This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
By Captain Carlton W. Meyer, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
The Marine Corps has it all: tanks, fighter aircraft, and construction battalions. The other services also have much of the same equipment, performing many of the same tasks. The Corps can shrink by eliminating some of this duplication, and still preserve its core capabilities.
Congress provides the Marine Corps with more than $9 billion annually and expects a combat-ready reaction force, not a list of unresolved problems. The Army has plans to cut divisions, the Air Force has plans to cut aircraft wings, the Navy has plans to cut ships . . . and the Marine Corps?
If the Marine Corps decided to eliminate all of its infantry battalions, it would still fall short of the required cuts. This option of cutting the core of the Corps is not feasible, but no other Marine Corps component is invulnerable. Hard decisions must be made now to ensure a combat- ready Corps of Marines into the next century.
Congress has agreed that the post-Cold War world requires smaller reductions in the Marine Corps than in the Army and Air Force. Nevertheless, the Marine Corps is expected to downsize and modify operational plans to include participation by the other services. Otherwise, Congress is likely to get involved in the process. We can prevent this interference by identifying any supporting elements within the Corps whose mission can be performed by another service. In his 1991 annual report to Congress, General A. M. Gray stated:
“As we debate our future force structure requirements, we should remember that the unique missions and functional capabilities of the services are designed specifically to be complementary, enabling, and enhancing. Used together, they provide us the means to generate rapidly whatever combat power is needed for the mission at hand.”
Many Marines like to believe that the Marine Corps is a self-contained fighting force. This is entirely false. The Navy procures all Marine Corps aircraft and provides a supply system for their support. Marines rely on the Navy for almost all aviation-related schools and depend on the Navy for sea transport and the Air Force for air transport. Navy beach groups, naval gunfire, and carrier air power make amphibious assaults possible. On land, Navy Sea- bees are required to construct permanent facilities, hard- surface roads, and airfields. Most obvious is the Marines’ reliance on the Navy for medical and dental services—to the extent of Navy corpsmen serving in infantry squads.
This dependence, far from weakening the Marine Corps, precludes a duplication of effort—which exists in many other supporting elements of the armed services. We must now take a hard look at ourselves to identify additional support that other services might provide.
Such an effort will never begin in earnest until specific proposals are presented that challenge the conventional wisdom. Therefore, a mission-elimination candidate from each of the Marine Corps air-ground task-force elements is proposed here.
Ground Combat Element
- Mission duplicated: tank support
- Units deleted: 2 active tank battalions + 2 reserves
- Other benefits: major procurement savings
- Mission support provided by: Army tank battalions
- Compensation available: M-1A1 tanks, facilities, rapid deployment
In recent years, the value of tanks has become a controversial issue in the Marine Corps. Tanks are expensive to procure, operate, and maintain. Training with them is dangerous and expensive; they are heavy and cannot be carried by helicopters, and only with great difficulty by air transport. They consume tremendous fuel, tear up roads, and require heavy bridges. Certain types of terrain restrict their mobility. Eliminating tank battalions from the Marine Corps would relieve many burdens, and their direct fire support could be provided by light-armored vehicles and helicopters.
On the other hand, heavily armored tanks can provide a tremendous edge in many aspects of warfare. Fortunately the U.S. Army is leaving Europe and is searching for neW methods to deploy its armor. The Army would no doubt be
agreeable to permanently assigning a tank battalion to each Marine division for direct support. This type of coordination was common in the Pacific theater during World War II, and more recently an entire Army armored brigade Was assigned to support Marine forces during Operation Desert Storm.
The Army should agree to a 100% manning level for its “first to fight” forward-deployed tank units. The Marine Corps could give its new M-1A1 tanks to the Army and [ Provide facilities at Marine Corps bases for the Army tank battalions. The anti-tank company in each Marine Corps tank battalion could be placed in the artillery regiment or divided among the infantry regiments. The Marine Corps ",ould accrue large savings in manpower, procurement, training, and maintenance costs. A closer association with the Army would provide Marines with more knowledge of Army operations, and soldiers would gain a better understanding of the Marine Corps and amphibious warfare. This integration would result in greater respect and trust between both services.
Air Combat Element'. __________________
^ Mission duplicated: air superiority/deep air strikes * Units deleted: 13 VMFA (F/A-18) squadrons + 5 reserve
^ Other benefits: base closure at Marine Corps Air Station ^MCAS) Beaufort, SC
£ Mission support provided by: U.S. Navy/U.S. Air Porce
^ Compensation available: almost 200 F/A-18s for the Navy
The F/A-18s of fixed-wing Marine fighter attack WMFA) squadrons are painted Navy gray without any Marine Corps green. This is because they cannot operate 0rWard with other Marine combat units. Efforts are under Way to forward-base F/A-18s on airfields as short as 2,000
feet. This effort will require more manpower, money, equipment, and training in a time of cutbacks; such airfields may not be available in the area of operations.
In view of potential adversaries today, the need of Marine fighter aircraft seems questionable. At-sea Navy aircraft carriers can quickly establish air superiority over coastal areas. On the ground, the Air Force dominates the assignment of main air bases. At the beginning of Desert Shield, the Air Force’s 1st Tactical Fighter Wing was deployed and operational within 14 hours. The Air Force and Navy are fully involved in fighter missions; the Marine Corps cannot justify duplicating this role.
It is difficult to envision a conflict where the Marine Corps will fight without overall air-space control by another service. This is more a factor of technology than interservice politics. The great range of today’s jet aircraft makes air control a theater-wide problem. The Air Force AWACS and the Navy Hawkeye aircraft will control the air war and use any available aircraft to accomplish objectives set by the theater or fleet commander.
Centralized air control proved successful in operation Desert Storm and is now considered a standard procedure in joint operations. Multi-purpose F/A-18s will often be tasked to support Navy or Air Force missions with deep air strikes, fighter escort and continuous air patrol. Therefore, the Marine Corps should eliminate its VMFA squadrons and concentrate its efforts on close air support.
Many joint-service merger advocates have long sought a total elimination of Marine Corps fixed-wing aircraft. The F/A-18 allows them to make a good case. However, if the Marine Corps moves first and unilaterally eliminates its VMFA squadrons, the important close air support mission can be protected. AV-8B Harrier vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft are unique to the Marine Corps. They are less likely to be tasked by a theater air commander because they will be forward-deployed with Marines and are considered exclusively ground-
By cutting out its F/A-18 squadrons, the Corps can hang on to its AV-8B Harriers and their vital close air support capability. This would lead to the closure or rearrangement of several Marine Corps air stations, while providing the Navy with much-needed aircraft.
attack aircraft. Although these aircraft are proven fighters, the skepticism of traditional jet pilots should prevent their employment outside the ground-attack role.
Some Marines may believe that this will result in far fewer aircraft available for close air support than in the past. This is incorrect. Since the Korean War the air combat element has grown tremendously. Attack helicopters are now available to provide instant firepower. Modern jet aircraft can carry much more ordnance than in the past. Advances in maintainability allow more than twice the
ready rates of Vietnam-era squadrons.
As a result, the Marine Corps available air power has grown exponentially since Korea. And since the Harrier can operate closer to the action, many experts (including General A. M. Gray) believe that Harrier squadrons will perform double the sortie rate of other attack aircraft. This is good news to the Marine infantryman, but it appears
Our Enlistment Regs Need Changes
By Captain L. A. Mcllvene, U.S. Marine Corps
With the reduction in force that was ordered by Congress before the Iraqi war began, the Marine Corps has the opportunity to tighten its enlistment standards. This would ensure the entrance of higher quality young men and women into our ranks. Changes in pre-enlistment standards would help to achieve this goal.
Currently, virtually all preservice drug use is waiverable.
In fact, incidents of experimentation with marijuana up to 150 times can be waived at the recruiting-station level. The use of more dangerous drugs such as cocaine, LSD, and amphetamines is also waiverable; anyone who has used hallucinogens must wait one year before being eligible to enlist. Limited drug use while in the delayed-entry program is also waiverable.
Since drug abuse is widespread among the enlistable age group, not all young men and women who experiment with drugs should be excluded from military service. The reasons for their drug use include youthful curiosity and peer pressure. But extended use of even the most harmless drugs, or limited use of the more dangerous ones, may be evidence of a serious problem and should be a disqualifying factor for service in the Marine Corps. Smoking marijuana 150 times goes beyond simple experimentation and enters the classification of dependence. It also shows a flagrant lack of respect for the law. Any use of highly dangerous drugs, such as LSD, crack, and methamphetamines, constitutes a clear danger to the individual and is evidence of a severe lack of self-respect. The regulations on pre-service drug use should be changed to exclude habitual users of less- harmful drugs and repeat users of highly dangerous drugs.
A waiting period of three to six months should be imposed between the last use of any illegal drug, including marijuana, and the date of enlistment. Any use of an extremely dangerous drug should require at least a one-year waiting period, and use of any hallucinogen should result in automatic disqualification from military service except in exceptional cases. The use of any illegal drug while in the delayed-entry program should mean automatic discharge with no chance of reenlistment. In recent years the Marine Corps has made great strides in the eradication of drug use among its ranks. These changes would take that eradication process a step further, by ensuring that the young men and women who enlisted in the Marine Corps would be relatively drug free. They also would already understand the high level of importance that the Marine Corps places on solving this problem.
As for problems with the police, under current regulations, up to six misdemeanors can be waived at the recruiting-station level. More than six misdemeanors or one felony can be waived by the commanding general of the recruiting region; two or more felonies must be waived by Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. There is a mandatory waiting period of three months from the final action of a felony conviction until an applicant is eligible for enlistment.
In times past, the military has had the reputation of being a last resort for criminals and the unemployable. We have come a long way in changing this perception, but we still hear the
1991
that the balanced combined-arms team has tilted too far toward air support, especially in light of the support available from the Navy and Air Force. As the Corps plans for reductions, it cannot maintain its large air-combat element at the expense of its traditional infantry force.
By dropping the F/A-18s, Marine aircraft will not be subject to the Navy’s allocation of aircraft carrier space or the theater air commander’s assignment of main air bases. Several ground-support squadrons can be eliminated and all others reduced in size. More funds and manpower would be available to focus on Harrier jump jets and expanding their capabilities. Operating closer to the ground- combat element, Harriers equipped with reconnaissance pods could provide more timely information than F/A-18s. Wing service support squadrons could concentrate on V/STOL pads and employment of short-takeoff ski jumps.
Higher manning levels would become possible throughout Marine Corps aviation, resulting in fewer accidents and better retention of expensive aviation-trained Marines. Finally, the nagging problem of shortages of fixed-wing pilots would be reduced.
The elimination of VMFA squadrons and their supporting elements would allow the closure of MCAS Beaufort, South Carolina. A new helicopter facility at MCB 29 Palms California would no longer be needed as a result of the closure of MCAS Tustin, California. Since MCAS El Toro would lose several VMFA squadrons, it could accommodate the helicopter squadrons destined for Twenty nine Palms. These steps would save even more money and manpower while satisfying future demands for base closings.
The Marine F/A-18s would be a windfall for the U.S.
Captain Mcllvene is the operations officer of the Chicago recruiting station. Previous assignments include 2d platoon commander and executive officer, Company I, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines.
should be ineligible for enlistment into the Marine Corps except for the most unusual cases—and then only with the approval of Headquarters, Marine Corps. This is not a proposal to eradicate married personnel from the Marine Corps or to deny Marines the right to get married while on active duty.
But too often young men with the responsibility of a wife and child look upon the military as a last resort in trying to provide for their family. They see only the steady income, base housing, and medical care. These individuals do not place their duties as Marines in their top priority, and all Marines must realize that the needs of the Corps are paramount. For the good of the service, the enlistment regulations should be changed to relieve that burden.
These proposed changes would be one way to increase the quality of the Corps' enlisted Marines. With the projected force reductions in the coming years and the renewed public confidence in the military, the Marine Corps is in a perfect position to implement the changes with minimal impact on the recruiting service.
A young Marine with a wife and child simply cannot support his family on his income as a private first class or a lance corporal, particularly if he is stationed in a high-cost area such as Washington, D.C., Southern California, or Hawaii. Many young Marines are too immature or naive to realize this at the time of their enlistment. For most of the 18- or 19-year-old enlistees, the initial pay they will be receiving—although small—is more money than they have ever earned before, but they still have no concept of the high cost of supporting a wife and child in an area far from home and family.
This not only presents a difficulty for the individual, it also creates problems for his command. Financial irresponsibility, domestic problems, and lower morale are all problems that must be dealt with by the commanding officer, thereby putting a burden on the entire unit.
Also, a Marine receives extra pay for housing and subsistence whether his wife and child live with him or not. Over the entire spectrum of the Marine Corps, these extra allowances can run into millions of dollars annually. In this time of record deficits and shrinking military budgets, this is an extra cost that the Marine Corps does not need to incur, if it can be avoided.
An individual with dependents
classic story of a judge giving a lawbreaker the choice between military service and jail.
Several changes are needed to the regulations concerning adverse police involvement. Three misdemeanors should be ample evidence that an individual’s record needs to be screened by a higher authority. Any felony conviction should require one to two years from the time of final judicial action until the applicant could be eligible for enlistment. The Marine Corps needs to know that the enlistee is not a habitual criminal; a three-month exhibition of good intentions is not enough. A second felony conviction should be an automatic disqualifying factor, without exception. Anyone who cannot learn to obey the laws after a felony conviction is too untrustworthy to be admitted into the Marine Corps.
. A third area that needs change *s the dependent status of prospective enlistees. Under current fegulations an individual with a spouse does not require a waiver t° enter the Marine Corps. An aPplicant who has an illegitimate ehild and is not paying child Support must receive a waiver from the commanding officer of the recruiting district. An appliCant who is paying child support 0r who is married and has a child must receive a waiver from the commanding general of the rgcruiting region.
Marine engineer support battalions should be eliminated and replaced by Navy engineer units. Navy Seabees (here, in Saudi Arabia) should become part of each Marine Corps force service support group.
Navy. Since the A-12 attack aircraft project was canceled, the Navy’s number-one problem has been finding an aircraft to fill the role of the aging A-6s until another aircraft is developed. The transfer of almost 200 Marine F/A-18s to the Navy would provide an immediate solution.
Combat Service Support Element:
- Mission duplicated: construction
- Units deleted: 3 engineer support battalions + 1 reserve
- Other benefits: better focus on combat engineer mission
- Mission support provided by: U.S. Navy construction battalions
- Compensation available: rapid deployment, facilities
The Vietnam conflict resulted in an expansion of Marine Corps engineer roles well beyond combat engineering. Marine engineers grew to support the employment of Marines as a land army rather than a light seaborne force. The heavy demand for base camp support, bunker construction, and bridging and road maintenance resulted in an expansion of the role of Marine engineers toward civil engineering. Engineer support battalions (ESB) were formed and became the largest battalions in the Marine Corps in both manpower and equipment—meaning they were expensive and heavy.
Such engineer battalions should be eliminated, and their mission fulfilled by Navy engineer units. It is normal for Marine forces to be assigned Navy mobile construction battalions (MCBs or Seabees) during wartime. Four were assigned to the Marines during Desert Shield/Storm. Unfortunately, none achieved full strength until one month after the Marines arrived. For rapid deployment, Navy Seabees should be integrated into the peacetime Marine Corps combat service support structure.
The mission of the two bulk-fuel companies currently found in the ESBs (one cadre) could be transferred to the landing support battalion (LSB). At one time bulk fuel was logically located in LSB, since it involves the offloading of fuel from Navy ships into large bladders ashore. Locating bulk fuel with the engineers is practical only in a base-camp environment. The small bridge company could be moved to the motor transport battalion. This may seem odd, but the employment of prefabricated bridges is much more a transportation challenge than a construction task. With the addition of the Seabees, each Marine Corps force service support group would include three Navy battalions (medical, dental, and construction), along with five Marine battalions.
The Seabees should be supportive of this move to return them to the task for which they were created, and it would allow them to deploy more rapidly with Marines on prepositioned and amphibious ships. But the Corps will need to work out a forward-deployment plan with the Navy. The effect on the Navy’s manpower reductions and the current
MCB unit rotation plan will need to be considered.
Fighting without engineer support battalions is not an unproven idea. In World War II, each Marine Division was supported by a combat engineer battalion, a pioneer battalion (now called a landing-support battalion), and a naval construction (Seabee) battalion. There were no ESBs.
With a decreased emphasis on construction, Marine engineers could concentrate on training and procurement for combat engineer missions. During Desert Shield, generals recognized that Marine engineers lacked specialized equipment such as armored vehicles and modern obstacle- breaching weaponry. Without the distraction of the construction mission and the need to carry associated equipment, Marine engineers could focus on requirements to support combat operations. The Seabees would also become more effective once they were integrated into the Marine Corps total combat service support structure; it would allow them to identify requirements sooner and to coordinate better additional support from fleet naval construction forces.
More in-depth analysis may reveal better candidates for elimination than these three. No matter which missions are deleted, the decision will be controversial. Many Marines who decry the special-interest groups in Washington and petty turf battles among the armed services will see that no organization is purely altruistic. Eliminating missions would disrupt the careers of some Marines, but these are the issues Congress expects the professionals in the U.S. armed forces to resolve.
If the Marine Corps displays the professionalism to lead in the elimination of overlapping functions, it will earn great respect from Congress, which in turn will lead to greater cooperation. Congress will be more likely to accept arguments that our nation needs to keep its first-to- fight units fully manned. And if the Corps’ number of missions are reduced, our high standards will be more attainable.
By acting to reduce supporting missions that can be provided by another armed service, the Marine Corps can stick to its most traditional roles and missions, fully preserving the core of the Corps. Those who are quick to criticize the missions proposed for deletion here should also be quick to propose alternatives.
Captain Meyer is an Individual Ready Reservist and a frequent contributor to military publications. He is a Marine Corps engineer officer. He is currently an economist for the state of Texas, involved in research along the Mexican border.