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As the Asian-Pacific region heats up and U.S. presence there draws down, Japan’s naval forces must expand to fill the gaps.
The post-Cold War Asia-Pacific security environment is characterized by diversity and change. Historic, cultural, and religious diversity, combined with territorial and boundary disputes and historic animosities, color its leaders’ perspectives. Change is occurring across three dimensions: political, as people demand more open and democratic forms of government; economic, as the growth of Asian economies continues to outstrip the rest of the world; and military, as modern weapons proliferate and nations seek a replacement for the familiar structure of the old bipolar world.
Today, the most rapidly modernizing forces in the world are in Asia Pacific. Long-term projection is difficult in this environment, but it is reasonable to believe that this region will look strikingly different in the early 21st century from what we have witnessed in recent decades. Because the security situation in Asia Pacific is far from stable, the Japan-U.S. security relationship will continue to be valuable.
The end of the Cold War has brought substantial complexity, fluidity, and uncertainty to the Asia-Pacific region. Several factors affect regional stability and, therefore, are important to Japan’s maritime security:
If the U.S. carrier fleet shrinks to 11 active carriers, Japan risks losing the one U.S. carrier homeported in Yokosuka to contingencies in the Mediterranean or Indian Ocean— at least temporarily. Pictured here in Yokosuka are the Independence (CV-62), homeported in Japan, and the visiting Kitty Hawk (CV-63).
► The implosion of Soviet power and its Pacific fleet. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia began unilateral force cutbacks and readiness reductions; however, there is evidence of continuing naval activity close to home.' In addition, in the Russian Far East Military District, which fronts Japan, capabilities still appear to far exceed those needed for defense. Russia’s military presence and power-projection capability, as well as its formidable nuclear arsenal, cannot be excluded from Japan’s security equation.
► The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear-weapon development problem in North Korea has not been solved, and the possible major instability on the Korean Peninsula inevitably would affect Japanese security. China has demonstrated a willingness to sell weapons for hard currency without consideration for the effects on political stability.2 These actions could bring instability—not only to the region, but also to the entire international community.
► The emergence of China. Currently, China’s naval force has very limited blue-water capability, but some of its senior military leaders are espousing naval expansionism.3 It has the potential to develop a military capability that no country in the region could challenge. Many states in the region find China’s combination of dramatic economic growth and systematic defense modernization extremely unsettling.
>• The potential maritime capabilities of other states. The nations of Asia Pacific are engaged in major arms-acqui- sition programs and the development of sophisticated military industries that will have significant implications for regional and international security.4 Although most of the regional navies are small, they could exercise power far out of proportion to their size because of a combination of advanced weaponry and the influence of geography, specifically choke points.5
► The South China Sea. There is a long-standing controversy over the two main island groups of the South China Sea; the Spratlys and the Paracels. These islands sit astride important sea lines of communication and atop undeveloped petroleum and gas reserves. In 1992, China unilaterally reasserted its claim to the Spratlys and the Paracels and set out regulations concerning the passage of military and commercial vessels through Chinese territorial waters. Even more disturbing, Beijing signed a contract with a U.S. company to explore for petroleum in parts of the South China Sea claimed by both China and Vietnam, pledging that the Chinese Navy would protect the claim by force if necessary.6
The situation in Asia Pacific is complex and potentially dangerous, but there is no fixed multilateral collective security system. A strong Japan-U.S. security relationship and the continued presence of U.S. forces is essential. The presence of U.S. military forces adequate to prevent the emergence of a dominant military power in the region— whether it be China or a revived Russia—is perceived as necessary to maintain regional stability.7 And their pres-
ence serves vital U.S. national interests in the region as well, including commercial access and freedom of navigation.8 The United States certainly has a clear rationale for maintaining a military presence in this region, and it can play a role no other power can assume.
The Japan-U.S. security relationship has been the cornerstone of the U.S. forward-deployed defense strategy in the region. During the Cold War, Japan served as a barrier to Soviet aggression and as a logistic support base during the Korean and Vietnam wars. Today, under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japan provides geostrategically important bases for forward-deployed U.S. forces. It also contributes a high level of host-nation support, paying about 70% of the cost (less U.S. salaries) of stationing U.S. forces in Japan—making Japan the least expensive place in the world, including the United States, to station forces.9 From a Japanese point of view, there is no question that this security relationship is vital to the existence and prosperity of Japan. On the other hand, the Japan-U.S. security treaty has worked to mitigate other regional states’ anxieties about growing Japanese power.
The Japan-U.S. security relationship will continue to be vital to preserving regional stability, but a shift in U.S. strategy and the downsizing of U.S. forces in the region could affect Japan’s security policy profoundly. A recent RAND study hinted at the future strategy, recommending a “proportional engagement” strategy that reduces U.S. regional forces while increasing the contribution of regional allies.10 The strategy makes explicit the U.S. commitment to remaining involved in Asia-Pacific security matters, but that commitment is not fixed. It is tailored to available resources, existing or emerging threats, and multiple U.S. roles and interests. In effect, it affirms that there will be more responsibilities for U.S. security partners. Thus, this strategy shift might apply more pressure to Japan in terms of burden sharing.
In this context, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is facing new challenges. First, U.S. force reductions could increase Japan’s military burden. Although the Pentagon promises no further force reductions in Japan after Phase III of the East Asia Strategy Initiative Report, the Bottom-Up Review states that the U.S. Navy will be reduced by roughly 30% from the 1990 force level.11 According to a recent RAND study, the naval force presence in the Western Pacific will be reduced to half of the 1990 force level. Although both countries reaffirmed the U.S. military commitment in Japan, it is hard to believe that this force reduction will not affect forward presence in Japan. Therefore, to maintain the security status quo, a significant shifting of the military burden from the United States to Japan could be required. In this case, the shift may take the shape of geographical and operational expansion of the JMSDF. The United States will not, however, want to shift its power-projection capability to the JMSDF, because it might upset the security equilibrium in the region.
Second, there could be an aircraft carrier gap in the Western Pacific. At present, the USS Independence (CV-62) and her battle group are homeported in Yokosuka to fulfill the U.S. military commitment to Japan. Assuming the Bottom-Up Review’s force of 11 active carriers (one homeported in the Western Pacific), the U.S. carrier force could offer full-time presence in the Western Pacific and only nine months coverage in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.12 If either of these two regions becomes unstable, it is reasonable to say that “our” carrier might be swung to other contingency areas—at least temporarily. Therefore, the JMSDF would need further coordination with the U.S. Navy, to minimize problems stemming from the carrier gap.
Third, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—particularly the threat of nuclear ballistic missiles in North Korea—has caused Japan to consider a new dimension in national defense: theater ballistic-missile defense. One possible solution is to modify the Standard missile on Aegis destroyers to intercept incoming ballistic missiles. The Aegis fleet provides the means to achieve a forward-deployed defense fairly quickly. This new and significant sea-based theater ballistic-missile defense promises to provide the nation an effective capability for a relatively modest cost before the turn of the century.13
Fourth, territorial disputes over the Spratly and Paracel Islands pose a potential threat to Japan’s sea lines of communication. Throughout the Asia-Pacific region, there are many disputes over fishing rights, continental shelf boundaries, rocks and islands; and there is continuing tension over the control of the sea. In addition, in 1982 the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea adopted the 200- nautical-mile exclusive economic zone concept. This trend toward enclosure of the sea will intensify as regional states grow in economic strength and demand more offshore resources.
Fifth, although there is no imminent political instability in the region outside the Korean Peninsula, inherent regional characteristics could cause several problems that stem from domestic turmoil. These include evacuations of nationals from troubled states, refugees on the seas, pirates, stowaways, and smuggling. Some problems should be managed primarily by the Maritime Safety Agency, but its vessels do not have the status of warships and are not equipped adequately to counter pirates with modern weapons.
Finally, the JMSDF’s mission has been expanded to include participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations and regional confidence-building measures. These missions still are peripheral ones for the JMSDF, but they are increasing in visibility and importance, and it is likely that the United Nations soon will acknowledge a greater need for ships and navies.14 There are several ways to encourage the existing impetus for confidence-building measures in the region, and the JMSDF could contribute to a wide range of measures. One possible and modest contribution is exchange visits of operational officers and ship port visits.
To meet these new challenges, the JMSDF will require flexibility, innovative thinking, and improved efficiency. First, it must expand its ability to accomplish its inherent mission. Few people consider the present JMSDF capability adequate for the defense of Japan and its extensive sea lines of communication. As the United States reduces its presence in the region, the JMSDF must begin by addressing the shortcomings in its own force posture. The JMSDF should continue to rely on the U.S. Navy to provide power projection and outer air defense, while improving its own fleet air-defense and logistic-support capabilities. The Japanese Air Self-Defense Force plans to procure four AWACS aircraft, but it will be difficult to cover the all sea lines of communication areas with such a limited number. The lack of logistic support also could complicate JMSDF cooperation with future U.N. peacekeeping operations. Future auxiliary ships must have substantial sealift and underway replenishment capability.
Second, we must add substantial flexibility—not only to manage an unforeseeable future threat, but also to meet emerging nontraditional missions. The JMSDF essentially has been an antisubmarine warfare force since its foundation in 1954. Considering the impending reduction of U.S. forces in the region, however, the JMSDF should try to build a well-balanced maritime force. This does not necessarily mean expanding the JMSDF mission to include power projection or a substantial amphibious warfare capability, which might cause anxiety among Japan’s neighbors. Another solution might be found in the past U.S. carrier debate. Proposals for a vertical/short take- off/landing support ship were made during the Carter administration. This type of ship has considerable capability to provide antisubmarine warfare convoy escort, limited air cover, early air warning to supplement AWACS, and sealift for U.N. missions such as a peacekeeping or humanitarian relief. Despite several hurdles that remain to be cleared, this idea deserves further consideration.
Third, the JMSDF needs a technologically innovative naval force. We are facing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and there is no sign that this trend is diminishing. To counter these threats, we must possess an adequate defense system, such as modified Aegis destroyers for theater ballistic-missile defense. We must maintain technological superiority to counter the rapidly improving potential regional threats: the naval buildup has accelerated as regional economies and maritime interests have grown, and, in addition, it is not uncommon for pirates to have sophisticated weapons. A heavily sea-dependent country such as Japan requires appropriate military equipment at sea. We also must preserve Japan’s small but critical defense-related industrial base and apply affordable civilian cutting-edge technology to improve its cost-effectiveness. A further consideration is managing restricted resources, including a sharply shrinking pool of qualified personnel. Technology can help by reducing the need for manpower.
Finally, the JMSDF must be cost-effective. Japan is facing a national agenda of budget-demanding issues such as social welfare, medical care, and education; defense budget growth cannot be expected. There are several ways to manage this financial situation. As a first step, we must eliminate waste. Another consideration is to find missions that are similar or duplicated among different services and assign them to a single service to improve efficiency. An additional and probably most important way is to introduce force multipliers. These include technological innovation, improved C3I and a cuing system for theater ballistic-missile defense, and increased jointness with other services and nations.
Japan and the United States have a common interest and a shared role in this region. The U.S.-Japan security arrangement has been a linchpin for Japanese national security, regional stability, and a successful bilateral relationship. It is also evident that not a single initiative laid out here can be accomplished without the U.S. Navy’s cooperation. Therefore, both naval forces will continue to play a critical role in enhancing bilateral security cooperation. If Japan and the United States are to have a shared national security policy, their geographic and politico-economic postures dictate that it be largely a naval policy. As a consequence, enhancing JMSDF-U.S. Navy cooperation is synonymous with improving Japan-U.S. security relations and eventually improving mutual national interests.
‘As Admiral C. R. Larson, CinCPac, testified, “[T]he Russian fleet is . . . operating much less. They are much closer to home. . . . They still have good hardware. . . . But personnel readiness is down due to the fact that they have not had the resources to go out and train. . . .” However, “they still yearn for a regional role. They also intended to keep their logistics station in Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. It serves as an important logistics base to support their regional objectives if called upon.” U.S. Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 103d Congress, 1st sess., Pacific Rim Issues (Washington: GPO, 1993), p. 110. Tbid., p. 113.
3Gen. Cho Nam Qi, a senior Chinese military officer states, “A strong mobile fleet built around large naval bases and air force facilities will provide a strong deterrent force as China expands its naval operations from coastal protection duties to encompass ocean patrols. . . . China wants to develop an oceangoing fleet to bolster its claim on the Spratly Islands . . . and to extend its military presence into the Indian Ocean, where India is attempting to ‘muscle in.’” Quoted in Joseph R. Morgan, Porpoises Among the Whales: Small Navies in Asia and the Pacific, East- West Center Special Reports, no. 2, March 1994 (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1994), p. 34.
4Ibid., p. 3. Morgan notes acquisition of improved sea power is logical for many of the Asian and Pacific states with important maritime interests. The most popular acquisitions are mid-size, missile-equipped frigates and corvettes. Asian countries have increased both purchases of used ships and orders for construction of new vessels from France, the United States, and Germany.
Tbid., p. 9.
6Harry Harding, “Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Global Engagement, Janne E. Nolan, ed. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 437.
7A study by RAND analyzes the utility of maintaining U.S. military presence in this region. First, it can balance, and hopefully inhibit, any tendencies toward uncontrolled arms rivalries that could make the region more prone to conflict. Second, it can reassure smaller countries that live in the shadow of much larger states that they have security options other than subordinating themselves to powerful neighbors. Third, it can work credibly with a diverse cast of regional states to develop collaborative political, institutional, and security arrangements for the longer term. James A. Winnefeld, et al., A New Strategy and Fewer Forces: The Pacific Dimension (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1992), p. 7.
8U.S. Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress 1992 (Washington: GPO, 1992), p. 2.
Tbid., p. 18.
l0James A. Winnefeld, et al., A New Strategy and Fewer Forces: The Pacific Dimension, p. 36.
"U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington: GPO, 1994), p. 27. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry states that his predecessor’s initiative, namely, the Bottom-Up Review, will be implemented in the fiscal year 1995 Defense budget. Manuscript prepared for the statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee in connection with the fiscal year 1995 budget for the Department of Defense, 8 February 1994, p. 2. l2Roger W. Barnett, “Seapower-Littorally,” 1994 American Defense Annual, Charles F. Hermann, ed. (New York: Lexington Books, 1994), p. 115.
13Capt. Rodney P. Rempt, USN, “Killing Scuds From the Sea,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1993, p. 58.
l4Capt. George Allison, USN, “The United States Navy and United Nations PeaceKeeping Operations,” Naval War College Review, Summer 1993, p. 23. Capt. Allison includes several missions that might be conducted under U.N. auspices, including exclusive economic zone patrols, drug interdiction, disaster and humanitarian relief, noncombatant evacuation operations, mine clearance, and assistance to peacekeeping forces ashore.
Commander Doshita, a 1982 graduate of the National Defense Academy in Yokosuka, Japan, graduated from the Public Policy Program at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., in December 1994. He previously served as navigator on board the destroyer JDS Hatsuyuki and on the communications staff of Escort Flotilla 1 in Yokosuka.