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By Lieutenant Commander Christopher A. Abel, U.S. Coast Guard
Small navies could be lured into shoal Waters at full throttle by the dash and dazzle of high-speed patrol craft like this German schnellboot—designed primarily to take on larger warships and survive—when they really need to buy something stodgier for law-enforcement and internal-security missions.
Today's small navies lace hard choices as they contemplate their future. The stakes are high and the margin for error is increasingly slim. Geopolitical standing, war-fighting technology, and peacetime naval missions are all changing greatly. The world is in (lux, and the best course to follow is no longer clear. For small naval forces, false economizing options muddle this confused planning milieu even further. Many tempting alternatives now promise more than they can ever deliver. A navy pinching pennies is ripe for seduction; the lure of a bargain can turn its head. But tleets built on the cheap are embarked on a shortcut to naval disaster. Strategic snake oil—however it’s bottled—is always a poison and never a tonic. The smart planners turn a deal ear to these new sirens' songs.
All leaders must first understand their objective before they can choose a safe course. A small navy s planners must know what it is that their fleet has to do. This step is estential and invariably unique; no two forces face an identical challenge. However, small navies share a core bi ndle of common roles, missions, and functions.
Tomorrow’s small fleets will remain tightly focused on m ssions performed fairly close to shore. Unlike their la gc brethren, small navies work in their own coastal “backyards.” Their primary missions are law enforce- ;nt and internal security—combating smugglers and terrorists and supporting the army in its operations. Small [fleets will protect offshore natural resources and police exclusive economic zones in that role. They .will aid distressed mariners and others in peril ashore and afloat. Combat operations
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should employ big-fleet platforms, equipment, or tactics that do not make good sense. Enhancing small navy functions must become the touchstone of every planning course. Options that fail this test are foolish and are best left behind. This process involves more than dollars and cents. Opportunity costs convert waste into danger. Squandered effort eventually translates into a loss of proficiency. All navies must keep their war-fighting skills sharp, but small fleets have to do so without losing sight of the much broader purpose they serve and their need to maintain a fine balance. There are five siren songs in particular that small navies should avoid.
The Wrong Equipment
will be limited to sea-denial missions, commerce protection, and raiding. Although rare, naval engagements will be against large navy ships. The prospect of fighting another small navy in actions at sea is remote. Each will avoid battling its opposite number as long as it can. As it is, any warfare assignment will account for only a fraction of time. Most efforts inevitably will relate to peacetime coast guard and security chores.
We should not ignore nor can we diminish this functional distinction between large and small navies. The latter are not just a bantamweight version of their mightier kin. Large navies are built for blue-water engagements, power projection, and distant naval presence assignments. Small navies will rarely, if ever, undertake such traditional tasks. Small fleets must reflect their own small navy missions—in training, doctrine, and hardware. None
Today’s international market is awash in a flood of big- league systems being offered for a song. A worldwide naval fire sale has become one of the Cold War’s legacies. The Americans are unloading massive stocks of surplus gear. New hardware also has been marked down in a manufacturers’ bid for new business. Many of these bargains seem attractive, yet most are bad buys in the end. Superpower discards are a telling case in point. Few are well- suited to small navy missions, having been designed solely for large navy work. What’s more, one navy’s junk may be another fleet’s treasure, but more often than not junk is junk anywhere. The price may be right, but the hardware is dated. Likewise, new equipment is never worth having when one needs apples but buys oranges- Suppliers must sell what they have irrespective of their customers’ needs. No matter how tempting the price or the terms, no fleet can afford to buy gear it cannot use. Small navies that purchase the wrong products are setting themselves up for a fall.
More Dazzle than Substance
This temptation is even riskier than the first. It offers the illusion of credible power. This option pays homage to hardware and little attention to people. No matter how impressive the system or platform, it never will be more than just wiring and steel unless it is placed in the hands of a sailor who knows how to use it. Even then, high-tech gear is still useless without a support scheme to ensure that it works. The most dangerous weapons are those that cannot function but look like they will. The problem, of course, is that navies are symbols, and state-of-the-art gear casts a shadow much longer than the run-of-the-mill- Moreover, those things that do not add to the picture—■ such as esprit and training or a bin of spare parts—are largely irrelevant when Goal One is impressing the folks down the road. The developing world’s navies are most prone to this danger of fielding forces built more on dazzle than substance, yet no fleet is immune from the risk of assembling its own smoke and mirrors. Today’s naval systems are finely honed tools that only skilled craftsmen can use to effect. A well-balanced navy makes sure that its tools and its artisans match.
One system in particular that deserves special mention is the modem fast-attack boat with precision-guided weapons. Neither the platforms nor munitions deserve to be the mainstays of small-navy fleets. These boats are usually single-mission assets designed to sink a larger warship- Their size and armament make them useless for much else. They may still make sense for sea denial, but even in that area their worth is slipping. Large fleets increasingly employ countermeasures that can defeat this threat. A small, unstable platform of limited endurance is poorly suited to exclusive-economic-zone patrols. Expensive missile systems have no place in law enforcement or internal security work.
Most small navies need corvette-sized units—hardy craft that carry deck guns and assorted small arms. Missiles, torpedoes, and electronic-support-measures gear might go on a few hulls in each navy’s fleet. Every ship should have its own flight deck and long-range sensing systems. These ships will cost more than a fast-attack boat but will pay larger dividends. Interestingly enough, the Soviets and Israelis—the two nations that revolutionized naval warfare with fast patrol boats—have lately turned away from small boats and are concentrating more on corvettes. The missile-armed boat’s heyday is ending. Small navies must respond to this change. These boats may still be tempting, but they simply do not answer most small navies’ needs.
I
ners first. Their men must be comfortable and conlidcnt at sea, in good weather and bad. A sense of military discipline, initiative, and honor are traits to inculcate in every new sailor. Otherwise, a fleet lacking them is nothing more than a waterborne mob that will fail under pressure. A cadre of officers who know their profession is needed to motivate these men to excel. Small navies need leaders that lead, not bosses who merely direct. Only when a navy has met these initial concerns can it consider its hardware and tactics. That done, it must ensure its people understand both and are trained in their use. Finally, it must practice and then practice more until skills and procedures become second nature. A fleet learns its business by going
Convertible Platforms ____________________
The multimission challenge facing many small navies gives rise to this siren’s song few should heed—the purchase of convertible platforms and associated gear. At first, this idea seems to be the ideal way to tailor platforms to the naval mission “du jour.” And yet, while the theory 's impressive, in practice the concept will fail. Its premise ignores common sense and reality. The system works, but only on a frictionless plane. Small navies cannot realistically count on its chimeral savings. What fleet can atlord to buy alternate systems and then let them sit in a crate on the bock? How well will the fleet maintain that gear and keep it ready for short-notice duty? Even if the equipment is Working (a long shot at best), whose people will know how to put it to use if they seldom perform its specialized mission? Most navies will do well at their day-to-day work but let other skills lapse. No system can work without People. And people need practice to keep their skills sharp. Convertible ships are an optimist’s dream and a realist’s nightmare.
Indifference to Logistics____________________
Logistics wins and loses wars. All navies must recall and respect this hard fact. No fleet can sail or light lor tong in the absence of a reliable resupply system. The notion that wars are now one-shot affairs both ignores recent history and misreads future trends. In the developing World especially, conflicts will still bog down into wars of attrition. Even brief fights are certain to be costly. Modern battles consume staggering stocks of supplies. Ammunition, spare hardware, and stores must be obtained in bulk, well in advance. Although these preparations are hidden expenses, a navy cannot slight them without serious risk. Small navies will need to reload and repair if they are to succeed.
Alliance Politics arc led. No navy is more than the sum of the sailors who serve in its ships. Those sailors need sturdy, reliable hardware that they can support and employ effectively. A well- thought-out doctrine for the use of that gear is another key need. Moreover, small navies should know their own limits. That said, each should constantly strive to find ways to negate those constraints. Force-multiplying options arc especially important. Each represents a triumph ol brains over brawn. A fleet that works smart is a navy that potential opponents have good cause to fear.
The personnel serving in any small navy determine its character and its odds for success. From Cape Trafalgar to the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, well-trained, well-led sailors have bested their foes despite facing overwhelming numbers or superior gear. Small navies should concentrate first on the basics, recalling that naval warriors are mari
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All nations require allies, but none can aflord to rely too heavily on their help. No ally will ever have all the same interests as all of its friends. Particularly when facing the prospect of combat, self-interest may lead some to rethink commitments. The strength found in numbers works only so long as those numbers agree. Small navies must ensure they can discharge their duties without relying too much on somebody else. A friend is a friend, but a friend in need often stands alone.
Conclusions _____
Confronted with shortcuts and cost-saving gimmicks, small navies must ponder their course with great caution. The waters may look safe, but conceal many shoals that will wreck the imprudent. The best bets are the oldest, secured by the soundness of the age-old verities. No licet can do wrong when its plans for the future include a mining of the past. That process will always lead right back to people, their training and experience, and how well they
ROYAL NAVY OF OMAN (J. ST J WILKES)
Well-trained, well-led people (here, in the combat information center of an Omani patrol boat) have always been the mainstay of small navies. They need leaders who lead—not bosses who merely direct—and sailors with discipline, initiative, and honor.
to sea and by doing its job.
In regard to equipment, small navies need gear on which they can count when the going gets rough. Fragile systems or those that need foreign support are prohibitive risks. Instead, simple hardware that can take some hard knocks is ideal for addressing a small navy’s needs. The fleet should be able to take care of most maintenance and support itself. Standard systems ease some of this burden. Commonality aids training and maintenance, support and employment alike. This gear should match the missions the navy performs and not be too complex or expensive to use. A million-dollar missile may prove to be much less effective than a good machine gun. Small navies must never forget what they are, that their needs are unique and their missions diverse. The hardware they purchase should help solve those problems and not create new ones.
To get the most from the gear that it has, a small navy needs doctrine and tactics that fit. Investing in both will pay off handsomely in peacetime and in war. Working smarter is a money-saving option that will save lives in combat and may turn the tide of battle. One can overcome tall odds through better knowledge of how to use the tools on hand. For example, in the 1973 war, the Israeli Navy drove its enemies from the sea without sustaining loss itself because it had developed superior doctrine and tactics for conducting missile combat afloat. Although the Israeli boats were considerably outnumbered and mounted missiles of much shorter range than those of their foes, they achieved their victory by playing a much smarter game. Small navies should seek to emulate this example, substituting brains where their brawn comes up short. The key is to think and to challenge convention; to do more with less.
Since information begets power, good data systems are essential. Small navies must make efficient use of these force-multiplying options. A fleet that knows more than its foes, or knows it sooner, or acts on it first enjoys 3 genuine edge in this modern information age. Inexpensive computers, communications, and sensors all represenl especially thoughtful investments. Integrating all three into a synergistic whole makes enormous good sense Technology already makes it relatively easy to direct naval operations in real time from ashore. This capability liberates scarce platform space and avoids needless redundancy in units at sea. Remotely piloted vehicles and fixed unmanned sensors are particularly cost-effective means to enhance a navy’s knowledge. By sharpening their perception, small fleets can focus resources more on response. The wars of tomorrow, against nature or man, will be fought with electrons even more than with steel. Small navies fail to maximize their potential as soon as they scrimp on these tools.
Today’s world is treacherous for the unwary. Small navies must choose their course with utmost care. A misstep at this point may lead to catastrophe tomorrow. Small navies must not permit the lure of a bargain to overcome prudence and rational thought. Today’s siren songs may be vexing, but each can be silenced through caution. Deals too good to be true are just what they first seem—each bears hidden costs and some keen disappointment. Hard work and attention to basics are what yield success in the end. Small navies must avoid rushing headlong in any direction. These fleets must be true to themselves. If they are, then the siren songs will fade.
Lieutenant Commander Abel is a law specialist assigned to the staff of the Commander, Maintenance and Logistics Command, Atlantic. If 1990, he won the Vincent Astor Memorial Leadership Essay Contest and the Coast Guard Essay Contest. He is the Coast Guard contributing editor to the Proceedings.
-It’s Hard To Be Humble.
1 recently came across an amusing sign involving the U.S. Marine Corps. It appears that someone applied some Madison Avenue magic to the Corps. The sign, a takeoff from a greeting card company, read:
Marines—When you care enough to send the very best.
James A. Giblin
.Half a Loaf.
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When a relief warrant boatswain of many years’ service in the Navy arrived on board our ship, the sailors in the deck force wondered what kind of a boss he would be. The boatswain kept them guessing for the first day or two, while he quietly sized them up and inspected the ship to see what had to be done. Ship’s work was lagging badly. Rust had begun to appear everywhere, and a staggering amount of chipping and painting was needed.
Finally, the boatswain called his men together and said, “You’re a fine bunch of sailors and I like the way you work. There’s a lot to do, but if you work as hard and fast as I think you can, we can probably get things shipshape around here in half the time any other ship could do it. I know you fellows don’t like long hours, though, and you like to get ashore on liberty. So from now on we’ll work hard but we’ll only work half-days.”
The sailors brightened, but their smiles quickly disappeared when they heard the rest.
“Yessir, boys, them 12-hour working days will go by quick as a wink. Now turn to!”
B. W. Blee
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