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Break the Navy Helicopter Mold
Lieutenant Commander Wayne Tunick, U.S. Navy
Army armed helicopters, or NATO assets available. At best, the frigate will have an unarmed LAMPS helo on board.
Any surface combatant deploying out of U.S. territorial waters could become involved in a surface action with no prior warning and little time to respond. Smaller nations have won moral victories by damaging, capturing, or sinking a ship belonging larger navies. U.S. Navy ships operate off the coasts of Libya, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Cuba, South America, and Africa. All these waters are potential areas for low-
A paradigm, for those unfamiliar with the term, is an example of the way things are done. It is time to take a tip from total quality leadership and alter some paradigms. Specifically, the Navy should alter its helicopter paradigm to arm them with sufficient firepower to perform a variety of missions.
Navy leaders today are charged with a monumental task: to be ready for war despite drastic budget reductions. Trade- °ffs are required in almost all areas. Hardware limited to a single mission is n° longer affordable. Fewer assets must Yield equal combat capability. Installing weapons on naval helicopters is an outstanding example of something we can do now.
Arming Navy helicopters with offensive weapons is not a new conCePt, but it requires emphasis. We must change the long-standing rule that fixed-wing aircraft are solely responsible for delivering weapons on target. There is an institutional reluctance to break with tradition and expand a role that up until now has been the sole responsibility of fixed- vving tactical aircraft.
The need to arm naval helicopters is well documented—and our allies recognize it. The Persian Gulf experience provides an excellent case study. Surface combatants and commercial vessels were threatened with attack by highly maneuverable fast patrol boats that could travel at speeds up to 50 knots and were a difficult target for ships and high performance jet aircraft to destroy. In order for coalition forces to maintain sea control during Operation Desert Storm,the patrol boat threat had to be neutralized.
The Navy relied on limited numbers of U.S. Army helicopters to meet this threat, but the Army helicopters stationed on Navy ships have very limited detection sensors and used other platforms, such as LAMPS helicopters, to locate hostile contacts. LAMPS and Army helicopters performing as hunter-killer teams were successful in the unique geographic setting of the Persian Gulf.
By
LAMPS helicopters worked with Royal Navy Lynx armed helicopters as well. Few would argue the utility of using armed helicopters to counter the fast patrol boat, although some believe that, given the Army and Royal Navy success, that there is no great need to arm U.S. Navy helicopters to perform the same mission. Since the Navy has been able to use other assets successfully, no deficiency exists; if there is no deficiency, there is no requirement. This narrow view relies on the Gulf’s unusual geographic features combined with the successes of the past and applies them at a broader level—what was successful in the Gulf will be equally successful worldwide.
This is incorrect. The decline of the Soviet threat has changed the world power balance from bipolar to multipolar. Regional power struggles will likely be more frequent because the participants do not have the potential to drag the superpowers into the conflict. A regional conflict has the potential to involve forward deployed U.S. Navy surface combatants with no warning. A fast patrol boat whose crew is equipped with shoulder-launched missiles is a very real threat for a frigate operating independently near a coastline with no Navy tactical aircraft,
Equipping the LAMPS-III with Penguin medium-range (about 24 miles) air-to-surface missiles is a step in the right direction, but provisions for other weapons should be incorporated if U.S. Navy helicopters are to provide battle group commanders with real flexibility.
intensity conflict. Is the U.S. Navy willing to let one of our surface ships be damaged or sunk by a fast patrol boat with a missile?
On any given day there are 50-60 LAMPS detachments deployed on U.S. Navy combatants worldwide. Arming these helicopters, which could be done
rapidly, would provide worldwide airborne firepower, often in areas where none is now readily available. But the requirement to arm helicopters should not be limited to LAMPS—HH-60H aircraft deployed as combat search-and-rescue and special warfare assets should be armed to provide carrier-based helicopter
LAMPS helicopters could carry versions of shorter-range, lower-cost Maverick missiles (above), the long-range (120 miles) SLAM derivative of the Harpoon missile (right), or 2.75- inch rockets for suppressive fire (far right); enlarged main-gear sponsons provide room for forward-looking infrared systems and laser designators.
antisubmarine squadrons with two armed HH-60H helicopters (part of the six SH- 60F plus + two HH-60H concept now in effect). The SH-60Fs could be armed as an additional option.
LAMPS-I1I helicopters armed with the Penguin air-to-surface missile will soon be operating with the fleet—proof that the Navy has recognized in principle the value of arming helicopters. At close to $1 million per copy, however, the Penguin will not be purchased in large quantities. Additionally, it does not lend itself to suppressive fire or multiple-target engagements. The Penguin is a capable missile, but a better mix of weapons is required to render our helicopters effective against varied threats.
What is required. The Navy needs low-cost weapons and a common airframe. The optimum plan would modify H-60-series helicopters with provisions to carry Hellfire, 2.75-inch rockets, and a forward-firing .50-caliber machine gun. Not all helicopters would necessarily deploy with weapons: kits would be included as part of the pack-up for potential conflict areas or when on independent operations.
The laser-guided Hellfire missile has proved successful against fast patrol boats; an H-60 could carry four of these missiles. This would allow multiple engagements with a weapons effective against fixed targets. Rockets are excellent suppression weapons and can also be effective against patrol boats. Machine gun fire is especially important for the HH-60H’s primary combat search-and- rescue mission.
The helicopter will require a laser designator and a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) system. A FLIR system is long overdue for helicopters responsible for the night surveillance and identification mission. During Desert Storm, and earlier actions, when battle group commanders needed positive identification of ships, helicopters given the mission had to fly up the wakes of unknown contacts and use their searchlights to read the name on the stem. This mission obviously requires a standoff sensor, an offensive weapon, and survivability equipment— chaff, flares, and infrared emission suppression. In fact, all Navy helicopters should be fitted with such defensive equipment. The proliferation of lethal surface-to-air missiles makes any ship or boat a potential threat.
The Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Commanders and both type commanders have strongly supported arming Navy helicopters, but the question of using other assets instead of arming Navy helicopters is consistently offered by some as an alternative. Arming Navy helicopters and using other assets are fundamentally different approaches and should not be considered as alternatives.
Using Army assets or U.S. Marine Corps AH-1W helicopters presupposes the knowledge of where and when the next conflict will take place, and that surface combatants will be in proximity to an area where these assets can be embarked. In addition, there are major problems with logistics and storage of helicopters aboard ship—the AH-1W, for example, does not fit in the hangar on out destroyers, frigates, and Aegis cruisers.
The cost? It is sufficient to say that the cost of the entire project would be less than the cost of one badly damaged or sunk combatant.
The solution. Recognizing the additional capability that arming Navy helicopters delivers, the Navy must respond- There is no need for endless briefings and studies. The question boils down to whether or not we are prepared to make the decision to arm Navy helicopters and include them as part of the strike force. The bottom line is that the concept is valid. It is time to start making things happen before another conflict erupts and finds the Navy with no assets in position to meet the threat.
Fear of change is normal. It is much easier to do .things the way they have always been done. The U.S. is learning that quality counts when competing in the world market. Industry is changing the way it is doing things in order to improve the process and the Chief of Naval Operations wants the NavV
to do the same thing.
If the Navy wants to maintain its combat capability with fewer assets, innovative thinking and change should be the order of the day. Break a rule. Armed naval helicopters work and the commanders want them. Stop the endless debate and make it happen.
Commander Tunick is undergoing SH-60 refresher training at Naval Air Station Mayport, Florida. A LAMPS-I and -III pilot, he was Assistant LAMPS Requirements Officer in OP-503 and aide to Commander Naval Air Systems Command.
By Lieutenant John R. Wood, U.S. Navy, and Lieutenant Commander Jeffrey C. McCampbell, U.S. Navy
Scrambling amid budget cuts, and the loss of the A-12 and Naval Advanced Tactical Fighter (NATF), the Navy is supporting a single fighter-attack aircraft for the carrier air wing of the 21st century, ^ice Admiral Richard Dunleavy, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare, has determined that naval aviation will support the F/A-18E/F Hornet. Accent program reviews show growing concern that Congress will not support both the F/A-18E/F and the AX.
The Grumman alterative to the larger Hornet was the F-14D Quickstrike—an F-14D
with hardware and software upgrades designed to transform an air superiority fighter into an all-weather strike- fighter capable of bombing selective targets with precision guided smart weapons.
Congress recently voted against buying additional F-14Ds in Fiscal Year 1992,
Which effectively shuts down the F-14 production line. Worse,
Congress decided not to fund an upgrade of existing F-14Ds to the Quickstrike configuration, which emasculates the F-14D’s fighter-attack capabilities. This effectively reduces carrier air wing's strike Potential by one-third.
To bridge the gap until the Navy decides °n its next-generation strike-fighter, the Secretary of Defense must seek congressional funding to upgrade existing F-14Ds to the Quickstrike configuration. This will enable the aircraft to provide the umbrella of coverage necessary during the 10- to 15-year gap until the F-18E/F or the AX reach the fleet ■n sufficient quantities. The upgraded F-I4D Quickstrike will give battle group commanders a versatile strike-fighter force that will ease the transition to the strike aircraft of the 21st century.
Despite the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, substantial threats to U.S. security remain. Long-ignored regional problems are emerging from the shadow of the Cold War. Potential troublemakers include North Korea, Syria, Libya, Iran,and possibly Iraq.
Many of these countries have sophisticated Soviet-supplied integrated air defense systems. In the event the military was directed to take action against these nations, carrier battle groups are the best quick-response options. The lack of suitable friendly airfields and the need to re-
The F-14D is a great air-to-air fighter but has little air-to-ground capability even though VX-4 has proved that Tomcats can deliver Harpoon missiles and iron bombs. Planned upgrades to make the F-14D a real strike-fighter should be accelerated.
spond quickly to changing events dictate the use of F-14D Quickstrike aircraft', carrier-based strike-fighters capable of long-range, all-weather, precision attack assisted by carrier-based aerial refueling assets.
The Navy’s current carrier-based allweather attack aircraft is the formidable but aging A-6E Intruder. During Operation Desert Storm, however, the U.S. Central Command chose to launch land- based F-117 stealth aircraft and allweather strike aircraft such as the F-15E Strike Eagle during the initial attacks on targets protected by Baghdad’s air defenses. This is evidence that the A-6E is no longer seen as the best aircraft to penetrate such defenses. Had upgraded F-14D Quickstrikes been available, naval aviation would have had a state-of-the-art strike-fighter to contribute.
The Navy will not have any stealth aircraft until the arrival of the proposed AX aircraft—an attack aircraft (possible strike-fighter) slated as the follow-on complement to the new Hornet—around 2010. Moreover, the Navy currently has no long-range, supersonic, all-weather strike-fighter capable of delivering smart weapons, The closest aircraft available today is the F/A-18C, which lacks both the range required to launch when 500- plus miles from the target and return to the carrier without substantial aerial refueling, and allweather capability. The only aircraft capable of assuming this mission in the near future at a fixed-price—and at low-cost, low-risk—is the F-14D Quickstrike.
Having set its sights on a strike-fighter, naval aviation is developing the F/A- 18E/F. If McDonnell Douglas can produce a stretched version of the F/A-18C with the all-weather attack capabilities, range, and payload of the A-6E, coupled with the air superiority capabilities of the F-14D and its Phoenix air-to-air
missile, the Navy will indeed have a formidable strike-fighter. Building a Hornet with these capabilities will not be easy. The research and development costs alone have been estimated at $5 billion, but recent news reports indicate this figure may be low. To put the size of the new Hornet in perspective, it may have a higher deck multiple (carrier deck-space per aircraft) than either the F-14D or the A-6E.
Comparison of various upgrades. It is important to define the differences in the various approved, planned, and proposed upgrades to the F-14D.
- Approved upgrades. F-l4Ds will deploy initially with a Navy-installed air superiority software upgrade designated Tape D01. This will enable the F-14D’s APG-71 radar to use radar modes similar to those of the F-l4A's AWG-9 radar and will provide excellent electronic counter-countermeasures. The F-14D will carry Sidewinder, Sparrow, and Phoenix air-to-air missiles plus its standard 20mm. air-to-air or air-to-ground gun. In addition, the aircraft will be equipped eventually with the airborne self-protection jammer (ALQ-165), joint tactical information distribution system, ALR-67 radar warning receiver, and an infrared search-and-track system.
The F- 14D thus closely resembles the Air Force’s F-15E Strike Eagle, and approximately 85% of the radar and avionics is common to both aircraft. Sadly, however, the resemblance ends there. The F-14D’s Tape D01 most closely resembles the F-14A’s Tape 115—without the F-14A’s air-to-ground capability. Deployed F-14Ds will be incapable of dropping a bomb or firing a HARM antiradar missile.
- Planned upgrades. Congress has agreed to set aside future funding to upgrade Tape D01 to the D02 and D03 versions. The Navy plans to install this software beginning sometime in the spring of 1994 after F-14D squadrons return from their first deployment with Carrier Air Wing 14. Along with other capabilities, these tapes should give the F-14D additional sophisticated digital radar modes, extensive electronic counter-countermeasures, the advanced medium-range air-to- air missile (AMRAAM), and a visual air- to-ground capability using Mk-80 series 500-, 1,000-, and 2,000-pound bombs.
> Proposed Quickstrike upgrades. The Quickstrike software and hardware would include all-weather navigation similar to the F-15E’s Lantirn system, APG-71 radar ground mapping and imaging enhancements, infrared search-and-track imaging enhancements, night vision provisions, and a self-contained laser designator. These upgrades, building on the planned Tape D02 and D03 upgrades, would give the F-14D Quickstrike a capability superior to that of the Air Force’s F-15E Strike Eagle—a long-range, allweather, supersonic, air-to-air and air-to- ground aircraft.
The current pace of the planned upgrades embodied in Tapes D02 and D03, however, leaves much to be desired. The Navy should change course and support Tape D02 to include all recommended Quickstrike upgrades and install this software and hardware as soon as possible. The F-14D is a digital aircraft complete with a Mil-1553 data bus; most existing and planned strike-fighter systems can be integrated into the F-14D with few hardware modifications. Also, the bulk of the research and development costs that are the sticking points for procurement of new strike-fighters such as the F/A-18E/F and the AX, already have been completed and paid for within the F-14D program.
A recently proposed incremental Quickstrike upgrade that would be installed in parallel with Tapes D02 and D03 has some definite fiscal advantages. It would ease the financial drain of a one-time Quickstrike upgrade, while giving the F-14Ds an all-weather precision attack capability very quickly. The proposal involves fitting an attack forwardlooking infrared (FLIR) system in the current television camera set housing under the Tomcat’s radome. A naviga" tion FLIR and an independent laser designator would be installed in a Phoeni* missile rail without losing a weapon station or fuel-tank hard point. In a high- altitude night bombing mission (simile to the initial attacks on Baghdad), the Quickstrike would have better capabilities than the Strike Eagle.
Several ball-park independent estimates for the Quickstrike configuration are $3-$5 million per aircraft for a total cost of about $250 million—about what it would cost to design and build foot new Hornet E/Fs at $60 million apiece The bottom line is that the Navy can upgrade 55 F-14D Quickstrikes now f°r the same price it will take to build foul less-capable Hornets ten years froin now.
The F-14D is competing for scarce resources. The F-14A, A-6E, and F/A- 18 all need additional funds to upgrade their capabilities. In today’s fiscal environment, some programs will have to do without- and many will need their service lives extended as long as possible. The F-14D will be around for another 20 to 30 years, - and no other Navy aircraft flying today has the growth potential of the F-14D air- ; frame. In a purely capability-per-dollat ratio, the Navy has the most to gain by budgeting the necessary funds to exploit fully the F-14D Quickstrike's capabilities- I The Navy has the opportunity to build the most potent carrier-based strike- fighter in the world.
The Navy must have a long-range, all-weather credible strike-fighter deterrent until the F/A-18E/F Hornet reaches the fleet. The F-14D Quickstrike is that strike-fighter.
Lieutenant Wood is transitioning to the F-14D with VF-124 at Naval Air Station Miramar, California. He flew F-14s with VF-1 and has been an instructor with VF-124. Lieutenant Commander McCampbell is on the Pacific F-14D fleet introduction team with follow-on orders to VF-31, the first of two F-14D fleet squadrons.
New Pollution Act Cuts Two Ways
By Captain Patrick J. Modic, U.S. Merchant Marine
Historically, tragedy has provided the impetus for marine legislation. Out of the Exxon Valdez calamity, for example, emerged the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA-90). Typically, it mandates regulations to prevent a catastrophic marine casualty that has already occurred.
The act, nevertheless, implements many new standards and amends existing regulations; of particular interest to shipboard personnel are the sections dealing with liability, prevention, and penalties.
Liability. In Title I, Congress responded to the public outcry for appropriate accountability after the Exxon Valdez spill. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act brought into being the “person in charge,” and the hallmark of OPA- 90 will be the new designation, “responsible party.” The language defining the “responsible party” is virtually the same
as that found in the Water Pollution Act—the responsible party for the yessel is any person own- lng, operating, or demise chartering the vessel.
Within the definition °f responsible party, the cargo owner is notably absent. Because of this legislation, there is concern that oil companies °perating their own ships "hll be induced to abandon their fleets to 1'mit their corporate exposure. Extending liability to the cargo owner would have been a legal incentive to the shipper to Patronize the more reputable carriers.
OPA-90 has removed the responsible Parties’ defense of limited liability in any incident resulting in a spill where any applicable federal regulation regarding safety, construction, or operations was violated. In comparison to the FWPCA, probably the most impressive aspect of OPA-90 is the strict liability for removal costs and the expanded damages. Even if a discharge results solely from the act of a third party, the vessel may still be held strictly liable as the “responsible party.” After meeting certain stringent tests, the responsible party will be entitled to recover cost and damages from the third party or the Oil Spill Liability Fund. However unfair that process might appear, the intent is based on the need for an immediate clean-up of the spill.
OPA-90 increases the responsible party’s liability for damages. Damages include: injury to or destruction of natural resources, their loss of use, and the cost of assessing the damage; injury to real or personal property; loss of subsistence use of natural resources with-
These dramatic photos of the M/V Surf City were taken by a ship’s officer after a ballast-tank explosion set off the main cargo. Though OPA-90 cannot prevent accidents, it does address manning requirements— which can lead to safer operations.
out regard to the ownership or management of the resources; loss of tax revenues by the federal, state, and local governments; damages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity; and the costs incurred in providing public services (including fire, safety, and health protection) during and after removal activities.
Fortunately, OPA-90 provides the customary defenses to liability: act of God, act of war, and act of third party. With respect to the acts of a third party, the responsible party will have the added onus of proving due care with respect to the oil carried and evidence of precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions, and the foreseeable consequences of those acts or omissions by the third party.
Under the FWPCA, the vessel is required to maintain evidence of financial responsibility. OPA-90 amends the
existing law by substantially increasing the dollar amount to be maintained. Further, OPA-90 mandates a periodic review regarding the desirability of adjusting the limits of liability to reflect significant increases in the consumer price index. Prevention. The greatest impact on the day-to-day operations on board the vessel will be found in Title IV, which amends existing legislation regarding the issuance of licenses and documents. On the crest of the alleged involvement of alcohol in the Exxon Valdez spill, the legislators specifically mandated drug and alcohol testing as a condition of licensing. A review of criminal, alcohol-drug abuse, and driving records may be required for an original license or renewal. To provide the machinery of review and testing, OPA-90 establishes a five-year term for licenses, certificates of registry, i.e., staff captain, purser, nurse, doctor, and for merchant marine documents (Z-Cards).
Under OPA-90, the U.S. Coast Guard has a specific mandate to conduct periodic random, reasonable cause, and postaccident testing for both drugs and alcohol. Although drug possession presently is a cause for revocation, alcohol abuse will now be a cause for suspension and revocation of licenses, certificates of registry, and merchant marine documents.
A new provision requires that the two next most senior mates temporarily relieve the master if he is reasonably believed to be under the influence of alcohol or a dangerous drug and is incapable of commanding the vessel. This puts new responsibilities on the chief mate. In addition to making the appropriate log book entries, the chief mate must notify the Coast Guard by the most expedient means and submit a written report with 12 hours of arrival at a port.
The OPA-90 section regarding tank- vessel manning reflects the legislative need to protect the environment from human error caused by fatigue and stress. The legislators have recognized that both are directly attributable to crew complement and workload. The Act mandates a minimum tanker-manning based on hours worked; no more than 15 hours in any 24- hour period, and no more than an aggregate of 36 hours in any 72-hour period.
One of the most controversial aspects of OPA-90 is the establishment of double-hull requirements for tank vessels. To address the outflow of oil as a result of a collision or a grounding, OPA-90 mandates double-hulls and not just double-bottoms. With few exceptions, existing tank vessels regardless of remaining service life, will have to undergo costly retrofits or be retired. A schedule has been established with 1995 being the first effective date for retrofit-retirement of the oldest existing single-hull tankers in operation, and 2010 as the last date for retrofit-retirement of the newest existing single-hull tankers. A vessel currently fitted with a double-bottom or double-sides has an additional five years of service before complying with the double-hull requirements for its respective age class.
The most obvious ramification of the double-hull requirements is that fleets of old tonnage that were operating profitably under the Jones Act are too old to be economically retrofitted. Within OPA- 90, however, Congress has provided a form of building subsidy: The Secretary of Transportation may guarantee loans up to 25 years for up to 75% of the construction or reconstruction of the tank vessel. Obviously, the new double-hull requirements will be an inordinate financial burden, but upon whom, the tank- vessel owner or the consumer? The cost will assuredly be passed on to the consumer at the local gas pump.
Hull-plating cracks caused by metal fatigue and wasting are common sources of oil pollution. The new Act addresses these sources by requiring the establishment of minimum standards for plate thickness for all vessels and the periodic gauging of older vessels in conformity with principles of international law.
The act greatly expands the national oil-spill response network that was established under the FWPCA. Each ship must prepare a spill-response plan and submit it to the Coast Guard for review. Further, a vessel will be required to maintain on-board appropriate spill-response equipment “that employs the best technology economically feasible and that is compatible with the safe operation of the vessel.” Conceivably, the shipowner could be required to maintain on board the vessel adequate spill response equipment to cover a theoretical maximum spill in adverse weather conditions.
The daily operations of shipping companies will be affected by the studies, new equipment, and expanded government participation resulting from OPA- 90. The ship operator will see an expansion of the Vessel Traffic Systems that were originally mandated by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act. Multiple studies ranging from appropriate crew sizes, through the adequacy of existing regulations, to the evaluation of simulator training are underway. Upgraded communication equipment and overfill-tank level or pressure-monitoring devices are now required. Not surprisingly, there is a section reinstating Prince William Sound as “pilotage waters.”
Penalties. The most confusing part of the OPA-90 legislation deals with penalties. The Coast Guard traditionally has employed a three-tiered penalty structure: civil penalties, license suspension and revocation actions, and criminal fines or imprisonment. The framers of OPA-90 did not adhere to this structure. Although most of the provisions amend existing laws, terminology is altered. It is difficult to know exactly which violations will result in a civil penalty and which violations will result in criminal fines and imprisonment. It is sufficient to say that many of the existing penalties have substantially increased.
Prior to OPA-90 it was clear that, under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, failure to report a spill would result in a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than one year, or both. A seaman reading OPA-90 would find the text anything but clear. The fine will be “in accordance with Title 18, U.S. Code, or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. Within Title 18 and based upon the term of imprisonment sited in OPA-90, failure to report a discharge will result in a Class E felony. At this juncture, a person convicted of a Class E felony may be fined up to $250,000. Let us hope that the judge is not having a bad day.
For violations of regulations under Section 3 11 b of the FWPCA or for a
discharge, OPA-90 has created two classes of administrative penalties. A Class I penalty may not exceed $10,000 per violation with a cap of $25,000; and a Class II penalty may not exceed $10,000 per day for each day during which a violation exists with a maximum of $125,000.
Further confusing the issue are civil penalties, which may be criminal in nature for:
- Discharge, generally—up to $25,000 per day of violation or an amount of $ 1,000 per barrel discharged
- Failure to remove or comply—up to $25,000 per day of violation or an amount up to three times the costs incurred by the Oil Spill Liability Trust fund as a result of such failure
>• Failure to comply with regulations—- up to $25,000 per day of violation
Gross negligence or willful misconduct—not less than $100,000 and not more than $3,000 per barrel of oil discharged.
Of particular note within the penalty i provisions is a nondescript paragraph entitled Criminal Penalties. This may be the | avenue by which a criminal act of an individual acting in a corporate capacity 1 will be prosecuted for criminal acts of negligence.
In an effort to modify behavior and operational practices, OPA-90 has addressed substance abuse and manning based on permitted hours of work. Since casualties will, unfortunately continue to occur, OPA-90 has mandated tanker-construction standards and new equipment to minimize the outflow of oil. To ensure compliance by corporate officers as well as shipboard officers, substantially increased penalties complete the new leg- ! islative package.
Depending on your point of view, OPA-90 will either be the death of the aging Jones Act Trader fleet or the rebirth of the American Merchant Marine. Studying the OPA-90 legislation, one can only be confused by the scope of its intent. In response to the cry for unlimited liability, Congress has compromised on a vast increase in liability for removal and damages. Recognizing the need to effect a timely and environmentally sensitive response to an oil discharge, OPA- 90 has mandated the overhaul of federal and shipboard contingency planning, training, and equipage.
Patrick J. Modic is an Associate Professor of Marine Transportation at the Massachusetts Maritime Academy. A graduate of the United States Merchant Marine Academy, he is a Master Mariner with extensive tanker experience.
Tactical Aviation Training Is the Key
rphe success of Marine aviation during X Operation Desert Storm reflects the validity of a Marine Corps tactical avia- hon training concept that began in 1975.
Today’s Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1) ^ the lineal descendant of the East and West Coast Special Weapons Training Units (SWTUs) of the 1950s and the Marine Air Weapons Training Units AtI 'antic and Pacific—MAWTULANT and MAWTUPAC—of the 1960s. The spe- Clal weapons units concentrated on train- lng Marine attack squadrons (VMAs) to deliver nuclear weapons and spent rela- hvely little time on conventional air-to- gtound weapons. The MAWTUs began t° shift the focus and by 1963 the special weapons-conventional split was about 50/50.
In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, "te Commandant of the Marine Corps •n 1975 formed a group to determine sPecific requirements for improving and standardizing tactical aviation training. Of the group’s recommendations, num- ^er 19 recommended the establishment °f a formalized tactical training program I°r all of Marine aviation. The recommendation became Project 19, which established a graduate-level weapons and tactics instructor (WTI) course that emphasized the interdependence of all Marine aviation functions; the goal was to improve the overall tactical aviation training program of the Fleet Marine Force. The idea was to use the WTIs to implement an improved individual and unit training program, thus increasing the combat readiness of their units and the TMF as a whole.
Initial WTI courses were conducted separately in 1976 and 1977 by the East- and West-Coast units. The success of these courses and the desire to standardize training led to the decision to combine the two units and consolidate WTI training. As a result, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-One (MAWTS-1) was commissioned on 1 lune 1978 at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, close to some of the best training ranges in the United States. The squadron now comprises 100 officers and 85 enlisted Marines, with experienced representatives from every aviation community, ground combat arm, and most aviation support specialities. The instructor staff is made up of second-tour captains and majors, all selected for their tactical competence and
their success as unit WTIs.
The semiannual seven-week WTI course is recognized as one of the most comprehensive graduate aviation courses of instruction in the world today. During the course, the squadron swells to a strength of more than 2,500 Marines and sister-service students. Almost every squadron and aviation unit in the Fleet Marine Force participates in a program of academics, flight operations, and a final exercise—planned, executed, and debriefed by the students. It encompasses all functions of Marine aviation in support of a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), and relies on extensive aviation support from all the armed services, giving it a distinct joint flavor. Since 1978, MAWTS-1 has graduated more than 2,000 Marine WTIs, 130 sister-service officers, and 14 foreign students.
The course objective is to graduate officers fully qualified in their warfare specialty and capable of planning and executing integrated missions. The aim is to provide one WTI or WTI aircrew per squadron or air-control unit per year.
In June 1983, the Aviation Development, Tactics and Evaluation Department was formed as a separate department. It provides a nucleus of aviation expertise to coordinate efforts in developing and evaluating tactics and hardware in all functional areas of Marine Corps aviation. Specific areas include:
> AV-8B Harrier and F/A-18 Hornet night-attack systems >• Helicopter night-vision systems
By Major Steven M. Jones, U.S. Marine Corps
>■ Global positioning systems for Marine expeditionary units
- Improved portable navigation aids for forward base operations
- Unmanned aerial vehicle employment
- Heliborne tactics against Soviet-style integrated air defenses
The April 1990 heliborne tactics project at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, has probably been most significant in terms of scope and impact. It involved developing tactics for heliborne forces prose-
These Marine air crews in Ditto Hall at MAWTS-1 in Yuma, Arizona, are reaping the benefits of a balanced Weapons and Tactics Training Program that has evolved over the years to improve the capabilities of Marine aviation. Officers from all the U.S. armed forces and several allied nations also have participated in the program. Instruction is not limited to pilots and naval flight officers, though—enlisted Marines attend a Weapons and Tactics Crew Chief course that includes classes on assault support and crew-served weapons, followed by flights on the nearby ranges in the WTI final exercise.
curing various missions against a dense Soviet-style integrated air defense system (IADS). All areas of intelligence, electronic warfare and command and control were assessed as they contributed to rotary wing missions at night. This was the
The CH-46 and AH-1 crews in the desert near Yuma (above) and the Marines manning a Hawk battery command post (right) receive realistic training. The VMA-311 AV-8B pilot over devastated Iraqi vehicles in Kuwait (lower) represents the combat payoff.
first program of its kind for Marine rotary wing tactics development and provided a tremendous opportunity to evaluate combined force employment tactics. The product of the effort was the “Operational Tactics Guide for Heliborne IADS Penetration,” a comprehensive planning document designed to aid the aviation commander in how best to employ his helicopter assets in a high-threat environment.
During the buildup to the Gulf War, the development department coordinated numerous quick-response projects for deploying operational units in the area of intelligence dissemination, familiarization flights through simulated air defense systems, translation and dissemination of an “Iraqi Ground Force Tactics” document, and technical assistance on employment of Iraqi mines.
In July 1990, MAWTS-I had just completed planning for WTI Course 191 and the follow-on battle staff training course when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The squadron immediately shifted its efforts from the WTI course to forming mobile training teams to support deploying Marine Corps units.
From 2 August to 5 September 1990, more than 40 instructors per day at four different locations participated in a massive training effort that involved 10 Marine aircraft groups, 3 Marine air control groups, 39 aircraft squadrons, 4 Marine air traffic control squadrons, 2 light antiaircraft missile battalions, and 2 Marine air support squadrons. Moreover, six instructors from the Ground Combat Department augmented the tactical exercise evaluation control group staff at the Ma' fine Air-Ground Combat Center at Twen- tynine Palms, California, for a ten-day live-fire exercise, then deployed with the 4th and 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigades afloat for follow-on training. The instructors assisted in the preliminary training effort by providing updates on the Iraqi threat, live-fire lessons learned, and employment-integration considerations for the Kuwaiti theater of operations.
In mid-August, as the Third Marine Aircraft Wing began deploying units to the Gulf region, 22 MAWTS-1 instructors went with it. They conducted academic and flight instruction and provided an important flow of information back to Yuma, where it was used to refine training for follow- on units. Instructors continued to work closely with the staff at Twentynine Palms to assist in training deploying units.
As the Operation Desert Shield buildup continued, the squadron’s focus shifted from individual to unit training tailored specifically to the area of operations; instructors developed two separate 15-day training blocs that combined academics and flying. During flight operations, the instructors performed the functions of a MAGTF aviation combat element, and were supported by a command, control, and communications system. Each problem refined integrated operations against the threat.
As II Marine Expeditionary Force units and reserve units began mobilizing at the end of November 1990, additional mobile training teams were dispatched to actuation sites around the country and more aircraft squadrons were trained in a slightly expanded version of the earlier •raining programs. In all, the nine weeks °f unit training at MAWTS-1 involved more than 31 squadrons and 4,000 aircraft sorties, providing the final preparation for units prior to deploying to the Gulf. In December 1990, a 44-man detachment left Yuma to form the nucleus °f a I MEF mobile training team in Saudi
Arabia.
When the air war began on 16 January 1991, several instructors joined units to fill some previously identified critical billets. MAWTS-1 ground combat instructors served as liaison officers with the 3d Saudi Arabian Division and as fire support coordinators and assistant operations officers in several Marine ground combat units. Air defense instructors helped coordinate the Marine Corps air-defense plan with allied networks and provided assistance to several Saudi Arabian units. In addition, MAWTS-1 instructors also served on the Third Marine Aircraft Wing planning staff and on brigade staffs afloat. They also flew 630 combat missions and 1,058 combat hours in support of the war effort against Iraq.
In the States, the squadron continued to support the training, intelligence, and research needs of the remaining fleet and reserve units. Additionally, the squadron was asked by the Commanding General I MEF to conduct a multiservice identification friend-or-foe (IFF) testing program designed to evaluate 22 different pieces of hardware introduced to preclude or reduce the risk of air-to-ground fratricide. The project was a massive undertaking, and included every type of strike platform and sensor flown in Desert Storm by Marine, Army, Navy, and Air Force aircraft against armored vehicles in static and dynamic tests. MAWTS-1 served as the test director for equipment evaluation and produced a final report 14 days later.
When the war ended, the mobile training team assisted in capturing vital afteraction data. In addition to normal lessons- learned input, the staff participated as members of the Marine battlefield assessment and liaison team. Armed with tape recorders and note pads, staff members went to every major Marine Corps command in the theater to collect firsthand perspectives and recollections on the war.
Beyond WTI: Instructors are not idle between WTI courses. Each instructor averages more than 90 travel days per year providing support to Fleet Marine Force units. Instructors also provide support for the U.S. Navy’s Intermediate Level Light Attack Weapon School, Strike Fighter School, and Medium Attack Weapons School, as well as the Marine Corps’s Amphibious Warfare School, Command and Control Systems School, and Command and Staff College.
In addition, there are other courses:
- Commanders Weapons and Tactics Course. First offered in 1985, this is a five-day course conducted at Yuma on an as-required basis following WTI courses. It brings together commanding and executive officers in a demanding flight program. Besides providing current weapons and tactics instruction, it serves as a forum for senior-level ideas on readiness and training.
- Weapons and Tactics Crew Chief Course. Conducted concurrently with the WTI course, it increases the knowledge and tactical proficiency of Marine Corps helicopter crew chiefs. Instruction includes classes on helicopter employment, assault support tactics, and crew-served gunnery. The academic syllabus is followed by an evaluation phase where crew chiefs serve as aircrew members during WTI flight evolutions.
>• Academic Support Package. This supplemental course provides the FMF WTIs with a library of standardized, professionally prepared classroom instructional material. The package is complete with the course ware necessary to instruct FMF squadron members in their specific training and readiness syllabus.
>• Aviation Combat Element Battle Staff Training. The first of these 14-day courses convened in December 1991. The course should provide integrated tactical staff planning and unit training for Ma- lutions. The course objective is to help group staffs learn mission planning and how to fight their aircraft group as a cohesive unit.
The Talon. This publication is Marine aviation’s professional journal and provides a forum for effective communication with the FMF on weapons and tactics issues. The Talon is designed to inform the fleet of the latest tactical, procedural and equipment developments, as well as ongoing projects in the squadron.
MAWTS-1 is now conducting the largest WTI course ever held—108 students and 100 aircraft. Moreover, the squadron continues to participate in a myriad of programs, research and development activities, and FMF support functions. Beyond its basic charter to support Marine aviation, the squadron is also regularly called upon to provide expertise to agencies outside aviation. The staff frequently interacts with other U.S. military services as well as engaging in a valuable information exchange with allied military forces.
Marine Corps aviation success in Desert Shield and Desert Storm validated the weapons and tactics training concept that began in 1975. MAWTS-1 and the WTI program have paid enormous dividends in increased combat readiness and effectiveness of FMF units throughout its history. The organization is the only unit in the Marine Corps where representatives of every combat arm and most support communities work together under one roof to foster the advancement of weapons and tactics. The WTI program is designed to develop instructors. Graduates become more than just proficient operators—they form the very core of a dynamic and successful tactical training program that benefits the entire Marine Corps.
Less than one percent of the Marine pilots in the Gulf War had ever experienced combat. In large measure, realistic training was the reason for their success.
Major Jones is the head of academics at MAWTS- 1. He flew UH-lNs with HML-167 and HMLA- 269 and made numerous Mediterranean deployments with composite squadrons. In addition, he spent two years with the Second Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company and was part of the MAWTS-1 mobile training team with HMLA-369 and HMLA-367 at A1 Jubayl during Operation Desert Shield.