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By Vice Admiral William Lawrence, U.S. Navy (Retired)
If 1981 career-limiting legislation had been in place during World War II, the commanders here—listed with their ages at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941—would have been forced, like many of today’s still-competent retired leaders, to watch the action from their armchairs.
Even before DOPMA, the Navy was already moving toward more youthful senior officers. A strong accent of youth began in 1961, when, at age 43, John F. Kennedy became the youngest president in U.S. history. Youth had become beautiful and age unattractive, if not ugly. The Navy fell into step with this national attitude and started producing younger flag officers. Admiral Elmo Zumwah became the youngest Chief of Naval Operations in history in 1970 at age 49. During his tenure he established policies permitting accelerated promotion, resulting in the selection of many officers for flag rank after only 20 years of service or less—a policy unprecedented in the Navy> even during World War II. Once the youth movement took effect, the practice soon became institutionalized.
Another factor was the increased politicization of the officer-promotion process after World War II. The greater complexity of planning, programming, budgeting, afd weapon systems acquisition in recent decades has require^ the assignment of more naval officers to Washington-based
There is a way the U.S. government can save billions of dollars. Amazingly, no political leaders have yet realized it. Even the ever-vigilant, perspicacious General Accounting Office has not detected it. The remarkable fact is that once we implement this action, the U.S. armed forces would see monetary savings and increased efficiency immediately. Difficult as it may be to believe, there are no up-front costs—as witnessed in such measures as base closures—before the benefits accrue.
We can achieve all this simply by returning to the past practice of allowing military personnel to serve longer. Decreased recruiting and training costs and a reduction in the size of the armed forces through increased personnel effectiveness could represent enormous savings. With more individuals serving longer, government outlays for military retirement could conceivably decrease as well.
At a time when life expectancy is increasing steadily, and the health and vigor of society are improving, the U.S. military has become a true anachronism in our country. Only .4% of the people in our armed forces are more than 50 years old. While the trend in most professions in the world is for people to work longer, the military since World War II has ironically taken the opposite course. In fact, the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1981 even imposed a 35-year maximum limit on military officers’ length of service. And that limit applies to officers who achieve pay grade 0-8 (rear admiral and major general) and above. For officers in the grades of 0-7 (rear admiral, lower half, and brigadier general) and below, the limit, with few exceptions, is 30 years. So, only a small number of officers in today’s armed forces serve beyond age 55.
The average age and career longevity of today’s officers is dramatically different from 50 years ago. The average age of military officers upon selection to flag rank is currently in the mid 40s. By contrast, General of the Army George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the Army during World War II, was 55 at the time of his promotion from colonel to brigadier general. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations during World War II, was 54 at the time of his promotion from captain to rear admiral. Today, most of the flag and general officers will have long since retired by then. If the current DOPMA career limits had been in effect in 1941, more than 15 of the Navy’s top commanders during World War II would have missed all or most of the war: Fleet Admiral King; Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Franklin D. Roosevelt; Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet; Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, Commander, U.S. Third Fleet; Fleet Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Commander, U.S. Fifth Fleet; Admiral H. S. Stark, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe; Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Commander, Pacific Amphibious Forces; Admiral Thomas C. Kincaid, Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet; and Admiral John H. Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics and Commander Naval Air Forces, Pacific Fleet. Significantly, no notable reference in history has ever implied that the age of these officers adversely affected their performance during World War II. Fortunately for our country, military officers of that era were allowed to serve to age 64.
Why has a youth movement occurred in the U.S. military, and what are the resultant detrimental impacts? The same youth trends have occurred in both the officer and enlisted components, and we could achieve similar economies and efficiencies in allowing our enlisted personnel to serve longer.
The trend toward a younger officer force appears to have occurred more through happenstance than by design- The first service component to move radically toward youth was the Army Air Corps, which expanded so rapidly and so significantly during World War II, that it became necessary to promote many young officers to senior rank to provide the required number of commanders. Furthermore, the glamorous nature of military aviation perhaps made gray heads and wrinkled faces seem incongruous with soaring in the wild blue yonder. General Hoyt S- Vanderberg was 43 years old when he was promoted to brigadier general during the war and only 49 when he became the second Chief of Staff of the newly formed U.S- Air Force in 1948. General Curtis Lemay was promoted to brigadier general at age 35 and became a general as the second Commander-In-Chief, Strategic Air Command, at age 40 in 1948.
After its formation in 1947, the U.S. Air Force convinced Congress of its necessity to maintain a large officer corps because of its inability to train pilots quickly enough in time of rapid mobilization. This large, hastily formed corps, comprised mainly of officers commissioned in World War II, was the major factor in the trend toward a more youthful force. Because of these early practices and traditions, the Air Force has remained the service most dedicated to youth. When the other services were still allowing officers to serve into their 60s, the Air Force by policy imposed a 35-year limit on careers. Air Force influence was instrumental in the adoption of the 35-year military career limit, when Congress enacted DOPMA if 1981. And the DOPMA edict essentially turned the Air Force career pattern into the required standard for the U.S- Armed Forces.
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commands and organizations, which in turn placed them in close contact with senior officers and political appointees. Consequently, the senior officials could not resist the natural human tendency to reward faithful subordinates with early promotion. This might help to explain the currently high percentage of early promotions among officers who served as executive assistants and aides to senior civilians and officers of three- and four-star rank.
Increased physical demands of a military career have not been a factor in the trend toward youth. Aside from the improved health, fitness, and longevity of individuals, advanced technology and increased automation have reduced the strength and endurance requirements of military personnel. The recent change in the rank of Navy carrier air wing commanders from commander to captain, With incumbents in their 40s, is graphic proof that relatively senior officers can handle the rigors of tactical aviation. Unquestionably, after the 20-year point in the military career, mental prowess and experience become Preeminent over physical attributes.
The 35-year DOPMA career limit has essentially standardized the practice of selecting personnel for flag rank at 25 years service or earlier, because the Navy wants to Provide its admirals enough years to serve in several assignments and to be able to advance to four-star rank. If the Navy did not do this, officers would not be prepared to serve as Chiefs of Naval Operations and Commanders- ■n-Chief of Fleets and Unified Commands before statutory retirement.
Naval flag officers today have considerably less experience than their forbears. For example, in the past decade several four-star admirals, including Chiefs of Naval Operations, have, at the time of flag selection, had only °ne seagoing or shore command earlier in their careers. Some of these officers spent more time ashore in Washington than on sea duty at the time of selection. By comparison, Fleet Admiral King, upon flag selection at 32 Vears’ service, had served for 22 of those years on sea duty, with five seagoing commands and two shore commands. Unquestionably, that background contributed to superior performance as Chief of Naval Operations during World War II. The lack of similar experience detracts from the performance of senior flag officers today, furthermore, the youthful retirement age denies the military the services of officers capable of significant further contribution. Admiral Arleigh Burke once commented that he did not attain his full potential as an executive until ten years after his retirement from the Navy at age 59. It *s time that the military stop serving as a training ground for private industry.
Flag selection at 25 years’ service or earlier also has induced the contribution the Navy receives from the captain (0-6) grade. With less than 3% selection opportunity f°r flag rank, many outstanding captains are not promoted. ^°me of these superb officers retire immediately when ?°t selected for promotion so that they can pursue civil- lan careers—a major loss of talent and experience from jhe Navy. Those who remain until the currently allowed 'ri years of service have reduced credibility, because they regarded as passed-over officers and shunted into backwater assignments. Unfortunately, the captains of today do not have the stature and respect commanded by their predecessors of a half-century ago, when officers were selected for flag rank after 30 or more years service.
For officers in today’s highly complex and technical
Navy to fulfill all the career requirements imposed by present laws and policies prior to selection for flag rank, 25 years’ service is obviously not long enough. The aviation career provides a good example. The Aviation Career Incentive Pay law requires military aviators to spend 9 out of their first 12 years, and 12 out of their first 18 years in operational flying assignments in order to receive flight pay when in nonoperational assignments. Each officer is also expected to obtain a subspecialty qualification in addition to his or her warfare qualification, which often requires postgraduate education and at least two years experience in a shore assignment. Current law now requires a three-year joint tour and one year of professional military education as prerequisites for promotion to flag rank. In addition, the officer must have completed a tour as a squadron executive officer and commanding officer, carrier department head, and commanding officer of a deep-draft ship, followed by command of an aircraft carrier. Each officer should also have at least one tour in Washington because of the importance attached to duty and experience there. It is extremely difficult for an officer to accomplish all of this in 25 years. Many outstanding young officers consider these career requirements, observe that “you can’t get there from here,” and choose to leave the Navy for civilian careers.
Because of the heavy at-sea demands of their careers, nuclear submariners are currently allowed a waiver that relieves them from a three-year joint tour requirement before promotion to flag rank. This is highly inappropriate, not only because of its adverse impact on the professional knowledge of the officers concerned, but because of the need for improved joint cooperation and coordination in our armed forces, reinforced by the recent Gulf War experience. The new Career Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act passed in 1991 established various experience and tenure requirements for acquisition assignments that will be difficult to achieve under present policies. Flag officers detailed to certain acquisition billets, for example, are required to have ten years’ experience in acquisition assignments.
The solution to these problems is relatively clear-cut. But it entails more than a simple modification of DOPMA career limits. Presently, approximately 70,000 officers are in the Navy in the ten officer ranks allowed in the U.S. armed forces (0-1 to 0-10). Only about 250—or .3%—of the officers, however, are in the top four—or 40%—of the grades (0-7 to 0-10). Military officers still consider attainment of flag rank to be the ultimate in success. Officers in the four flag ranks receive special perquisites and prestige not accorded other officers. The problem is, so few officers attain flag rank that many highly capable and ambitious officers choose not to make the service their career because of the limited opportunity they perceive for “success.”
With extension of DOPMA career limits may come a need to restructure the officer rank profile into more of a true pyramid, rather than the significant “neck down” phenomenon at pay grade 0-7 and above. Perhaps fewer grades than ten—maybe eight—would be optimum. Pay and responsibility should increase proportionately with increased rank, unlike the significant jump that now occurs between ranks 0-6 and below and ranks 0-7 and above. Changing 200-year-old traditions is always difficult, but perhaps it would be beneficial to discard the term “flag” for the top pay grades, in the interest of the overall effectiveness of the officer corps.
Whether the maximum service limit should be based on years of service or age should be studied carefully. Age would apparently be most appropriate, because it is the commonly used retirement criterion in most professional fields. In any event, the maximum age at retirement should be at least 62 years old. We should retain the current stipulation that personnel be separated or retired if not promoted beyond certain grades, and the time-in-grade requirements for advancement should increase as the careef limit of military personnel expands. Promotion to pay grade 0-5, for example, might occur in the 18th year-— and to 0-6 in the 25th year—as opposed to the 15th and 21st years, respectively, which is now the case. Although this will be an emotional issue, we should give serious consideration to raising the minimum service requirement for retirement from 20 to 25 years.
All these changes present only one disadvantage. The youth of today seem more eager for quick “Success’ than earlier generations. They are certainly less disposed to emulate the example of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who served patiently for 17 years as a major. The services should thoroughly explain and “market” this new concept to young officers. Reduced force size and lower government retirement costs should permit more attractive salaries for military personnel. Maintaining pay comparability between the military and the private sector should become standard practice.
Unquestionably, some will object vigorously to this ne^ approach. The older force will be less innovative and more conservative, they will say. Slower promotions will prove stifling to the officer corps, and we will risk developing a military caste system, they will claim. A careful review of history shows that such concerns are not valid’ The achievements of famous “old” people should allay some of those concerns: General of the Army Dougin MacArthur was 71 when he commanded United Nations Forces in Korea; Amos Alonzo Stagg was an active football coach at 84; Conrad Adenauer was Chancellor of West Germany at 87; Winston Churchill was Prime Minister of Great Britain at 80; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court until 91; and Ronald Reagan served as President of the United States until 77-
With the urgent social and economic problems facing our country, it is imperative that we achieve the best military capability possible for the resources expended' Allowing military personnel to serve longer careers would be a major step toward this objective.
Vice Admiral Lawrence is the president of the Association of Naval AV1 ation, a former Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, and form6 Chief of Naval Personnel. He spent nearly six years as a prisoner of in North Vietnam.