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RADM E. J. Hogan, Jrv USN (Ret.)
The New World Order—whatever it implies for military strategy and required forces—is going to mandate an affordable and relevant integration of the nation’s sea-based projection forces: a real and robust Navy-Marine Corps team.
If the naval services do not make their own case, then they will become an underwater coast guard, and the projected global reach and stealthiness of our land-based forces will receive the lion’s share of future defense budgets. In that case, we had better hope that stealth can provide the invisibility, survivability, and punch that its proponents forecast; it had better be able to deliver the equivalent of Lamont Cranston’s (“The Shadow” of radio-serial days) surreal ability “to cloud men’s minds.” If it does not, the guys in the platforms are going to be grapes for a tough and seasoned adversary, whoever it may be.
To provide the impetus for the establishment of an integrated Navy-Marine Corps team, two major initiatives must be undertaken at the top level:
^The mission of sea-based projection forces must be redefined to reflect the new environment.
►The team must be restructured to match mission with capability at an affordable level. The Title-10 pontificating and the silent service stonewalling aren’t going to cut it.
The naval services need a new story line, a new transmission service free of static, and credible, assertive messengers with relevant, compelling—and most important—understandable justification arguments. This is a time of dramatic change, and the nation’s citizens must understand that our maritime origins and imperatives will still be relevant in the 21st century.
I do not suggest that the strategic-deterrence and sea-control missions and the concomitant need to keep the sea lines of communication open will disappear; they will not, and the capability to dominate the deep-blue-water environment will persist. But the size and structure of the naval services will be determined principally by the contribution that sea-based projection forces can make at the margin. We must define the appropriate balance between sea- and land-based forces in the unstable and volatile world we will contend with for the foreseeable future.
If we allow to go unchallenged the emerging illusion that invisible, long-range air power—alone—will provide sufficient crisis management, presence, deterrence, and punch to the power- Projection job, and that air power can provide worldwide contingency response from the continental United States, then there "'ill be very little need for sea bases and the U.S. Navy will be very small indeed. We must articulate the balance between land- and sea-based assets that can best meet our base-force requirements at realistic and affordable levels—and we must make the strongest case for it.
The first step is to recognize the requirement to integrate sea- based tactical aviation. We can no longer afford to maintain two Separate inventories: one for our blue-suited carrier battle group t^ck spots and another for our green-suited, land-based tactical aviation augmentation wings, both carrier-suitable because of bhlhooks or short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) capabilities.
Naval aviation in the broadest sense must be rationalized and ’megrated so that its component tactical aviation power-projec- bon requirements are matched by affordable and relevant capability and inventory. The mission of sea-based and land-based tactical aviation must reflect the expected contingency-response and campaign requirements to establish air supremacy. Only by defeating quickly the enemy’s counter-air capability can the full weight of airborne striking power be shifted to supporting Army or Marine Corps troops in the land battle as defined by our strategic objectives. Our technology must be realistically applied—low observables, precision-guided munitions, etc.—and combined with the prerequisite weight of effort to get the job done. It must be a combined-arms approach.
The next step is to define the integrated capability required to meet the rationalized, sea-based tactical aviation mission, i.e., an affordable mix of top-line, high-technology, stealthy, expensive platforms and lower-cost, high-performance, serious-pay
load carriers to provide the weight of effort once air supremacy is established. The key is to optimize at the top level on the carrier decks rather than at the unit level so that the available deck spots provide the best mission match. We probably should opt for multi-role capability at both ends and a 25% top-line inventory, e.g., a 60-plane tactical aviation deck load would have 15 advanced tactical fighter/advanced tactical aircraft equivalents and 45 lower-cost haulers.
This approach will allow us to maintain a surveillance and antisubmarine warfare capability as necessary on the remaining carrier deck spots, and the appropriate lift and direct-support aircraft on the aviation-capable amphibious ships within affordability boundaries. The team concept is a prerequisite if solvency in the Navy’s aircraft-procurement account is to be accommodated; if it is ignored, we can kiss the carriers good-bye and shift Marine aviation to light-blue suits (and no tailhooks.)
Other initiatives should be pursued, but, if we can’t get the long-standing Navy-Marine Corps naval aviation team restructured to meet new missions within budget constraints, Lamont Cranston may have to carry the ball in the 21st century.
Admiral Hogan commanded the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63), VF-92, and the Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, Maryland. He was the Navy's Chief of Legislative Affairs when he retired in 1987.
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Proceedings / November 1991