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Contents:
Pushing Them Out the Back Door—59 Not a ‘CVN Gator’—10
A Crisis of Confidence—10
Plane Parts, Rotting Timbers, White Paper, and Fighting Joint—11
Which Ship for a Flagship?—11
Who Needs the Law of the Sea?—11
Russian Navy in Distress—12
Information Sources—12
Twilight of the Supercarriers—13
The F/A-18E/F Is ‘Catch 22’—13
The U-Boat Peril Overcome—14
Expansion of the Regular Membership Category—15
Put Harpoon on EA-6Bs—15
It’s Time to Think Profit and Loss—19
The Ultimate Meritocracy—20
Enhanced Helicopter Night Visual Identification Tactics—21
Where Are the Unmanned Surface Vehicles?—21
Commanders Must Command—22
We Are Here to Stay—23
Where’s the Admirals’ Revolt?—24
“Pushing Them Out the Back Door”
(See J. G. Burton, pp. 37^12, June 1993;
J. H. Cushman, p. 14, July 1993 Proceedings)
Editor’s Note: The response to “Pushing Them Out the Back Door” has been strong. Three contributions by Army officers are published in a special section in this issue, pages 59-65.
May Cover Photo—11
A Right to Serve—14
Tomorrow’s Fleet—23
“Not a ‘CVN Gator”’
(See T. C. Pierce, pp. 74-76, June 1993
Proceedings)
Rear Admiral J. B. LaPlante, U.S. Navy—While making an excellent case for carrier-aviation support of Marine Air- Ground Task Force (MAGTF) operations, Commander Pierce raises a critical issue. Since . . From the Sea” appeared, we have become adept at describing littoral warfare—now we must determine how best to fight it. The answer is maritime maneuver warfare.
Worldwide proliferation of highly sophisticated weaponry guarantees that warfare in the littorals will put a premium on the ability to react rapidly and effectively to opportunity—as well as to threat. Only by embracing the principles of maneuver warfare—and taking them to sea—can we hope to cope in this new and potentially much more lethal environment. Maritime maneuver warfare is a concept whose time has come; it is a natural fit with littoral warfare. The Naval Service—read: the Navy—must recognize that fact and initiate a serious examination of the principles and practices of maneuver warfare—at the institutional level, as well as by individuals.
Becoming effective in maritime maneuver warfare will not be easy; in fact, it may be impossible, given our current tactical organization, training practices, and operational patterns. Two significant changes, therefore, are prerequisites.
► Full integration of MAGTFs with Navy battle groups. Occasional linkups for exercises and workups will not do; they will produce neither the unity of effort, nor the commonality of outlook, nor the mutual trust and understanding that are required in maneuver warfare. In a maneuver engagement, when the main effort shifts, the entire team must react, instantly
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and effectively. This capability can coffle only with full-time integration. In the ft" ti ture, we simply will not be able to affol“ ti to operate separate battle groups and anr F phibious groups on a routine peacetime l: basis. The twin realities of presence re' s quirements and force-structure reductions j will drive us to integration—learning t0 s
operate that way might be making virtue a of necessity—but virtue it is, neverthe- i less. The land-warfare thinkers determined some time ago that conventional 1
modes were not suited to ground ffl*' t
neuver warfare—we must make similat 1 adjustments.
► Establishment of operational staffs that < are capable of lightning-quick reactiont I
coordination, and planning in a rapM I developing maneuver campaign. The only 1 effective way to accomplish this is to in' I tegrate battle group, MAGTF, and a®" phibious-warfare staffs. Our experience in the Persian Gulf was that fully inte' grated Navy-Marine Corps amphibious- warfare staffs work. Recognizing tha* Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF)-Commander, Landing Force (CLF)-related doctrine and practice apply only to deliberate operations, and that there is very little deliberate preplanned action in a maneuver campaign, one can conclude that we must evolve beyond CATF-CLF staffs to full integration. This notion will alarm and dismay out traditionalists, but tradition is of precious little help when a paradigm shift lS under way.
The newly formed Naval Doctrine Command is at the cutting edge of innO' vative tactical thought in both these areas- In the near future their proposals on the organization, composition, functionstraining, and operations of Naval Expeditionary Task Groups (and Task Forces)—to include their staffs—wiH reach the fleet. It will behoove all of uS to pay attention. □
“A Crisis of Confidence”
(See T. M. Gallagher, pp. 32-36, April 1993;
J. D. Brackin, p. 16, May 1993; C. D. Slack, p. 14, June 1993 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Glenn T. Ware, Judge Adv°' cate General’s Corps, U.S. Naval Re' serve—Lieutenant Commander Gallagher’s thesis statement—that “to do the
flag-selection process by escort specialists. It is little wonder, then, that Marine Corps Major General Harry Jenkins was picked to head N-85 Expeditionary Warfare—the office responsible for amphibious ships, mine warfare, and special-operations forces—in the new Navy organization.
It took a war for aviators to overcome the dominance of the battleship admirals’ “gun club.” But several decades after Inchon and Wonsan, amphibious and mine- warfare officers have yet to break the grip of the “escort club.” For a Navy that wasn’t prepared to deal with a low-tech
Politically expedient and ‘correct’ at the expense of what is right signals a decay in the backbone of military justice”— struck me as a disconnect of sorts. The "politically correct” thing happens outside the military justice system, which Provides a check on the evils of whatever is perceived as “politically correct.”
The military justice system is set up to provide a strict adversarial approach to fact finding—and delivery of appropriate punishment, if an accused person is found guilty. It involves objective assessment by lawyers and judges and is instituted to ensure that an innocent person is never convicted. It is what goes on around the military justice system that is troubling, not the system itself.
Does any officer seriously believe that he or she can go to a general court-martial, be acquitted, and continue on with his or her career—including promotion? The officer is ostracized, and will never again be on the fast track. This does not happen because the military justice system is decaying, but rather because some 'eaders decide to “take care of the matter” since, in their eyes, the system has “failed.” Some leaders are great at defending the Constitution but fail to support it when they think the military justice system has not produced the Politically correct result, or when they try t° produce the politically correct result because they believe the military justice system will not do so.
The military justice system guards against such actions. Anyone can walk 'Mo a Navy court and listen and observe lawyers and judges zealously litigating to ensure that the rule of law—not “the Old Man’s” justice—is being applied. The Problem is that we do not give the military justice system a chance. When approaching a high visibility issue, we try t° play footloose and fancy free—with an eye toward the press—rather then letting the justice system work. Let’s leave it alone. We all may be surprised by how "'ell it works. □
“Plane Parts, Rotting Timbers, White Paper, and Fighting Joint”
(See S. C. Truver, pp. 7-11, June 1993 Proceedings)
“Which Ship for a Flagship?”
(See J. O’Neil, pp. 84-86, June 1993 Proceedings)
Terence Roche Murphy—In his address to the U.S. Naval Institute’s Third Annapolis Seminar, Vice Admiral William
Owens—the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessment—accorded first place in the “central focus of the new Navy” to “power projection in the form of Marines and amphibious ships.” He added that “the Navy is focusing on two key concepts in the power-projection role: standoff weapons and support to Marines ashore.”
Has the Navy actually ended its obsession with “go-fast” blue-water forces and, instead, concentrated on power projection? The evidence suggests otherwise. Captain O’Neil portrays a Navy that cannibalizes its amphibious force of vitally needed flagships and transfers them to the battle forces—with whom they are too slow to keep up. In an interview published in the March 1993 Seapower, Admiral Owens stated that “traditional” U.S. Navy strategy involved “putting Marines ashore” but otherwise “not too much direct support of those Marine forces, and certainly no integral mission between the Navy and the Marine Corps” (my emphasis).
Part of the reason for the Navy’s reluctance to part with its old ways is the lack of admirals with experience in the ‘Gator Navy. A Marine colonel commanding a Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) is on the fast track for general. In contrast, command of an amphibious squadron—a major joint command by any test and a far more broad-ranging position the command of a destroyer squadron—is considered a dignified billet for a senior captain with limited promotion prospects. Even Amphibious Ready Group commodores—de facto flag officers—do not prosper.
For example, then-Vice Admiral Henry Mauz (now Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet) stated at the U.S. Naval Institute’s 1992 Annapolis Seminar that of the 12 surface-warfare captains selected for flag rank that year, all but one was a cruiser- destroyer specialist. Admiral Mauz indicated that the 11-to-l ratio probably was based on the dominance of the surface
mine threat 40 years after Wonsan and which won’t admit that its 40,000-ton amphibious aircraft carriers are modem-day capital ships, a change in corporate culture cannot come too soon.
It must have been deeply embarrassing for the Navy’s leadership to turn to the Marines, who understand joint and four-dimensional littoral operations, and who—with the unsung ‘Gator Navy- have developed innovative tactics to conduct them. But after Captain O’Neil’s depressing tale, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the decision to “send the Marines” to the N-85 billet was a necessary first step to establish the ‘ centra focus” of Admiral Owens’ new Navy. U
May Cover Photo
(See R. S. Reade, D. J. Rutkowski, p. 24, July 1993 Proceedings)
John A. Buxton, Ph.D., HSPP The cover photograph of the May 1993 Proceedings made my blood boil. In fact, the
entire magazine went straight into the trash—in honor of all those who served many of whom did not return because of those who refused to serve. □
“Who Needs the Law of the Sea?”
(See G. V. Galdorisi, pp. 71-74, July 1993
Proceedings)
Sean T. Connaughton—*Captain Gal- dorisi’s points regarding the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law ot the Sea and the rights of navigation and overflight are well taken, but he overlooks an important aspect of the Convention.
Increased public concern about the environmental dangers posed by pollution of the oceans has caused many coun-
tries—including the United States—to pursue initiatives intended to protect the marine environment. Unfortunately, many of these efforts infringe on traditional maritime legal concepts—e.g., freedom of navigation and the right of innocent passage. For example, the U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 1990) requires tankers lightering 60 miles offshore to have double hulls and imposes pollution- response plan requirements for all ships within the 200-mile limit.
The Convention condones and supports the right of states to take such actions. Article 56 of the Convention sets forth the rights, jurisdiction, and duties of the coastal state. It allows a state to establish an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and to subject it to the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal state. It states that, in the EEZ, the coastal state has sovereign rights for the purpose of protecting and preserving the marine environment. With this legal foundation, states have the ability to restrict navigation and overflight rights on the grounds of “environmental protection.”
Increasingly, the U.S. Navy and individual unit commanders are at risk of violating such laws. It is not difficult to imagine that, in the future, the following dialogues could take place during a confrontation between a U.S. Navy carrier battle group conducting underway replenishment (a.k.a., “lightering”) off Upper Slobovia and a cutter of the Upper Slobovian Coast Guard.
Cutter. “This is the Upper Slobovian Coast Guard. You are conducting activities that violate our laws. Specifically, you are lightering outside of a designated lightering zone; lightering without an approved vessel-response plan; and operating without a contract or other approved means with local oil-spill-response resources sufficient to respond to a worst-case discharge by the oiler. Additionally, your oiler has not been inspected for compliance with the safety and pollution-prevention regulations issued under our marine pollution control law. Also, the oiler is not double hulled. You are ordered to stop immediately your illegal activities.”
Task Force Commander (TFC): “We are engaged in innocent passage in international waters—60 miles off your country’s coast.”
Cutter: “You are lightering in the waters of our EEZ. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention grants us the right to protect and preserve the marine environment within those waters. We have exercised those rights by regulating the activities of oil tankers, including lightering.”
TFC: “The United States never signed the Convention.”
Cutter: “This is true, but the United States has taken the position that—with the exception of the deepbed mining provisions—the Convention reflects customary law and, therefore, is binding.” The TFC had been involved a similar situation a few years back with Libya, and, therefore, he immediately communicated with Washington for instructions.
Washington: “We have consulted our legal experts in the Departments of Defense, State, and Transportation, as well as key congressional sources involved with this sort of thing. It appears that the Upper Slobovian statutes and regulations are identical to OPA 1990 and the regulations promulgated thereunder.” TFC: “But what about the principle of freedom of navigation? It has been a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy since the founding of the country. We have fought the Barbary Pirates, the British, the Germans, and the Libyans over this sort of thing. We almost fought the Canadians over this, too.”
Washington: “Yes, but that was before the dangers of oil pollution in the marine environment were recognized.”
TFC: “What should I do?” Washington: “Unfortunately, it appears that you, the commanding officers of the escort ships and the oiler, and the U.S. government have violated Upper Slobovian laws. Theoretically, all could be subjected to criminal and civil penalties. Thank goodness for sovereign immunity.”
The above situation could arise—even without the Law of the Sea Convention entering into force and regardless of whether the United States ratifies the Convention. The international rights of navigation and overflight could be strengthened greatly if the Convention clarified these rights vis-a-vis environmental protection. Unfortunately, the United States is one of the nations at the forefront of infringing on these rights under the pretext of marine-environmental protection. It is difficult to imagine, therefore, the U.S. government seeking revisions to the Convention to address this threat to commerce and military operations. □
“Russian Navy in Distress”
(See P. Huchthausen, pp. 77-80, May 1993 Proceedings)
Captain Larry C. Johnson, U.S. Navy— Captain Huchthausen’s argument about the dire need for the United States to assist the Russians in dismantling their decommissioned nuclear submarines rests on political—not technical—reasoning. Dismantling ships—even nuclear
ships—does not require advanced technology; it is a straightforward industrial effort. The shipyards of the former Soviet Union built nuclear ships and submarines for almost 40 years. The Russians already have demonstrated that they can remove submarines’ reactor compartments, and they have dismantled entire ships. I would also point out that the U.S. techniques of nuclear-submarine disposal are well-documented.
Decommissioned ex-Soviet nuclear submarines are not a significant environmental hazard. They are already enclosed in a hull designed for submergence pressure, and, once shut down, they are safer than operational reactors. Furthermore, most of the submarines the Russians want to scrap have been inactive for years, and are not viable candidates for reactivation.
I agree that the Russians may need regulatory, political, and environmental assistance—and certainly international pressure—to dispose of their reactors. This is a far cry, however, from the technical liabilities and financial burdens associated with direct U.S. involvement in the effort-
The bottom line of this issue? The only reason the Russians lack funding for dismantling old submarines is their unwillingness to abandon new construction- Russia continues to build nuclear submarines, developing ever more modern and capable attack submarines. In addition, Russia retains the largest nuclear- submarine construction capability in the world.
We should not subsidize the modernization of the Russian submarine fleet by spending U.S. tax dollars to help dispose of their outdated submarines. The Russians are technically capable—let them put the resources being used to build new ships to a task they have left unattended far too long. □
“Information Sources”
(See pp. 209-215, May 1993 Proceedings)
Editor’s Note: The Naval Order of the United States (NOUS)—the organization responsible for, among many othet things, the Samuel Eliot Morison Award for Naval Literature—was omitted front the list of associations in the 1993 Naval Review. The Order's 1993 Congress will be held on 26-29 September 1993 in Chicago, Illinois. Those interested in attending should contact: Captain Charles S. Downey; 719 Berkshire Court; Downers Grove, Illinois 60516. Our thanks to Captain Wallace H. Lloyd, Jr., Commander General of the NOUS, for bringing these matters to our attention.□
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“Twilight of the Supercarriers”
(See C. R. Girvin, pp. 40-45, July 1993 Proceedings)
Commander H. G. Hatch, U.S. Navy— Captain Girvin makes some interesting Points regarding the future roles of carrier aviation. However, he arrives at two erroneous conclusions concerning the use of naval aviation in the Gulf War, and misses one significant point regarding the Purpose of carrier aviation. Naval air was not used as effectively as it could have been in Desert Storm, not because of inherent limitations in the aircraft, but from a misuse of our assets by senior commanders and their staffs.
Carrier air could have contributed significantly more to the air campaign had We not wasted valuable assets on routine combat air patrol (CAP), surface combat air patrol, and surface surveillance co- °rdination missions. Throughout the war, inordinate numbers of our sorties were spent drilling holes in the sky waiting for the Iraqis to attack the fleet. As the operations officer of an A-6 Intruder squadron, it was incredibly frustrating to see many of our sorties wasted flying protection for the surface ships or providing tanker support for a plethora of fighters °n CAP station. Because our squadron Was crew limited, sorties flown in support of the fleet defensive scheme were sorties lost to support the Joint Forces Air Component Commander’s (JFACC’s) air operation. Without a doubt some sorties were required for fleet defense, but a more aggressive employment of the Persian Gulf carrier force would have resulted in more bombs on target.
On the few occasions that Iraqi vessels did present themselves, carrier aviation was quite successful in destroying these targets—and I have the forwardlooking infrared tapes to prove it! I agree With Captain Girvin that cannon- and missile-armed helicopters are extremely effective against small, fast-moving surface vessels, but the U.S. Navy did not Possess that capability during Desert Storm. We should acquire this capability, either through modification of the SH-60 or cross-decking of Army helicopters.
About the only universally accepted lesson of Desert Storm was the value of stealthy, precision-guided munitions capable aircraft. To concentrate our limited Purchasing power on a short-range, nonstealthy, relatively low-technology platform dedicated to close air support, fleet defense, and the long-dismissed scouting mission is foolish. Regardless of what scenario we find ourselves in, the basic offensive nature of air power and the un
defined characteristics of future threats will demand a stealthy, multi-role, precision weapons-capable aircraft that can reach past the littoral. The F-18 E/F, combined with smaller, less capable carriers, simply won’t fill the bill—we need the AFX.
Air power is inherently offensive, and carrier-based air is conceptually the most offensive form of air power. Carriers do not exist to protect or serve the fleet; they exist to strike the enemy at home or in any ocean. Regardless of the size of the fleet, any carrier force that has a primary mission of fleet or self-defense becomes, in the words of our Air Force colleagues, “a 5 billion-dollar, self-licking ice cream cone.’O
“The F/A-18E/F Is ‘Catch 22’”
(See N. Hogan, p. 10, July 1993 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Riley D. Mixson, U.S. Navy, Director, Air Warfare, Navy Department—Rear Admiral Hogan severely criticizes senior Navy and Pentagon leadership for being “lulled” into a decision to develop and build the F/A-18E/F at the expense of the A/FX. Admiral Hogan has his facts wrong.
Let’s cut to the hunt. What Admiral Hogan is really concerned about is deep
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strike,” the range for which remains undefined, and first bomb on target always from Navy aircraft. A complex subject to be sure, but one which has to be debated in the context of “joint" warfare with all services participating, be it a surgical strike or a Desert Storm equivalent. In both cases, Naval Air is on track with cruise missiles from both ships/subs and/or stand-off weapons from aircraft— the E/F at the turn of the century and an AFX like aircraft in 2010 to 2015.
The E/F has incorporated as much survivability technology as is appropriate for that design. The E/F is a quantum improvement in that regard over any other operational aircraft today. With the addition of an electronically scanned array (ESA) radar, the E/F’s survivability will improve another order of magnitude. The reader should note that there are many elements of survivability, including jamming (whether on board or off board as in the EA-6B), defense suppression, speed, performance, decoys, end-game countermeasures, and on-board defensive electronic countermeasures. The E/F will incorporate the best combination of survivability elements which will ensure a very high rate of day-to-day mission accomplishment without loss to enemy defenses.
With respect to the so-called "deep
Figure 1: Deep-Strike Capabilities
* ,
SLAM | TSSAM SLAMP31
T
• A-6 (2 Mk-84 LGB, 2 AIM-9, tank)
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 735 nm.------------ ►
• F/A-18E/F (2 Mk-84 LGB. 2 AIM-9, 1 AIM-120, tanks)
............................ ■ ......... 640 nm. " ►
• AFX (2 Mk-84 LGB, 2 AIM-120)
----------------------------------------- —--------------- 700 nm.-----
• F-14D (2 Mk-84 LGB, 2 AIM-9, 2 AIM-120, tanks)
■■ 605 nm. ►
• F-117 ( GBU-27 2,000-pound class)
...................................... - 545 nm. ►
Note: All profiles are high-medium-high.
Terms: LGB = Laser-guided bomb; AIM-9 = Sidewinder air-to-air missile; AIM-120 = advanced medium-range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM); GBU = guided-bomb unit.
strike” mission, a glance at Figure 1 shows the capabilities of five aircraft when ordnance loads are held constant.
The Navy is not giving up on unrefueled ranges with either the E/F or the AFX. Couple the ranges inherent in those two aircraft with long-range missiles (TSSAM, SLAM P31) and with the first true Navy mission tanker (E/F tanker with more than 16,000 pounds of fuel to give) and those ranges stretch beyond anything achievable to date with Navy organic tanking.
The F/A-18E/F is our major first step toward a stronger, more streamlined 21st century Navy. It is supported by the Navy and Marine Corps as the kind of reliable, high-technology, sortie-generating aircraft envisioned in “. . . From the Sea” scenarios. Its air superiority performance with ESA and AMRAAM will rival the best in the world. Its strike and battlefield interdiction capabilities are the best in the world. As the backbone of the future carrier air wing, the E/F is the key to achieving our costsaving neckdown strategy to just two tactical aircraft types—the E/F and AFX. At one-third the cost of a new-start aircraft, the E/F will have the range, payload, survivability, and growth capacities that the Navy wants in a 21st century strike fighter. It has a firmly established development cost of $4.88 billion (Fiscal Year 1990 Dollars) and is performing on schedule and below budget.
The F/A-18E/F decision was arrived at through judicious, intelligent decisionmaking. Each and every study group that has analyzed the E/F program— NASA, Wright-Patterson, the Defense Science Board, the Department of Defense, the Center for Naval Analyses, and the U.S. Air Force Red Team—and others have confirmed the operational and design parameters of the E/F and its programmed cost as being both realistic and conservative in nature.
We in Naval Aviation have remained consistent with the Naval Aviation Plan the past several years. The E/F is Naval Aviation’s bridge to a high-end AFX type aircraft, whether it be called AFX or JAF or JSSA or ?. The E/F and an AFX will create the most formidable air wing in the world. In the meantime, the
E/F will be an aircraft that you will want your sons and daughters to fly when the clarion calls us to war.Q
“The U-Boat Peril Overcome”
(See J. Sweetman, pp. 30-31, June 1993
Proceedings)
Norman Polmar—Jack Sweetman might err when he cites Asdic as being named for the Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee.
There is considerable confusion over the origin of this term. The British Admiralty coined the term “asdic” during World War I with the first known reference appearing in a report dated 6 July 1918. Asdic was considered sufficiently ambiguous that the term would reveal nothing to an enemy. Prior to that it was referred to as the “electrical detector.”
After Winston Churchill used the term in the House of Commons in December 1939, the Admiralty advised the Oxford University Press that the word was an acronym for Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee, “a body which was formed during the war of 1914-1918, and which organized much research and experiment for the detection of submarines.” However, no committee bearing this name has been found in the Admiralty archives.
The term when first used in 1918 almost certainly was derived from the AntiSubmarine Division, the Admiralty department that sponsored antisubmarine research in World War I—according to the official British history Seek & Strike: Sonar, Anti-Submarine Warfare and the Royal Navy, 1914-54 (1984). □
George W. Duffy—Dr. Sweetman states that “ONS” designated convoys from the United Kingdom to Sydney, Australia. Actually, ON was the designation for westbound convoys across the North Atlantic from the United Kingdom to North America, commencing in July 1941. The letter S j was added whenever needed to indicate a “slow” convoy, whatever its destination. Eastbound convoys on the North Atlantic were designated j either as HX (from Halifax or New York) or SC (from Sydney, Nova Scotia, and, for a time, NeW York).
In the next sentence, he writes that “ONS-5 cleared the English Channel on 22 April 1943.” That is also wrong. The Germans still occupied France at that time, and there is no way any Allied ocean-going convoys were moving in or out of the Channel. In fact, convoys designated KM (United Kingdom to the Mediterranean) and MK (Mediterranean to the United Kingdom) were routed around the north of Ireland until August 1944. □
“A Right to Serve?”
(See J. F. Kelly, pp. 81-84, May 1993; E. A.
Eve, p. 25, July 1993 Proceedings)
Edward L. Runyon—I am 16 years old and have been a member of the Naval Institute for approximately six months. At the risk of offending some, I am appalled at the extremely negative emotion shown by naval men and women against the gay community.
While I never have had any homosexual feelings, many of my fellow students are homosexuals. In fact, one of my best friends recently told me that he was a homosexual. Since my initial shock over his announcement, I have learned that several other of my friends are either homosexual or bisexual. Again, in each case, it bothered me to some extent. After much discussion and thought, however, I have concluded that there is no difference between antihomosexuals and racists. My friends state that they did not choose to be the way they are. Instead, they simply are what they are. And, we have been bigoted for too long. It’s time we forget about our petty differences and make peace. □
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“Expansion of the Regular Membership Category”
(See F. B. Kelso, p. 22, March 1993; H. W.
O’Quin, A. Masulatitis, T. R. Daniel, p. 20,
May 1993; B. Longo, J. E. Shassberger, pp.
14-19, June 1993 Proceedings)
Storekeeper Second Class Hank Vinson, U.S. Naval Reserve—As a member of the naval service for nine years—and an associate member of the U.S. Naval Institute for two—I applaud the efforts of the Board of Control to expand the regular membership category.
I am sure there are naysayers who insist that allowing enlisted personnel to become regular members will jeopardize the quality of Proceedings and the entire Naval Institute. They still entertain, I fear, outdated ideas concerning the quality and character of the enlisted ranks.
The enlisted personnel of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard are well trained and highly intelligent. Including them in the U.S. Naval Institute as regular members—and accepting them as frequent contributors to Proceedings—will only increase the stature of an already fine organization. □
“Put Harpoon on EA-6Bs”
(See W. H. Wilson, pp. 107-108, December 1992 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Charles E. Tam- blyn, U.S. Navy—Lieutenant Wilson is fight on the mark when he states that the Navy’s “remaining operational aircraft— and the new ones we buy—must adapt to expanded missions to cover the myriad
of operational contingencies facing carrier air wings.” However, there already is a versatile carrier aircraft involved in every mission area—including electronic warfare, mining, command-and-control, antisurface warfare (ASUW), and antisubmarine warfare—because of an aggressive operational advisory group process, innovative tactical development, and comprehensive training: the S-3B Viking.
The arguments that Lieutenant Wilson made for putting the Harpoon on the EA-6B Prowler instead of the S-3B are uninformed:
> Slow and unmaneuverable? The EA-6B’s maximum airspeed capability is higher than the S-3B’s, but what does higher speed have to do with delivering a missile? Maneuverability is more important and even the F/A-18 pilots who who provide “bogey” services during the defensive combat maneuvering syllabus at the S-3B fleet readiness squadrons can attest to the excellent maneuvering characteristics of the S-3B.
y Currently, the S-3B has strike-attackvectoring (SAV) capability and is scheduled to receive the global positioning systems
y It would be true to say that the EA-bB has “the best tactical situational awareness of any strike aircraft”—as long as you don’t consider the S-3B as a strike aircraft. The EA-6B has an impressive electronic-surveillance suite; the S-3B s ALR-76 has a wider frequency spectrum and greater sensitivity and its APS-137 inverse synthetic aperture radar can identify hostile shipping well outside the range of air defenses. These two sys- terns—coupled with an unmatched acoustic and non-acoustic suite j;ive S-3B crews a “situational awareness” beyond the wildest dreams of those in the Prowler community.
> Lieutenant Wilson claims the fleet needs an autonomous sea-strike aircraft that can detect, localize, and destroy hostile surface targets with the Harpoon and has an accurate data-link picture, precise navigation capability, and a SAV capa-
Capable of firing the HARM, the EA-6B (above) is a magnificent air- defense-suppression platform. It makes little sense to have it also fire the Harpoon—and waste these capabil- ities—while the S-3B Viking is better suited to fire the antiship missile.
bility. It already has one: the S-3B
Viking. ,. • m
The EA-6B is the most capable jamming aircraft in the U.S. inventory; with the addition of the high-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM), it is an awesome air defense-suppression system. It makes little sense to give it an ASUW mission and waste these magnificent capabi l- tjes—when the multimission S-3B Viking already can do the job better. □
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“It’s Time to Think Profit and
Loss”
(See W. Carroll, pp. 12-14, April 1993; F. P. Blaisdell, p. 14, June 1993; M. L. McDaniel,
P- 25, July 1993 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Paul A. Schack, V-S. Navy—While Lieutenant Commander Carroll’s commentary states that the department of the Navy’s Total Quality Leadership (TQL) effort has merit, I take exception to many of his other remarks. TQL is not a program; it is a philosophy °f leadership and management. Additionally, as one of the instructors in TQL at the Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia, I can only wish that we had become disciples of TQL as Commander Carroll writes. The fact is, many eommands only embrace TQL to solve •^significant internal problems and do not c°ncentrate on improving their significant processes that would benefit their customers and help achieve their long- runge strategic plan.
TQL is not “a feel-good panacea” that Will solve all our problems—it was never intended as a problem-solving methodology. As defined by the Navy, TQL is: “the application of quantitative methods and the knowledge of people to assess and improve materials and services supplied to the organization, all significant Processes within the organization, and meeting the needs of the end user, now and in the future.”
Commander Carroll’s article goes on I to say that “TQL is ultimately a Zumwal- tesque band-aid of a packaged program Provided by the lowest bidder and is part °f the problem posing as the solution.” having served on active duty since the Zumwalt era, I feel qualified to say this type of thinking displays a lack of understanding of what the Navy’s TQL philosophy is all about. TQL is a fundamental change from the way we do business now. It is not, as Carroll sug- | Bests, “incorporating managerial buzzwords to achieve fundamental change,” but rather a top-down, process-focused, Quality-improvement philosophy requir- lng a cultural change to be successful.
Commander Carroll paints a picture of TQL where the executive officer cannot make a decision until all the votes are tallied. Again, this shows a lack of TQL knowledge and how it can help a command. Commands practicing TQL will have teams that will vote and use many TQL tools to achieve consensus and Sroup/team support, but these teams will be working on process-improvement issues, not on the way the executive officer runs the ship on a daily basis. More •Uiportant, if a command displays a general air of insubordination as depicted in the article, that command has far bigger problems than the use of TQL.
People who misunderstand or oppose the TQL philosophy often look for reasons why it won’t work. Picking on one point as does Commander Carroll when stating “It doesn’t really embrace Denting’s fundamental . . . tenets (and therefore won’t work), because if it did, we’d have to eliminate fitness reports and modify the rank structure” produces a flawed evaluation of TQL implementation. Dr. Deming’s 14 points (Obligations of Man-
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agement) cannot be implemented all at once. To say that because we still have fitness reports and evaluations means we cannot start a journey into TQL is wrong, and that type of thinking is analogous to saying you should not build a house, because you cannot put the roof on while you build the foundation.
TQL will take time. Fully implementing all 14 points will be difficult and painfully slow. I am not sure where Commander Carroll got the impression TQL would modify the rank structure, because nowhere in any of the TQL courses does
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the issue of modifying the rank structure arise. In fact, a basic premise of TQL is that the existing chain of command is maintained. Admiral Kelso has stated in his videotape on TQL that “TQL does not change anyone’s responsibilities in the chain of command one iota.”
Commander Carroll’s article continues to discuss change within the Navy. Many of the proposed changes are directly in line with TQL, yet the author makes no connection between TQL and his proposed changes. Commander Carroll’s point on setting up direct-buy and singlesource programs is right in line with the TQL philosophy, which teaches to reduce variation and end the practice of awarding business on the basis of price tag alone. Commander Carroll wants the defense industry to realize that “in a keen global marketplace, a company has got to predict the future and provide a good product.” This, too, is in exact agreement with the total-quality philosophy, which uses statistical process control, scientific method—the Plan, Do, Check, Act cycle—and knowledge of process stability and capability to predict the future. The goal of using TQL is not only to produce a good product but also to work continuously on process improvement to provide a great product. As rework and waste are reduced and ultimately eliminated, quality costs less, not more. TQL provides precisely the procurement system Commander Carroll proposes (as a better system). Understanding systems and the extended system that includes the customer, supplier, and internal processes is the basis of TQL.
I agree with Commander Carroll that the naval leader of the future must welcome and not fear change, and change for the better—based on data—is what TQL
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is all about. The old way of change, based on personal preferences or hunches, is called tampering. It will not lead to any significant improvement, but instead may increase the frustration level.
Commander Carroll brings out the point that if the only answer to a budgetary or training question is “because that’s how we have always done it,” it is time to look for a new way. TQL supports that sort of thinking by having a command make a flow chart of its processes and use other TQL tools to assess and analyze the way things are done. The standard answer, “because we have always done it that way,” is wrong; TQL encourages the exploration of new and innovative ways to improve processes, using data and an organized scientific method. Rewarding innovative thought and deed among subordinates is in perfect accord with TQL. An understanding of processes and the extended system promotes innovative and breakthrough thinking.
The article concludes by adopting a profit-and-loss way of thinking to develop us into a focused force. Commander Carroll writes, “We can do more with less if we change the system.” I agree the system should be changed, and TQL is the vehicle that can deliver that change. The only difficulty with TQL is that people want instant results. The Navy is faced with many complex issues and problems, and (to paraphrase H. L. Mencken) for every complex question, there is a simple answer—which is wrong. TQL is the right answer, but it is not simple. □ “The Ultimate Meritocracy”
(See S. Baldwin, pp. 33-36, June 1993; D. F.
Twyman, J. D. Wolfe, pp. 16-19, July 1993
Proceedings)
Master Gunnery Sergeant John W. Crawford, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps—Lieutenant Baldwin asserts, in one breath, that the “Navy’s goal should be to change men’s acculturated attitudes toward women in order to eliminate sexual harassment and to create an environment where men and women can work together in an atmosphere of mutual respect.” In another breath, he claims that “a double standard for physical requirements should be tolerated at the entry and training levels,” and that “gender norming ... a perfectly sinister practice ... is necessary at the precommissioning level.” His reason for tolerating of such practices: the double standard will allow vital women into the services.
Formalizing a double standard at the
entry level legitimizes the “objective i standards” arguments of some politicians- From a Marine Corps standpoint, however, objective standards belie the old saw of “Every Marine a rifleman” that is based on the philosophy that all Marines are trained and ready to puI down their pens, spatulas, shovels, oi wrenches, pick up their weapons, and move into the fray.
The mental qualities of the individual may be taken into account when the adrenalin is flowing, but it rarely flows in training. The only way to discover if a woman has the strength to compete if a fixed-bayonet battle is to put her in such a battle. But since ordinarily we do no1 wait until the fight begins to train Marines, we must select and train only those who have the best chance of winning in the rigors of pitched battle.
In fact, the Navy and the Marin® Corps must train for the hardest fighting imaginable. A good model is the Guadalcanal campaign; its sea, air, and land battles exemplify what is demanded of all ranks and rates in combat. Aviators mus1 be ready to continue fighting on the ground if they are shot down. Marines should be prepared to endure harsh living conditions and to fight at close quarters against a determined enemy. Sailor* must be ready to fight their ships, even if they have been damaged, and to save them.
In order for women to serve in these conditions, they must be as physically qualified as the men with whom they serve. Any double standard will fail to prepare them for the rigors of war and hinder the acceptance of women in combat roles by men. There must be a single physical standard that reflects true preparation for the worst exertions of battle. I suggest that all the services adopt the Marine Corps’ old physical-readiness test: a three-mile walk/run in full field gear with rifle; 100 step-ups in two minutes; a rope climb in full field gear; and a 200-meter fireman’s carry.
Admittedly, applying this standard would disqualify many women from service. But those women who pass such a test will be recognized as being as physically capable as the men with whom they serve. No stigma will be attached them''' as there would be if Lieutenant Baldwin's double standard was applied.
I am not against women serving in the U.S. military—particularly, my Corps-' but I am against political definitions of combat and its physiological require- | ments. The bottomline is victory. Any standard that does not give us the best I chance for victory must be either reformed or discarded. □
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“Enhanced Helicopter Night Visual Identification Tactics”
(See S. McGovern, pp. 91-92, June 1993 Proceedings)
Commander Chris Dewhirst, U.S. Coast Guard—The enforcement of the complicated fisheries regulations in New England waters, where more than 10,000 vessels operate, make night operations critical. The possibility of marine collisions and other disasters in the sensitive coastal areas of New England also make it imperative that there be a method of Setting detailed information to the federal on-scene coordinator (FOSC)—usually a Coast Guard officer from a Marine Safety Office or Captain of the Port Office— whenever a disaster occurs. In the past year, several have occurred at night—e.g., the 600-foot containership Chiara Srounded and took on a 17° list as she exited the Cape Cod Canal. Although helicopters were quickly on scene, the lack °f night-vision recording capability hindered salvage efforts and delayed decisions related to pollution prevention.
Presently, at Coast Guard Air Station Cape Cod (which covers the waters off blew England), our HH-60J pilots use the ANVIS-6 night-vision goggles (NVGs) "'ithin specific limitations to ensure safe operations. Our HU-25 fixed-wing pilots do not fly with goggles, and NVG experiments with observers have produced disappointing results.
Hoping to meet the night-vision requirements, the air station evaluated a sensor manufactured by B. E. Meyers and Company of Redmond, Washington: the “Hark Invader Owl.” The camera consists °f a Nikon High-8 minicamera equipped "dth a third-generation (ANVIS-6) NVG tube, a 50mW focusable laser illuminator, and interchangeable photographic lenses—including a 75-300-mm. zoom Miich has been most useful. The gear is 'ntegrated, rugged, and costs about $7,500 °n the General Services Administration schedule. Although initially skeptical, we have found it to be extremely useful, Uud believe it could revolutionize the way "'e carry out our missions.
Illuminating the target is critical as Lieutenant McGovern describes. We 'earned that, when dimmed down to a faint glow by the rheostat control, the HH-60’s nose light provides an effect that >s like turning on the lights in a dark r°om instead of the flashlight beam that die laser presented. We are able to read easily draft markings, load lines, and Uarries from 150 feet away. A more integrated solution would be the infrared sPotlight suggested by Lieutenant McGovern. This illumination is critical to
minimizing the “coma” effect of bright deck lights in the field of view. The laser, however, still has value in pointing and cuing.
In flights over test tanks of various kinds of oil floating on water, the camera recorded the oil slicks in excellent detail at altitudes from 500 to 1,500 feet. If delivered in a timely manner, the video would help a FOSC to direct pollution- response equipment more effectively. Data-linking or visually tagging skimmer gear so that it is better identified on the video also would make the FOSC’s job easier.
In the case of our most recent night fisheries violation, the recorded video was
Using a “skunk-works” approach, the personnel of Coast Guard Air Station Cape Cod have developed the “Dark Invader Owl” into a potent tool in night patrol operations off the New England Coast.
almost of television quality. When additional frontal illumination was provided, the bright deck lights do not hinder the sensor’s ability to see and record necessary data. Fine details—such as net mesh size (three inch versus the legal five inch), fish on deck, boats’ names and identification numbers, and the crew activity— were plainly visible. The ability to record the radio transmissions on the videotape recording gave the violators ample opportunity to incriminate themselves— which, inexplicably, they seemed eager to do. All this has made post-case analysis and case presentation a snap. In terms of fines assessed from cases in which the Dark Invader Owl has been used, the gear is expected to pay for itself in the first few months of operation.
Stabilization also is critical. We quickly discovered that, although the gear comes with a software programmed “digital stabilization,” the high-zoom setting of 300 mm.—equal to eight-power binoculars—causes the object to move in the field of view and become “jumpy”— much like using binoculars or a weapon sight at sea. High-quality video recorders, however, can capture the freeze-frame images to identify evidence—e.g., deck activity. We obtained dramatic improvement in picture quality when, from another air station, we borrowed a gyrosta- bilizer (manufactured by Ken-Lab of Essex, Connecticut) which fastens onto the bottom of the camera.
Although we are still learning about this sensor, in a short time the air station has gained a capability to make effective night fisheries prosecutions and give a FOSC actual footage of a collision scene, thus, providing maximum time to position salvage and spill-response equipment. The ability to observe deck activity—such as crewmen slipping on the suspenders of their foul weather gear quite clearly from more than 150 feet away would be invaluable to cutters performing night boardings in high-threat environments such as the Caribbean. A bridge-mounted sensor could observe, report, and record all activity on a suspect vessel as the boarding party approaches, and as the boarding transpires.
Much work remains. The doctrine for this new capability exists only in the minds of a few innovative lieutenants in the field. Attention needs to be focused on supportability and training issues. Although the cost of the gear is very low, the sophisticated technology in the ANVIS-6 and the integration with the camera and lenses require operators to have several hours of training to become proficient. At the air station, we concentrated on training two petty officers (avionics technicians) to become our operators for the evaluation period. This proved to be successful and the quality of their video continues to improve. I recommend this “skunk-works” approach to units exploring the use of this technology until official doctrine catches up. □
“Where Are the Unmanned Surface Vehicles?”
(See W. R. Smedberg, pp. 107-109, Apnl 1993 Proceedings)
Wade Armstrong, Master Mariner By proposing specific roles for unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), Admiral Smedberg provided a useful starting point for the discussion and development of viable USV missions. Nevertheless, the bulk of his article—that portion devoted to the ocean-surveillance ships—contains fac-
“Commanders Must Command”
(See E. Hebert, pp. 55-59, September 1992; E. B. Hontz, p. 14, October 1992; K. A. Eubanks, pp. 13-14, December 1992; J. E. Lyons, p. 18, January 1993; M. Morris, pp. 23-24, February 1993; M. A. Hess, p. 29, May 1993; D. Kern, p. 20, June 1993 Proceedings)
Captain James W. Stratton, U.S Navy (Retired)—The U.S. Navy does not dif
sion could be accomplished, under the same limitations that exist for manned ships, by a USV.
The USV issue needs to be carefully considered from the legal perspective, as well. Without international standards for such operations, the Navy could find itself at the mercy of unscrupulous fishermen and shipowners who will seek out USVs, perform some full-contact shiphandling, and then file grossly inflated damage or loss claims.
If the issues I have outlined are addressed, I would strongly support a viable USV program. I am sure I speak for a great many of the T-AGOS veterans in welcoming the opportunity for relief from such arduous duty in the future. □
tual and logical irregularities that detract from the value of the treatise.
I disagree with Admiral Smedberg’s statement that “the first 18 monohull Stalwart (T-AGOS-l)-class ships the Navy built could not operate safely in high sea states.” Having spent five years in this class ship in the far reaches of the North Pacific most of that time in command
of the USNS Triumph (T-AGOS-4)______ I
can attest to the heavy-weather capabilities of these small ships. We operated routinely in much higher sea states than any other fleet units. I never made a winter Northern Pacific mission that did not entail long periods of operating in seas exceeding 30 feet; and every such mission had at least a few days with 50- to 65-foot seas. Yes, it was miserable, wallowing around in such rough conditions at three knots. But most of the fine men and women in these seaworthy ships were
The first Stalwart (T-AGOS-l)-class ocean surveillance ships—the Capable (T-AGOS-16) below—entered service in 1984. Now, because their primary mission to trawl for Soviet subs has largely gone away, the Navy is deactivating these ships. What’s left of their mission will be covered by the four new Victorious (T-AGOS-19)-class SWATH ocean surveillance ships.
ANDERSON & RIZZO.INC.
not unduly concerned. As with modern high-performance aircraft, the ships could withstand much more of a pounding than their frail human occupants.
In discussing the risk of collision, Admiral Smedberg suggested that the ASW aircraft could maneuver the USV to safety. This logic has more holes than a wheel of fine Jarlsberg cheese. First, because of our remote operating areas, P-3 Orions often were able to remain on station with us for only a couple of hours. On many missions, we would be in UHF range of a P-3 for brief periods only three or four days a month. If there were five T-AGOS USVs on Northwest Pacific stations, naval aviation wouldn’t have to worry about a new mission in the New World Order: all available aviators would be needed to fly USV patrols. Beyond the obvious danger posed by harsh weather, our operations areas often would put our aircraft within range of hostile air-defense systems. It doesn’t make sense to risk dozens of aircraft and hundreds of highly trained aviators to do what has been accomplished with a few $27 million ships, each with a crew of 25 people.
The T-AGOS ships operate under strict electronic-emissions control—including radar and collision-avoidance systems. Therefore—given the technology
presently available—drone control would have been nearly impossible. With a passive optical sighting-and-ranging system (motion-stabilized to prevent seasickness of shoreside drone operators), this mis-
DOD (McDERMOTT SHIPYARDS)
fer only from the Royal Navy in requif'i ing its surface officers to be both engi' neers and tacticians, it differs from virtually every other navy in the world' Other navies give their commanding officers the same responsibility for engi' neering performance as the U.S. Navy, but without the extensive qualification requirement. Are our command responsibilities so very different from every other j navy that we really need such cross-. training?
Expert deck officers and engineering i officers—not officers who know a little | of each skill—are needed in ships. Deck | officers should be surface-warfare officers who have some familiarity with engineering; engineering officers should be engineering-duty officers (14XX) who have some familiarity with topside operations.
The current system breeds mediocrity. \ producing less-experienced ship captain* \ and engineers. When I commanded a destroyer, I wanted department heads who j knew their jobs. It was frustrating to have j some who had virtually no background in their areas of responsibility. As a surface nuclear-engineering officer, I wish that I’d had more shiphandling time before my command, instead of just meeting the minimum requirements. True, there are some officers who can excel in all areas. Nevertheless, if even these of- j ficers worked in a specialty area, it would | improve the surface Navy’s overall j performance.
Why are naval aviators not required to . have same qualifications as surface-warfare officers before they can command . ships? One obvious answer is that their ' career path does not support such a re- I quirement. But are the deep-draft ship* . and aircraft carriers staffed with more ca- j pable engineers, or are these senior aviators so much better than their surface- I warfare counterparts that they don’t need . this experience? When I served as an | instructor at the Senior Officer Ship Ma- | terial Readiness Course, I saw that three months of instruction was enough to ac- i quaint aviators with the essentials of engineering and provide them enough in- | formation so they could assess accurately i an engineer officer’s performance. Why does a surface officer need more back' ground than that?
This is an emotional issue for many j people. Modern quality management in the private sector is management by facts- Why can’t the Navy establish a process- , action team, study group, or committee to gather the facts and make a recoin- | mendation? Let’s not perpetuate a system that might not be the best for our present , and future needs. □
22 i
Proceedings / August 1993
“We Are Here to Stay”
(See P. Adams et alM pp. 92-94, April 1993; O. Gotay, J. King, G. D. Gibson, pp. 20-24, June 1993; D. T. Sweeney, A. B. Moulton, P. C. Olsen, C. H. Fries, C. W. Castelli, A. M. Greenwood, p. 26, July 1993 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Randall E. Beck, U.S. Naval , Reserve—The U.S. Navy recently made
some interesting changes to its personnel | regulations regarding body-fat percentage and the treatment of officers and sailors who do not meet the new standard. For many years, the Navy has discriminated against those who carry their body Fat above certain percentages; however, 'he new regulations are more stringent and allow the Navy to be even more selective *n determining who can enlist and who can be processed for separation on the grounds of body-fat percentage.
If I were an overweight person in the Navy, I would feel as if the Navy was S'ngling me out solely because of my overweight condition—my “status”—and disregarding my performance record. There are many overweight people in the Navy who have been recognized for exemplary conduct and have been performing their duties at least as well, if "ot better, than slim people. Besides, the vast majority of Navy jobs don’t require a physically fit person to perform them. Jn addition, I would point to recent med- lcal evidence which suggests that for tllany people who are overweight, their Problem very well may be a genetic trait, ""parted to them before birth, and, therefore, one which is impossible to over- c°me through diet or exercise. In other words, they were bom that way. To try f° be otherwise becomes a contradiction °f character for them. This is certainly believable, since eating is a very basic need in the hierarchy of human needs, a need that goes even deeper than other Oeeds which are not necessary for indi- v'dual survival—e.g., sex.
If these new rules affected me adversely, I would get really upset. I would form political-action groups—with catchy "antes like “Eat Up” and “Plump Nation”—that would strengthen my cause, and enable me and other overweight people to manipulate a non-caring military entity through back-door channels. Through them the voice of fat Americans "'ould be heard, and we would begin to "take demands of the U.S. military. We 'vould demand that the U.S. Armed Forces not only tolerate looking at our bodies, but that they sanction our lifestyle °f gluttony. We would insist that overweight Americans have a right to serve fheir country, because, after all, the mil- ttary is just another federal employer,
with no more special reason for existence than any other federal agency.
The Navy seems to think it has the right to discriminate against any physical, psychological, or personal trait that it thinks will degrade the combat effectiveness of its units. Of course, currently, the Navy has no problem enforcing this particular standard, because being fat is generally unacceptable in our present-day culture—despite the fact that, by conservative estimate, 15%-20% of Americans are overweight. But I would champion my cause until politicians—including the President—finally felt enough political pressure to see it my way and make the military accept us. And once the military accepts us, society would have to do so, too. As soon as fat people were accepted, I would work with other groups representing people who felt they were similarly discriminated against, until the day comes when the military could not deny anyone their “right” to serve, regardless of their physical, psychological, or personal status. □
“Tomorrow’s Fleet”
(See S. C. Truver, pp. 225-238, May 1993
Proceedings)
Captain John E. Liebmann, U.S. Navy (Retired)—For all the study and hard work behind . . From the Sea, ” it fails as a strategic-planning document largely because the New World Order does not lend itself to grand strategies, but rather to a menu of disparate tasks. Fundamentally, “. . . From the Sea ” is a recitation of tasks and—no surprise here—the tasks sound exactly like what the Navy has been called on to do the past 48 years. While we prepared and trained for the North Cape Armageddon, actual tasks consisted almost entirely of limited intervention in peripheral states. Will the demise of the Soviet Union reduce the need for intervention? Hardly. With the restraining ties of the Cold War unbound, tension and conflicts are flaring up all over. The Navy is actively engaged in Somalia, the Persian Gulf, and the Balkans. Engagements against Iran and North Korea—which should not be allowed a nuclear capability—are all but inevitable. Evacuation missions loom in a dozen trouble spots. Aircraft and ships scour the Caribbean for drug runners. The Navy has a very full plate. So, what does it need to execute . . From the Sea”! In a word, numbers.
Can anyone claim that, during past years, force levels were excessive? Can anyone who spent long deployments off of Lebanon or Haiphong believe we had
GUADALCANAL-1942
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,
too many ships? During Operation Market Time—the sea blockade of Vietnam—the Navy had 241 surface combatants, but it was stretched so thin that we had to bring in a mix of World War II-era destroyer escorts, minesweepers, and U.S. Coast Guard cutters. Now we are being asked to be ready to do the same sort of thing but with far fewer surface combatants—80 by some counts, though I have read numbers as low as 65.
In the face of this—and against all logic—the Navy is holding its plans to procure a single class of surface combatant: the $840 million Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Aegis destroyer. The Arleigh Burke is a high-tech ship designed to defend a battle group, on the sea—not from the sea—against a saturation raid by Soviet Backfire bombers. Four are funded for 1993 with another 15 planned through 1997. That’s all the surface combatants Navy is buying because it can’t afford any more.
I have nothing against these ships. Without a doubt, the Arleigh Burkes are powerful and survivable surface combatants. But they have three drawbacks: they cost too much; they can only be in one place at a time; and the threat against which they do best no longer exists. For any of the myriad missions envisaged in “. . . From the Sea”—blockade, surveillance, rescue, humanitarian, or interdiction—two lowly frigates with helicopters would be vastly more useful than one Arleigh Burke- class destroyer.
The Navy should cancel all future procurement of the Arleigh Burke class and rescind funding for those where outlays have not reached 70%. It then should develop a low-cost surface combatant that is just good enough to counter the threats the Navy is likely to face, while carrying enough ordnance—including the Tomahawk cruise missile—to make them useful, and then build as many as funding allows. Until then, keep the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates and other surface combatants at the 1993 level of 145 ships.
It is time to look at everything that the Navy is building or plans to build, and weigh its usefulness in relation to “... From the Sea ” scenarios. If its usefulness is lower than its cost should mandate, look for something else that is more useful and, I hope, less expensive.
For example, I would trade two aircraft carriers for ten fast sealift ships, or place two heavy Army divisions into the reserves and use the savings to fund a Marine Corps of 197,000 Marines (the 1990 strength) rather than the 159,000 now planned. I would exchange a couple of attack submarines for 20 ocean minesweepers, and any number of attack aircraft for a fleet of C-17 transport planes.
To do any of this, the mind-set of the entire Defense Department must change. Advocacy for the sake of advocacy must cease. Those who hope to rise to flag rank on the back of big budgets must be dissuaded. Above all, the Pentagon must have the courage to admit that some of the things it has been doing all these years won’t work anymore and that symmetrical resource allocation is a foolish consistency in an all too inconsistent world. □
“Where’s the Admirals’ Revolt?”
(See J. L. George, pp. 66-71, May 1993; C. E. Mundy, T. Murphy, M. Cale, D. Ware, pp. 2023, July 1993 Proceedings)
Shephard W. Hill, Director of Government Operations, North American Aircraft, Rockwell International—It is unfortunate that, in making his case for the need for naval air power, Dr. George uses the Air Force’s B-l bomber as a rhetorical pawn.
He suggests that the B-ls missed the
Persian Gulf War because they “have never worked properly, and the Air Force is now asking for more than $2 billion in a shrinking defense budget just to bring them up to lowered specifications.” Dr- George goes on to say that since “the B-l does not work (according to some General Accounting Office [GAO] reports, it may never work) at least half , should immediately go into mothballs.” ' The B-l was not used in the Gulf Wat I for the same reason the Trident submarine was absent from any action—in I 1990, it was dedicated to the nuclear j mission. B-52Gs saw action because they were conventional assets with crews trained for conventional missions.
Regarding Dr. George’s claim that the Air Force has requested $2 billion to “fix” the B-l—he has his facts mixed up again. The funding requested for the B-l is not to “fix” the aircraft but, rather, to provide it additional conventional capability—i.e., the ability to drop 2,000- pound precision-guided bombs. Indeed, the upgrade is not unlike the service life extension program for the Navy’s aircraft carriers. The basic approach is the same: take a good basic platform, maintain modern capabilities, and realize a longterm return on your investment.
On the matter of GAO studies, Dr- George should not depend too much on that esteemed investigative arm of the Congress. The GAO has questioned the ability of an Aegis cruiser to turn without capsizing, the cost-effectiveness of nuclear submarines versus diesel submarines, and the relative worth of an aircraft carrier battle group—which it characterized as a $30 billion self-defense force with little power-projection capability. The facts show that the B-l works very well. It holds 44 world records for speed, payload, range, and time to climb. It can fly supersonic at 200 feet or 37,000 feet- It can carry 24 2,000-pound bombs internally and has an payload capability of nearly 125,000 pounds.
The bottom line is that the United Sates needs both long- range bombers and aircraft carriers if it is to protect its interests- It is hard to imagine B-ls and B-2s flying up and down the coast of Lebanon in a “presence mission.” At the same time, however, aircraft carriers cannot be in all places at all times and the United States must have the ability to strike anywhere, often in a matter of hours. □