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By Vice Admiral Richard M. Dunleavy, U.S. Navy
Naval aviation is entering a new era. Today, it faces challenges to its future that are more severe than ever. Our greatest challenge is affordability. The drastically reduced projected budgets will cut not only the nice-to-have capabilities, but also some capabilities we consider essential.
Under these conditions, it is not surprising that stories are emerging about some difficult decisions that are more myth than fact.
One myth I hear frequently is that naval aviation is not getting its fair share of the Navy’s budget or total obligation authority (TOA). The truth is that naval aviation has received its fair share for the past five years at least, and—as far ahead as the budget is currently projected in the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP)—receives more than either the submarine or surface community. It is not an even three-way split. Both those communities are also making deep cuts in capability—down to a minimum sustaining rate needed to protect their related industrial bases. One of the Navy’s goals is to maintain a balanced warfighting capability. With naval aviation already having the dominant position in TOA, which is increasing relative to OP-02 (Submarine Warfare) and OP-03 (Surface Warfare) across the FYDP, it is hard to justify naval aviation getting an even larger slice of the pie.
I also need to set the record straight about the decision to terminate the F-14 line. Nobody in the Navy Department wanted this—but it was necessary. I would have been deeply concerned if the F-14 decision had not caused a great deal of dismay in the fleet. Naval aviators believe strongly in their mission and their aircraft and the ensuing emotional debate shows that naval aviation has not lost its heart. But, let’s look at facts, not myths.
F-14 Myth #1: The F/A-18 vs. F-14 decision was driven by the “single-seat Mafia.” The fact is the F-14 decision was an affordability decision; we cannot afford the combination of the F-14D, F/A-18E/F, and AX. A long-range, all-weather attack capability is critical, so either the F-14 or the F/A-18 had to give. We sacrificed some range, speed, and payload by going with the F/A-18E/F, but the Hornet has its own advantages in some mission areas. It is cheaper to operate and has a lower unit cost, which allows us to buy more aircraft and reach the Chief of Naval Operations’s goal of 60 offensive aircraft per aircraft carrier. If we cannot buy enough aircraft to fill our flight decks, we will lose the carriers. When you balance capabilities and costs, the F/A-18 compares favorably with the F-14D in most areas, is good enough in others, and is the most cost-effective overall.
F-14 Myth #2: OP-05 has not supported the F-14. In November 1988, the CNO approved full funding for the F-14D—supporting an OP-05 proposal. In the April 1989 revision of this budget, the Secretary of Defense deleted
F-14D funding, primarily for affordability reasons. In addition, the Tomcat is a single-mission aircraft, devoted primarily to air defense, at a time when power projection is receiving increased emphasis. In December 1989, during the 1992 budget-planning cycle, OP-05, the CNO, and the Secretary of the Navy again supported the F-14D. In September 1990, the budget summit resulted in a planned 25% cut in Department of Defense forces, and, in December 1990, the F-14D was again not supported by the Secretary of Defense. The bottom line is clear: Every time naval aviation puts money into the F-14, it is deleted by higher authority. Since the money cannot be recovered in another program, it becomes a net loss for naval aviation and the Navy.
In addition to these F-14 myths, I frequently hear that “Washington doesn’t listen to the fleet.” That just isn’t true. Operational advisory groups, commanders-in-chief conferences, the carrier air group commander warfare committee, and Proceedings are just a few of the many avenues for fleet inputs. We do listen. However, the fleet has more demands than our money can support, and this will only get worse with declining budgets. In the future, nothing will ever be accomplished without fleet-generated requirements and fleet support, so, keep asking. We in Washington will keep doing our best to get the top items on the list funded.
Another myth is that naval aviators should “avoid Washington duty like the plague.” It’s fine for junior officers to stay in the cockpits through department-head tours. But, it remains a fact that Washington duty looks good on your record, and the earlier you have this experience, the better you will understand the system and how to make an impact. Most important, however—naval aviation needs good people in Washington, making good decisions. Washington is a great place to live, with everything available from camping to opera, superb restaurants, and a beautiful surrounding area. The cost-of-living is higher than some areas, but there are many things to do for free. Overall, you would be hard pressed to find an area that has a better quality of life.
A myth particularly disturbing to me concerns naval aviation’s performance in Desert Storm—that naval aviation lost the public affairs war. (Perceptions vary on this: some in Southwest Asia said CNN stood for “Cable Navy News.”) If the Navy had problems in getting press coverage during Desert Storm, it was often our own fault. We , had a number of hardware deficiencies—such as video recorders—that we will correct. But more important, we must change our attitude toward the press. We must end our history of resistance to press coverage. The Navy and naval aviation have an intriguing story to tell, which the press is willing to tell. But, we have to help them get . the story.
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Proceedings / February
Naval Aviation Decisions
In Desert Storm, the Navy did not “win” the war alone—but without us the war might well have been lost. We were there first, and undoubtedly deterred further aggression. We enforced the embargo and moved bombs, beans, and bullets. We destroyed high-value enemy targets. Our suppression of enemy air defenses was critical, and we met all taskings. We remain on-station today and will be there tomorrow. Naval aviation was the first in—and the last out.
A final misconception has to do with Congress and that “Congress can fix bad Department of Defense/Navy policies.” Congressional correspondence is everyone’s absolute right and I do not discourage anyone from exercising to naval aviation losing credibility. I only ask you to assure yourself that your input is in the best interest of all of naval aviation.
The recent dramatic changes throughout the world are resulting in a major restructuring of the Defense Department and Navy plans. Long-standing requirements are being questioned, and the roles and missions of the Navy and naval aviation are under review. What the result will be is not clear today and will not be clear for some time. As options are explored and numerous “solutions” are offered from various quarters, rumors and misinformation will abound. I will do my best to keep you as well informed as possible.
this right. Please keep in mind there are many competing factors in any decision made in Washington and you may jf°t have all the available information. Realize that con- hcting voices can create a perception on Capitol Hill that naval aviation does not have its act together—which leads
r°seedings / February 1992
One fact is clear—naval aviation needs your continued support! Keep strokin’!
Admiral Dunleavy is the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare (OP-05).
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