The hoisting of the Russian colors over the Kremlin marked the official end of the Soviet Union and, to many, final victory in the Cold War. The debate about the post- Cold War utility of naval forces and the future structure of navies touches fleets around the world, which have to weigh the effects of political change.
For this special feature of the International Navies Issue, Proceedings posed the question—“How will changes in the superpower relationship affect the future of your navy?”—to the commanders of the world’s navies.
Twenty-two commanders responded:
Vice Admiral J. R. Anderson, Canadian Navy—As the world situation changes, so will the Canadian Navy as it responds to the government’s newly announced defense policy. However, the Maritime Command’s basic mission will continue to be the maintenance of a combat-ready, general-purpose maritime force capable of meeting Canada’s maritime needs.
To accomplish that mission, the Maritime Command will gradually evolve its current antisubmarine warfare fleet into a more versatile and balanced maritime force with enhanced antiair, antisurface, mine-countermeasures, and ASW capabilities. It will also create a more equitable balance of maritime resources between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets.
Current and future procurement programs will develop a smaller, but much more effective fleet consisting of 12 new Halifax-class patrol frigates and 4 modernized Tribal- class destroyers, supported by conventional submarines, coastal defense/mine countermeasures vessels, sovereignty and surveillance vessels, replenishment ships, and other support craft, plus maritime patrol aircraft and shipbome helicopters.
Personnel adjustments will keep the number of sailors at near-current levels, although a larger proportion will serve in the Naval Reserve, which will increase in size and importance, drawing on recruits from all walks of life across Canada.
The resulting modem navy will enable Canada to maintain its international maritime commitments and meet its domestic sovereignty and surveillance requirements. □
Admiral Alfredo Arnaiz, Peruvian Navy—The Peruvian Navy’s future will not be directly influenced by the changes in the superpower relationship. The United States began to lose interest in South America at the end of the 1960s, when the threat of Marxism-Leninism to South American governments decreased (nevertheless, that threat continued in Central America). A change in U.S. policy—looking toward South America as a region of potential interest, including economic development—would be desirable.
As many other South American countries have, Peru has sought to replace its obsolescent World War II-era U.S. and British ships, turning to France, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands. From these countries, we have received the surface, sub-surface, and air units that help the Navy maintain its traditional role of protecting our territorial sea, controlling the sea lines of communication, and enforcing international treaties. The Peruvian Navy has, since the mid-1980s, been involved in low-intensity conflict, counterinsurgency, and countemarcotics operations that require the use of many naval resources, human and materiel. □
Rear Admiral Knud Borck, Royal Danish Navy—The timeless and fundamental purpose of navies is to meet national maritime security needs and support other national interests. The political and strategic environment determines the conditions for meeting this purpose, defines navies’ essential missions, and sets out requirements for their size and shape. The practice of adjusting to changing environments has never been new to the Royal Danish Navy, throughout its 500-year history.
Denmark was a front-line nation in the strategic environment of the Warsaw Pact versus NATO, and the better part of the Danish Navy was tailored specifically for its combined national and NATO mission of maintaining control of the Baltic approaches.
In the changed environment, NATO already steers a revised course. Its key elements are: a broad approach to security; smaller standing forces, but more flexible and mobile ones in multinational formations; and increasing emphasis on ability to respond to crises.
The changed situation calls for review of mission priorities and possibly adjustment of force structure. In line with agreed NATO policy and strategy, Denmark will be well-served by a future navy comprised of a balanced fleet with: increased flexibility through fewer single-mission and more multipurpose ships; improved capabilities for deployment in multinational contexts, including NATO’s maritime-reaction forces; and improved economy through further standardization, containerization, and modularization of ships, particularly for application in multi-role units.
These desirable adjustments will take time, but they will provide a continued capability to handle the regional mission and the potential for a broader response to whatever other requirements might arise. Fiscal constraints will make a continued search for savings and the maintenance of the delicate balance between front-line and support structures likely future requirements, as well. □
This is the unfortunate reality that affects our Navy. To counter it, it will be necessary to emphasize the Navy’s ability to maintain the proper balance between defense and the development of the nation and the safeguarding of its interests—by performing such missions as the protection of the exclusive economic zone and assistance to national research efforts and technological development.
Admiral Dick Borjesson, Royal Swedish Navy—Despite the lessening of tensions between the superpowers, we still have a sizable military capability in and around the Baltic region, and the area is still of great strategic importance. Therefore, it is far too early to make significant reductions in Swedish naval forces.
The Royal Swedish Navy’s most important task has always been to defend Sweden against invasion. In the short term, the risk of an invasion is very low, but the peacekeeping and crisis-handling roles and participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations are becoming tasks of increasing importance. Our naval forces are well-prepared to take part in a variety of operations—in peacetime, in crises, and in time of war.
The number of units in the Swedish armed forces probably will be reduced in the near future, as a result of budget restrictions. In the Navy, we will replace older ships and equipment with modern hardware, embodying high mobility and flexibility.
After the submarine intrusions into Swedish waters during the last ten years, we have learned the lesson that if you decide to reduce your military capacity, it is easy to get rid of materiel and trained personnel—but it takes a very long time to rebuild. Therefore, all efforts will be made to maintain a high standard for men and materiel in Sweden’s future navy.
Vice Admiral Ignacio Pena Cimarro, Venezuelan Navy— The changes the world has seen are being used by some political groups to create an unfavorable environment for the armed forces. They remark that military forces are now useless, and go on to distort related facts (especially about equipment costs). Many of these missions will require additional ships and the development of onshore posts to exercise command and control.
Through these missions, we can maintain a credible naval defense. Otherwise, it would be too long and difficult a process to call up the necessary sophisticated elements of naval power, should the international situation change drastically.
Admiral Alain Coatanea, French Navy—While the new East-West relationship has reduced the risk of a major conflict, it has also eased control by either superpower over potential troublemakers. Therefore, crises can develop—even in Europe—and become quite explosive. In such a changing and uncertain situation, France should be able to prevent any direct aggression against its territory and contain external crises. Hence, sufficient nuclear deterrence, power projection, and blue-water control capabilities are needed.
The recent dismantling of the Warsaw Pact is causing all Western nations to cut their military budgets. France and its navy are not exempt from this trend, and our naval programs have been reassessed. The ballistic-missile submarine programs, with the first Triomphant-class boat to be commissioned in 1995, will be maintained. As for power projection, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the Charles DeGaulle, equipped with the Rafale attack aircraft, is scheduled to replace the carrier Clemenceau in 1998. The shipbuilding programs for six Floreal-class and six Lafayette-c\ass frigates, designed for maritime control, will be completed. However, the French Navy is now planning to build only six or seven Rubis-class nuclear-powered attack submarines and has canceled the BAMO catamaran mine-warfare ship program.
By strengthening its close ties and attaining broad interoperability with allied and European navies, the French Navy will make a substantial contribution to international defense efforts. □
Vice Admiral J. De Wilde, Belgian Navy—Like most other navies in the Atlantic Alliance, the Belgian Navy will be shrinking. Along with the other branches of the Belgian armed forces, the navy will suffer a 15% overall cut in personnel by 1996. Because of this personnel cut, shore establishments are being restructured and reorganized, and the Reserve Naval Base at Kallo (Antwerp) is being closed. Furthermore, a number of obsolescent mine-countermeasures (MCM) ships will be laid up by 1993, reducing the MCM fleet by one-third.
Smaller budgets for training will mean fewer days at sea for certain types of ships and result in a smaller number of units in a status of immediate readiness for operations. In MCM training, the accent will be more on the use of simulator-assisted activities to offset the shortage of at-sea days.
Despite these limitations, our Navy will continue to prepare for action in our two traditional fields of naval warfare: antisubmarine warfare and mine countermeasures. We plan to continue our present level of participation in NATO’s Standing Naval Forces and to maintain our capacity to play a modest role in the Alliance’s mobile, flexible, and multinational maritime defense effort. □
Commodore Teo Chee Hean, Republic of Singapore Navy—While superpower confrontation has receded, the likelihood of regional and interethnic conflicts flaring up may now be greater. Small nations may find themselves on their own when superpower strategic interests are not threatened. Their need for continuing vigilance and strong defense capabilities for deterrence is therefore undiminished.
Singapore will continue to update its modest defense capability in the light of future uncertainties, consonant with the view of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that regional resilience is best ensured by having strong national resilience.
Major air and sea routes traverse Southeast Asia, and natural resources abound. The presence of U.S. forces has contributed toward peace and stability in the region and enabled ASEAN to sustain one of the highest rates of economic growth in the world. A continuation of this presence is important if prosperity for all countries of the Pacific Rim is to be realized. This is why U.S. forces will be allowed to use military support facilities in Singapore. At the same time, Singapore will continue its active support of the Five Power Defense Arrangements with Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. □
Rear Admiral I. A. Hunter, Royal New Zealand Navy— There is a temptation in times of great and momentous change to focus on immediate challenges and ignore longterm responsibilities. Never was this enticement so great as now. It would be easy to bask in the well-won victory over totalitarianism, brush aside the sacrifices that led to the qualitative improvement in East-West relations, and neglect the collective strength of democratic institutions upon which these historical changes were firmly rooted.
I am not convinced that the challenges we face in a multipolar world—with power and influence diffused among a multiplicity of nations—provides any respite or opportunity for fundamental change for the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN). Regional conflicts seemed endemic even when the Cold War was at its most intense, and a reliable and predictable set of relations governed great power interdependencies. Now, global ideological regimes have been replaced by narrower ethnic, economic, and environmental pressures, which have the potential to be far more destabilizing and certainly less predictable. In the face of such uncertainty, greater reliance needs to be placed on enduring relationships rather than on opportunistic policies with short-term or introspective horizons.
The only change I see for the RNZN is cementing in place even more firmly our traditional role in Asia-Pacific affairs as a reliable partner in a coalition of democratic nations. □
Vice Admiral Evangelos Lagaras, Hellenic Navy—With the beginning of the post-Cold War era, the Hellenic Navy is reassessing its maritime strategy for the next century.
In this reassessment, the Hellenic Navy is considering many factors, including: political instability in the Balkan states—with which Greece shares 1,000 kilometers of the borders—and in Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and North Africa; the continuing need to protect sea lines of communication in the Aegean, Ionian, and Mediterranean seas, on which Greece, as a peninsular and insular nation with one of the world’s largest merchant fleets, is heavily dependent; and the need to maintain a balance of power in the region.
The Hellenic Navy also realizes that there is a growing tendency to employ maritime forces in unconventional missions of countering narcotics trafficking, terrorism, pollution, and piracy, as well as supporting humanitarian aid.
Defense obligations deriving from Greece’s full participation in NATO, the European Community, the Western European Union, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the United Nations will also be considered.
Last, but not least, the Hellenic Navy will be drawing upon the lessons learned from its participation in the Gulf War. Not only were two frigates deployed to the Gulf, but Coalition forces also were supported from the bases in Greece, and Greek air and sea assets conducted surveillance of the chokepoints in the eastern Mediterranean.
Taking into account existing realities and the framework of the new era, Greece considers the development of new concepts to be essential, and will modernize its maritime forces in order to maintain the ability to react to any of the risks and challenges mentioned earlier and to respond quickly and decisively should a crisis arise. □
Vice Admiral I. D. G. MacDougall, Royal Australian Navy—The short answer to the question is: very little. For many years, Australia’s defense policy has been governed by the regional strategic environment rather than by superpower politics.
"It would be easy to bask in the well-won victory over totalitarianism, brush aside the sacrifices that led to the qualitative improvement in East-West relations, and neglect the collective strength of democratic institutions upon which these historical changes were firmly rooted."
The superpower rivalry has mainly been played out in Europe and in the Pacific largely confined to North Asia. While the U.S. Pacific Fleet may face reductions, it is clear that the United States will remain a major Pacific power and its fleet the major naval force in the region.
European force reductions have led to suggestions of an arms race in the Asia-Pacific region. This is highly unlikely. Certainly, the region’s economic development has given impetus to maritime expansion. But it has been modest and based on legitimate security needs such as protection of trade and exclusive economic zones. The growing cooperation between regional navies on a bilateral and, where appropriate, a multilateral basis in Southeast Asia contributes to regional stability.
It is clear that in these changing times, maritime forces need to be multi-purpose, flexible, and quick-responding. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) is well on the way to developing into such a navy. I am confident that the RAN’s force structure and operational doctrine will enable it to play a positive role in the region. As ever, the result will only be effective if respective navies work hard at interoperability and seek out opportunities to do so whilst exercising together. □
Admiral Jorge Martinez, Chilean Navy—The Chilean Navy does not exist because of any particular enemy. It exists because the sea lines of communication are vital for the development and security of a maritime country like Chile.
Threats may vary, but geography does not change. The strip of territorial sea, exclusive economic zones, and the location of Chile in relation to strategic oceanic passages has established the need for a constant, well-organized and modern naval presence.
Crisis management is the form of conflict in which naval power is most effective because of its special characteristics of presence, permanence, graduality, flexibility, and mobility. Despite budget reductions, we must strengthen existing forces. That will be accomplished by more realistic training and cooperation with other navies.
A transformation in the concept of alliances, brought about by likely reductions in the superpowers’ naval strength, will oblige allies to share responsibilities in areas of mutual strategic and economic interest. Allied forces can enhance cooperation by means of technology transfer, especially in the area of electronic software that ensures rapid communication in times of crisis. □
Vice Admiral Murtala Nyako, Nigerian Navy—The demise of the Soviet Union and the attendant end of the superpower military rivalry will not lead to any significant shift in the maritime defense policy of Nigeria and the Afro-centric focus of that policy.
For many years, Nigeria has not based its plans on any identified enemy. Rather, we have adopted a maritime-resource enjoyment strategy and based our naval plans on policing our waters to prevent illegalities. We have also long identified the need to contribute to multilateral peacekeeping efforts, especially in Africa. The key role we have played in the Economic Community of West African States’ forces in Liberia is influenced by that policy.
The structure of our naval forces, therefore, is a blend of capabilities for maritime policing, defense readiness, and national diplomatic efforts.
We recognize how changes in the superpower relationships have changed the perception of the utility of military forces. There should not, however, be unwarranted haste to shed what is wrongly perceived as an unnecessary military burden, especially in countries where military forces are presently insufficient.
The Nigerian Navy—if it is to continue to be relevant to the economic development and security of the nation as well as make any meaningful contributions to international naval cooperation at the bilateral and regional levels or under the aegis of the United Nations—needs major platforms such as frigates, corvettes, landing ships, and mine countermeasures vessels. These ships are not cheap to acquire, maintain, or operate.
Admiral Fumio Okabe, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force—Japan’s current defense policy is based on the 1976 National Defense Program Outline. The Outline’s basic premise is that Japan can best contribute to the stability of the Northwest Pacific region and the security of the West by precluding a regional military power vacuum—both through the maintenance of “minimum and standard” defense forces to repel a limited and small-scale invasion, and through the Japanese-U.S. security arrangements—rather than by preparing against a specific military threat. This premise is derived from the Japanese Constitution and the consequent strictly defensive military policy of Japan.
Japan has contributed to the maintenance of the local military balance through such policies as the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force’s (JMSDF) responsibility of defending the surrounding sea area and sea lines of communication out to 1,000 nautical miles. However, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have always been purely defensive, even during periods of severe East-West confrontation. Therefore, Japan’s maritime defense requires that the current Japanese-U.S. defense structure remain firm—regardless of the international situation.
To help ensure that there is no change in the region’s military balance, the JMSDF will continue to develop into a high-quality, highly capable force. Also, I will do my utmost to improve the cooperative relationship that currently exists with the U.S. Navy in every field so that, together, the United States and Japan might continue to contribute to peace and stability in the Northwest Pacific. □
Admiral Sir Julian Oswald, Royal Navy—The reduction in superpower tensions has enabled us to address security in a wider sense. Now that the world is becoming increasingly multipolar, security means not just the defense of the homeland, but encompasses environmental, humanitarian, trade, arms sales, investment and economic concerns in the wider world. Britain is an island nation in a key geostrategic position, and its naval forces have traditionally played a vital role in protecting its security and safeguarding its national and overseas trading interests. Our prosperity and economic stability continue to depend upon the freedom of trade, of which 94% by weight is carried by sea.
The Royal Navy of the future, albeit smaller in size, will be better equipped and retain a balanced capability ready to respond, in conjunction with our allies, to crises wherever and whenever they occur. Multinational cooperation is the backbone of crisis response. Despite the thrust toward a more European-oriented defense force structure through the Western European Union and possibly the European Community, I regard NATO as the essential structure for safeguarding the security and freedom of its members. It is on this basis that our maritime forces will continue to make a major contribution to NATO’s multinational force structure, whilst still being able to meet our specific national commitments. □
Rear Admiral Kjell A. Prytz, Royal Norwegian Navy— Norway’s lasting security problem is that—despite the positive changes that have occurred in regional politics— the residual military power in the Northern Area, represented mainly by the Russian Northern Fleet, remains overwhelming compared to Norwegian strength. Hence, even though the military threat is reduced it poses a dilemma, for intentions may change much quicker than it takes to build a well-trained navy.
Furthermore, it is a fact that the Kola Peninsula becomes increasingly more important to Russian maritime interests, as old shores are being lost. Modern ships—including the first large aircraft carrier—continue to join the Northern Fleet.
A lower level of readiness will make it easier to reduce the running costs of our navy and thereby facilitate new projects. The main challenge will be to maintain a balanced structure. The competence and skills related to traditional tasks—e.g., anti-invasion and protection of coastal sea lines of communication—as well as participation in NATO’s Standing Naval Forces, cannot be allowed to diminish. Therefore, in the future, the Royal Norwegian Navy will likely consist of a small number of relatively high-quality units. □
Admiral Laxminarayan Ramdas, Indian Navy—As the dramatic changes taking place in Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Persian Gulf region create a reduction of tensions between the two superpowers, they also provide an opportunity to reduce tensions in the Indian Ocean region. The steadily increasing population of the planet will put greater demands on the resources of the seas. One can easily see that the next century will emerge as the Century of the Seas.
India’s rich maritime tradition goes back thousands of years. When it was strong at sea, India flourished; when sea power was neglected, India declined. Geography has provided India with a unique maritime situation—sitting astride one of the busiest “highways” of the world on which is carried many strategically vital goods, including oil. The Indian Ocean also has a large number of nations on its littoral, most of which are developing.
The economic well-being of India is dependent on its trade and its offshore and oceanic natural resources. The Indian Navy has gradually grown to meet its vast maritime responsibilities. While India does not covet any other country’s territories, it does not like its territories interfered with. Thus, India will continue to develop a balanced fleet of surface, subsurface, and air elements with the emphasis on a “builders’ navy.”
There are many new challenges in the new geopolitical environment and the Indian Navy stands ready to meet them and to promote cooperation with other navies that share our values to work for peace and stability in the region.
Admiral Filippo Ruggiero, Italian Navy—The end of the bipolar strategic balance means a shift toward a dynamic, unbalanced, and swiftly changing political situation—especially in the Mediterranean area which, from a geostrategic standpoint, stretches up to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.
This new reality will mean increased turmoil, unrest, and crisis that will require strong capacity for crisis management, military as well as political. For military forces, a premium will be on quick reaction, flexibility, mobility, interoperability, sustainability, and responsiveness, all features inherent in naval forces.
With the Mediterranean Sea being at the heart of the “Southern unstable frontier,” it is easy to foresee that the Italian Navy will face a growing requirement to meet the new security challenges to Italy’s vital interests, as well as those of its allies. This requirement demands a well- balanced naval force for surveillance and control of the sea lines of communication so vital to Western security and prosperity, as well as enhancing peaceful cooperative dialogue with emerging nations. □
Vice Admiral H. van Foreest, Royal Netherlands Navy— In Europe, the strategic perspective has undergone major alterations—and the end of them is not yet in sight. Clearly, the greatly reduced threat of large-scale attack from the East justifies a reduction in the size of combat- ready forces in the region. This will also affect the size of the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN). At the same time, multiple smaller crises of an unpredictable nature that require an adequate, credible, and flexible military response may occur not only in Europe itself, but also elsewhere in the world. These crises may be directly or indirectly detrimental to the security and economic well-being of Western Europe.
From the perspective of the RNLN, safeguarding of sea lines of communication and contributing to peacekeeping and crisis management with ready, high-quality naval and amphibious forces, will continue to be of major strategic importance. Therefore, the basic missions and structure of the RNLN will not change.
Three factors will continue to direct RNLN planning for the future; an ongoing emphasis on quality; a strict maintenance of high operational standards; and full participation in NATO as the venue for both collective security and guaranteed maritime interoperability.
Rear Admiral Jouko Sakari Visa, Finnish Navy—Developments in the Baltic region have not yet demanded any great alterations in the duties and organization of the Finnish Navy.
In a general sense, we are well aware that the political changes in Eastern Europe could cause crises that would have repercussions in the Finnish sea area. However, the withdrawal of Russian armed forces from Central Europe and the Baltic states to the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland is critically important to the situation in the Baltic. Should Estonia claim a territorial-waters limit of three-to-four nautical miles, the international waters close to Finland would be broadened significantly. This could lead to increased military activity—especially by the Russian Baltic fleet—near Finnish waters.
The overall aim of the Finnish Navy is to deter and repel any attempts to exploit our sea area. As is customary with Baltic navies, we will combine modem weapon technologies with our available resources to maintain flexible, rapidly deployable forces with a high degree of readiness. As far as the development of our Navy is concerned, our most important purchases will be devoted to enhancing our mining and surface-to-surface missile capabilities and enhancing ships’ protective systems and mobile sea surveillance efforts. □
Vice Admiral H. P. Weyher, German Navy—Changes in the relationship between the United States and the former Soviet Union affect the German Navy significantly.
Until recently, the German Navy had to contribute to the deterrence of and defense against major aggression in the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic, as well as in the western Baltic. It was the Navy’s task to safeguard sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and to defend German and allied territory bordering on the western Baltic.
The latter task required forces especially suited for naval warfare in the Baltic: fast missile-attack craft, coastal submarines, naval fighter-bombers, small amphibious units, and minelaying assets. In order to protect the SLOC in northern European waters, the Navy employed antiair-warfare and ASW escorts, maritime patrol aircraft, and mine- warfare ships.
Recent developments have drastically changed those governing factors. The threat of large-scale military aggression in Europe no longer exists. Therefore, in the years to come, the Navy will reduce those forces designed specifically for operations in the Baltic and, in the long run, replace them with forces capable of operating in all areas where the German Navy could contribute to peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and other operations. This process is already well under way. Eventually, all our amphibious units and minelayers in the Baltic will be decommissioned and significant reductions made in the numbers of naval fighter-bombers, fast missile-attack craft, and coastal submarines. The attack craft and the coastal submarines will later be replaced by patrol ships and submarines that can be employed throughout our entire area of operations.
This development does not mean that the German Navy will neglect the Baltic Sea in the future. This sea area will grow in economic importance for Northeastern Europe and will continue to require military efforts for the development and preservation of military stability. Therefore, the presence of our Navy as a balancing factor will continue in this area.
Thus the change in the superpower relationship and the resultant changes in the emphasis of our long-term planning—from a rather regional to a much more international approach—will create a German Navy that is well-suited to adapt to the new situation and future developments.
Vice Admiral Lambert J. Woodburne, South African Navy—Before the early 1970s, the South African Navy (SAN) was almost an “associate member” of NATO, with ASW and the protection of the sea routes around the Cape of Good Hope high on its agenda.
However, from the mid-1970s, the SAN was almost completely isolated. Conflict raged across southern Africa against the background of a bipolar world, split along ideological lines. Military hardware, supplied by the Soviet Union especially, poured into the region. Well-armed and backed by surrogate forces, African states acquired military power that soon bore no relation to their economic power.
Under these conditions, the SAN concentrated on its own security interests and developed a balanced and very capable navy, in a regional context. While the conventional threat against the Republic of South Africa has waned and is likely to remain minimal into the next century, the United Nations arms embargo against South Africa may well be the last of the sanctions to be lifted.
In South Africa, instability—a characteristic of change— is likely to continue for some time, even after an acceptable political dispensation has been reached. In southern Africa, socio-economic stresses may have unpredictable results. During this uncertain period of negative external threat (which one would hesitate to call “peace”), the SAN will continue to serve the national interest in the classic roles of enforcement of state authority and support of diplomatic initiatives, while maintaining a balanced naval force ready for any eventuality.
For the future, therefore, changes in superpower relations are not likely to impact significantly on the role, tasks, and development of the SAN. These will instead be based on South Africa’s own interests as a developing country within the southern African context.