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Pushing Them Out the Back Door
S|°n did not concentrate on killing Iraqi soldiers but on defying their modern equipment. When General Schwarzkopf v«baliZed his intent to the battlefield commanders he made clear that the destruction mission was intended to deny Saddam Hussein future use of the modern Soviet equipment with 'vhich he had armed his Republican Guard. Anyone who b - leves that the existence today of any heavy Republican Guard Visions demonstrates they escaped unscathed also must believe 'bat the Little Big Horn massacre did not occur becaus st>ll have a 7th Cavalry in the U.S. Army today.
If there was great concern about a large enemy force escap- >"8 over the river at Basra, why did the high command not give 'be order on the 27th or early on the 28th of February o place 'be 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) north of clty
Position where they could have blocked any escape.
bad planned for and was ready to execute such ajnissio . Colonel Burton does raise another key question. er air power at this point? The coalition had enormous '° bomb these “masses” of enemy forces, purpor y 'heir way through Basra and across the river. On 28 Febru y, *°r the first time during the ground war, skies w® were
sandstorms concealed movements, and weather co [deal for effective air operations. My guess is t a e ■ 'aunching of the 101st Airborne and no intensive air P . because There was no need for them. Yes dismounted soldiers ’’’ay have been streaming across the Eup ra es- Weapons, vehicles, and equipment were burning in -
Colonel Burton states that more than 75% of “
CUrred in VII Corps. Without diminishing the effort ’
11 should also be recorded that most of the ig | the main c°mPlished by VII Corps units, because VII Corps had a«ack. To allege that Gulf War rates were the highest in
tory is both irresponsible and absolutely wrong. Recent studies indicate that the Desert Storm fratricide rate was probably much lower than World War II and other subsequent major conflicts. The discipline and competence of our soldiers kept rates even lower than they might have been on the high tempo, high lethality Desert Storm battlefield.
It is not unusual for commanders who have seen a battlefield from different vantage points to have discussions and even disagreements about events and conditions on that field. While those of us who participated in the Gulf War are saddened that such controversies have arisen, we also understand that professional disputes are inevitable and may even prove to be useful. In my judgment, however, Colonel Burton’s article does not fall in that category. Instead, he has distorted the professional debate. The real reason for picking up my pen was to counter the great disservice Colonel Burton does to the magnificent soldiers of VII Corps. Those young warriors demonstrated the same great courage American fighting men have always shown and their competence is without parallel. Those soldiers have become victims of their own enormous success. The fighting skills they brought to the field—their training, discipline, and courage—turned what even the most optimistic prewar analysts had viewed as a very tough several weeks of war into a four-day rout. In his assaults on Generals Schwarzkopf and Franks—who will be remembered as a courageous, inspirational battlefield commander who accomplished his mission in full—Colonel Burton also assails these great soldiers who performed so brilliantly and who were so extraordinarily successful in the job their nation asked them to do.
They deserve much better.
General Griffith, now the U.S. Army's Inspector General, was the Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, during Operation Desert Storm.
Publisher’s Note: We have received a great deal of mail in response to this article. Many letters asked why we published the original article.
We work hard to try to ensure that the Naval Institute provides a genuinely open forum for the discussion of matters of significant professional interest. In doing so, we have developed several informal criteria, among them that an author should be factual, and that the discourse should be at an appropriately professional level. Whether the Editorial Board agrees or disagrees with an author s interpreta tion or conclusions is not suppose to be a criterion. Because critics fre quently assert that someone with whom they disagree “doesn t have is facts straight,” or “doesn t understand,” we generally give the author some leeway, in the interest o eep ing an open forum. Our experience has been that an author who over steps is invariably brought up short
Answering the Mail
General Franks in Desert Storm
by the responses from our attentive readers, and that the end result is a balanced view.
We believe that this will be the case in the present instance. General Franks (whose article, “The Army’s View of Joint,” was published in the May Proceedings) takes some hits along similar lines in General Schwarzkopfs book, It Doesn't Take a Hero (Linda Grey/Bantam Books, 1993). General Schwarzkopfs stature made it awkward for General Frank’s supporters to rally effectively to his defense. Colonel Burton appears to present no such impediment. With this special section, General Cushman’s letter in the July Proceedings, and letters that will be published in future issues, we believe the net result will leave the unprejudiced reader with a view more favorable to General Franks and his role in the Gulf War than it was before the process began.
Truth is stronger than falsehood, and if both have their day in court, truth will win. Yet our track record is imperfect in distinguishing one from the other before both sides have been aired. Thus we sometimes err on the side of publishing a view that in the end is established as errant. This seems to us to be far preferable to screening out unpopular views in advance. An open forum is not without costs, but its value in the long run far exceeds those costs.
Proceedings / August 1993