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transition had already itegnn-ai the expense of 7,000 jobs.
|t’s the “vision thing.” Last year this r-Was a key indictment against President Leorge Bush’s performance and the RePublican Party’s plans for the future. In ate winter 1993, a similarly clouded pres- ’bential “vision”—particularly with regard to U.S. national military strategy, P°bcy, and forces—was becoming apparent. What now must be called Presi- Uent Bill Clinton’s own “vision thing” as already and will continue to pose grave consequences to the post-Cold War ■S. military, especially to the Navy and he Marine Corps, as they seek to breathe 1 e into the strategic concepts Outlined in the white paper,
’ • ■ From the Sea: Preparing J?e Naval Forces for the 21st 10% level „
Ulled. The Clinton Depart- JPem of Defense comprised Just Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, with Deputy Defense pecretary-designate William erry undergoing Senate c°ufirmation hearings, and °nly a few Bush political aPPointees serving in hold- °ver/caretaker positions. everal other designates for be Office of the Secretary of etense were in their own mfices, awaiting confirma- 0r>, but no service secrets had been named: a re- Su'1 of what numerous ^°mmentators labeled inor- 1(1 ate White House concern 2 ensure that the administration truly rented U.S. diversity, with inside-the- ®ltway rumor mills churning out a med- ey °f names supposedly on a short list, s°mewhere. With the departure of Secjetary of the Navy Sean O’Keefe on 20 anuary, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, assumed the [>0st-> an unusual but not unprecedented Urn of events.
Meanwhile, only two weeks after e'ng confirmed as Defense Secretary, Aspin ordered the Armed Services to ?ake some $10.8 billion in cuts from the 266 billion fiscal year 1994 defense bud-
get submitted by the outgoing Bush administration. . . and to get the results to him in six days.' A few weeks later, he reportedly asked the services for a final 1994 adjustment of only about $7.8 billion, acknowledging that the one-week schedule did not provide sufficient time to make prudent decisions.'
Still, last year’s apprehensions about the prospects for a defense-budget free- fall had become reality. The five-year, $50 billion in additional defense cuts proposed by then-President Bush in his January 1992 State of the Union address
beyond the 25% reductions already incorporated into his revised fiscal year 1993-1997 plan—paled in comparison to the mandate that the nascent Clinton administration brought to Washington. For the Navy and Marine Corps, the loss in fiscal year 1994 resources demanded by Secretary Aspin in early February amounted to $3 billion; for fiscal year 1995 through 1998 the Naval Service looks to share with the Air Force and Army an additional $115 billion or more in Defense budget authority reductions, according to initial Clinton-Aspin plans. From about 6.2% of U.S. gross national
product in fiscal year 1985, the last year in which the defense budget actually saw an after-inflation increase compared to the previous year (plus 6.5% growth in 1985, since then real annual declines in Pentagon budgets have averaged minus 4.1%), by fiscal year 1999 defense budget authority could amount to no more than 2% of the gross national product. During the same period, defense accounts likely will decline from about 27% to 13% of the total federal budget.
A uniformed-service cutback from 1.7 million to 1.2 million or fewer people by 1999 may be in the cards; this likely will be complemented by similar reductions in the civilian force of many Defense Department and service activities, most coming as voluntary early retirements. But the threat of layoffs hangs in the air, especially as a result of base closings and realignments. President Clinton’s proposed $31 billion stimulation of the domestic economy promised to create about a half-million jobs; but these will be offset by the loss of what some estimate to be as many as a million uniformed and civilian Defense positions by the end of the decade. Others point to another two-to- three million job losses in various defense-industry sectors throughout the United States, with about 600,000 jobs at risk in the U.S. aerospace industry alone.3 Thus, President Clinton’s $31 billion effort is more symbolic than substantive in a $6 trillion economy that was already expanding at 4% in early 1993.
While the President on 11 March announced a five-year. $19.6 billion defense-conversion plan, emphasizing dualuse technology to assist U.S. industry in adjusting to the post-Cold War spending priorities, $1.7 billion of that already had been appropriated in fiscal year 1993 (but not released by the lame-duck Bush De-
Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) is “astounded when I hear people talk as if the defense budget has not been cut.” In his criticism of the defense-cut plan, he stated that, “we have been dealing with numbers grabbed out of the air. No one knows where these cuts are going to come from.”
indictment, however. Indeed, during d’jj 1992 campaign candidate Clinton offt’1'6’ numerous visions about where he wou1
cunty.
that
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War” and to “forge a new economic p1
fense Department) and another $17 billion had been announced by Mr. Clinton as a “technology initiative” during a February swing through California’s Silicon Valley.4 This left, at most, $1.2 billion in new spending promises. And it seemed ironic that the President chose to announce his plan at a Westinghouse Electronics Systems plant that had put in place its own conversion initiative that reduced its work force by 7,000 people during the previous five years.
These defense savings are to be complemented by $382.2 billion in tax increases, all of which are to compensate for $230.7 billion in spending growth and tax cuts that the President outlined in his 1993 State of the Union message. If President Clinton were successful in his plan, however, the net federal deficit reduction of about $473 billion during the next five years actually would be less than the Bush administration’s fall 1990 budget agreement. If it had held—even after President Bush renounced his “read my lips: no new taxes” pledge—it would have reduced the deficit $482 billion by fiscal year 1995.
Stung by Republican “tax and spend” criticisms, conservative congressional Democrats had devised plans by early March for an additional $63 billion to $96 billion in cuts during the five-year period, which President Clinton embraced willingly. This resulted in the passing of a multi-year budget resolution in the House that showed the deficit being reduced by $510 billion.5 The resolution also identified $16.3 billion in economic stimulation (expected to create about 250,000 jobs); $231 billion in increased investments for education, job training, social services, health, science and technology initiatives, and community development programs; and $115.7 billion in additional defense budget cuts through fiscal year 1998. Still, after whittling away at the federal deficit for four years, the resolution shows the deficit beginning to rise again in fiscal year 1998. And the national debt shows no sign of significant, if any, reduction by either presidential or congressional efforts. The version of the budget resolution passed by the Senate— without the $16.3 billion in jobs programs—differed very little from the House measure and called for a reduction in defense spending $105 billion more than that proposed by President Bush in his final fiscal year 1994-1999 plan.6
Sensing that the administration would be tempted to raid the Defense Department’s coffers even more for the additional federal budget reductions and to pay for expanding domestic programs, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, complained that he was “astounded when I hear people talk as if the defense budget had not been cut.”7 With about 85% of President Clinton’s proposed budget cuts to be absorbed by the Pentagon, “the only part of the federal government that has carried its fair share,” Nunn lamented that “unfortunately, there continue to be those who seem to believe that the defense budget can bear all of the budget cuts, and that we can get the deficit under control if only we would cut the ‘Cold War’ defense budget.” The bottom line, from Nunn’s perspective, was that the administration had offered few concrete details on how it planned to achieve long-term defense savings while ensuring sufficient capabilities to meet current and future responsibilities.
What vision there was in the Pentagon’s mid-February budget flail and in the following weeks perhaps was presaged by Secretary Aspin’s February 1992 proposal as Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. His “Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era” outlined four alternatives of war-fighting capability that he concluded could generate from $15 billion to $208 billion in savings from the Bush administration’s revised fiscal year 1992-93 five-year plan.8 His most radical alternative, Force A, would have cut the Navy’s fleet of 12 active air-
craft carriers (and one training carrier)t0 just six active ships and the nuclear-po"' ered attack submarine force from 80 t° 20 submarines, leaving untouched the a®" ministration’s goal of 50 amphibious 3s' sault ships but reducing the active fleel from the “Base Force” objective of 4-’ ships to no more than 220. During h,s confirmation hearings in January, ho"' ever, Aspin admitted that he and a 1*®*' ited staff had worked out his various op' tions on the “back of an envelope.” Still, Aspin’s initial action on t*sca year 1994 plans was more in line with Ws Force C: a fleet of 12 carriers and abo111 340 ships in all. But this may ultimate'' prove unaffordable, especially as the bt® for health-care reform, the national sef' vice program, and other domestic inh3' structure investments eventually come d®e and the Congress balks at raising taxes cutting domestic entitlements even m°re than already planned by the White HoitSe' Force A might be more in line with the Clinton administration’s willingness10 pay for the military. ,
The “vision thing” may be an unf®’r take the Defense Department and th® Naval Service. His most explicit nation3' security statement, a 12 December 19“ speech at Georgetown University, calle for a “New Covenant for American Se ' This covenant would seek to fine “a new national security policy
ioF
icy to serve ordinary Americans b) launching a new era of global growth- Specifics were left to a later date.
In other campaign statements he 'vaS somewhat more explicit, outlining his de sire to reduce defense spending “abo1 $60 billion” and cut the Navy’s card® force to just ten ships. But it was not a doom-and-gloom for the Navy: duri®? one campaign swing through ConneU1 cut he assured voters that at least two 1 not all three Seawolf (SSN-21)-class submarines already approved by the Co® gress would be built, and similar state ments acknowledged that he support the construction of the ninth Ni>n'!~ (CVN-68)-class nuclear-powered carrier' CVN-76. He urged continued develop ment of a “fast-sealift capacity” l*1® would have “commercial as well as n)1 itary benefits.” He also called for retai® ing a survivable nuclear force to det any conceivable threat, and general-pur pose forces capable of projecting p0VU quickly when and where it is needed, H vowed to preserve the U.S. military technological edge and to acquire behe
type/Hull
Number
^Rcraft
Status
CARRIERS
George Washington John C. Stennis United States
GUlDED missile cruisers
CG-69 CG-70 CG-71 CG-72
CG-73
CVM.73
CVN-74
CVN-75
1983 Newport News 1988 Newport News 1988 Newport News
Com. 4 July 92 Lau. 13 Nov. 93* K.L. 29 Nov. 93*
MCM-11 Gladiator MCM-12 Ardent MCM-13 Dextrous MCM-14 Chief
COASTAL MINEHUNTERS
1986 Peterson Builders Lau. 29 June 91 1990 Peterson Builders Lau. 16 Nov. 91 1990 Peterson Builders Lau. 20 June 92 1990 Peterson Builders Lau. 12 June 93*
Vicksburg Lake Erie Cape St. George Vella Gulf Port Royal
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
Litton/Ingalls Bath Iron Works Litton/Ingalls Litton/Ingalls Litton/Ingalls
Com. 14 Nov. 92 Com. 24 Jul. 93* Com. 30 Jun. 93 Lau. 13 Jun. 92 Lau. 20 Nov. 92
GlJ|DED MISSILE DESTROYERS ODG-52 “*•53
OoG-54 ^G-55
£&G'56 ^C-57 ^G-58
5&C-60
S&G-61
no0-®
noG-« no0'64
S&C-6S 5&G-66 &0-67 &0-68 fe-69 fe-70
Gt>G-7)
^DG-7t ^G-73 hnG-74
rSG-75
Dt)G-76
Barry
John Paul Jones Curtis Wilbur Stout
John S. McCain Mitscher Laboon Russell
Paul Hamilton
Ramage
Fitzgerald
Stethem
Carney
Benfold
Gonzalez
Cole
The Sullivans Milius Hopper Ross
1987
1987
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989 1990 1990 1990
1990
1990 1991 1991
1991
1990 1992 1992 1992
1992
1991 1993 1993 1993
Litton/Ingalls Bath Iron Works Bath Iron Works Litton/Ingalls Bath Iron Works Litton/Ingalls Bath Iron Works Litton/Ingalls Bath Iron Works Litton/Ingalls Bath Iron Works Litton/Ingalls Bath Iron Works Litton/Ingalls Bath Iron Works Litton/Ingalls Litton/Ingalls Litton/Ingalls Bath Iron Works Litton/Ingalls Bath Iron Works Bath Iron Works Litton/Ingalls Bath Iron Works Bath Iron Works
Com. 12 Dec. 92 Com. 18 Dec. 93* Com. 31 Oct. 93* Lau. 16 Oct. 92 Lau. 26 Sep. 92 K.L. 12 Feb. 92 Lau. 20 Feb. 93 Lau. 16 Oct. 93* Lau. 24 July 93* K.L. 4 Jan. 93 K.L. 9 Feb. 93 K.L. 10 May 93* K.L. 3 Aug. 93* K.L. 27 Sep. 93* Ord. 16 Jan. 91 Ord. 16 Jan. 91 Ord. 8 Apr. 92 Ord. 8 Apr. 92 Ord. 8 Apr. 92 Ord. 8 Apr. 92 Ord. 8 Apr. 92 Ord. Jan. 93 Ord. Jan. 93 Ord. Jan. 93 Ord. Jan. 93
MHC-51
MHC-52
MHC-53
MHC-54
MHC-55
MHC-56
MHC-57
MHC-58
MHC-59
MHC-60
MHC-61
MHC-62
Osprey
Heron
Pelican
Robin
Oriole
Kingfisher
Cormorant
Black Hawk
Falcon
Cardinal
1986
1989
1989
1990
1990
1991
1991
1989 1992
1992
1990 1993
Intermarine USA Intermarine USA Avondale Avondale Intermarine USA Avondale Avondale Intermarine USA Intermarine USA Intermarine USA
Com. 10 July 93* Lau. 21 Mar. 92 Lau. 27 Feb. 93 Lau. 28 Apr. 93* Lau. 22 May 93* Lau. 7 Sep. 93* Ord. 29 Mar. 91 Ord. 22 Apr. 92 Ord. 22 Apr. 92 Ord. 22 Apr. 92
FAST COMBAT SUPPLY SHIPS
AOE-6
AOE-7
AOE-8
AOE-9
AOE-10
Supply
Rainier
Arctic
Conecuh
Bridge
1987 National Steel
1989 National Steel
1990 National Steel
1992
1992 National Steel
Lau. 6 Oct. 90 Lau. 28 Sep. 91 Lau. 30 Oct. 93* Deferred Ord 15 Jan. 93
COASTAL PATROL BOATS
PC-1
PC-2
PC-3
PC-4
PC-5
PC-6
PC-7
PC-8
PC-9
PC-10
PC-11
PC-12
PC-13
Cyclone Tempest Hurricane Monsoon Typhoon Sirocco Squall Zephyr Chinook Firebolt Whirlwind Thunderbolt Shamal
1990 Bollinger 1990 Bollinger 1990 Bollinger 1990 Bollinger 1990 Bollinger 1990 Bollinger 1990 Bollinger
1990 Bollinger
1991 Bollinger 1991 Bollinger 1991 Bollinger 1991 Bollinger 1991 Bollinger
Com. 19 Dec. 92 Com. 13 Jan. 93* Lau. 6 Mar. 93 Lau. 6 Mar. 93 Lau. 20 Feb. 93 Lau. 22 May 93* Lau. 24 July 93* Lau. 18 Sep. 93* Ord. 19 July 91 Ord. 19 Jul. 91 Ord. 19 Jul. 91 Ord. 19 Jul. 91 Ord. 19 Jul. 91
N-739 | Nebraska | 1987 | Electric Boat |
N-740 | Rhode Island | 1988 | Electric Boat |
N-741 | Maine | 1989 | Electric Boat |
V-,42 | Wyoming | 1990 | Electric Boat |
N-743 | Louisiana | 1991 | Electric Boat |
?ack: | SUBMARINES |
|
|
17? | Annapolis | 1986 | Electric Boat |
| Springfield | 1986 | Electric Boat |
‘-762 | Columbus | 1986 | Electric Boat |
•-763 | Santa Fe | 1986 | Electric Boat |
'7<?4 | Boise | 1987 | Newport News |
| Montpelier | 1987 | Newport News |
| Charlotte | 1987 | Newport News |
| Hampton | 1987 | Newport News |
I68 | Hartford | 1988 | Electric Boat |
■7® | Toledo | 1988 | Newport News |
'77« | Tucson | 1988 | Newport News |
J'771 | Columbia | 1989 | Electric Boat |
fV-,2 | Greeneville | 1989 | Newport News |
*'773 | Cheyenne | 1990 | Newport News |
^l | Seawolf | 1989 | Electric Boat |
*1-22 | Connecticut | 1991 | Electric Boat |
Lau. 15 Aug. 92 Lau. 17 July 93* K.L. 4 Apr. 89 Lau. 27 Jan. 90 Lau. 15 May 91
Com. 11 Apr. 92 Com. 9 Jan. 93 Lau. 1 Aug. 92 Lau. 12 Dec. 92 Com. 7 Nov. 92 Com. 13 Mar. 93 Lau. 3 Oct. 92 Lau. 3 Apr. 92 Lau. 4 Dec. 93* Lau. 18 Aug. 93* K.L. 15 Aug. 91 K.L. 24 Apr. 93 K.L. 28 Feb. 92 K.L. 6 July 92 Start 25 Oct. 89 Start 14 Sep. 92**
OCEANOGRAPHIC SURVEY SHIP (Military Sealift Command)
T-AGS-45 Waters T-AGS-60 Pathfinder T-AGS-61 Sumner T-AGS-62 Bowditch
1990
1990
1990
1990
Avondale Halter Marine Halter Marine Halter Marine
Lau. 6 Jun. 92 K.L. 3 Aug. 92 Ord. 30 Jan. 91 Ord. 29 May 92
OCEAN SURVEILLANCE SH1PS/SWATH VARIANT (Military Sealift Command)
' •
>-3
LHd4
J-HD-s
0qCk
5-SD.49
J*S1
US ASSAULT SHIPS
Essex 1986
Kearsarge 1988
Boxer 1989
Bataan 1991
Bonhomme Richard 1993
landing ships
&
LSD-52
Harpers Ferry Carter Hall Oak Hill Pearl Harbor
1988
1990
1990 1993
MlNE COUNTERMEASURES SHIPS
Litton/Ingalls
Litton/Ingalls
Litton/Ingalls
Litton/Ingalls
Litton/Ingalls
Com. 17 Oct. 92 Lau. 26 Mar. 92 Lau. 7 Aug. 93* K.L. 25 Apr. 94* Ord. 11 Dec. 92
T-AGOS-21 Effective T-AGOS-22 Loyal
(SURTASS VARIANT)
T-AGOS-23 Impeccable T-AGOS-24 Integrity
OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH SHIP
T-AGOR-24 Revelle
OILERS (Military Sealift Command)
Beniamin Isherwood 1985 Henry Eckford 1985
Tippecanoe 9«B
Patuxent 1
Yukon 1^89
Laramie 1989
Rappahannock 1989
CON VERSIONS/RE ACTIVATIONS
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
1989 McDermott 1989 McDermott
Del. 15 Jan. 93 Del. 11 June 93*
T-AO-191 T-AO-192 T-AO-199 T-AO-201 T-AO-202 T-AO-203 T-AO-204
1990 Tampa Shipyards 1992 Tampa Shipyards
K.L. 2 Feb. 93 K.L. 2 Feb. 93
1992 Halter Marine Ord. 11 Jan. 93
Tampa Shipyards
Tampa Shipyards
Avondale
Avondale
Avondale
Avondale
Avondale
Del. 29 Sep. 93* Del. 15 Apr. 94* Lau. 16 May 92 Lau. 21 Aug. 93* Lau. 6 Feb. 93 K.L. 28 Dec. 92 K.L. 29 June 92
Avondale
Avondale
Avondale
Avondale
Lau. 16 Jan. 93 Lau. 23 Oct. 93* K.L. 21 Nov. 92 Ord. 1993
Constellation (SLEP) 1990 Philadelphia NSY Comp. 5 Mar. 93 Enterprise (RF/COH) 1990 Newport News Comp. 4 May 94
CV-64 CVN-65
FLEET OILERS (JUMBO)
AO-186 Pl‘>"e
1990 Avondale
Comp. 16 Dec. 92
* Projected by Naval Sea Systems Command .......
** Due to modular construction techniques, there is no formal keel laying date.
While the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier George Washington (CVN-73) was being commissioned on 4 July 1992 at Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia, candidate Clinton was stumping crosscountry, endorsing, at least in principle, this and the next three carriers, including the as-yet-unnamed CVN-76.
intelligence, focusing on a more sophisticated understanding of political, economic, and cultural conditions that can create conflict.
In terms of the myriad proposals he announced as a candidate, President Clinton so far has worked to fulfill most of his promises to tomorrow’s fleet.
Just before he left Washington, President Bush proposed a fiscal year 1994 Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) program of $4,939 billion for six new ships and two conversions; total Navy budget authority was $82 billion, about one-third of the total Defense Department request. Through fiscal year 1999, the Navy intended to build or convert 42 ships, at a total cost of $40,009 billion. The Clinton administration’s fiscal year 1994 budget announced on 27 March would reduce the proposed nuclear-powered cruiser refueling and make cost adjustments resulting in a total of $4,295 billion in fiscal year 1994 shipbuilding and conversion funding in the Navy budget of $77 billion. Secretary Aspin admitted that this plan was “treading water.”10 Others were less kind. Representative Jon Kyi (R-AZ) commented that “there was no strategy in any of this,” and that “starting with a number and fitting a strategy to that, that’s the wrong way to go about it.” Senator Nunn tersely remarked that “we haven’t seen the five- year defense plan. We have been dealing with numbers grabbed out of the air. No one knows where these cuts are going to come from.”
Indeed, the budget for the out years remained practically undefined, awaiting the results of Aspin’s “Bottom-Up Review.” Despite the uncertainty in future funding, restructuring, and downsizing, the Naval Service in spring 1993 appeared to have a well-structured plan for the future. Ironically, the increasingly urgent and strident demands from the new administration and the solidly Democratic Congress come at the same time as the need for naval forces remains conspicuous, as Operations Desert Storm, Southern Watch, Restore Hope, and Provide Comfort have made clear. Achieving the goals and carrying out the plans, however, will demand perseverance and articulation: key naval war-fighting capabilities, billions of dollars, and thousands of jobs throughout the United States hang in the balance. Whether the plan will be executed or not will depend as much, if not more, on old-fashioned politics— and perhaps a helping or two of pork— as on well-reasoned and objective operational-requirements assessments.
According to insiders, the likelihood of additional reductions was anticipated as early as last fall and had already been war-gamed in the new resource assessment process in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The immediate fallout of the early-February budget drills included already planned force-level reductions, nuclear-refueling cancellations, and curtailment of other previously high- priority programs. In his 8 February memo to Secretary Aspin, Admiral Kelso outlined the Navy’s proposals, which included the accelerated decommissioning of 21 ships and nuclear-powered submarines during fiscal year 1994:
► The aircraft carriers USS Forrestal (AVT-59) and USS Saratoga (CV-60), with the USS Ranger (CV-61) already planned for decommissioning in 1993
> The nuclear-powered cruisers USS Texas (CGN-39) and USS Virginia (CGN-38)
> The nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Baton Rouge (SSN-689)
> Eight Knox (FF-1052)-class frigatcs' these were previously placed in the Nava1 ; Reserve Force as key elements of the ln' , novative Naval Reserve Training Cofl' : cept, as well as the other 32 FF-1052s that last year were placed in 180-day re" ; duced-operation status as part of the pr°" , gram; all now will be decommissioned- | with several countries reportedly lining up to acquire them; some proposals cad for the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)' j class frigates to replace the 1052s, espe' dally as most if not all of the FFG-7S , could be placed in the Naval Reserve Force by 2000
> The six Pegasus (PHM-l)-class hy' drofoil guided-missile patrol craft
> Six older Leahy (CG-16)-class and Belknap (CG-26)-class New Threat Up' grade cruisers
> Three support ships: the destroyer ten' 1 ders USS Sierra (AD-18) and USS Yosemite (AD-19) and the submarine ten' der USS Hunley (AS-31)
In light of all this, the Navy migh1 plan for a fleet of 310 active combatants | and combat logistics force ships, in ad' dition to 50 support/auxiliary ships in fis* 1 cal year 2000, a significant reduction I the “Cold War” fleet of 566 ships and even the Navy’s preferred 451-ship “post' | Cold War” fiscal year 1995 Base Force’ | Still, the top-level goals remain:
> A Navy comprising 12 carrier batt|e groups (or, in the new argot of the Navy s | “Force 2001 . . . From the Sea” briefings’
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In light of the potential for the Clinton administration to reduce the Navy’s farrier force to just ten ships, and the eneral Accounting Office’s study on the Cafrier issue, in mid-February the Navy °udined its case for 12 carriers in an internal “talking paper” for Admiral Kelso. (The ' •...................... ...
italicized passages here are direct
ticularly if the crisis would be in the Persian Gulf area. The ability to maintain carriers on station before, during, and after hostilities is as important as being able to surge a large number of carriers for a short time.
>■ On-scene carrier forces are important in ensuring political commitments to allies and friends, demonstrating resolve, and coalition-building, which in turn are significant contributors to regional conventional deterrence. Integrated training in the geographical and physical environment of potential crises, contingencies, and conflicts provides invaluable information to ship and air crews and affords the opportunity to work with allied and friendly naval and air forces. All this would be in doubt if the force were re-
luced to ten carriers.
► A 12-carrier force permits them to route periodically between forward-oper- iting areas and home ports in the United States. This is especially important during a prolonged crisis, since the fighting edge of crews and the material conditions of ships and aircraft deteriorate over time. Current personnel tempo guidelines guidelines—mandating a two-to-one ratio of time in home port areas to time deployed overseas—are based upon empirical data from the “hollow-Navy period of the 1970s and early 1980s. Should the force decline to ten carriers, today s normal deployment lengths of six months would expand to eight-to-mne months While this would allow the Navy to satisfy presence and crisis-response requirements, it would also violate these personnel tempo guidelines, jeopardizing the retention of the Navy’s most valuable resource-its highly skilled and motivated people—and reducing the material readiness of its ships and aircraft.
>■ Responding to dramatically changed international and domestic situations, the Navy has developed innovative ways to employ and deploy its forces to maintain a flexible presence throughout the world. Nevertheless, these are predicated upon preserving a carrier force of sufficient size and capability to meet the requirements of a still-dangerous world. That minimum force is 12 carriers.
The USS Forrestal (CV/AVT-59) replaced the decommissioned USS Lexington (AVT-16) as the Navy’s auxiliary training carrier in February 1992, an event that turned out to be short-lived. Secretary Aspin’s mandated fiscal year 1994 budget adjustments sent the Forrestal to the breakers, with the retirements of the USS Ranger (CV-61) and USS Saratoga (CV-60) speeded up to reach the 12-carrier level in fiscal year 1994, a year earlier than planned. The final car
Naval Expeditionary Forces)
A Navy/Marine Corps team of 2.5 Ma- 'lne Expeditionary Brigades, for a total Marine force of approximately 159,100 troops, a figure Marine Corps Comman- "ant> General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., continued to regard as a “hollow force” in b‘s quest to retain 177,000 Marines."
12 Amphibious Ready Groups Admiral Kelso concluded that this torce would still permit the Navy and Marine Corps to be “capable partners in the [Defense] Department’s joint military a"ena” and support the new strategy of Force 2001 . . . From the Sea.”
Carriers?
®xtracts from that paper.)
A combination of global presence, conditional deterrence, crisis response, and Wa'fighting requirements drives the 12- c,‘rrier force. Should the force be reduced to ten carriers, current requirements for a carrier presence in the Mediterranean, Western Pacific, and the Persian Gulf areas of responsibility simply cannot be satisfied without undermining the Navy’s ability to retain highly skilled and motivated people and to maintain the readi- aess of its ships and aircraft.
A 12-carrier force cannot meet the old-War “continuous-presence” goal in hree world regions, a requirement that tove the previous 15-carrier force-level objective. The Navy has therefore instituted a peacetime deployment posture of “flexible presence” that recognizes the "tevitability of carrier “gaps” and the ''eed for other naval expeditionary forces 0 complement the carriers. A reduced 0rce of ten carriers will not meet the uni- led commanders, presence, crisis-resPonse, and warfighting needs, and would result in a one-third decrease in continu- °us/fiexibie presence in the three princi- P3] areas of responsibility.
. The Regional Defense Strategy, which '"eludes requirements for forward pres- e"ce as the foundation for effective cri- ~'s response, mandates that the United , tates have the capability to react to mil- 'tary crises simultaneously. A 12-carrier °rce will satisfy this requirement; a reaction to ten carriers will not.
Aon-deployed “surge ” carriers cannot resP°nd effectively to a short-duration cri- s's or early on in a prolonged crisis, par-
rier to receive the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) modernization and rehabilitation, the USS Constellation (CV- 64), in early 1993 was undergoing sea trials after leaving the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard; she was scheduled to rejoin the fleet in late spring.
The Navy will complete the nuclear refueling and complex overhaul of the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) at a cost of about $2.5 billion, and will request $3,831 billion full-funding for the ninth Nimitz-class carrier, CVN-76, in fiscal year 1995 as the replacement for the USS Kitty Hawk in 2003. Total cost for CVN- 76 is estimated to be about $4.7 billion; Congress approved $832 million for long- lead funding in fiscal year 1993, good evidence that Capitol Hill supported the Navy’s program to maintain 12 modern carriers in the fleet.
With the commissioning of the USS George Washington (CVN-73) in July 1992, two nuclear-powered carriers are currently under construction at Newport News Shipbuilding: the John C. Stennis (CVN-74), expected to join the fleet in fiscal year 1996, and the United States (CVN-75), to be delivered in fiscal year 1998. Long-lead funding of $1,015 billion was to be requested in fiscal year 1999 for a tenth Aimifz-class carrier, CVN-77, with balance funding coming in fiscal year 2001 for a 2007 commissioning. A modest research-and-develop- ment program is intended for a future carrier (CVX) anticipated to join the fleet between 2010 and 2015, to ensure that the recommendations of recent studies by the Center for Naval Analyses and the Naval Studies Board are investigated fully. In line with current planning assumptions, all of these new-construction carriers will replace older, conventional ships to maintain the 12-carrier force.
According to early 1993 planning, the Navy will request about $2.5 billion during fiscal years 1994 to 1997 for the nuclear refueling and complex overhaul of the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) by Newport News Shipbuilding following the completion of the Enterprise. In addition to new cores and general overhaul, many of the ship’s older weapon systems and equipment will be replaced with systems now going in the new-construction ships. This will give the Nimitz, which was commissioned in 1975, at least another 20 years of service life when she rejoins the fleet. The Navy also planned for long-lead funding of $1,897 billion to be requested in fiscal year 1998 for the refueling and overhaul of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69), commissioned in 1977.
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry- dock Company is the only U.S. shipyard qualified to build nuclear-powered carriers, and competes with the General Dynamics Electric Boat Division for nuclear-powered attack submarine contracts. Both shipyards’ futures—Electric Boat’s more than Newport News’s—are linked to the Navy’s shipbuilding-and-conver- sion program. This points to an important aspect of the carrier industrial-base issue: the future health of second- and third-tier subcontractors. More than 120,000 people in some 4,000 companies in 43 states share the workload on the Navy’s nuclear-powered carrier acquisition program; some unique elements rely almost completely on Navy work to remain in business. For example, Babcock & Wilcox, the only manufacturer of nuclear cores for Navy propulsion systems, and three or four manufacturers of other components and reactor vessels are critically dependent upon carrier new-con- struction and refueling.
The U.S. civilian nuclear-power industry is moribund; no new commercial nuclear plants have started since the Three Mile Island disaster of 1979, and about 15 plants have been canceled since then. In Babcock & Wilcox’s case, it had also held contracts for five SSN-21 reactor components, despite the fact that only three Seawolfs had been funded through fiscal year 1992. With the Bush administration’s truncation of the SSN- 21 program at no more than two ships last year, and a submarine-building “holiday” of at least seven years, future nuclear-powered carrier construction is crucial to preserve this element of the U.S. defense industrial base.
Surface and “Expeditionary" Warfare
Surface-force contraction quickened with the fiscal year 1994 budget adjustments mandated in mid-February and the expected reductions in the fiscal year 1995 and future budgets. All of the Navy’s New Threat Upgrade cruisers probably will be gone by fiscal year 1996 or 1997. The last of them, the USS Sterett (CG-31), completed her modernization in 1992. All of the four Virginia (CGN-38)- class nuclear-powered cruisers likewise will be decommissioned by 1997; they either had just begun or were scheduled to begin refueling during the next three years, and their decommissioning will save about $500 million. Of the once nine nuclear-powered surface warships in the fleet, only the two California (CGN-36)- class guided-missile cruisers will remain active beyond fiscal year 1997, as the Navy in 1992 announced the decommissioning of the USS Long Beach (CGN- 9), USS Truxton (CGN-35), and USS Bainbridge (CGN-25) in fiscal years 1994 and 1995. The California completed her refueling in 1992; the USS South Carolina (CGN-37) will complete in 1993.
Only two years ago the Navy identified the need for 224 warships: four battleships, 100 battle-force combatants, and 120 protection-of-shipping combatants With the likely movement of a majority of the Oliver Hazard Ferry-class frigate* to the Naval Reserve Force, 116 acti^i surface combatants (a total of 150 or so| if reserve assets are included) should be in the fleet by the turn of the century.
The critical surface and expeditionary warfare programs that the Navy intend* to pursue include:
Aegis Warships
All 27 Ticonderoga (CG-47)-claS* Aegis cruisers will be in the fleet by fis' cal year 1995, with 19 of the class bud1 by Litton/Ingalls Shipbuilding and the rs' mainder by Bath Iron Works. The nearterm future of the Navy’s surface war-; ships appears to be in the Arleigh Burkt > (DDG-51)-class Aegis destroyers, 26 of which have been ordered through fiscal year 1993; three of the 1993 ships weld to Bath Iron Works, giving Bath a total
Surface Combatant Projections Fiscal Years 1991-2000
1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | |
FFG-7 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 30 | 30 | 27 | 24 | 19 |
FF-1052 | 46 | 42 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
DDG-2/37/993 | 26 | 15 | 9 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
DD-963 | 31 | 31 | 31 | 31 | 31 | 31 | 31 | 31 | 31 | 31 |
CG/CGN | 27 | 26 | 25 | 18 | 12 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
BB-61 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
DDG-51 AEGIS | 1 | 3 | 4 | 9 | 15 | 18 | 22 | 25 | 28 | 32 |
CG-47 AEGIS | 16 | 20 | 24 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 |
;
!
/
The near-term future of the surface Navy lies '" Aegis As new ships launch-the guided-missile cruiser Port Royal CG- 73) on 5 December 1992 at Ingalls in Mississippi (opposite) and the guided-missile destroyer John S. McCain (DDG-56) on 26 Sentember at Bath Iron Works in Maine—plans are in the woPrks to complement the DDGs in the early 2000s and to replace the CGs with a new cruiser design between -015 and 2020.
ship that might complement the DDG-51 Aegis destroyers early in the next decade.
A draft Mission Need Statement might support a new-ship acquisition between 2003 and 2004 time frame or a significant block upgrade to the current DDG- 51 program.
Ship Self-Defense_____________________________
and long-term initiatives for various ship classes: nuclear and conventionally powered carriers, Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers, selected Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates (probably on the active fleet assets), Whidbey Island (LSD-4 l)-class dock landing ships, Wasp (LHD- 1)- and Tarawa (LHA-1)- class amphibious assault ships, and the Supply (AOE- 6)-class combat logistics ships. Begun as the “quick- reaction combat capability” project to demonstrate multisensor integration and distributed ship command-and- control capabilities, the Ship Self Defense System program now embraces all hard-kill and soft-kill systems for nonAegis combatants, including the 5-inch Rolling Airframe Missile, the Mk-15 close-in weapon system, the Evolved Sea Sparrow missile, various electro-optical systems (infrared search-and-track, and thermal imaging systems), and improvements to the Target Acquisition System Mk-23 and SPQ-9 radars, the SLQ-32 electronic warfare systems, and several other passive electronic warfare and decoy systems.
Sea-Based Theater Missile Defense
°f 15, with Litton/Ingalls building the other 11, including the fourth 1993 ship. Another 21 were in the final Bush administration fiscal years 1994 to
'999 shipbuilding-and-conver- s'°n program sent to Congress ln January.
How much this acquisition Pr°gram will be revised by the Qinton/Aspin team was uncertain in mid-March, but President Clinton’s budget and State of the Union messages in mid-Feb- niary clearly called for “sacrifices” from all elements of U.S. society. Among other recommendations from diverse quarters, the Congressional Budget Office called for reducing ODG-51 procurement from 15 to just ten ships in the fiscal Vear 1994 to 1997 period, a c°nclusion based upon an assessment of the air threat to naval forces with the demise °f the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.12 Rumors from the Office of the Secretary of defense in mid-March indicated that it might direct the Navy to “level-load” the acquisition at a c°nstant three DDG-51s per year, with one ship going to "ath, one earmarked for Litton/Ingalls, and the third to be UP for competition between the t't'o yards.
The Navy’s plans originally called for the final 1994 DDG- -H to be built to a revised Flight HA design, incorporating important littoral-warfare capabilities: a two-helicopter han- §ar and the vertical-launch Evolved Sea Sparrow missile system. Some systems previ- °Usly included in the Burke design—the SQR-19 tactical t°wed array sonar, the Mk-15 close-in weapon system, and the Harpoon antiship missile— w«uld be deleted for affordability reasons and because they were less critical or redundant capabilities in the littoral envi- fonment. Based upon budget and schedule issues, however, the first Flight IIA rke may slip one or two years.
Well beyond the Burkes, the Navy has Preliminary plans for a new cruiser it-GX) expected in 2015 to 2020 as a follow-on to the Ticonderoga class; the Ticonderoga herself will be 35 years old in 2018, and the last of the class should retire in 2030. Meanwhile, assessments c°nducted under the auspices of the “21st Century Destroyer Study” are investigating numerous technology-system solutions to meet future threats in a smaller, perhaps less costly, but highly capable
Within the new Program Executive Office for Ship Defense, the Navy has consolidated previously disparate antiair warfare elements into a comprehensive program that emphasizes both quick-fix
A relatively new aspect of what . . From the Sea” called the “mastery of the littoral” is theater missile defense. This is driving some far-reaching plans for the surface fleet, with the Navy and Marine Corps carefully examining naval capabilities that could contribute to tactical missile defense, essentially as an extension of traditional Navy concepts of layered air defenses. The still-evolving idea of a seamless sea-based theater missile defense that extends well over land focuses on modifications to the phased- array radars and weapon-control systems on board Aegis combatants, and the linking of defense built upon real-time networking of sensors and fire-control systems, the Navy’s improved Standard missile (SM-2 Block IVA upgrade) with the Army’s upgraded Patriot and Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems, and the Marine Corps improved
With the Navy’s current . . From the Sea” littoral orientation comes a commitment to large-deck amphibious ships. According to Vice Admiral William Owens (N8) on board the Wasp (LHD-1) in January, this new class of amphib ship is a “central component” of the Navy. The newest ship, the Kearsarge (LHD-3), will enter service later this year.
Hawk missile systems. (THAAD itself could be a candidate for shipboard vertical launch, according to some observers, if it can overcome a weight problem.)16 “Such a capability,” according to Admiral Kelso, “could be a determining factor in our ability to prevail . . . essential for successful power projection in an uncertain world.” Secretary Aspin recognized this requirement explicitly in his 2 February memo, stating that theater missile defense programs “should be given the highest priority.”
Under the management of the Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs Office, the Navy’s Sea-Based Theater Missile Defense program was affected by the $2.5 billion reduction in Strategic Defense Initiative Organization funding for fiscal year 1994. The proffered cut from the originally proposed $423 million to approximately $200 million would delay by as many as three years several critical elements of the Navy’s program, which was funded at $90 million in fiscal year 1993. Reflecting Secretary Aspin’s apparent favor of sea-based systems, however, his office restored about $58 million for fiscal year 1994 sea-based programs. If funding is maintained at an “adequate level,” Navy program officials believe that they could field an initial system by the end of the decade.
Some have proposed that the Navy take over all aspects of research and development, testing, acquisition, fleet introduction, and life-cycle management of the sea-based programs. However the or- ganizational/funding issues are resolved,
Congress will scrutinize all proposals for theater missile defense to ensure that unnecessary redundancies and excess costs do not slip through, with the “battlelines” between the Navy and Army systems already evident in early 1993."
Looking to the possibility of competing with the Army’s ground-based systems, the Navy’s sea-based proponents note that the strategic agility provided by a sea-based system, the planned improvements to the Standard Missile that will give it the ability to counter practically all theater-based threats, and the rapid and innovative positioning of Aegis ships in littoral warfare tactical situations would result in about 60% of the world’s population centers being able to be protected from the sea. Perhaps most important in this period of austere funding, Navy proponents view their solution as a flexible, multi-mission system that suffers none of the tooth-to-tail inefficiencies, single-mission, and “strategic inagility” of ground-based missile defenses, and one that could be acquired at the margin for about 10% of the existing Aegis antiair warfare investment.
Amphibious Warfare
Inasmuch as the Navy and the Marine Corps are now full partners in joint operations from the sea, the amphibious fleet will continue to enjoy favor. From more than a half-dozen ship types in 1990, amphibious forces will decrease to just three by the first years of the next decade: the Tarawa/Wasp LHA/LHD assault ships; the Whidbey Island and Harpers Ferry (LSD-49/cargo-variant) | dock landing ships; and the new-desig11 LX to replace the aging landing platform | docks (LPDs), dock landing ships (LSDs), landing ship tanks (LSTs), and amphibious cargo ships (LKAs).
The Navy is planning to buy as man) as 12 LXs, with the lead ship costing 1 $833 million in fiscal year 1996. FoU( I more LXs are in the current plan, two each in fiscal 1998 and 1999, with the two-LX-per-year program continuing | until all 12 are acquired through 2010- The Defense Acquisition Board approved | the program in mid-January, and detail j design efforts will continue for a medium' size (approximately 23,000 tons full | load), diesel-powered ship of about 680 feet in length, capable of carrying ap' , proximately 800 to 900 Marines, with | 21,000 square feet of space f°r tracked/wheeled vehicles, 25,000 cubic feet of cargo space, helicopters (CH-5d j and -46, or smaller) or vertical take' off/landing aircraft, and two landing craft I air cushion (LCAC) vehicles. The LX i will not, however, have space for an embarked flag officer as in the Austin (LPD' 4)-class landing platform docks or the , heavy-lift capability of the Charleston (LKA-113)-class amphibious cargo ship- Although the Navy had truncated the Wcwp-class LHD program at onl)' five ships as a cost-saving measure last year (originally a sixth | Wasp was in the fiscal year 1993 | shipbuilding and conversion plan- | and the Marine Corps at various times had indicated a preference | for ten LHDs), the Marine Corps- Congress axis combined to include the sixth LHD that had j been dropped from the Navy’s i shipbuilding and conversion pro- ) gram. This (perhaps) final ant' . phibious assault ship costing $1-2 billion apparently survived the mid-February adjustments, and I some indications are that the Navy would accept a seventh LHD if it did not compete with other critical programs. At the January 1993 change of command for the Wasp, Vice Admiral William A. Owens (N8) stated categorically that the LHDs are a “central component” of the Navy- a role that will be enhanced with the incorporation of planned command, control, and communication systems upgrades, and innovative uses of these highly capable, flexible ships. Together with the carriers, which are getting similar upgrades, these ships will be able to serve as joint task force command
3
the full range requirement at an affordable price, but the only current U.S. battlefield missile is the 24-inch Army Tactical Missile System, which Admiral Kelso in February stated would be evaluated for such a launch. This system may prove attractive in some scenarios, but its cost per round might rival that of the Tomahawk, making it an uncertain player in naval surface fire support. A similar concept calls for a “navalized” multiple- launch rocket system modified for vertical launch. By the end of the decade, the Navy could have approximately 7,000 vertical-launch system cells in the fleet, making any vertical-launch system-capable weapon an attractive prospect.
In any event, declining procurement funding dims the prospects for near-term introduction of any new surface fire support system, despite Admiral Kelso’s endorsement that the Navy’s “strategy demands a new look at these programs to ensure our ability to put forces ashore at minimum risk.” For the time being, the Navy’s reliance upon its 5-inch guns—a total of no more than 160 Mk-45/54 guns in the year 2000—and naval aviation to support troops ashore will remain unchallenged.
Naval Special Warfare
ships, a critical role in future littoral operations, according to Admiral Owens. They could embark Air Force and Army joint task force commanders and their staffs, in addition to Navy/Marine Corps commanders.18
Mine Warfare
In his 8 February memo Admiral Kelso noted that “recent events in the Persian Gulf have graphically demonstrated |he need to make quantum improvements ■n Mine Warfare and Naval Surface Fire Support.” In its response to the congressional mandate in the fiscal year 1993 Authorization Act, the Navy in mid-January submitted a report that reconfirmed the decisions and program directions out- Uned in Admiral Kelso’s Mine Warfare plan of January 1992. Most contentious was the Navy’s reaffirmation that almost all of the service’s mine-warfare forces will be consolidated at Ingleside, Texas, a move that piqued the strong interest of the South Carolina congressional delegation, especially Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC), who is the ranking minority member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The Mine Warfare Command, Mine Squadron Two, and °ther elements of the Navy’s mine-warfare forces are now located at Charleston Naval Base, with the shipyard and naval station included as candidates for closure during the 1993 round of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission.'9 In- Sleside was spared in the list sent to the commission in March.
The Navy program would ensure that the 14 Avenger (MCM-1)- and 12 Osprey (MHC-51)-class ships, along with airborne and explosive ordnance disposal mine countermeasures forces, will remain m the cutting edge of technology. In fact, almost all of the Navy’s future mine warfare program—other than operations and maintenance accounts—involves tech- Uology research and development for mine countermeasures systems. Practically no funding exists to enhance the current stockpile of mines for shallow- water littoral operations, a critically shortsighted proposition, as the Navy’s extensive use of Destructor (Mk-36) mines during Operation Desert Storm demon- crated their tactical value.
While no additional surface mine countermeasures vessels are required in the near term, and the once-proposed variant of the Osprey has been dropped from all plans, the Navy included $131 million in fiscal year 1994 to modify an existing amphibious warfare ship, the TJSS Inchon (LPH-12), to serve as an interim mine countermeasures command-
and-support ship (MCS). The Navy also will continue to investigate the possibilities of requesting a new-construction MCS in the future. And while the Navy did investigate the costs and benefits of acquiring an existing heavy-lift ship through the commercial market for Navy USe—perhaps operated by the Military Sealift Command—it concluded that the most cost-effective solution was to continue to lease such ships from the relatively large pool of heavy-lift ships in service today. Related was a Navy consideration of deploying some mine countermeasures ships on a near-permanent basis to Persian Gulf home ports. Such a move would significantly decrease the requirement for a Navy-owned heavy-lift ship.
Naval Surface Fire Support________
A chronic shortcoming of the surface/ expeditionary fleet—and one that for about a decade has garnered interest on Capitol Hill—is naval surface fire support. Although congressional preoccupation with it intensified as a result of the decommissioning in 1991-1992 of the four Iowa (BB-61)-class battleships with their 16-inch guns, the current disposition of the new Congress (much less the administration) remains uncertain. While the strategic capabilities of the conventional Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile were demonstrated clearly during Operations Desert Storm and Southern Watch, Tomahawk missiles are far too expensive—about $1.3 million each—and too few in number—about 3,100 remaining in inventory after the Desert Storm and Southern Watch strikes or yet to be acquired—to provide tactical “unmanned close-air support for friendly ground forces. The 5-inch guns of numerous Navy surface combatants have proved to be such weapons, some surface warriors retort. But they have gone up against only rather limited targets, situated relatively close to the beach.
No current naval gun has the range to support the Marine Corps’ over-the-horizon landing concept, particularly if the MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft enters the fleet later in the decade.20 Some proposals have tried to resurrect the Mk-71 8- inch major-caliber lightweight gun intended for destroyer-sized ships and tested during the mid-1970s, but canceled in 197S by then-Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. Electromagnetic and electrothermal gun technologies promise significant range increases, but neither may be available for many years. A vertical- launched battlefield missile could meet
One area that now falls within the new N85 Expeditionary Warfare Directorate is Naval Special Warfare, which is required to conduct a broad array of clandestine and dangerous operations—combat search-and-rescue, sabotage, diversionary attacks, monitoring of enemy movements and communications, pre-assault reconnaissance of amphibious assault areas for enemy mines and obstacles, visit/board/search-and-seizure, and coastal patrol and interdiction, among other important littoral-warfare tasks.
In terms of current and future surface programs, in mid-February the Navy took delivery of the first of the 13 Cyclone (PC-l)-class patrol craft. Armed with shoulder-fired Stinger surface-to-air missiles, two 40-mm. Mk-19 grenade launchers, two 25-mm. Mk-38 Bush- master cannon (single), and two .50-caliber and two 12.5-mm. M60 machine guns, the craft have a crew of 28 and are capable of delivering ten embarked troops, including Navy SEAL (sea-air- land) forces, Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments, and Marine Force Reconnaissance troops. Future plans call for these craft to be fitted with two stabilized weapon platform systems for firing up to six Stingers as well as surface- to-surface missiles.
The 13 PC-Is are intended to replace
the Navy’s 15 old Sea Spectre craft built during the 1970s. In light of the announced early retirement of the Pegasus patrol missile hydrofoils, which had begun playing a role in counter-drug operations in the Caribbean, the 170-foot PC-Is with their 35-knot top speed and 2,000-nautical mile endurance (at 12 knots) may find themselves in greater demand than once thought. Other special- warfare programs include 72 10- meter/40-knot rigid inflatable boats to replace the 30 obsolescent Seafox boats, and two research-and-development craft for classified tests. Future programs include development of a smaller (80-foot), faster (40-knot) Mk V special-operations craft intended to support a SEAL platoon, as a complement to the PC-Is, and perhaps a special-operations force submarine or two.
Submarine Warfare
With the future of U.S. submarine construction still uncertain, Connecticut’s Electric Boat launched two submarines in August 1992—the nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine Nebraska (SSBN-739) and the nuclear-powered improved Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class attack submarine Columbus (SSN-762). As the Seawolf (SSN-21) program plods along, the last of the SSN-688-class boats will be completed in 1996, and the last SSBN will be finished in 1997.
two ships would be built. Evidently, President Clinton will keep his word. The SSN-22 will be named the Connecticut (in an apparent departure from Navy practice: first battleships were named after states, then nuclear-powered cruisers, and then the Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines). Congress in fiscal year 1992 approved funding for a third unit that the Bush administration later canceled. In 1989, however, the Navy requested and received funding to construct five of the Seawolf reactors and related propulsion components, a fact that continues to fuel optimism that the third and perhaps as many as five SSN-21s may ultimately be built' According to Rear Admiral Thomas Ryan, Director of Submarine Warfare (N87), three of the BSY-2 combat systems for the SSN-21 class have also been funded, providing additional rationale for building the SSN-23.21 He believes that the third Seawolf could be acquired for about $1.4 billion, at the margin, although he emphasized that there were no Navy plans to do so. President Clinton later disavowed any intent to build the SSN-23, while Secretary Aspin, in a 27 March news conference, noted that the third Seawolf was a fiscal year 1995 issue. If the three SSN-2 Is are ultimately built, however, some industry observers have called for “innovative uses” of the two remaining S6W reactors, perhaps in special-mission submarines. Navy officials discounted this prospect, saying that these reactors would likely remain as spares.
Even without the resurrection of the Seawolf program, both Newport News and Electric Boat still have submarine
work, but only for the near term. Of the improved Los Angeles (ISSN-688)- c'ass submarines under construction in early 1993, four were being built by Electric Boat, with the remaining seven at Newport News. The final unit of the 62-submarine class, the Cheyenne (SSN-773), is scheduled for completion in August 1996; the last Electric Boat Improved 688, the Columbia (SSN-771), should be delivered in February 1996. The SSN-21 should reach the fleet in mid-1996, because cracks discovered in critical hull welds delayed her construe - hon a year. The SSN-22 will be complete 'n mid-1997. In early 1993, Electric Boat also had five Ohio (SSBN-726)-class hallistic-missile submarines under contract. The Navy plans for the final boomer,” the Louisiana (SSBN-743), to he completed in August 1997.
A critical element in the future remains the new attack submarine. Variously identified as “Centurion,” or “NSSN," or “SSNX,” the plan has been restructured significantly to reflect the changing international threat environment, revised military strategies, and daunting budget realities. The Centurion Cost and Operational Effectiveness Assessment was well under way in early 1993, with 12 distinct designs—but no non-nuclear concepts— being considered. The assessment was expected to be released at the end of the summer, and the Navy’s assessment of the submarine-related industrial base, ^hich in mid-March was under review by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, should be available at the same time. They are expected to complement each °ther, underscoring the critical need to sustain the U.S. nuclear-propulsion industry and a minimum essential submarine-construction capability.
Vice Admiral Owens cautioned that it might be a mistake to assume that the first two Centurions will be “traditional SSNs.” In a March interview he offered that the Centurion hull, the S9G reactor and propulsion system, and basic combat
systems could be augmented with “smart communications” and other modifications that would make it capable of working close to the shore, and thus a potentially effective special-operations submarine. He acknowledged that the Navy was carrying on preliminary discussions with the Special Operations Command on required capabilities, especially in light of the prospect for the existing special-mission- configured SSNs to be retired by the end of the decade, with as many as two special-operations Centurions being considered. Follow-on Centurions would follow a more traditional SSN design to sustain required force levels.
In addition, the Special Operations Command will acquire new minisubmarines that will expand the operating envelope of Navy SEAL forces well beyond the capabilities of existing delivery vehicles. Speaking at a symposium sponsored by the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies on 16 March, General Carl W. Stiner, Commander-inChief of the U.S. Special Operations Command, noted that he was investing in a minisub that could be deployed from SSNs and carry up to 12 SEALs.
Despite the draconian cuts endured already and the prospect for even more dramatic reductions in the Navy’s shipbuilding and conversion, the Navy still calls for a Centurion lead-ship contract award in fiscal year 1998 and delivery in 2003. If that schedule survives, the gap will still be some seven years between the delivery of the SSN-22 and the delivery of the Centurion, one measure of the priority the Navy is placing on Centurion to preserve the submarine industrial base. The Bush administration’s fiscal year 1994 request included $3.2 billion in research-and-development funds, and the six-year plan included $3.82 billion for SSNX. An additional $828 million was slated for fiscal year J999 for the second unit, with full funding planned for fiscal year 2000. Assuming a notional 30-year service life for
nuclear-powered submarines, and considering the expected reduction of the SSN force during the 1990s through an accelerated decommissioning of older SSNs as well as the first units of the Los Angeles class, a two-per-year acquisition rate of Centurions after the turn of the century would sustain SSN force levels of about 55 submarines.
Several industry and congressional observers in early 1993 noted that it would take a massive leap of faith to continue believing that the SSNX will be funded in 1998. The more likely year will be 2000, if not beyond, regardless of the Navy’s industrial-base arguments. Congressional Research Service analyst Ron O’Rourke, for example, has continued to ask whether Centurion will be “affordable.”22 Pointing to a historical average of 20% of the Navy’s annual shipbuild- ing-and-conversion accounts for new-con- struction nuclear-powered submarines during the Cold War, O’Rourke reasoned that about $1.4 billion each year (in constant dollars) would be available for the Centurion program in the future. This implies a unit procurement cost of $700 million to maintain a 50 to 55 attack-submarine fleet. Yet O’Rourke noted indications that the Centurion could cost at least $1.3 billion on an average, unit- cost basis once in series production.
As this debate continues, the Navy will begin to retire the first units of the Los Angeles class in fiscal year 1994, about 13 years earlier than originally planned and with half of their service lives remaining. The initial 688-class submarines will continue to be retired on a schedule that previously had them going into the yard for mid-life core refuelings and overhauls. These expedited retirements could continue at a rate of about two to four 688s per year, with the SSN force bottoming out at some 50-55 units perhaps as soon as the end of the decade, if worst-case assumptions prevail. By then, all but one or two of the Navy’s special mission-configured submarines
six “long-hull” Sturgeon (SSN-637)-class and two former Lafayette (SSBN-616)- class ballistic-missile submarines (SSN-642/645) modified to carry dry deck shelters—also are expected to be decommissioned. (This projection has driven a requirement for the Centurion, and perhaps some further-modified SSN- 688s, to be able to accommodate SEALs and the dry deck shelters that house SEAL delivery vehicles and other equipment.) Although Admiral Ryan noted that internal Navy and Joint Staff analyses have addressed various SSN force levels from 52 to 68 submarines, he recognized that Secretary Aspin last year specified only 40 SSNs in his apparently favored Force C, a real worst-case prospect and a force level seconded by the Congressional Budget Office in 1993.23
The Navy’s future SSBN force will continue to be founded on the 18 Trident Ohio class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines, with the older units being phased out by the mid-1990s. The Navy had originally planned to backfit the Trident 1I/D5 ballistic missile into the first eight SSBNs that had received the Trident I/C4 missile, beginning with the refueling of the USS Ohio in fiscal year 1992. But this was delayed for cost reasons. The D5-backfit program already has been slipped for the first three Tridents, and now, with subsequent decisions to reduce significantly the acquisition of D5 missiles beginning in fiscal year 1994 and to terminate the D5 program three years later, it appears to be abandoned altogether. Previous alternatives to the D5- backfit plan had addressed a C4-service- life extension, but that, too, may be too expensive to pursue, at least for the near term. Some indications, however, are that the older missiles may be able to be retained through 2010 even without the extension.
If the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) is eventually ratified by the now five parties, and the so-called START II/June 1992 Bush-Yeltsin Summit initiatives are carried forward, the Navy’s SSBN force will be responsible for about 50% of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent capability and all of the multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads—1,728—available to the United States. This possibility, coupled with the apparent abandonment of the D5 backfit program, has generated numerous suggestions for the 24-tube Ohio-class submarines:
► Reduce the number of warheads per ballistic missile, now constrained at eight MIRVs each.
► Reduce the number of SSBNs carrying ballistic missiles, perhaps converting the first eight Tridents into cruise-missile strike platforms.
► Mix and match ballistic and conventional weapons on the remaining submarines.
► Develop “brilliant” conventional warheads for the C4/D5 missiles.24 Some proposals clearly would contravene treaty provisions in force; others clearly fail a common-sense test. But the 18-Trident force will prevail, for the time being.
Combat Logistics Force/Auxiliaries/Strategic Sealift
The fiscal year 1994-1999 shipbuild- ing-and-conversion plan submitted in January showed:
► A new-design ADC(X) costing $540 million in 1998, to begin replacing the Mars (AFS-l)-class combat stores ships and Kilauea (AE-26)-class ammunition ships in the early years of the next century
► Two ocean-surveillance ships (T-AGOS/SURTASS), one each in fiscal years 1996 and 1997, at a total cost of $373 million
► A single Supply (AOE-ll)-class fast combat-support ship in fiscal year 1999 ($733 million)
► Three oceanographic-research ships, two in fiscal year 1994 ($116 million) and the third in 1996 ($71 million).
Still, the Navy’s support forces will feel the need for reductions, with the number of ships declining from 66 in fiscal year 1988 to about 50 in 2000, complementing an expected 46 combat logistics ships. The outgoing Bush administration also requested $4.42 billion to support strategic sealift programs, one area certainly garnering strong support from the Clinton White House. As Rear Admiral James B. Greene, Jr., Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics (N4B) commented, the National Defense Sealift Fund is “well-supported and near-sacrosanct; it is probably the last Navy program that would be cut in the current climate.”25
The stated combat logistics force requirement is one fast combat-support ship (AOE) for each of the 12 carrier battle groups, although in the early spring 1993 that was being readdressed as part of the Combat Logistics Force Structure Study conducted by the Director, Surface Warfare (N86/863). Today, the combat logistics requirement is being met by the four Sacramento (AOE-l)-class station ships, seven two-ship combinations of replenishment oilers and ammunition (AOR/AE) ships, and “jumboized” (T-AO-177) oilers. The Supply (AOE-6) program is an important element in ensuring that this requirement will be met
in the future, but it has been plagued by technical problems, a strike and incorn- plete labor contract that contributed to schedule delays at National Steel and Shipbuilding Company, and cost overruns.26 Although five AOE-6s have been approved by Congress, in 1992 the Navy cancelled the acquisition of AOE-9 and reallocated the funds to other programs- In January 1993 the Navy awarded the company the contract for AOE-10.
Strategic sealift was responsible for the , movement of more than 95% of everything the United States sent to the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991, and was key t° the humanitarian efforts in Somalia dut- ] ing 1992 and 1993.27 The fiscal year 1993 budget called for $1.2 billion for the ne# National Defense Sealift Fund, but that was reduced during the fall 1992 markup to $613 million. During the previous three years the Congress appropriated nearly $2.5 billion to design and acquire sealift ships. For the fiscal year 1994 to 1999 program, however, the Office of the Secretary of Defense requested an additional $4.42 billion for the National Defense 1 Sealift Fund, all of which will be administered by the Navy for the Secretary of Defense. The significant increase i® funding requested for fiscal 1994 and the out-years was prompted by continuing high congressional interest, President Clinton’s stated requirement to enhance strategic lift, and the Mobility Requirements Study prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the wake of Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Desert Sortie- The study outlined an integrated mobility plan that includes new construction and conversion of sealift ships and an expanded Ready Reserve Force operated (and which could also be maintained i® the future) by the Military Sealift Command, additional afloat prepositioning assets for the Army, and continued procurement of the C-17 transport aircraft for the Air Force.28
The study concluded that the Navy should acquire additional sealift capacity equal to 20 large, medium-speed (24-knot sustained) roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships in two basic configurations: ll large, medium-speed ships, each with a 380,000-square-foot capacity; and nine prepositioning ships, each with a 300,000- square-foot capacity. The Naval Sea Systems Command in the first-quarter of 1993 continued with design reviews for these ships: five shipyards (Avondale Bath Iron Works, Bender, National Steel and Shipbuilding, and Newport News Shipbuilding) were working on conversion designs, and two more in addition to these five (Litton/Ingalls and Tamp® Shipyard) were preparing new-construc-
tion concepts, according to Rear Admiral Greene. The Navy intends to award inversion contracts in May 1993 and new-construction contracts in September, w>th all expected to be delivered by the end of fiscal year 2000.
This program sparked a debate between the Marine Corps and the Army, with the Marines arguing for adding one the newly acquired prepositioning ships to each of three maritime prepositioning Ship Squadrons (Diego Garcia, Marianas Islands, Western Atlantic)
which would do the job at the least cost, ^cording to the Marines. The Army had taken the position that the prepositioning ships called for in the study should go to augment the afloat prepositioning ships SuPporting Army theater needs, a result the study’s recommendation that the ^rmy preposition a heavy brigade-size force at sea. Regardless, the need for additional prepositioned assets to serve as lhe cutting edge for surge shipping in efttergencies was proved beyond doubt in lhe Persian Gulf and Somalia, and in dtid-March it appeared that the Army’s '°gic had carried the day.29
The study also cited the need to expand the Ready Reserve Force from the cUrrent 97 ships to 140—of which 102 | are to be dry-cargo ships—and to incase the readiness of the fleet for a fu-
ture major regional contingency. This requirement was based upon the force s performance during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Three-quarters of its ships did not meet pre-crisis breakout timelines, with most—about 75%— of the late activations the result of mechanical failures and the rest associated with initial difficulties in finding shipyard workers and crews at the height of the summer 1990 vacation season.30 Still, these ships carried 21% of all dry cargo, one-third of the military unit equipment.
and achieved a 93% reliability rate during numerous voyages. The Maritime Administration’s fiscal year 1994 budget for the Ready Reserve Force may be insufficient to meet the readiness levels specified in the study. This has generated several alternatives, including transferring its maintenance to the Military Sealift Command, as a key element in preserving the ships’ readiness for breakout in future emergencies.
U.S. Coast Guard
The near-term future for tomorrow’s Coast Guard fleet once again can be summarized as “buoy tenders and a single ice breaker (WAGB)” and trying to maintain current assets in the face of uncertainty regarding budgets, roles, and missions.
Even so, the procurement of the WAGB was postponed by the Naval Sea Systems Command in spring 1992 because of affordability issues, and a contract for the ship (with Ingalls and Avondale competing for the program) was expected in the summer 1993. Beyond that, the outlook is unpredictable and in some cases contentious.
This is especially so, given that the roles and missions emphasis apparently has shifted toward the more traditional Coast Guard roles of safety, law en-
The Navy’s newest fleet oiler Yukon (T-AO-202) is christened in February 1993 at Avondale Shipyards in New Orleans. The 13th of 16 replenishment oilers in the class, she is scheduled for delivery in December. The last three such ships under contract will be double-hulled.
forcement, and environmental protection, and away from military operations. As one Coast Guard senior planner expressed the situation, “it depends upon how ‘green’ the Coast Guard wants to be.” The Fleet Mix Study of 1991, which began to look at the future need for high- and medium-endurance cutters (WHEC/WMEC) refocused last year on requirements for replacing the 80-foot
Point-class patrol boats, especially after the Heritage-class program was canceled. The 36 Point WPBs were built in 19601967 and 1970, and will soon be coming to the ends of their service lives unless some sort of extension initiative were put in place, which looks unlikely. Thus, the need to address future high- and medium- endurance cutter requirements has essentially been put on the back burner until the patrol-boat problem is solved.
While this will not create near-term difficulties for the Coast Guard, some officers are concerned that it may jeopardize acquisition of new cutters, considering the Navy’s embrace of littoral warfare. Even so, the 12 Hamilton-class high-endurance cutters completed their force rehabilitation and modernization program in spring 1992, which will provide each ship an additional 15 years of service. Similarly, the 16 Reliance-class 210-foot medium-endurance cutters are undergoing major maintenance, which will add 15 years of life. And the last of the Famous class of 210-foot medium- endurance cutters were delivered in August 1990, guaranteeing the Coast Guard a relatively modem cutter fleet at least until 2005. But it is also a fleet that is relinquishing the wherewithal to carry out military missions as weapon systems, such as Harpoon, are being removed.31
Out of the Swamp?
The Clinton Administration’s mandate for change clearly champions high-technology solutions and quick-reaction forces for the armed forces. For many in the Navy, this succinctly describes the character and capabilities of the ships and aircraft now in the fleet and those that will come tomorrow. A nagging uncertainty, however, is whether the White House and the Congress will have the insight and wisdom—and the willingness— to listen to the advice of U.S. military leaders. They must, in order to sustain and preserve the necessary naval capabilities for the future as the domestic agenda is thought through and pursued. In this sense, one of the many challenges for the Navy and Marine Corps is to educate and inform, not only outside the Naval Service, but within the services as well, to build a consensus for the Navy and Marine Corps of the future.
“. . . From the Sea” set the stage for the future development of the Navy and Marine Corps as truly joint members of the post-Cold War U.S. military. At the establishment of the Naval Doctrine Command, Marine Corps Commandant General Mundy commented that . . From the Sea’ provides the conceptual underpinning, the common vision for the future, but it is only the initial step. It must be expanded and implemented.” Whether it stands the test of time and the ravages of budget-cutting remains to be seen. The white paper outlined critical imperatives, things needed to ensure that the strategy can indeed be carried out, a list that included the Naval Doctrine Command. The extent to which these and other important initiatives will be supported by President Clinton and his White House advisors, Defense Secretary Aspin, the new Secretary of the Navy, and the Congress will determine whether tomorrow’s fleet emerges from the swamp of apprehension and indecision in which it seems—from the outside, at least—to be mired in 1993.
to the Government Accounting Office report, Carrier Battle Groups: The Structure and Aff°rf ability of the Future Force, GAO/NSIAD-93-74, ruary 1993. See also, “GAO Says. . . Improvement’’ in Tomahawk Missiles, AEGIS Radar Reduces N# for 12 Carriers,” Inside the Pentagon, 11 March 19^ pp. 4-6.
"RAdm. Riley D. Mixson, Director Air Warfafe (N88), “A Naval Vision,” presentation at the Octo* ber 1993 U.S. Naval Institute Seminar, “The Futufe of Military Air Power.”
l4In early February the Air Force’s F-22 progf**11 came under increased scrutiny as a result of a De fense Intelligence Agency report that question^ the requirements for the F-22 in light of dramatical!) decreased threat assessments. This has led sort[1] Air Force officials to consider an air-to-ground vet' sion of the F-22, while others have urged a “cou* pling” of the F-22 and Navy AFX programs.
Study Could Thwart F-22,” Defense News, 22-2 February 1993, pp. 1, 12.
15Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Op tions, Congressional Budget Office, February 199-[2][3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]’
P- 45- ,7
l6“New THADD Puts on Weight,” Defense News, March 1993, pp. 3-28.
l7“Sen. Heflin Tells Aspin Navy’s Area-Wide TM^ Effort Duplicates THADD,""Inside the Navy, 2 March 1993, pp. 5-7.
‘"Interview with Vice Admiral Owens (N8), 16 Mafc 1993.
,9“31 Bases to Close, 134 Others Hit by Defense Cut' backs,” The Washington Post, 13 March 1993, pP‘ AI, A8.
20“U.S. Mulls Rebirth of V-22 Program,” Defend News, 15-21 March 1993, pp. 4, 28.
21America’s Nuclear-Powered Submarines: Key ments of U.S. Naval Power (U.S. Navy: 1992), P■ '' 22Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Centurion Attack Suh' marine: What is Affordable?” CRS Report 93-10 *• 6 January 1993. .
23Congressional Budget Office, Reducing the Defied pp. 46-47. See also, “Pentagon Urges Navy to duce Attack Sub Fleet to 50,” Defense News, 15-2 March 1993, p. 10. .
2A“U.S. Navy Girds for New Threats: Seeks to EtjfflP Trident Missiles with Conventional Warheads, ” De' fense News, 8-14 March 1993, pp. 1, 28.
25Interview with RAdm. Greene, 5 March 1993.
26“Congress to Investigate AOE 6 Program,” Nav) News & Undersea Technology, 25 January 1993, pP' 1,8; “Lack of Oversight led to AOE 6 Problems, Of ficer Says, ” Navy News & Undersea Technology- 1 February 1993, p. 6.
27Desert Sealift: The Military Sealift Command in tW Gulf War 17 August 1990-11 May 1992 (Department of the Navy, Military Sealift Command: 1992) advance copy in mimeo.
"Mobility Requirements Study (Volume I): ExecU' tive Summary (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Joi'1^ Chiefs of Staff, 23 January 1992). See also, “OS” Adds $2.5 Billion to Navy’s Strategic Sealift Pr° gram for FY-95 Through FY-99, ” Inside the Navy- 18 January 1993, pp. 8-9. Additional information provided by RAdm. Greene (N4B) and the Strategy Sealift Office (N42), March 1993.
29 ‘‘Sealift Chief: Somalia Experience Shows Needf°r Smaller Sealift Ships,” Inside the Navy, 8 Marc1 1993, p. 4; see also, “ Joint Staff Panel Rejects M(I rine Corps Bid to Take Over Army Prepositioning Job, ” Ibid., pp. 4-5.
30Desert Sealift—The Military Sealift Command >n the Gulf War, pp. 8, 46-47.
31Capt. Bruce B. Stubbs, USCG, The U.S. Coas Guard’s National Security Role in the Twenty First Century (Newport, RI: Center for Naval WarfaN Studies, U.S. Naval War College, June 1992), p. xxX^-
Dr. Truver is Director, Studies and Analysis’ at TECHMATICS, Inc., in Arlington, Virginia-
'Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy, “FY 1994 Budget Adjustments,”
[2] February 1993.
"‘Pentagon Seen Backing Away from $10.8 Billion FY-94 Budget Cut,” Inside the Pentagon 25 February 1993, pp. 1, 4-5.
[3]At the Naval Institute’s October 1992 Seminar on the “Future of Military Airpower,” John Capellupo, President of McDonnell Douglas Aircraft, predicted a 40% drop, from 1.3 million to 700,000 people, in the defense aerospace industry by 1995. See Scott C. Truver, “Naval Institute Seminar: Four Air Forces .
. . Indeed!” Proceedings, February 1993, p. 79. Later, Ann Markusen, an economics professor at Rutgers University, estimated that at least two million defense workers would be looking for jobs by 1997. William Matthews, “Analysts Predict Drawdown Will Devour Industry Jobs,” Defense News, 1-7 March 1993, p. 23. Other estimates have come close to three million defense jobs, including the impact of base closings and realignments announced by the Defense Department in mid-March.
[4]“Clinton Acts to Ease Defense Conversion,” The Washington Post, 12 March 1993, pp. AI, A14; see also, “Clinton Defense Plan Comes Up Short, Say Critics,” Defense News, 15-21 March 1993, pp. 1, 29.
’“House Passes Clinton Package to Raise Taxes, Trim Deficit,” The Washington Post, 19 March 1993, pp. Al, A18-A19.
[6]“Senate Approves First Step in President’s Budget Plan,” The New York Times, 26 March 1993, p. A16; “Senate Endorses Clinton’s Budget,” The Washington Post, 26 March 1993, pp. Al, A18.
[7]“Nunn Warns Against Defense Cut Plan,” The Washington Post, 6 March 1993, p. Al.
[8]“Top Congressman Seeks Deeper Cuts in Military Budget,” The New York Times, 23 February 1992, pp. 1, 26; Chairman Les Aspin, HASC News Release, 26 February 1992.
[9]Loren B. Thompson, “Bill Clinton’s Views on National Security: An Assessment,” Global Security Project, National Security Studies Program, Georgetown University, 28 September 1992, pp. 8-9.
[10]“Defense Budget ‘Treading Water,”’ The Washington Post, 28 March 1993, pp. Al, A10-A11; “Clinton Defense Budget Varies Little from ‘93,” Defense News, 29 March-4 April 1993, pp. 1, 36.
"“Mundy Warns of Hollow Force,” Navy News & Undersea Technology, 8 March 1993, p. 6. "Director, Air Warfare (N88/885), “Talking Paper: Implications of Reducing Carrier Force Levels from
[12] to 10,” undated [February 1993]. This was prepared for submission by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Secretary of Defense. A few days later a similar “talking paper” was prepared in response