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Proceedings editors Linda O’Doughda and Scott Belliveau talked recently with General Rowny—former Special Presidential Assistant for Arms Control Matters—about Post-Cold War events and trends.
Proceedings: Henry Kissinger recently predicted that an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian government would be established in Russia, although he wasn't certain who lhe leader of that government would be. What are your thoughts on the current situation in Russia?
Ambassador Rowny: It's very precarious. The Russian government is not very well structured.
^he Russians don’t have a good separation of powers in their constitution at present between the President and their Congress of Deputies. So, while ^oris Yeltsin is not the perfect leader, he’s better than any alternative at the Present time. However, he’s gradually been losing ground over the last year, bor example, in early December last year he suffered a heavy loss when the naming of four of his principal deputies "'as taken away from him and put into the hands of the Congress of Deputies.
Russia is faced with a precarious sit- nation in which Yeltsin is confronted "nth a Congress of Deputies who were elected sometime before [Mikhail | Gorbachev left the scene. He doesn’t have a Way of dismissing that congress and nailing for new elections, and their term has two more years to run. Not °nly did Yeltsin lose his right to name his four principal cabinet ministers, but his acting premier, [Yegor] Gaidar, also was forced to resign.
Yeltsin could pull an authoritarian coup, but he doesn’t "'ant to do that. It’s just a very dicey situation. The world "'ill have to wait and see how it plays out. My own guess ls that Yeltsin will eventually resign in frustration, and chaos will follow.
The second alternative is that Yeltsin would dismiss the c°ngress. He floated a trial balloon on that with Chan- CeUor [Helmut] Kohl. President Clinton and others told Yeltsin not to go that way. Therefore, Yeltsin doesn't think be could get support from outside Russia to dismiss the Congress of Deputies. It’s a messy situation.
Proceedings: As a follow-up to that, Mr. Ambassador,
would you make some recommendations to the Clinton administration?
Ambassador Rowny: I felt that during the presidential campaign [Bill] Clinton forced foreign policy off the front pages and out of the debates. I thought this was a mistake. I had no quarrel with the notion that the domestic economy was the number-one issue, but I felt there also was a number-two issue, and that was that Yeltsin needed some moral support. Now he’s getting some support, but it may be too late. My advice to the Clinton administration is it should get into the act and see what it can do to get the Group of Seven to give Russia the proper type of financial support. It is important that the West help the Russians move more rapidly toward market reform.
Proceedings: You’ve obviously worked with some of the people in the Clinton administration: for example, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Secretary of State Warren Christopher. How do they view the U.S. role?
Ambassador Rowny: I know Les Aspin better than Warren Christopher. I think Aspin is a very capable man, and I believe he is going to try to keep intact as much of our military capability as he possibly can. But it’s a very tough situation, given the pressure he is under to cut the budget. As for Christopher, I think he will be a middle-of-the-roader. He was [Secretary of State Cyrus] Vance’s deputy in the Carter administration. Christopher is a very cautious person. He will move very deliberately, step-by-step. I don’t look for any big successes, and I don’t anticipate any grave mistakes.
Having said that, I think the State Department is poorly structured and faulty because the number two man— Clifford Wharton—has no diplomatic experience. It is the deputy who traditionally runs the State Department. Clinton’s idea of having our national economy be the centerpiece of his administration doesn’t have to apply to the State Department. The Treasury and Commerce departments can do that. Therefore, I’m rather pessimistic about the State Department playing its proper role in foreign policy.
Proceedings: In this post-Cold War era, what do you think the purpose of arms control should be? And what are its prospects?
Ambassador Rowny: The purpose of arms control in the aftermath of the Cold War is to move toward a solution to the nuclear situation and the problems brought about by the dissolution of the bilateral rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union. A vacuum has been created in which a spate of hot wars has been allowed to occur. The number of these small, hot wars will grow. Look at the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina today. Tomorrow there will be wars in Kossovo and Macedonia. Meanwhile, arms control has a big job—one not really understood or appreciated—of winding up the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). START is a long way from being implemented. Russia won’t reduce its nuclear weapons until the other nuclear states give up their weapons. Ukraine is now having second thoughts about giving up its nuclear weapons. We need to do some rather imaginative thinking about trying to work with both Russia and Ukraine. If Ukraine will not give its weapons to Russia, they will probably have to be brought to the United States for destruction. It is clear that Ukraine does not want to give the weapons to Russia.
The big new challenge facing arms control is in nonproliferation. The danger is that more and more states will get nuclear weapons. It is not an easy problem to solve. Moreover, there are additional problems caused by the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons—the “poor man’s atomic bombs.” So, there’s plenty of work for the arms control community to do.
Proceedings. What are the implications of North Korea’s announcement that it is withdrawing from the nonproliferation treaty? What, really, are our options? Ambassador Rowny: Our options are really quite limited. This is an ominous situation because it aids and abets others who might want to move in the same direction. First, we need to mobilize world opinion. Second, we need to apply economic sanctions. Third, we need to strengthen our military position in South Korea and consider storing nuclear weapons there. But it’s not a rosy situation. Unfortunately, North Korea’s ability to produce several nuclear weapons can make a tremendous difference. We must worry not only about North Korea using the weapons, but that they might sell them to other pariah states.
Proceedings: Can the West stop this proliferation? Ambassador Rowny: I think we can, but it is not an easy problem to solve. It’s such an important problem that we have to work hard to solve it.
Proceedings: I think for the sake of our naval audience, the question at hand seems to be whether naval arms control has a future.
Ambassador Rowny: I have always been opposed to naval arms control. I led the fight against naval arms control when I was in the government. In my article for Proceedings [May 1990], I said that naval arms control is neither necessary nor desirable. I am convinced that navies play a role keeping commerce moving and lines of communication open between nations. Ships, unlike nuclear systems, are not primarily offensive, but defensive in nature. Therefore, attempts to control naval arms or naval vessels can only hurt us.
Proceedings: Do you see opportunities for conventional arms control?
Ambassador Rowny: Nations are not going to give up , conventional arms. Therefore, we need to be alert to op- i portunities for keeping conventional arms in balance. 1
Proceedings: Mr. Ambassador, what would be your hops t for the Strategic Defense Initiative? ;
Ambassador Rowny: My hope is that there would be a sea change in the thinking of the U.S. Congress that would permit defenses against theater and international ballistic missiles. However, the prejudices against strategic de- \ fenses are great and the problems are misunderstood. The , current idea of relying solely on ground-based defenses is | the wrong way to go. It seems to me one needs space- based defenses against ballistic weapons. A ground-based ; defense against a chemical weapon only contaminates you s when you knock it down. You have to destroy the weapon k ; in its boost or post-boost phase. j
There is some attempt to keep SDI going, but it is being ;
cut too far back. I would like to see SDI research and (
development pushed, particularly now that the Russians (
have agreed to work with us on it. The need for SDI is i
as great as ever, but the domestic political realities are s
devastating. I shudder to think what would have happened (
if Saddam Hussein had owned nuclear weapons and had ,
aimed them at Israel. It’s bad enough that he had Scud ,
missiles, but fortunate that we had some rudimentary sys- <
terns—Patriot missiles—to knock them down. \
I’ve been a believer in SDI from the beginning. I find t it hard to accept that the logic and wisdom of strategic defenses have never been bought by our Congress. The j rejection is still tied up in the Soviet theory that if strate- ; gic defenses were permitted, it would only increase ouf t
ability to launch a first strike against them, even though t
I’ve never seen a preemptive or first-strike plan put to- ]
gether in the U.S. government. Nevertheless, we fell for ]
the Soviet line. But now that the Russians have said that ^
we should work together on strategic defenses, we should ,
take them up on the idea. '
l
Proceedings: Do you believe that Saddam Hussein’s i knowledge of the existence of SDI would deter him? Ambassador Rowny: I think it would be less of a de- \
terrent than a real protection against a ballistic-missile at- ]
tack. Several weapons launched against our troops or out ]
allies could do untold damage. Now that we have the j
technology—Brilliant Eyes and Brilliant Pebbles [space- ]
based detection and attack systems]—we should work toward destroying ballistic missiles in the boost or post- t boost phase. In this connection, the idea of putting all ouf defenses on naval vessels is not a practical idea. I think j we should be developing SDI. We spend something like ] $25 to $30 billion a year, even in today’s reduced ] weapons budgets, for developing and perfecting offensive capabilities. But we will spend only $3.8 billion next t year for developing defenses. The expenditures for of' < fensive weapons and defenses are completely out of ] balance. i
I
Proceedings: Why do you think the misunderstandings* >
or the misperceptions, persist? ,
"I think the biggest threat is that a pariah, or rogue, state will get hold of a weapon with which it could . . . threaten us or our friends and allies."
and strategic nuclear
Ambassador Rowny: As I state in my book, It Takes One to Tango [Brassey’s (US), Inc., 1992], Ronald Reagan, before he was President, converted me to believing in strategic defenses. Reagan asked me if there wasn't a better way to deter a possible enemy than holding a pistol at his head because he had a pistol at our head.
“Yes,” I said. “We could put on a helmet.”
“Why don’t we do that?” he asked.
“Because,” I said, “we don’t have the technology in hand t° protect ourselves.” But when we did develop the technology, we couldn’t get the budgets to implement it.
On the positive side, SDI saved us at Reykjavik because Gorbachev stormed out of the meeting when SDI came up. Gorbachev had Rea- §an on the ropes, had him almost agreeing to giving up all of our nuclear weapons. This would have been a disaster. So, thank God there was a fight over SDI. Gorbachev saved us from the idea of zero nuclear weapons. You can’t have zero ■tuclear weapons until you have tear perfect verification procedures.
Since that day is a long way off,
''’e were fortunate that SDI saved the day at Reykjavik.
Proceedings. Someone once characterized Reykjavik as a very interesting meeting with the result that, when Reagan came home, his mission was first seen as a failure.
How do you account for this?
Ambassador Rowny: Reykjavik was, on the whole, a good meeting.
There were real breakthroughs in moving ahead on the intermediate weapons.
What happened was that because the meeting broke UP over SDI, [Secretary of State George] Shultz was very Pessimistic at his press conference. And the press, not knowing the good that was accomplished at Reykjavik, Painted a gloomy picture. Several days later, President Heagan went before Congress and spoke to the nation. ^Ahen he pointed out what had been accomplished, he bmned public opinion around.
I look upon Reykjavik as a success in two ways. First,
paved the way toward the INF and START agreements. Second, it got us out of the trap of proposing to reduce nuclear weapons to zero.
Proceedings. You mentioned in your book that there were s°me people who had a grasp of arms control—its true Purpose—and others who would have taken any deal that was set before them. Who would you rate as the top three heroes of U.S. arms control, and who were the three 'vho didn’t do so well?
Ambassador Rowny: I think that the top three were Presidents Reagan, Nixon, and Ford—in that order. Reagan because he had sound policies and the luck of the Irish; Nixon because he had the right ideas, even though he was not able to carry them out because of Watergate; and Ford because he had good policies and understood the Soviets, even though he didn’t last in office very long.
As for the three who didn't do so well, the worst was President Carter. He simply failed to understand the Soviets and did not grasp the arms-control process. The next worse was Secretary Vance, who didn’t understand the Soviets and did not know how to negotiate with them. (At his first meeting with Foreign Minister [Andrei] Gromyko, he said, “If you don’t like our position, here’s our fallback.”) Third on my list would be [Paul] Wamke, who was the Director of the Arms Control Agency and the chief negotiator of SALT II.
Proceedings: You mentioned in your book the do’s and don’ts of arms-control negotiations. Didn’t you advise not to make an eleventh- hour deal because the Soviets enjoyed pulling a rabbit out of the hat at the last minute?
Ambassador Rowny: Yes. The Soviets saved most of their real negotiating for the end game, believing that we would become impatient and give in, in order to bring home a deal. We confused— particularly during the Carter days—the notion of getting any agreement with that of getting a good agreement. Once the Soviets realized that our primary objective was to get an agreement, they simply demanded more and more. After Secretary Vance’s first big concession, SALT II went downhill. George Meany once said: “Don’t ever sit down to a negotiating table unless you’re ready to get up and walk away.” We didn’t do that. The Soviets were very disdainful of Carter. They said, “Carter is naive; he doesn’t understand the realities of international politics; he doesn’t understand how to deal with us. We believe in strength.”
Proceedings'. To continue with the ideas you expressed back in 1990, what sort of agreements would you like to see enacted in the future? Where do you see the European nations or Japan, for example, fitting in?
Ambassador Rowny: My thesis is that negotiations are going to become increasingly important internationally, particularly in the economic sphere. The new, big challenges in the future are going to be with Asia and the European Community. Unfortunately, we have a poor track record in negotiations. We don’t train negotiators and we don’t keep good negotiators. We don’t seem to understand the importance of negotiations. It’s as simple as putting yourself in the other person’s moccasins. You have to learn the other person’s history, his culture, and his language. Only when you learn these can you begin to interact with him.
Proceedings-. Mr. Ambassador, with the drawdowns in the defense industry, are there some bases and facilities that should be kept for the purpose of arms-control negotiations? Ambassador Rowny: Yes, I think that there are some installations that should stay open. For example, Fort McClellan, Alabama, which is the installation that develops doctrine and trains troops to protect against chemical- weapon attacks. The Chemical Warfare Convention, which was signed in January, forswears the offensive use of chemical weapons. It prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons. But it does permit the development of defenses. There are two ways to deter against a chemical attack. The first is to be able to retaliate. Since chemical weapons will be prohibited under the Chemical Warfare Convention, that option will no longer exist. To close a place like Fort McClellan, which has the only live-agent test facility in the world, would be a mistake. Not only does the Army train its own troops, but it also trains troops from the other services. It also trains personnel from 24 other countries. It is also the place to develop inspector teams, people trained to verify properly the chemical warfare conventions. So, I think the Base Closure Commission should look at this proposed closing very carefully.
Proceedings: In the former Soviet Union you have the country saying, “We'd love to get rid of these nuclear stockpiles, but we don’t have the resources to do it.” Ambassador Rowny: Right.
Proceedings: What is the best way for the West to address these mechanical problems?
Ambassador Rowny: One of the best ways is to use the $800 million that Congress has appropriated to dismantle the weapons. Then you have to get rid of the enriched uranium and plutonium that are left. This second step is difficult. Getting rid of the plutonium is a harder problem. It has a long half-life and is very toxic and corrosive. Today, only the Japanese have the technology to reduce this plutonium to usable fuel.
Proceedings: Our final question is, what is the biggest nuclear threat that we face today?
Ambassador Rowny: I think the biggest threat is that a pariah, or rogue, state will get hold of a weapon with which it could blackmail or threaten us or our friends and allies. I don't think that the thousands of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union are a threat today. But they could become a threat in the future.
The greatest risk is the possibility that some irresponsible leader could someday develop or acquire nuclear weapons and threaten our friends and allies—and, perhaps, us.
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