian/machinist mate can fulfill the requirements of the deck and engineering departments. Additional manpower can be accessed into the Naval Reserve, if necessary, through the Advanced Pay grade Program.18 This would enable the Naval Reserve to retain some maritime personnel who might be leaving the industry because of a lack of employment opportunities.
One of the biggest challenges in manning the RRF during Desert Shield and Desert Storm was finding qualified seamen, especially experienced engineering crews. The Ready Reserve Force includes at least 60 steam ships.15 Even though recently obtained RRF assets will be diesel-driven—as are the 12 RO/RO ships currently being converted and added to the fleet—there are no indications that the steam ships will be replaced in the near future. Manning the Ready Reserve Force and, in particular, the engineering plants of these ships, will remain a challenge as long as a significant portion of this fleet is steam-powered and most merchant ships are diesel-powered.
Possibly the largest source of steam-trained engineers in the world is the U.S. Navy. The majority of the U.S. Navy’s amphibious and combat logistics force ships operate steam systems, as do nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, surface ships, and submarines. The basic expertise is essentially the same, since basic heat-transfer theory and concepts are the same whether ships are equipped with nuclear reactors or fossil-fueled boilers. As naval personnel from these ships leave active service, they should be encouraged to remain with the Naval Reserve with assignments to RRF manning billets. In addition, the Naval Reserve already includes many steam-qualified personnel; many will be available for reassignment as units are changed and current Naval Reserve ships decommissioned.
The Ready Reserve Force Mantling Plan
Three basic elements are critical to the development of a credible plan to man the RRF with Naval Reserve personnel:
► Public Vessels. The Ready Reserve Force is composed of government-owned ships; as such, they are public vessels and not required to conform to Coast Guard licensing requirements. Even the Military Sealift Command is not required to man its vessels with licensed mariners in the event of an emergency.2" If we recognize that all RRF vessels are public vessels, highly trained Naval Reservists can be assigned to these ships even if they are not licensed by the Coast Guard or other agencies. In essence, this is what occurs on all Navy vessels.
> Billet and Training Structure. Although crew size would vary somewhat by ship type, the proposed RRF manning plan for each ship would include a crew of about 36 licensed and unlicensed personnel. It is important to note that these ships would be manned to commercial standards; functions normally executed on Navy ships, such as maintenance and repair, for the most part would be accomplished ashore. The reserve crews would operate ships from point to point.21
For each individual joining the crew, a comparison of qualifications would be made to billet requirements. Deficient skills would be corrected through training. On-the- job training on the specific vessel would be a key element. Attendance at Navy schools, the two federal and six state maritime academies, or union institutions would be a important component for most billets.
Familiarization on specific vessels would be accomplished when the vessel is activated for its readiness test and during normally scheduled reserve drill periods. The reserve crew would be part of this breakout procedure and would sail the ship in exercises, if possible. Platform-specific training would enable Naval Reservists quickly to become proficient in their ship’s requirements.22
► Implementation. This proposal would allow the Department of Defense to link a part-time strategic sealift asset (the Ready Reserve Force) with a part-time personnel resource (the Naval Reserve). The projected annual cost of a crew of 36 personnel per ship is approximately $217,000, including the costs normally associated with maintaining a Selected Reserve program. Even if some additional costs for training at the maritime schools is necessary, this appears to provide good value for a modest investment.23
Issues
Why has an RRF reserve manning program not been implemented earlier? There seem to be a number of reasons: lack of overwhelming need in the past, failure to view the RRF as military ships, the perception of maritime union influence, other proposals from the Maritime Administration, and the lack of appreciation for the strategic potential of a Merchant Marine Reserve in the Naval Reserve itself.
► A Pilot Program. The 1992 Reserve Policy Board recommended that a military Merchant Marine Reserve be developed for the RRF.24 In the late spring of 1993, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics authorized a pilot program, developed by Captain Frank Fly- ntz, that would provide a Naval Reserve crew for one RRF ship. The pilot program includes billets, training plans, and funding estimates. In addition, funding was provided for a basic Merchant Marine Reserve program that would provide annual training for about 1,100 officers. Backed up by the usual Naval Reserve administrative assets.
Ready Reserve Ships Require Ready Reserve Crews
By Michael J. Blaney
The concept of the Ready Reserve Force is merely a step in the right direction toward a practical, reliable, logistical support capability. To its credit, the RRF does supply some additional hulls, but the problems associated with maintaining and manning these vessels to ensure their readiness are critical. This being the case, I would like to suggest an alternative.
Ready Reserve ships require Ready Reserve crews. These dedicated crews can be drawn from the civilian sector by recruiting reservist-volunteers from industrial and commercial market segments. For example, Babcock & Wilcox,
Foster-Wheeler, and Combustion Engineering all manufacture marine boilers. These firms also manufacture similar utility boilers that are employed in steel mills, pulp mills, paper mills, chemical plants, oil refineries, and several other industrial and commercial applications. Westinghouse and General Electric manufacture turbines and generators for commercial as well as maritime applications. In fact, most of the technical specialties required to man RRF vessels can be found in the private sector. Drawing individuals from this population on a volunteer-reserve basis will provide a dedicated crew for each RRF vessel and will not deplete the ranks of the merchant marine. Additionally, crewmembers can be recruited who have specific knowledge of the apparatus they will be charged with operating and maintaining. It’s
essential that a certain percentage of each crew be professional mariners; however, the greater percentage can be industrial specialists.
It is reasonable to assume that industry will request some type of equitable arrangement in return for making their employees available for immediate RRF call-up. The private sector also will expect a practical limit on the number of individuals who can be called up from any given corporate entity. The government should be prepared to make assurances concerning the length of time an individual may be expected to be away from his position, if that position is expected to be held open pending that individual’s return.
At the outset, it should be clear that the volunteer-reservists’ mission is temporary. If the crisis that necessitates the activation of the Ready Reserve Fleet is expected to be prolonged, the volunteer-reservists should be relieved by professional personnel recruited for that purpose. From the perspective of the volunteer-reservist, there are benefits provided by his employer that the government should be prepared to supplement, such as salary, health insurance, life insurance, retirement benefits, and accrued vacation.
The linchpin of the volunteer-reservist dedicated crew concept is a facilitator who will possess acute knowledge of the vessel and the vessel’s systems. This person will be the depository of all information concerning that vessel and her crew. The facilitator will have access to the technical information that describes the differences between his particular ship’s boilers and the industrial boilers which are maintained and operated on a day-to-day basis by the industrial specialist in his crew. The facilitator will have access to all information regarding the ship’s turbines, generators, evaporators, gears, radios . . . virtually every system, and those systems' industrial counterparts. To the facilitator will fall the responsibility of ensuring, through training and testing, that the ship’s crew is knowledgeable about the differences between the indus- . trial/commercial variant of a system and the marine variant. Practically speaking, the ship’s facilitator will be the technical liaison between the Ready Reserve Force and industry.
several Selected Reserve units are currently in existence to support this force.25 Assessing the success of the pilot program will require time, but it is evident that many in the Department of Defense appreciate the value such a program offers.26 ► Union Concerns. Union opposition to manning RRF ships with Naval Reserve personnel centers around concern for lost job opportunities. But with the demise of the U.S. merchant fleets, the unions just cannot supply the mariners required in a national emergency.
Mr. Blaney is an application consultant with Honeywell's Industrial Automation and Controls Division.
which of their customers use a particular device. Once a specific market or company is identified, advertise in the appropriate journal or trade paper for individuals with experience with a particular marine system or its commercial variant. (Prior naval experience would be an important parameter to consider when seeking out qualified individuals.) In some instances, large corporations may have their own internal newsletters.
Today, two realities are readily apparent: The shrinking size of the U.S. Merchant Fleet will require the United States to rely more heavily on foreign shipping in the event of another Desert Shield-type crisis, and there are no guarantees that the Ready Reserve Force will be able to respond in a timely manner. At best, reserve manning of RRF ships is a stop-gap measure. Even if the Department of Defense acquires the vessels mandated by the Mobility Requirements Study, what assurances do we have that those vessels will be deployable in the future? To ensure that the United States has a credible sealift capability in the future, it is incumbent upon the government and U.S. commercial shipping firms to work together to increase the competitive capabilities of the U.S. Merchant Marine. Perhaps leasing RRF vessels back to commercial shipping firms is a way to reduce costs to U.S. operators. Commercially operating these ships would ensure the probability that RRF vessels will be capable of deploying. Additionally, the move would create jobs in the U.S. maritime industry and, as a side benefit, offset the cost to the taxpayer of maintaining dormant hulls. A plan of action remains to be seen.
their personnel will be located near the ships, offering ample opportunity to perform ship’s work.
► The proximity of the vessels will allow for “deployment training” for the service that will be embarked.
> There may be instances where the vessel herself can provide a warehousing function for the equipment that will be embarked, reducing overhead costs. The savings then could be diverted to the RRF to supplement the upkeep of the vessel.
Recruiting crews for these vessels should be fairly straightforward. There are several industrial publications in which to place advertisements seeking qualified reservist-volunteers who have related experience with a particular ship’s systems. For example, Power Engineering and Power cover the power-generation industry; Spectrum is a professional publication of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers; and Intech and Control cover instrumentation and control in virtually every industrial process-control environment. There are also a number of industry-specific publications that could be used. Local branches of several professional organizations, such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and the Instrument Society of America, also would be good places to seek qualified crew candidates in any given geographic area.
Equipment manufacturers can be excellent sources of individuals with specific knowledge of a particular ship’s systems. The process used to locate prospective reservist candidates could take on a form similar to this: Identify the various systems employed on a specific ship. Contact the manufacturers of those devices, and with their assistance, compile a list of similar devices in the commercial or industrial sector. Most manufacturers will have marketing data showing
Further, the crew will be required annually to demonstrate their state of readiness. Each year, each ship of the RRF will be reactivated. All systems will be powered up and checked out. Assuming all is as it should be, the ship will proceed to a logical point of embarkation. This shakedown cruise will allow the crew to familiarize themselves with the operation of their actual vessel. The crew also will be able to debug the ship’s systems, perform preventive maintenance, establish a ship’s routine, and determine which reactivation functions can be performed while under way, thereby streamlining the activation process and ensuring that the vessel can be deployed within her allotted time frame.
To further enhance the maintainability and deployability of each RRF vessel, it would be advantageous to redeploy each ship to a logical point of embarkation, such as a prospective loadout site. This loadout site would become the RRF vessel’s new homeport. It also would be beneficial to recruit the crew from the same geographic area as the loadout site. These two actions yield many benefits:
V The delay incurred while the vessel reaches her point of embarkation is virtually eliminated, as is the cost of deploying the vessel from the National Defense Reserve Fleet site.
► The crew will be in a position to deploy much more quickly, with reduced transportation costs.
► The crew will be in a better position to train on board ship and maintain the vessel, increasing the probability that the vessel will be able to deploy.
► The Army, Air Force, or Marine contingents that will embark on these vessels have the ability to contribute in part toward their upkeep. These services have a vested interest in the seaworthiness of these ships, and in many instances,
y A Civilian Merchant Marine Reserve Program. MarAd has proposed its own civilian merchant marine reserve program. This program would require U.S. ship operators to maintain a list of qualified mariners who are not actively sailing. These personnel would receive annual
training and pay—at commercial maritime rates—in exchange for an agreement to man the RRF, if necessary. Costs would average about $5,000 annually per person, with a startup target of $1.15 million, rising to $10 million within five years, when the program had 2,000 individuals participating. Training would be provided on RRF platforms in conjunction with their annual test activations.27
A civilian merchant marine reserve program might have merit, but it does not appear to have the support of the unions, nor does it really address the problem of a declining manpower base. Developing a list might be a useful analytical exercise, but DoD still would be depending upon the union hall hiring concept to support a crucial military crisis-response asset. In 1989, MarAd tested the concept of building a manning list by tasking ship operators to develop manning levels for the National Defense Reserve Fleet and specific crew members to meet those levels. MarAd officials then made calls to determine mariner availability and willingness to serve. Of 743 licensed mariners sampled, about 49% could not be contacted because of inaccurate or missing information.28
Neither commercial ship operators nor the Maritime Administration have experience in running a large reserve program. As an example, a mariner would be under contract to report when mobilized, but if that mariner declined to report, the only way to compel his presence would be by taking him to court. Such a procedure would be slow, tedious, and unpopular.
As numerous airlift crews have demonstrated, relying on reservists to man key strategic mobility assets, whether in peace or war, provides a highly reliable source of personnel. Managing a large pool of geographically diverse individuals who assemble intermittently is a managerial skill that is the essence of the Naval Reserve. MarAd has no such infrastructure, and to create such an organization with its administrative components would entail considerable cost, time, and effort.
► The Naval Reserve. There have been previous proposals to man the RRF through the Naval Reserve, but the Naval Reserve leadership was not supportive. Whether this was because these ships were viewed as “non-naval,” because of legal constraints on allowing Navy personnel to man these ships, or because of concern for maritime industry interests, these issues are no longer germane. There a strong strategic link between these two important reserve resources. The Naval Reserve is the best source of dedicated personnel to man the Ready Reserve Force to guarantee that it will be responsive to national needs.
To ensure a reliable source of personnel for the RRF, the Naval Reserve should be tasked to provide a tailored pool of trained, dedicated, responsive and cost-effective personnel to enable the RRF to respond on demand. The logical relationship of combining dedicated part-time Naval Reservists with a vital part-time military asset like the Ready Reserve Force is irrefutable. It is time to settle on this new course and ring up ahead full.
'Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress, Pursuant to Title V Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authority and Personal Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), p. 3-1-3-5.
’“Executive Summary of Mobility Requirements Study,” Inside the Navy, 3 February 1992, p. 19.
’Ibid. See pp. 20-21 for the complete list of recommendations of the Mandated Mobility Study.
The figure 108 includes the 12 RO/RO ships purchased and being added to the RRF in the summer of 1993. American Shipper, February 1993, p. 65.
The RRF, part of the National Defense Reserve Fleet, is composed of the most viable ships in today’s environment and includes those 74 (out of the 1990 96- ship force) ships that were activated for Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The rest of the National Defense Reserve Fleet is composed mostly of World War II Liberty ships. Modem commercial ships, including those ships in the RRF, carry much more cargo. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm operations, seven fast sealift ships carried the equivalent cargo of 116 World War II Liberty ships. As a result, the Maritime Administration probably will scrap these ships by the year 2000. Strategic Sealift: Part of the National Defense Reserve Fleet Is No Longer Needed (Washington: Report to Congressional Requesters, Government Accounting Office, October 1991), p. 14.
bThe Ready Reserve Force: Enhancing a National Asset, Joint Department of De- fense/Department of Transportation Ready Reserve Force Working Group, October 1991, pp. 6-1 to 6-4.
’While Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell made such a recommendation to Defense Secretary Les Aspin. “More on the RRF,” Shipyard Chronicle, 15 April 1993, p. 3.
8“Army and Air Force Generals Call for Merchant Marine Reserve Program,” Inside the Navy, 22 April 1991, p. 2.
’Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense, The Third Report of the Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense: Findings of Fact and Conclusions, 30 September 1988, p. 20.
"'Presentation at the Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 1992, by American President Lines representative. The figures in the text are not the most pessimistic figures. If maritime reform is not passed, some have suggested the U.S.- flag dry cargo fleet could number as few as 18 ships.
"This ratio is based on the assumption that about 2.6 mariners are required to support one merchant sailing job. Thus to fully support full RRF activation, some 9,500 mariners would be required. If the U.S. merchant fleet numbered only 18 ships, their labor pool would be about 1,350. Strategic Sealift: Part of the National Defense Reserve Fleet Is No Longer Needed, p. 34.
’’Andrew E. Gibson and Commander Jacob L. Shuford, USN, “Desert Shield and Strategic Sealift,” Naval War College Review, Spring 1991, pp. 6-19.
13Global 93 Coast Guard Information Book (Newport, RI, July 1993), Tab 30. "Andrew E. Gibson, “After the Storm,” Naval War College Review, Summer 1992, pp. 25-27. Gibson’s proposal included the following elements: (1) allow U.S. shipping companies to obtain foreign-built vessels and continue to receive government shipping and subsidies; (2) have the government supplement the wages of U.S. seamen in order to make U.S. labor competitive with foreign operators; (3) reduce the size of U.S.-flag merchant crews; (4) allow U.S. ship owners to defer taxes; (5) provide federal payments to develop a merchant marine reserve system. ''Gibson and Shuford, p. 16.
'^Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force, Merchant Marine Program, Data Base (New Orleans: May 1993).
17Strategic Sealift: Part of the National Defense Reserve Fleet Is No Longer Needed. 'The Advance Paygrade Program is a means by which immediately needed skills can be added to the Naval Reserve. Individuals are extensively evaluated for their civilian and previous military skills; those who meet requirements are offered a paygrade commensurate with their experience rather than having to being their naval careers as E-ls.
'The catalog listing the ships in the RRF is available from the U.S. Maritime Administration. The number of steam ships will understandably change as ships are added to the RRF, but the catalog contained more than 60 as of mid-1993. 20Code of Federal Regulations, Title 33, Part 19, July 1992, p. 73.
Tn a presentation at the Naval War College, Newport, RI, 22 June 1993, Capt. Frank Flyntz, USNR-R, Assistant Chief Merchant Vessel Personnel, U.S. Coast Guard, outlined his proposed pilot program for using Naval Reservists to crew RRF ships. The authors’ plan draws extensively from Mr. Flyntz’s excellent and detailed ideas. He emphasizes that commercial crewing of RRF ships is preferred if available. The authors have concluded that if a large robust merchant marine existed, this would be preferable but poses too high a risk for the Department of Defense given the current state of the U.S. commercial maritime industry.
2Tbid.
’’Flyntz, op. cit.
■JReser\ e Forces Policy Board, Reserve component programs FY 1992, pp. 5556.
’"Interview with LCdr. Fermoile, director, Naval Reserve Merchant Marine Program, Office of the Chief of the Naval Reserve, New Orleans, LA, 26 May 1993. ’6Flyntz, op. cit. Capt. Flyntz’s plan calls for a RRF ship to go to sea crewed by a fully trained and qualified Naval Reserve crew one year after the crew is assigned. This could occur in mid- to late 1994.
’’Interview with Mr. Chris Korusa, transportation specialist, Labor and Training Office, Maritime Administration, Washington, DC, 20 May 1993.
Strategic Sealift: Part of the National Reserve Defense Fleet Is No Longer Needed, p. 34.
Captain Somes, a former submarine commanding officer, is a professor of National Security Decision Making at the Naval War College. Captain Fogerty was recalled for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm during which he commanded Military Sealift Command elements in Jacksonville, Florida, and Charleston, South Carolina. Commander Gregory is commanding officer of the USS Reid (FFG-30).