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MAJGEN 1.1. Hopkins, USMC
General Hopkins commands the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, which provided much of Central Command’s defensive capabilities in the early days of Desert Shield, and later was the Deputy Commander of the IMEF. He also commands the Marine Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California, where many of the Desert Storm Marine Corps units trained before deploying.
Proceedings: When were you alerted?
Hopkins: The brigade was alerted officially to deploy on 8 August 1990, while the Maritime Prepositioning Ships [MPS] got under way on the 7th, and we started working the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). We didn’t have all the ships in the right spots. Only three were at Diego Garcia; one was at Blount Island, Florida, on a maintenance cycle; and one was en route. So we didn’t have our total package. But the Diego Garcia ships got moving.
We worked like hell. We had a problem with the TPFDD right away because it was due to be updated in October. This was August, it hadn’t been reworked for a couple of years, and we had some problems. Everybody wanted to put on more gear than the 250 equivalent airlift sorties allowed. So after my staff came to me and said, “We need a decision. They’re trying to dump everything on,” I said, “If you put something additional on the aircraft, you’ve got to take something off.”
Proceedings: Did you take more tanks on your ships, based on what you thought you would be up against?
Hopkins: No. We had the generic Maritime Prepositioning Force {MPF} equipment package. We couldn’t have changed it anyway. The MPS concept equals the prepositioned ships plus the fly-in echelon. The flexibility is there, though, for new weapon systems like the light armored vehicle [LAV] variants, or new communications gear, and things that haven’t been loaded on the MPS since the last maintenance cycle; those get put on the fly-in echelon.
Proceedings: How was your intelligence support?
Hopkins: One of the failures of the whole damn war was intelligence. I think it was terrible, absolutely terrible. Strategic intelligence, what the Air Force was using in Iraq, that’s something different. But the battlefield intelligence was inadequate. When the battalion commanders and regimental commanders—and I’m getting beyond my portion of it—crossed the line of departure, they didn’t know what was in front of them, and that’s just unconscionable, as far as I’m concerned.
Proceedings: You were the senior Marine commander in the area. Did you have to do most of the liaison with the Saudis? Hopkins: Yes. [Brigadier] General Jim Brabham had served with Central Command on a previous tour and knew the area, so General Boomer sent him over to look at the infrastructure. He went to Riyadh right away and really didn’t have anything to do with the 7th MEB. As soon as we got in we were hunkered down at the port and marrying up our units with the equipment, I focused on the tactical situation.
I conducted visual reconnaissance flights with the helicopters, and went down to talk with Major General Saleh, who was the Saudi Eastern Province Commander. Here we were, all these Americans coming into Saudi Arabia and we needed some decisions: Where we could deploy; what infrastructure could we use; where could we establish live-fire ranges. Those kinds of things.
Rear Admiral Bader was the senior Saudi naval officer in Jubayl, and he had a lot of influence in the local area. I would talk with him. There was a Royal Commission of Jubayl on the ! civilian side of the house which controlled most of the available infrastructure, but we had to get some camps set up to get our Marines out of the port. Our Marines were sitting in these warehouses in 130° temperatures, with no heads or showers. The decision-making system in Saudi Arabia took a long time to get moving. We did the best we could in Jubayl, but the Saudis couldn’t gear up fast enough. With the stench and the heat, it was just tough. We had a good setup at the port facility, but we had to get the troops out to the field for morale and security reasons.
Every day I would go around and see someone from the Royal Commission, or Bader, or I’d go down and see Saleh, and then I’d get in a helicopter and I’d go north to see how the hell we were setting up. We started to break the log jam. We got the ranges, and we got permission to deploy. But it took a lot of time.
Proceedings: Did you have to go immediately into defensive positions?
Hopkins: No. Like everything else, you’ve got to prepare the equipment and do the reconnaissance. While the subordinate units were getting ready, my staff was tying in with Central Command in Riyadh, and I was making liaison with the local authorities, both civilian and military, so we could do what we needed to do.
Proceedings: Were the Saudis defending?
Hopkins: No. They had a couple of trip-wire units deployed to the north, but for all practical purposes, the Saudis hadn’t initiated any defensive plans for the eastern province. I wanted to get a sector assigned to the Marine Corps, get the ranges, and find out what limitations I had. For instance, they didn’t want us to put the tanks and the amtracks [AAVP-7 assault amphibians] through the towns, because they thought we were going to damage the roads and alarm the people. That type of thing.
The 2nd Brigade 82nd Airborne Division was in there. We tied in with them defensively right away.
Proceedings: Did you have liaison teams with the 82nd? Hopkins: Yes. We talked to them daily and figured out how we were going to defend. My mission was to defend as far forward as possible, grind down the Iraqis if they attacked, plus defend the vital areas around Jubayl. We were also supposed to defend Ra’s Tannurah, which is to the south, but that’s too big an area- We just didn’t have the force for it, even though eventually we had 17,000 Marines in the brigade. The Army eventually picked up the mission.
Proceedings: What about the equipment coming off the ships? Hopkins: We had no problems with the offload. The pier facilities and the airheads were great. We started to move the AV-8BS up to the King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station right in back of Jubayl so they would be responsive to the front lines. The F/A'
18s were down at Shaik Isa in Bahrain.
There were only about three or four defensible pieces of terrain between the Kuwaiti border and Jubayl. I went up to Manifa Bay, which is about 70 miles south of the Kuwaiti border. We
the
cement factory. We were going to stay there.
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didn
.. t give us the tankers that we needed to get across the Atlan- c- That was my biggest concern, because basically the concept ails for us to be combat ready in about ten days. We were ready n the ground, with the MEB declared combat ready on 25 Au- but the F/A-18s didn’t arrive until around the 23rd, because ey were delayed. The Air Force was moving its own aircraft, 11 that’s one of the weaknesses of the MPF concept—it’s not
decided to screen there with the light armored vehicles, and then Colonel [now Brigadier General Carlton W.] Fulford could deploy the mechanized units and the greater part of the Regimental Combat Team by the cement factory, which was 40 miles north °f Jubayl and 27 miles or so south of Manifa Bay, where there "'as some relief in the desert. It was the best defensible terrain and Fulford deployed his Regimental Combat Team there.
That was our concept. We would screen as far forward as Possible, delay and attrit the Iraqis with air power, then defend in amain battle area along what became known as “cement ridge.” The Iraqis had two possible attack routes. We thought they’d jhther come down the coast or use a route a little bit to the west, hot both these routes come together at a junction near the cement actory. If they kept coming, we had drawn a line in the sand by
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roceedings: How soon were you ready?
Hopkins: 25 August. We were alerted on 8 August. The ships ®°t there on 16 August. We started bringing in the troops, and we Probably could have been ready a couple of days earlier if the air ad gotten over sooner.
had the attack helicopters, the Hueys, and the transports. "e helicopters were coming in by Air Force C-5s. We had them • They were coming in fine.
But the fixed-wing was stalled at MCAS [Marine Corps Air Ration] Beaufort and at MCAS Cherry Point. The Air Force
The 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade ground combat element—and its helicopters—got to Saudi Arabia on schedule, courtesy of U.S. Air Force C-5s and the Maritime Prepositioning Ships. The Brigade's fixed-wing aircraft, dependent on aerial refueling to get across the Atlantic, took longer because of the competition for scarce tanker aircraft.
tied together at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level. They’ve got to say, “Okay. The ships are gone, but you also have tactical aircraft to deploy.” The aircraft need the same priority as the ground forces, and they didn’t get it.
Proceedings: When did you first get some OV-lOs, either FLIR [forward-looking infrared radarj-capable or for tactical air coordinator (airborne) missions and radio relay?
Hopkins: Not in August. The first OV-lOs arrived in the latter part of September. They self-deployed [via Greenland, Iceland, and down through Europe], The weather affected them. So they didn’t come till later, and that was a mistake.
Colonel Manfred Rietsch, who commanded Marine Aircraft Group 70, had said, “Let’s crane the OV-lOs on board the T- AVBs [the aircraft maintenance ships USNS Wright (T-AVB-3) and the USNS Curtiss (T-AVB-4)].” So I talked to General [Royal] Moore, who commanded the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, and he said, “We’U let them go out with the 5th MEB.” But the 5th MEB didn’t come out for a couple more months.
If we had to do it again, we’d have to get the OV-lOs over earlier. We could see vastness of the desert from the maps, and we knew that the OV-10 was a player. They’re money in the bank. The one time you need them justifies all you have to go through to get them there. The carrier battle groups are always going to be around. But we’ve got to get the OV-lOs in there. It’s tough. I don’t want to belabor this, because it was a hiccup; we were still combat ready. We used the Hueys to make up for it. Proceedings: How did you tie in with the 82nd Airborne? Hopkins: We had daily meetings with the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd, which was also at Jubayl. I asked, “What are you guys going to do?” We divided up the pie and so forth. The 82nd was going to send their antitank [AT] teams out there, with tanks and AT weapons in front to hit them with whatever they’ve got, and then try to delay to Dammam.
Proceedings: The carriers were there early, and the Air Force F-15s came in fairly early; what kind of liaison did you have with the carriers?
Hopkins: We didn’t go directly to the carriers. We went through Central Command and NavCent in Bahrain. Until we got our own aircraft there and we had the self-sufficiency of the Marine air-ground task force, we were mainly tied into the Air Force through CentAF in Riyadh. At that time, remember, the carrier battle groups were not coming up that far north because they didn’t know what the missile and mine threats were. That evolved—they came up later when they knew the missile threat wasn’t there.
Proceedings: How would you have gotten air support if you really needed it?
Hopkins: We would have gone right to the Air Force through our liaison officers with CentAF in Riyadh. We had our own attack helicopters, but every day we were hoping Saddam wouldn’t come down. If he had come down, it might have been a different story in terms of the whole outcome. We would have hunkered down right around Jubayl. Jubayl is the petrochemical capital of Saudi Arabia. All the water that they get in Riyadh comes out of the desalinization plants in Jubayl, so they could have theoretically cut off Riyadh.
We were tied into all the command-and-control systems. We
t*r
Pioneer remotely piloted vehicles (right) worked well in the Gulf War; long hampered by inadequate navigational capabilities, RVPs are here to stay. (Opposite) Marine riflemen had to contend with the powdery Saudi desert. Training before the ground assault emphasized heavy Tiring of individual and crew-served weapons.
didn’t have full Marine air support yet, but we planned to plug in, send a mission, say, “Hey, we need this.” Central Command would have come through for us, and by 23 August Boomer was in Riyadh. I wasn’t worried about getting air support. Proceedings: Did you have any ground-based electronic warfare capability?
Hopkins: No, that was in the follow-on echelon. We didn’t have radio battalion support going in, but we did eventually get that capability.
Proceedings: Where were you getting your battlefield intelligence?
Hopkins: We relied on Central Command pushing it down to us from Riyadh. Talking with General Saleh on a daily basis tied in the Saudi Army side of it, and I would talk with Bader. But their intelligence was poor. We didn’t really have any intelligence except what was coming from Central Command, and it painted an overpowering picture—we were facing 11 Iraqi divisions. But this was from a macro-viewpoint.
Getting back to my earlier comment, intelligence was terrible. Later on after the 7th MEB had been absorbed into I MEF, we were tracking the Iraqi 80th Tank Brigade for months. Because of the T-72 tanks, it was a major threat—but it turned out that this unit wasn’t in our sector after all. It had left Kuwait months before and we didn’t know it. The intelligence was not accurate. They kept on building this guy to be a great fighter, great artillery; they had barriers and mines; they’re going to put oil into these obstacles and light it off—and so forth.
Proceedings: Did you see any prisoners of war before the ground war started?
Hopkins: We never got any POWs until after the war started, and we got them for ourselves. The Saudis had the POWs and wouldn’t let us interrogate them to get the intelligence we needed.
The Saudis picked up defectors. They took prisoners. But for the whole six months of Desert Shield, right until we initiated the attack, the Saudis controlled any defector who came across, and any POWs. At our level, we never knew whether we were getting any of that information.
Proceedings: What took most of your time while you commanded the brigade?
Hopkins: Planning. Conducting liaison. Preparing the defense. How we were to be supported? All those things you need to give the tactical commander exactly what he requires. Making sure the operations order we had was good tactically, that we tied in with the 82nd, that the Saudis knew exactly what we were doing. We worked those issues day in and day out.
Proceedings: The desert has few terrain features—how did that affect you?
Hopkins: We had enough GPS gear as the operation developed. There were a few problems with maps in terms of adequate numbers. Then, of course, when you’re along the coastline it doesn’t present the problem that you would have if you were in the middle of nowhere. We didn’t want for anything logistically. We unloaded those ships; we got the ammunition into our positions; and then we trained as best we could. Colonel Fulford conducted combined arms training, working the artillery and air hard. Proceedings: But until the 25th, were you depending a great deal on air?
Hopkins: Yes. If they had come down on the 25th, of course, we would have had a hasty defense instead of a more deliberate defense. We would have used Air Force air, and kept on unloading the ships, getting stronger each day.
Proceedings: When did you give up the brigade as it was absorbed by I MEF?
Hopkins: Between 3 and 6 September. The 7th MEB command j element and the headquarters were absorbed by the MEF. Proceedings: You run the Marine Corps training at Twentynine Palms in addition to commanding the brigade. Were the troops prepared for what they went up against? Do you plan to change any of the training?
Hopkins: With the commitments the Marine Corps has, every summer we’re rotating about one-third the outfit. We were in the ' middle of that when the call came. Fulford assessed the state of training of his battalions—1/7 [1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regi' ment], 2/7, 3/7, and 3/9. The MEB had been scheduled to go to Turkey on Exercise Display Determination in September, and I used the cover of that exercise to get moving a little bit, because even before we were officially notified on 8 August, I thought maybe we would be involved.
We used a little operational security to good effect. On the West Coast, everybody said, “Hey, they’re going out of the 1st Marine Division.” Nobody said anything about Twentynine Palms. So it was a good thing. We got out of town without a lot of publicity. We set up an eight-day program—a minimum program—and a 14-day program, because when you deploy in echelon, you don’t all go at the same time. Whatever training units needed, they got. We went 24-hours-a-day; we worked the Combined Arms Staff Trainer (CAST), command and control, and battalion and regimental operations.
The 7th Marines were at Twentynine Palms and 3/9 was on its way up to Canada to work with the Princess Guards. We brought them back. That was Fulford’s best-trained battalion because i1 had been together the longest.
Proceedings: Was 3/9 ticketed to go originally?
Hopkins: No, but we brought four battalions over. It happened that we had the lift for four battalions instead of what we’d call 3 troop lift for three, so we had four battalions. We constituted one of the battalions as a reserve, but that came later.
Here is how it all evolved. One of the 7th’s battalions—3/7-—^ was on unit deployment, but 1/5 had just come back from Pam ama, so Fulford asked for 1/5 and Major General [John P-) Monahan [then commanding the 1st Marine Division] said* “Fine. Take 1/5.” Remember, we still didn’t know if 3/9 was going to be turned around. So we had 1/7, 2/7, and 1/5. Then as we started working the TPFDD, and because Fulford wanted 10 take as much as we could, he asked Division to turn around 3/9' and we got them. So the final bag was 1/7, 2/7, 1/5, and 3/9-
We worked all the staffs in CAST. We realized we could no1 do a standard combined arms exercise but we’ve got a mobile assault course that ties in artillery on a company level. So we said, “Let’s get everybody on the mobile assault course that we can, tanks, amtracks, LAVs, and then we’ll work the infantry guys, zero their battle-sights, put them on the weapons ranges, and do as much of that as we can.” That’s exactly what we did.
I think that was a dynamite program. I think it raised the level of confidence and maximized the opportunity that we had. The units that were going to flow first in the air lift went out to the field first. As the time-phased deployment unfolded, each one of the battalions got maximum opportunity to train before leaving. Proceedings: People may forget now about the chemical threat because it didn’t materialize. Did you have all your gear at the time?
Hopkins: We took everything we had. The intelligence guys knew the Iraqis had a hell of an NBC [nuclear, biological, and chemical] capability, so we brought all the gas masks, all the MOPP [mission-oriented protective posture] gear. The British §ear came later. We got anything we asked for. The Marine Corps turned to; DoD turned to; the industrial complex turned to. Proceedings: Are you emphasizing anything different in training Jow that you’re back?
Hopkins: They caught us short in our mine-clearing capability, because we hadn’t worked with that. The Army’s National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, went to battle stations, came up with some video tapes, brought them on over, and we w°rked that. But we started from ground zero in building up, Setting equipment.
roceedings: How did your equipment hold up over there— jjjnks, LAVs?
Hopkins: Terrific. People ask me, “Are these kids—or the officers—any better than they were ten years ago?” I say, “Marines always Marines, but there is a big difference between us and years ago, and that’s the weapon systems we have.” All our "'capon systems worked perfectly. The only real glitch we had "'as the line charges we used to blow breaching paths through the jj*lne fields; we had only about a 50-60% success rate. We just °ubled up whatever our requirement was to do that, and we had 0rne teams come on over and work on it. But that’s basically the pn|y thing that caused us any problems. r°ceedings: Did you have enough night-vision capability?
Hopkins: Not initially for everyone, but enough for the forward units. Eventually, we had plenty. That was one of the imbalances that cost the Iraqis. It was just dynamite. With the M60, we were taking T-72s out at 3,000 meters, using our night vision stuff. We used it and optimized it.
Proceedings: Did the 7th MEB have M60 tanks on the ships? Hopkins: Yes. A lot of people said, “How can you go up against a T-72?” Well, take [Lieutenant Colonel Alphonso] Buster Diggs, who commanded the 3d Tank Battalion. When this thing came down, I called him in and asked, “What do we have to do?” He said, “The only thing we’ve got to do is when they come, we’ve got to close with them right away and take away the advantage they have of outgunning us. In close, we’ll have more maneuverability, we’ll have the sabot round, and we’ll cause some problems.” And he was right, absolutely right. During Desert Storm we were taking out the T-72s with M60s firing sabot rounds because we got in close.
Proceedings: You’ve also got remotely piloted vehicles [RPVs]. Did you take the Pioneers?
Hopkins: We had one company in the fly-in echelon of the brigade. Initially there were some problems but then they were worked out. They did a hell of a job. We used them for battlefield surveillance, for adjusting artillery. The RPVs are here to stay.
Proceedings: Do you have any strong feelings about whether some of them should stay with the division, some belong to the wing, who should own them?
Hopkins: No. That was a turf battle at first. They should either be owned by the division, and used by the surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence guys; and by the artillery—or the assets should be pooled under the MEF. We’ve got to resolve that. The aviators wanted to control the RPVs to preclude any chance for midair collisions, but that’s not a problem. The RPVs have to be out in front of a tactical commander, although you could use it for rear area security.
Proceedings: Did you have any communications problems? Hopkins: We used multi-channel and TacSat, but don’t forget, we weren’t that far out. The regiment was outside of Jubayl and we could still communicate with the LAVs that were forward, so the distances were okay.
Proceedings: Did you use an LAV for a command post? Hopkins: No. My command post was not that far from the units. The command and control could still go from Jubayl. Proceedings: Did you use commercial telephones much? Hopkins: Absolutely. The reason for that is that whether people realize it or not, Saudi Arabia has the best telecommunications system in the whole world. Remember, the Iraqis weren’t trying to take all that stuff out, so we used any means available while we established redundancy in our communication. Then as the units kept on flowing in, we got more communications gear, and it worked out.
Proceedings: Did the troops initially stay in the lines for a long time before anybody got to stand down?
Hopkins: Yes, they did, but their adrenalin was pumping—later on it was motivation that kept them going. We moved right to the field. General Boomer made a conscious decision that we would not have any built-up areas like those we had in Vietnam. We were going bare-boned. You put a camouflage net over somebody and it drops the temperature about ten degrees. We had to get them acclimatized as soon as we could, and the only way to do that was to put them in the field. Three or four weeks after we got there, they’d be down to their tee-shirts. These Marines really looked good. Then we just started training, training, and more training. Eventually we set up a rotation system from the field to Jubayl for some rest and relaxation.
Proceedings: Did individual weapons hold up in the sand?
The Marine Corps wheeled light armored vehicles (LAVs) in the light armored infantry (LAI) battalions gave infantry units the mobility they needed in the vast spaces of the desert, as U.S. and Saudi Marines trained together in preparation for combat operations.
Hopkins: Absolutely. We were cleaning the weapons twice, three times a day. Sand storms would come up and the Marines would be doubly careful. But we didn’t have any problems like the ones we had in Vietnam, many of which were caused by improper care.
Proceedings: How did the LAVs hold up?
Hopkins: Remember that the Marine Corps and the Army went together on the LAV and then they left us. This is General [Alfred M.] Gray’s initiative. One of the things in combined arms, and one of the things in the desert, is mobility. You can’t walk. You’ve got to have mobility. The LAV is a dynamic weapon, and that includes the TOW and mortar variants. The 25-mm. chain gun was deadly. The LAV held up. It could go 30-40 miles per hour across the desert floor. We used it when we were determining where we were going to breach and before G-Day, we used the LAV to run up and down the border of Kuwait to confuse the Iraqis on where our penetration was going. Proceedings: Are you referring here to deception operations such as Troy?
Hopkins: Yes. [Brigadier General] Tom Draude ran that, and the LAV was a big player. The tires held up, everything worked. Proceedings: Did you have any tank transporters?
Hopkins: No, our tanks went on their own tracks, or we got host-nation support. We did do that. Or you borrow them from the Army, once they are established.
Proceedings: What is the 7th MEB story?
Hopkins: I’m very proud of what happened. Since the Iran affair with the hostages, a lot of people in the Carter administration, the Marine Corps, and the Navy, invested in the MPS concept; it went like clockwork. We were the only service that had any initial sustainability. We could have fought on 25 August and sustained ourselves, but everyone else had to wait about six months for the buildup.
The Army moved all its combat service support into the reserves. In contrast, we were feeding hot meals in the mess hall within 16 days, before the MEF arrived. We had kept our field
messes, had brought them with us, and had the capability to serve cooked Bravo [canned] rations augmented by some fresh food that came in from the infrastructure.
The secret of the MPS concept, of course, is exercises. When I came aboard in 1989, a year before, we took four ships and went to Exercise Thalay Thai. I had the same Colonel Powell who commanded the Brigade Service Support Group; I had Colonel Fulford with the ground combat arm. The only officer I didn’t have was the MAG-70 commander. Colonel Fratarangelo, who was transferred to Central Command; Colonel Rietsch took his place.
At Thalay Thai my staff and those commanders did a two-ship offload in a worst-case basis—6,000 meters off the beach—by ferrying everything. People knew each other, and they knew me-
The secret is employment. Pre-deployment or deployment, we’re going to get there—but then some people lose track. The real question is what are you going to do when you get there? Are you going to be combat effective? Do you know how to do these things? I’ve always tried for balance. The deployment mode is important. We’ve got to meet Transportation Command’s requirements. But what we get paid for by the American people, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief, and the JCS, is employment. That’s always my thing.
I believe that a lack of human intelligence regarding Iraq and its capabilities, (remember that Humint [human intelligence] was drastically cut at the national level in the 1970s), put us at the mercy of the National systems. These photographic systems can’t tell you enemy intentions, although they can do other things well. The intelligence information flow was terrible. V't’ had to send guys back to Washington to get photos three day5 1 before we went into the minefields.
We got terrific cooperation from the Saudis. In any kind ot operation like this, you’re going to have to spend a lot of tim6 with the host country. In this case, the host country is very sophisticated and you’re the outsider, just walking in there. Vo11 have to do the right thing. It all worked out.