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Contents:
Break Some Rice Bowls—14
TacAir=Naval Air + Marine Air—14
Desert Storm: The Marine Commanders—14
No More Package Deals—14
Guadalcanal Was a Long Time Ago—14
Getting Rid of the Nukes—20
Dialing Down the Threat—20
Welcome to the Revolution—22
Down By Subs—24
Attack Submarines Must Attack! Attack! Attack!—25
Save the Tailhook Association—26
Making Interoperability Work—28
F/A-18s for the U.S. Air Force—29
Waging a War to Protect the Seas—29
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a forum where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings. Please include your return address and a day-time phone number.
“Break Some Rice Bowls”
(See D. A. Wills, p. 82, November 1991 Proceedings
“TacAir=Naval Air + Marine Air”
(See E. J. Hogan, p. 13, November 1991
Proceedings)
Captain Ken Curtis, U.S. Navy, Air ASW Officer, Commander, Naval Air Forces, Pacific, and former Operations Officer, USS Tripoli (LPH-IO)—A restructuring of aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and amphibious readiness groups (ARGs) is needed. In future crises, they will likely respond together. Therefore, they should cease operating independently of each other.
ARGs have well-documented warfighting deficiencies; they are woefully lacking in ASW, antiair warfare, and antisurface warfare capabilities. Although current doctrine calls for them to come under the CVBG’s air umbrella, the integration of ARGs into the composite warfare commander (CWC) concept has never been successfully accomplished.
With new and far more capable classes of amphibious ships and Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) being restructured for contingency-and-limited-objective warfare (CALOW) and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), deploying a 2,000-man MEU (on board one Tarawa [LHA-l]-class or one Wasp [LHD-1]- class ship and one Whidbey Island [LSD- 41 (-class ship) with a CVBG is beginning to make more and more sense.
Meshing an ARG into a CVBG would accomplish many things: It would negate the need for an amphibious task force commander and his staff, thus streamlining the chain-of-command; it would finally solve the CWC problems related to ARGs; and it would facilitate the retirement of the older amphibious ships.
Things need not stop there. As paucity of funding erodes the capabilities of naval aviation, the next logical step would be the integration of Marine F/A-18 and A- 6 squadrons into carrier air wings. Not only would this be a better use of our services’ dwindling resources, but, since Marine aviators would be providing close air support for the MEU, it would be tactically sound, as well.
Some may call these ideas “doctrinal heresy.” Maybe so—but we must recog
nize that the radical changes looming on the horizon demand a reassessment of many of our assumptions, along with bold and innovative reforms, if we are to keep the Navy-Marine Corps team alive and well. □
“Desert Storm: The Marine Commanders”
(See W. E. Boomer, J. A. Brabham, C. C. Krulak, J. I. Hopkins, R. N. Moore, J. M. Myatt, and W. M. Keys, pp. 47-50, November 1991 Proceedings)
“No More Package Deals”
(See C. W. Meyer, pp. 36—40, November 1991 Proceedings)
“Guadalcanal Was a Long Time Ago”
(See J. J. Kratz, pp. 70-71, June 1991; J. W. Graham, pp. 23-26, October 1991; M. E. McBride, pp. 20-21, November 1991 Proceedings)
General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps—I want to commend the Naval Institute on the superb quality of the November issue. Proceedings always combines a detailed and thorough look at past operations with insightful discussion on the future of the naval services, but the November issue is truly exceptional on both counts. The views of the Marine commanders in Desert Storm that you presented will serve as a touchstone for analysis of our operations in Southwest Asia and elsewhere for years to come. And the winners of the Marine Corps Essay Contest provided fresh perspectives on how we can do better what we have always done best: naval, expeditionary, combined-arms operations. As we refine the capabilities of the naval services to meet the challenges of the future, such perspectives will be invaluable.
I read Captain Meyer’s essay with particular interest. The Marine Corps has recently completed a thorough force structure planning effort in which we considered just the types of issues that Captain Meyer’s essay raises. Fundamentally, we asked about the capabilities the Corps must retain to fulfill its role as the nation’s expeditionary combined-arms force in readiness.
One of the answers that came out of this effort was that we need to retain
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our F/A-18 Hornet squadrons, although we may be able to operate with fewer as we downsize other parts of the Corps. Many of the reasons are apparent from Major McBride’s letter in the November Proceedings and General Moore’s account of 3d Marine Aircraft Wing operations in Southwest Asia. Essentially, we cannot do what the National Command Authority needs the Marine Corps to do—i.e., provide the full range of capabilities required of naval expeditionary forces—without F/A-18s.
It is not a question of either F/A-18s or AV-8B Harriers. The Corps needs both. The AV-8B gives us unmatched flexibility in basing options, but by itself cannot provide either the range of aviation functions or the volume of ground- support sorties required by a Marine Air- Ground Task Force (MAGTF).
Marine F/A-18s aren’t just fighters. They can provide all-weather air defense around the clock if necessary, as they did throughout Desert Shield when aircraft carriers were considered too vulnerable in the northern Persian Gulf. But with the retirement of our A-6E Intruders, F/A- 18s will also provide the bulk of our day/night attack capability, our only in- the-weather close air support capability, our fast airborne tactical air coordination and airborne forward air control capabilities, and all our tactical reconnaissance. They are also our principal shooter of the homing anti-radiation missile (HARM) for the suppression of enemy air defenses.
As an example of how important they are to the MAGTF, Marine F/A-18s flew more than 5,200 sorties in Desert Storm, accounting for more than 52% of all Marine offensive air-support sorties. Together with the A-6Es (which are being replaced by F/A-18Ds), they dropped 73% of the ordnance—with deadly accuracy. The few Marine Harrier squadrons—superb as they are—could not have made up the difference if we didn’t have F/A-18s.
The other services will support Marines as much as they can in joint operations. That is not an issue. The fact is, however, they cannot replace the capabilities of Marine fighter-attack squadrons, for three reasons:
First, Air Force and Navy squadrons can’t provide the fully responsive air support that Marine expeditionary forces need to offset their relative lack of armor and artillery. This isn’t a criticism of the Navy and Air Force pilots; they are superb at what they do. But Navy and Air Force squadrons can’t be integrated into an air-ground task force because they aren’t organized, trained, and equipped from the ground up for expeditionary combined-arms operations. They can’t generate the high sortie rates of Marine aircraft based close to ground combat units, and they lack basing flexibility. Navy squadrons can’t come ashore unless hosted by Marine maintenance support; Air Force squadrons can’t go afloat if required. Neither of them can be integrated with ground forces down to the aircraft group/regimental level.
This leads to the second reason that the Marine Corps must not relinquish the functions of our F/A-18s to other services. Marine fighter-attack squadrons are a critical element of the nation’s shore- based naval aviation force. They are a highly cost-effective swing force, capable of conducting naval combat air patrols from shore as they did during Desert Storm, and augmenting carrier air wings afloat as they did during the air strikes on Libya. It would be truly short-sighted to eliminate one of the nation’s most versatile and cost-effective aviation assets, in the interest of reducing the cost of our armed forces.
The third reason is as simple to Marines as it may be complex to those who aren’t: our fighter-attack squadrons are part of our Corps. They’re Marines. Their proud heritage is as much a part of what makes our Corps great as any formation under a Marine battle color. Their legends and traditions are “such things as regiments hand down forever.” They will remain.
Again, let me commend Proceedings for its continual efforts in support of original thinking and vigorous dialogue. These will be more important than ever in the next few years as we consider the roles of the naval services in the radically new era that lies ahead. Continue the march! □
Captain Mark P. Stolzenberg, U.S. Marine Corps—When General Moore was asked about intelligence support provided to infantry units by OV-lODs during Operation Desert Storm, he replied, "The grunts always love the OV-10, but they are picking the wrong airplane. The intelligence they were getting was from the F/A-18D that operated deep into the battlefield.” This comment is incredibly misleading.
Intelligence gathered from Marine observation squadrons did not pass through any air-support agencies. It went directly to infantry regiment and battalion fire support coordination centers through the air officers, usually within minutes of each request. While it was not “processed” intelligence, this information did provide infantry units a timely and trustworthy picture of what was happening a few miles to their front. The information provided by the F/A-18D, valuable as it was, did not make it to the users in a timely fashion. I know, because I hunted for it at Marine Aircraft Group- 13 (Forward) before every one of my missions. After speaking with the majority of the 2d Marine Division’s air officers and forward air controllers, I know that such information did not get to regiments and battalions.
Airborne forward air control and airborne tactical air coordination and other supporting arms coordination come under the observation mission. Observation requires time on station to develop situational awareness. It also requires timely response to Marines on the ground. And it may demand as well that, as in Desert Storm, there be the reassuring drone of two or three aircraft over our infantry 24 hours a day. □
Rear Admiral J. B. LaPlante, U.S. Navy, Commander Task Force-156/Commander Amphibious Group Two during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm—The otherwise superb collection of interviews of Desert Shield/Desert Storm Marine Corps commanders was marred by the omission of the Marine commander afloat, Major General Harry Jenkins (Commander Task Force- 158/Com- manding General, 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade). Granted, we spent most of the war out of sight at sea and did not execute the assault that had been prepared. But to discount the operations of the largest amphibious task force assembled for combat since the Korean War is short-sighted.
In the vastly changed world we face, the uses of naval force will differ greatly from those of the past. The missions, tasking, and operations of the Marines afloat in the Gulf were typical of those we will be called on to perform in the future—among them:
- No-notice embarkation of large expeditionary forces
- Long periods afloat—poised—to provide deterrent and stability enhancing pressure
- No-notice noncombatant evacuation operations (e.g., Operation Eastern Exit, the evacuation of Americans and other nationals from Mogadishu, Somalia, in January 1991 by elements of Task Forces 156 and 158)
- Enforcement of economic sanctions During the Gulf War, Iraqi ships ignored orders to heave to. Given our reluctance to use disabling fire, the only option was the use of Marines and SEALs staged from amphibious ships and fast-roped aboard.
The employment of the Marines of the Desert Storm/Desert Shield amphibious force was immensely different from that of the Marines on the ground, but it has more relevance to the future of U.S. naval forces. The lessons learned by General Jenkins and the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade should be recorded and studied. An excellent starting place would be to publish an interview with the “other” Marine commander.
Editor's Note: An interview with Major General Jenkins is scheduled for publication in the May 1992 Naval Review Issue. □
Lieutenant Colonel David M. McLaughlin, U.S. Air Force, Deputy Director of Operations Plans Division, Pacific Air Forces—Colonel Kratz’s list of the missions that "the Air Force sees as its charter” is complete, save one: close air support (CAS). Close air support has always been a fundamental mission of the Air Force. Colonel Kratz is right in saying that the Air Force is not interested in the AV-8B. It does, however, fly 600 A-10s (whose sole mission is close air support), uses F-16s and AC-130s in the same role, and maintains an impressive CAS-related tactical command, control, and communication system.
Colonel Kratz’s concern with the appointment of a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) is that Marine F/A-18s would be unavailable to support the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander. But JFACC doctrine (Joint Publication 301.2) specifically allows for an amphibious objective area
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thority and MAGTF control of organic aircraft are not mutually exclusive.
Colonel Kratz refers to an incident in Desert Storm—in which eight Marines were killed by friendly aircraft—to bolster his argument that the MAGTF must provide its own close air support. However, this and other air-related friendly fire incidents in Desert Storm were not caused by a command-and-control system that sent “unsolicited” aircraft to drop bombs short of the MAGTF’s fire support coordination line. Instead, blame imprecise
to be maintained “during sustained operations ashore” because “the MAGTF commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element.” Thus, the JFACC’s au-
The U.S. Air Force believes that it takes close air support seriously. The proof is in the aircraft—A-10s and AC-130s, here.
navigation systems, weapon malfunctions, featureless terrain, darkness, or bad weather. Regardless of which U.S. service or even which nation controls it, pilots of all services know how-to fly close air support effectively and safely. Thousands of Desert Storm sorties attest to that fact. Yes, the blue-on-blue problems must be fixed, but let’s put our effort into addressing their real causes.
Now, more than ever, we need joint solutions to joint problems. The services need to understand each other’s capabilities and weaknesses—so that, jointly, we will continue to enter the fight with advantages in airspeed and altitude. □
“Dialing Down the Threat”
(See N. Friedman, p. 107-109, December 1991
Proceedings)
Commander Nathaniel French Caldwell, Jr., U.S. Navy, author, Arctic Leverage (New York: Praeger, 1990)—President George Bush’s surprise announcement of a drastic change in U.S. nuclear-weapons policy—including the abolition of all sea- based tactical nuclear weapons—was designed to take advantage of the postcoup-attempt environment in the Soviet Union. The United States had hoped to prod Soviet central authorities to follow suit, before the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed the republics to gain control of these weapons.
Stability also accrues from the elimination of Soviet sea-based tactical nuclear weapons. Although these weapons are unlikely to come under the jurisdiction of any independent republic, controls over their use are still less stringent than those over strategic weapons.
From a practical military standpoint (if it follows the U.S. lead) the Soviet Navy will give up more tactical nuclear weapons than the U.S. Navy—weapons that are the biggest threat to our carrier strike operations. If it ever gets pulled down from the shelf, the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy might even be reinterpreted in this light.
So far, so good. But many questions remain. The biggest are: Does the Soviet central authority have the power, the will, and the resources to follow the U.S. lead? Can it physically remove these weapons to central storage or destruction sites? What about getting the cooperation of a recalcitrant military and the independence-minded republics? President Bush’s surprise announcement was meant to eliminate the need for difficult negotiations on implementation and verification, but President Mikhail Gorbachev’s ambiguous response to the U.S. initiative was not encouraging. It has been followed by low-level U.S.-Soviet talks—to answer questions about exactly what each side is cutting, how the cuts are to be implemented, and what the next subject of bilateral talks should be.
Still, the unilateral removal of U.S. land-based tactical nuclear weapons from Europe makes sense, because the targets for these weapons no longer exist. The removal of land-based tactical nuclear weapons from Korea may even help open the North Korean nuclear program for inspection. Current geopolitics mitigate the loss of military capabilities suffered by removing U.S. land-based tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. In fact, it is in the best interest of our nation to do so, because these weapons can be transferred more easily from the United States to regional contingency areas than away from a European nation’s sovereign territory.
However, with the loss of these weapons from platforms that operate con-
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tinuously in forward trouble areas—surface combatants, submarines, and aircraft carriers—the United States loses an important deterrent capability. The “neither confirm nor deny” policy, combined with the forward presence of the U.S. Navy, gave the United States a regional nuclear presence and helped to deter non-conventional warfare. In the Gulf War, the U.S. regional nuclear presence was a daily reminder to Iraq of the likely re
sponse to any use of chemical or biological weapons.
Today, more than a dozen countries have nuclear-weapon programs; many more have chemical or biological weapon programs. Ballistic-missile technology is spreading into the developing world, and along with it the capability of delivering devastating attacks. By removing its tactical nuclear weapons from the high seas, the United States has relinquished a continuous regional nuclear presence. Now, nuclear power projection in regional disputes has to start from U.S. territory—a move that may send all kinds of unintended political signals. No longer will regional belligerents automatically assume that the U.S. Navy has the ability to respond in kind to non-conventional warfare.
Stability and the desire to mitigate uncertainty in Soviet territory are critical goals, and parallel Soviet tactical nuclear reductions might still occur. But it must be remembered that the Soviet Union— if it still exists—is not the threat anymore; therefore, the removal of a Soviet sea- based tactical nuclear capability does not affect any strategic or tactical equation. Uncertainty is the threat, and the U.S. Navy must be able to provide a regional nuclear presence to deter non-conventional warfare. The capability to deploy sea-based tactical nuclear weapons quickly should be developed before the weapons are all brought ashore—and, to be credible, this capability should be practiced regularly with real weapons.
This may mean that we will never again pull liberty in New Zealand, but— even though that’s a lot to give up—so be it. □
SPARTON
Lieutenant Commander Richard Boike, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy—Thank you, Captain Byron! You’ve given hope to all of us who had resigned ourselves to never seeing Total Quality Leadership (TQL) in the fleet—except in print. Admiral Kelso should put Captain Byron’s article on the recommended reading list or, better yet, carpet-bomb Washington, San Diego, and Norfolk—the places where TQL could be strangled in its cradle—■ with copies of it.
TQL means a long-overdue upheaval
“Welcome to the Revolution”
(See J. L. Byron, pp. 30-35, October 1991; J.
E. Simpson, pp. 17-18 December 1991
Proceedings)
Senior Chief Quartermaster (Surface Warfare) Michael G. Harrison, U.S. Navy—It’s about time that such a practical approach to the application of Navy TQL was expressed. Once again, the Navy seems to be wallowing in the usual drill of program implementation by buzzwords. To many of us at the deck-plate level, however, Captain Byron’s insightful, refreshing, and invigorating ideas have great promise. Captain Byron should head this program, be given wide latitude to make it work, and be there to see it through to fruition. □
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in the superior-subordinate relationship that exists between operational forces and shore-based staffs. Staffs must realize that their function is not to regulate, authorize, control, restrict, inspect, and direct fleet actions to the nth degree. Their mission—their very reason to exist—will be to get to the fleet what the fleet says it needs. In other words, the fleet must become more important than the staffs—especially to the staffs themselves.
Any inspections, assessments, or “assists” will be at the discretion of unit commanders, who are ultimately responsible for keeping their commands in fighting trim. A commanding officer will be judged on the unit’s performance of its mission—not on highly subjective grades it receives during essentially administrative reviews.
The resources now devoted to archaic staff functions will be used for real and effective training, made available to every unit. Training will no longer consist of thinly veiled inspections, but will become an opportunity for units to learn new skills or hone old ones, while being assessed by trainers who are real experts in their fields—not just average sailors on shore duty who have read a publication or two.
TQL is a very exciting frontier. It is all about teamwork, motivation, initiative, flexibility, individual commitment to organizational goals, and, above all else, building quality into the process. Captain Byron, thanks again. □
Frank X. Hamel—Six pages of gob- bledygook will go a long way to ensure that TQL will end up in a gear locker alongside the other “alphabet-soup programs that we have suffered in the past.” While probably unintentional, the accompanying photograph of bored, detached enlisted personnel more accurately depicts the deck-plate response to this vague, detached program.
The Navy could save itself tons of time and money by simply reproducing Admiral King’s seven-paragraph letter that was the sidebar to Captain Byron’s article and announce that it is the Navy’s total quality leadership program. Otherwise, leave TQL/TQM to the production °f widgets—where Dr. Deming properly applied it. □
Captain R. S. Cloward, U.S. Navy; Com- 'nander, Amphibious Squadron Nine— Captain Byron’s comment that staffs "traditionally regard themselves as lilies of the field, more capable and more important than any of their subordinate com- rnands” is either designed to incite com-
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ment or to display his ignorance about operational staffs. I’ll assume the former.
The readiness squadrons (of which I can speak with some knowledge) were chartered around a concept of service to subordinates. My philosophy in Amphibious Squadron Nine has been that ships and staffs are as closely linked as mountain climbers—mutual trust and support are essential for their survival and success. This may not be a strictly TQL attitude, but it’s a long way from considering ourselves “certainly wiser than anyone of the same rank in operating units.”
The comment that "TQL is not an option. It is our only hope” smacks of hubris. TQL is the option chosen by Navy leadership and—while it is an excellent common-sense solution—it is not our only hope. Rather, TQL is a powerful tool, best used in concert with our other strengths.
Most Navy professionals (including me) do not need to be admonished to “get to work.” Just give us the tools—in this case, knowledge of TQL and a mandate to proceed—and we’ll do the job.
Despite these reservations, I really liked the article . . . honest! □
“Down by Subs”
(See E. L. Beach, pp. 89-92, April 1991
Proceedings)
Tom A. Friedmann—With his book, Operation Drumbeat, Michael Gannon did a great service to history and the U.S. Navy by clearly placing the blame for the German Navy’s tremendous success off the U.S. East Coast and in the Caribbean in early 1942 on the man who was responsible for the debacle: Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King. The fact that it has taken so long for the indictment to be handed down is as remarkable as Captain Beach’s apologia for King.
Captain Beach’s most astounding statement is his excuse of King's failure to comprehend the importance of the U-boat offensive because “the number of items one person's brain can handle is finite. Similarly, there is a limit to the number of persons or organizations one can keep under intimate and personal control: somewhere around eight." Delegation is, therefore, necessary, and delegation creates bureaucracies that, in turn, “swamp the organization or person theoretically served.”
This is not the first time that this remarkable excuse has been used on King’s behalf. In his book Master of Sea Power, Thomas B. Buell noted that in early 1942, “There were greater disasters in the rest of the world that took King’s attention .
. . [his] immediate priorities once war began were to stop Japan and, together with [Army Chief of Staff General George C.[ Marshall, to work with the British Chiefs of Staff to develop a unified strategy.”
Marshall faced the same disasters as King; yet, it was a letter from him in June 1942 that forced King to examine the U.S. antisubmarine effort. Winston Churchill and the British chiefs of staff labored under the effects of equally appalling disasters (such as the loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse and the fall of Singapore), but were mindful of the dangers posed by the loss of U.S. merchant shipping.
As far as developing a unified strategy is concerned, the keystone had been set months before: Germany first. Did King’s preference for a “Japan first” strategy blind him to the battle that was taking place some 150 miles from his office in Washington, D.C.?
The Battle of the Atlantic was the determining campaign of the war. Without the Allied victory at sea, victory both on land and in the air would have been impossible. If, as Captain Beach says, a mind can only concentrate on no more than eight items at a time, how could the survival of the United Kingdom fail to rate as one of them in King’s?
Captain Beach argues that one reason for the disastrous losses was the conflict as to whether convoys or general-area patrols were more effective in combating submarines.
Why wasn’t this issue settled well before 1942? We had the experience of World War I, when the implementation of the convoy system slashed Allied merchant ship losses to U-boats. The British experience of 1939^11 reaffirmed the validity of the convoy system.
Even more damning is the fact that the U.S. Navy had been in the shooting war in the Atlantic for a year prior to Pearl Harbor—and the man commanding the Atlantic Fleet for much of “Mr. Roosevelt’s War” was King.
Did King’s well-known anglophobia keep him from making use of British experience? Could it have subconsciously kept him from adequately heeding the U- boat menace?
Beach is on firmer ground when he talks about the stifling effects of bureaucracy on decision making. But even here. King cannot escape censure.
King was the first person to serve as both Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief of the United States
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Fleet. Although President Franklin D. Roosevelt could not alter the Navy’s notorious bureau system without legislation, he did promise to dismiss any bureau chief who stood in King’s way. Because of this promise, it is hard not to blame King for the blemishes on the Navy’s record in World War II—including the inability to correct weapon failures promptly (and for tolerating attendant accusations of cowardice or lack of initiative against many good naval officers), the cashiering of Commander Joseph Rochefort (the Navy’s magician of “Magic”) and the failure to censure those who neglected to search for the USS Indianapolis (CA-35).
Undoubtedly, too, King’s personality contributed to his problems. Called “ferocious” by Captain Beach, King was a self-proclaimed “son-of-a-bitch.” Working for a such person inhibits the free flow of ideas and demands that inordinate amounts of time be spent analyzing a superior’s moods rather than attending to the work at hand. This is not easy to endure in the civilian sector, and it must be extraordinarily difficult to function under similar circumstances in the military, particularly when they are compounded by the exigencies of war.
The value of history lies in its lessons. Unfortunately, learning the right lessons sometimes means that the reputations of the people who made history suffer in the process. □ cisely locate or track SSBNs on patrol. ASW aircraft, like the P-3, can localize and attack SSBNs once cued to a suspected area, but are relatively ineffective in open-ocean non-cued searches, and cannot operate in areas where the United States does not control the airspace. Establishing air superiority during regional crises is one thing; doing so over Soviet home waters would be quite a different matter. Additionally, a P-3 cannot effectively conduct anti-SSBN operations under Arctic ice; an SSN is the only platform capable of locating and eliminating
SSBNs when they are deployed in such a manner.
Providing ASW screening for carrier battle groups remains an important SSN mission. Indeed, as our naval forces continue to shrink and we shift our planning to regional contingencies, the importance of this mission will increase. With their high underwater speed and endurance, SSNs are capable of arriving in a crisis area well ahead of a battle group. Once on station, an SSN can provide real-time tactical intelligence to the battle group commander, sanitize the area of enemy
222Z2222S
“Attack Submarines Must Attack! Attack! Attack!”
(See: K. Peppe, pp. 62-64, September 1991;
W. J. Ruhe, pp. 27-28, December 1991 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Robert B. McPherson, U.S. Navy—The nuclear attack submarine (SSN) missions that Commander Peppe advocates dropping—in favor of renewed dedication to deep-water antisurface warfare (ASUW)—are precisely the ones that our SSN force must perform in the uncertain times ahead. Although political changes in the Soviet Union have reduced the likelihood of superpower nuclear war to its lowest point in history, one cannot ignore the fact that the Soviets still possess and continue to build ultra-quiet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) capable of destroying the United States. And as both superpowers reduce their land- based nuclear delivery systems, their reliance on sea-based systems will increase.
There is no better platform to hunt Soviet SSBNs than a U.S. nuclear attack submarine. Fixed arrays have geograph- tcal coverage limitations and cannot pre
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submarines, and launch cruise-missile attacks against key inland targets—all while remaining virtually untargetable.
Although part of the ASW mission could be performed with T-AGOS ships, as Commander Peppe suggests, their utility in the initial stages of even a low-intensity conflict would be limited at best. You simply do not send a slow, defenseless T-AGOS ship to conduct ASW off a coastline before air and surface superiority are established. Although surface ships with the SQR-19 TACTAS system and LAMPS III helicopters are formidable ASW platforms, the SSN remains the best ASW platform—and an extremely cost-effective one, when you consider that it can operate without expensive escorts and logistic supply trains.
Commander Peppe also rejects special- warfare-support operations as a legitimate SSN mission. Converted SSBNs currently provide this capability, but soon there will be no more Poseidon-class SSBNs to convert—because they all will have reached the end of their useful lives by the end of the decade. More important, the ability to insert and extract special warfare forces will become increasingly vital as we shift our warfare planning emphasis to control of regional conflicts.
Although SSNs can be a significant force multiplier in ASUW, helicopters and attack aircraft also can be quite effective in neutralizing the small combatants and patrol craft that constitute the bulk of the world’s navies. It is also important to note that even while we were at war with Iraq, we chose to board and divert merchant ships loaded with Iraq- bound supplies, rather than sink them.
Although every submariner dreams of prevailing in a furious Red Ramage-type battle against a task force of surface shifts, we cannot let our zeal for the “fun” mission of ASUW misdirect our efforts. Certainly, we should train and improve in this area, but it should not become our primary focus. In an era of constrained budgets, the U.S. submarine force must do what it does best—which, precisely, is just about everything. □
Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. McFetridge, U.S. Army—As an avid reader of Proceedings for more than twenty years, I have read articles that either raised my blood pressure or piqued my interest—and some that seemed so implausible that I thought they must surely have been written tongue-in-cheek. I am not sure in which category I would classify Lieutenant Commander Peppe’s article.
The nuclear attack submarine (SSN) is an important weapon that, like every other defense system today, is under considerable scrutiny to justify its cost and utility. The requirement for cost effectiveness calls for broadening—not narrowing—the mission spectrum of any system. The current debate over mission profile and capabilities of the $1.5-3 billion Seawolf underscores this point.
Lieutenant Commander Peppe would limit the missions of SSN to “sinking the enemy’s (surface) fleet and denying him the seas.” It’s a sound historical concept, but with one major flaw—the Imperial Japanese Navy was sunk in 1945.
There is no surface fleet nor combination of navies that could challenge the air and surface forces of the U.S. Navy on the high seas. Furthermore, the most capable navies in the world are, with the exception of the Soviet Navy, all our allies. Whatever the Soviet Navy evolves into, it will be markedly less capable and less threatening than its predecessor. Even in its heyday, the Soviet Navy could only have made NATO control of the open seas a sporting proposition for a relatively short time.
Since 1945, the United States has fought four significant conflicts and conducted many other show-of-force operations, during which not a single U.S. torpedo has been launched. Indeed, with the exception of the Tomahawk firings during the Gulf War (which could have been done just as well by surface ships), the U.S. Navy’s submarines have indeed been a silent service. So, to survive the budget axe, attack submarines are going to have to demonstrate that they can make a unique warfighting contribution that cannot be done cheaper, faster, and better by other systems. The SSN will have to perform all the missions Lieutenant Commander Peppe wants to eliminate— and probably more.
The submarine’s main tactical advantage is stealth; it can go where surface and air forces cannot be maintained. It can strike and escape before it is detected and attacked. With satellite tracking, long-range targeting, and stand-off launch of precision-guided munitions, World War Il-style antisurface warfare is a risky mission that cannot be justified— even if it can be accomplished. Why risk a ma/ri-hundred million dollar investment at periscope depth and in visual range to shoot a torpedo across the wake of a ship that can be destroyed with a terminally guided missile? Firing torpedoes might be “what the submarine does best,” that does not justify submarines sufficiently. If it did, we would still have horse cav
alry, because, after all, a mounted charge is what cavalry does best.
For well over a hundred years, the Army built and maintained an expensive, complex system of coastal artillery fortifications. The Coast Artillery was a popular branch of service: comfortable, located near large cities, and not demanding frequent, arduous deployments. After 1814, however, the Coast Artillery never fired a shot in anger against an enemy fleet. The U.S. Navy saw to it that no Confederate, Spanish, German, or Japanese warship ever got within range. Eventually, the Army accepted reality and the Coast Artillery was converted to AntiAircraft (now Air Defense) Artillery which has an important role on the battlefield. The nuclear attack submarine must evolve as well.
It is time for submariners to put aside the nostalgic dreams of lining up on the Shinano, just as the Army put aside the cavalry charge. If not, we will surely lose the nuclear-powered attack submarine and all its magnificent capabilities. □
Save the Tailhook Association
Joseph F. Towers—I share the justified outrage of Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett in the wake of charges of sexual abuse at the recent Tailhook Association symposium in Las Vegas. However, I am very concerned about his termination of direct and indirect Navy support for the Tailhook Association.
For its 35 years, the Tailhook Association has been the source of extraordinary professionalism and esprit de corps, a leading proponent of sea power and carrier aviation, and a publisher of a superb quarterly journal. Now it has been declared persona non grata and ordered to leave its offices at the Miramar Naval Air Station.
Secretary Garrett’s outrage and actions sent a strong message regarding sexual abuse, excesses, and gross misconduct in the Navy: such behavior will not be tolerated and will be prosecuted. However, to penalize an entire organization for the alleged misconduct of a few officers is unwarranted and unfair.
Getting to the bottom of these allegations is important. However, the process shouldn’t include the destruction of a professional society that can continue as a viable proponent of naval aviation and our national defense for many decades to come.
Editor’s Note: Also in this issue, “Tailhook Reflections, ” page 93. □
“Making Interoperability Work”
(See D. Palzkill, pp. 50-54, September 1991; A.
Rosebrok, pp. 22-23, December 1991
Proceedings)
Captain H.D. Connell II, U.S. Navy, Commander Carrier Air Wing Three— Lieutenant Palzkill is on target about the great gulf, in terms of interoperability, that exists between the Navy and our sister services. His suggestion concerning junior-officer exposure to joint operations is also on the mark.
In the five years since Goldwater- Nichols mandated joint qualification as a prerequisite for officer promotion, the Navy has reluctantly accommodated an administrative, rather than operational, compliance. Desert Storm is a clear reminder that operational effectiveness is the real point of jointness. The Navy must quickly move beyond administrative compliance and into full partnership in joint operations.
The Navy has been preoccupied with getting a large number of officers into the joint-qualification process and in getting the right billets certified by the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL)—necessary first steps in meeting the Goldwa- ter-Nichols mandate and in reconciling Navy career patterns with the new promotional aspects of the law (especially as they deal with flag-officer selection and service). At present, the law does not credit service at the unit level—and in our haste to get on board, we have taken our joint billets wherever we could find them, primarily in planning and coordinating positions for senior officers.
Despite the law’s intended focus on employment of forces, most Navy billets are on the Department of Defense (DoD) staff and at major headquarters elements of unified commands, including billets as senior-flag-officer aides and at the Transportation Command, the Defense Nuclear Agency, and even the Defense Mapping Agency. Very few spots have been accredited at the middle- and low-echelon field combatant levels, where the Navy commanders must execute joint plans.
We must work within the DoD to get unit-level billets accredited. While awaiting JDAL reconciliation, however, we should press on with an expanded program of joint-service liaison and exchange officers.
Our numbered fleet staffs presently have all-service representation; we should apply this model at lower levels. We need Navy line billets at the lieutenant and lieutenant commander levels in Air Force, Marine Corps, and Army tactical units, and a corresponding assignment of sister-service liaison officers to our aircraft carriers, carrier air wings (CVWs), Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), amphibious squadrons (PhibRons), and tactical electronic warfare (VAQ) and airborne early warning (VAW) squadrons. Not only would joint execution improve, but the cross-pollenization at the grassroots level will create a cadre of officers experienced in joint-service matters from the bottom up. Many of them will become officers who will make significant contributions at the senior staff level.
For a start, we should certify and fill the following lieutenant and lieutenant- commander billets: one Army or Air Force communications officer to each aircraft carrier; one Army officer to each MEU or PhibRon; one Air Force and one Marine aviator to each CVW, with Navy and Marine aviators to Air Force wings and Navy aviators and Air Force fliers to each Marine Aircraft Group staff; and one Air Force targeteer to each aircraft carrier and to the Naval Strike Warfare Center staff.
Because battle-space control and electronic warfare are so critical, the new look should also include an Air Force electronic warfare/electronic countermeasures officer to each Navy and Marine Corps EA-6B squadron, and an AW ACS controller to each Navy VAW. Navy and Marine Corps reciprocal assignments would go to each Air Force electronic warfare and AW ACS unit.
In addition to supplementing our present top-down approach, this program would appeal to our top-performing junior officers, by allowing them to remain within their warfare specialty for a flying tour and still get the early joint qualification requisite to career success. The presence of sister-service officers in many tactical units will benefit all the services. These liaison officer billets will be reciprocal—meaning that no billet growth would be necessary, and that the program can be implemented without delays caused by new-billet programming cycles.
As Lieutenant Palzkill indicates, equipment incompatibility is an obstacle to joint effectiveness in the field, and working the acquisition system to connect Navy command, control, communications, and intelligence systems with those of our sister services is a top priority.
Other efforts should focus on mobility and munitions. From the mobility standpoint, we can no longer tolerate incompatibilities in types of jet fuel and airrefueling equipment. The Navy’s concerns over shipboard firefighting are valid, but must be reviewed to find ways to make handling of Air Force JP-4 at sea less onerous. Of greater importance, because it affects both combat and peacetime aviation safety—all large tankers must be dual-configured for simultaneous boom-in-slot and probe-in-drogue service, or else all Navy and Air Force tactical aircraft should be able to receive in both modes. The plea “Say tanker posit” by Navy, Marine, and Air Force aviation must be answerable by every tanker in the joint-operations airspace. Accommodation may require some weight and performance penalties, but the potential payoffs will outweigh them. We have solved a similar problem with allied navies for refueling at sea. It can be done—must be done—for in-flight refueling.
We must also quickly correct two simple munitions-related incompatibilities: aircraft self-protection expendables and air-to-ground ordnance. Navy, Marine, Air Force, and Army aircraft all use decoy flares and chaff rounds to defeat the enemy AAW array. At present, however, one service’s square-shaped expendables literally cannot be fitted into the other’s round-shaped dispenser holes.
A similar situation exists for bombs. Navy efforts to use the Air Force’s heavy penetrator bomb underscore another acquisition failure. Since Air Force weapons are not built to meet Navy requirements for thermal protection, the Navy will not permit their presence at sea. Also, the lugs used on the Air Force bombs are not suitable for carrier launch and recovery.
Once again, good reasons exist for the Navy’s requirements, but we must either develop workarounds (Navy lugs for Air Force weapons, for example), re-evaluate our engineering and safety concerns, or insist that our requirements become part of the joint-acquisition process.
Joint doctrine, equipment, and munitions are not just matters of engineering reconciliation and budgeting concerns; they can also decide who is deemed suitable to fight. Where the theater or joint task force commander cannot afford parallel logistics trains to accommodate different services’ requirements, some of the players may no longer be invited to the game. The Navy must do better. Desert Storm may or may not be the prototype for future Navy combat operations. Whatever the future holds, joint-service experience and joint compatibility clearly will be required of Navy officers and naval units. We should complement our top-down focus with a grass-roots approach that focuses on changes at the tactical-unit level. Cross training at the junior-officer level and a concentrated focus on mobility and munitions capability will pay large dividends. □
k
F/A-18s for the U.S. Air Force
Captain Donald Eckstein, U.S. Air Force—The tactical aviation communities in both the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force are slowly approaching a day of reckoning concerning the size and capabilities of the “low” end of their tactical fighter aircraft inventories. The Navy has already concluded that despite the impressive capabilities of the F-14, it must instead develop the F/A-18E/F Hornet to meet quantity goals and keep the average age of its fighters from increasing dramatically. The Air Force is also slowly
\l
U.S. NAVY
The Hornet may be the tactical solution for the Navy and the Air Force—and no, refueling won't be a problem.
realizing that if the Multi-Role Fighter (MRF) is to be bought in sufficient numbers to replace early models of the F-16 Fighting Falcon in the mid-1990s, it must purchase some type of variant of the current F-16C/D Block 50.
There is an obvious solution to this dilemma that will benefit both services and the U.S. taxpayer to boot: the Air Force should also buy the F/A-18E/F. When it is fully developed by the mid- 1990s, the improved Hornet will be an extremely capable fighter and could be considered as limited only when compared to such unaffordable airframes as the F-14D Tomcat and F-15E Eagle. While the F/A-18’s second engine makes it somewhat more expensive than the F- • 6, it has some very desirable qualities that the F-16 doesn’t: second engine reliability, a dedicated weapon-system operator for night and adverse weather attacks, and Harpoon and standoff land-attack missile (SLAM) capabilities. Critics of this idea will quickly point out that, while this proposal sounds nice in theory, the lack of Air Force-specific requirements—like a boom refueling receptacle—would require perhaps billions °f dollars in modifications. This type of “problem” is actually an opportunity. Instead of wasting money fitting a boom receptacle onto Air Force F/A-18E/Fs, the Air Force’s KC-135 fleet should be modified by installing drogue refueling pods on their wingtips. The KC-10 was built with a separate drogue unit in its tail and a program is underway to modify all 59 KC-lOs with wingtip drogue units. The technology, therefore, is already on the shelf. This retrofit would triple the number of refueling stations available to the Navy on the 600-plus airframe KC- 135 fleet and ensure that every Air Force tanker could refuel both Air Force and Navy aircraft on the same sortie.
Another criticism is bound to be that buying the Hornet would introduce a new fighter into the Air Force inventory and, thus, increase support costs. However, the Air Force is already supporting a version of the Hornet’s General Electric F404 engine in the F-117. A coordinated Navy- Air Force logistic support would lower per-item unit costs and increase the availability of parts to aircraft maintenance operations. Use of existing Navy depot maintenance and support facilities would greatly reduce both spending on support infrastructure and cut supply problems.
Significant savings would result from purchasing a common airframe because of the cost efficiencies of large, multiyear aircraft buys. If both services insist on developing more advanced versions of existing fighters, billions of dollars will be spent on research and development (R&D) and low-rate production inefficiencies with no subsequent increase in Navy and Air Force combat effectiveness. In the early 1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara faced a similar situation with the Air Force buying the F-105 Thunderchief and the Navy buying the F- 4 Phantom. McNamara’s decision to buy a common fighter—in that case, the Phantom—proved to be one of his better ones. If Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney acts now, the Air Force could still influence the R&D of the F/A-18E/F, posssibly supporting the features that the Navy may not be able to afford. In these days of a rapidly decreasing Soviet threat and the associated public perception in the United States that the services must reorder and rationalize their spending priorities, this is one opportunity that should not be missed. □
“Waging a War to Protect the
Seas”
(See J. W. Kime, pp. 56-59, October 1991 Proceedings)
Fire and Safety Technician First Class
Gerald L. Brooks, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve—Admiral Kime stated, “When prevention fails, response becomes critical.” He cited many recent marine disasters illustrating the need for rapid response— the Argo Merchant, the Exxon Valdez, the American Trader, and the Mega Borg. Unfortunately, disasters such as these undoubtedly will happen again. The most cost-effective way for the Coast Guard to ensure that it has the manpower needed for disaster response is to use Coast Guard Reserve personnel.
To address this issue, Admiral Paul Yost (Coast Guard Commandant before Admiral Kime) changed the port securi- tyman (PS) and fire and safety technician (FS) (formerly FI, firefighter) ratings. The PS rating would concentrate on port security and military readiness. When mobilized, port security units (PSUs) would provide security around ports and ships to prevent sabotage. The fire and safety rating (which never received the support, time, or leadership that it needed to develop) was to concentrate on port safety, environmental protection, and port firefighting.
Although the PSs proved their worth in the Persian Gulf, there is now a proposal to merge the FS and PS ratings.
Instead of abolishing the FS rating, the Coast Guard should use the skills of these personnel to augment its emergency response capability. To become a Coast Guard Reserve FS, a reservist must be a certified firefighter. Firefighters train to respond to pollution and hazardous materials incidents in addition to fighting fires. Beyond technical skills, being firefighters, FS personnel could maintain a more effective liaison with other response agencies.
Instead of turning the FS specialists into generalists, the Coast Guard should form fire and safety units (FSUs) to respond to marine pollution incidents, major-vessel and port fires, and natural disasters. Just as PSUs provide the organizational framework for security and military readiness training and mobilization, FSUs could provide the same framework for training and response to environmental or other marine disasters. To save on administrative costs, the PSUs and FSUs could be combined in a single command.
There is a need for both the military readiness response (as Desert Storm proved) and the environmental and disaster response (as the Commandant’s own examples proved). The success of the PS rating in Desert Storm could be equaled by the FS rating’s in the response to the next Exxon Valdez. □