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By Vice Admiral Dieter F. Braun, German Navy
Despite changes in political boundaries, Germany remains a trading nation dependent on the sea for imports and exports. Its naval forces must reflect the requirement to guarantee the nation access to the sea lines of communication that link it with the World.
The positive change in East-West relations, the Vienna negotiations on arms control and disarmament, the fundamental political changes taking place in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and the unification of the two German states have combined to change decisively the terms of security policy in Europe.
There is the chance that continued arms-control negotiations, the increasing cooperation of former Cold War opponents, and the democratization of countries hitherto governed by authoritarian regimes will lead to an era that will rule out—even in the long run—the probability of war between East and West.
Against this background of change, the German Navy must reassess its future role and reevaluate the resources that may be required. The budget problems that conlront Germany as a consequence of the unification will make it more difficult to obtain the necessary political and public support for all matters of maritime defense. Scrutiny of our present conceptual foundation, however, shows clearly that in spite of the changes in European security policy, the German Navy can find its bearings by rclerring to several constants:
- The easily quantifiable dependence of Germany—a highly industrialized country, short of it not poor in raw materials—on the unimpeded use of the sea lines of communication connecting us with friends and partners (see Table 1).
- The Navy’s peacetime mission—national defense, contributions to detente, execution ot maritime tasks, and
Table 1 Germany’s Maritime Dependence 1989 (prior to unification) | |
Exports as percentage of gross national product (USA-9%; | |
Japan-13% | 35% |
Export gains | 690 billion DM1 |
Jobs dependent on export | 33% |
Export via sea | 33% |
Import via sea | 66% |
Ships at sea with German cargo | 1,000 (10% of |
German cargo at sea/day | world shipping) 7,000,000 tons |
Ships unloading for Germany/day2 | 150 |
Cargo unloaded for Germany/day | 650,000 tons |
Ships/day for reinforcements | 60 |
Ships/day for resupply | 100 |
Demand for selected raw materials | |
oil | 95% |
iron | 98% |
manganese | 100% |
wolframite | 100% |
vanadium | 100% |
chrome | 100% |
‘$460 billion 2mainly Dutch and German ports |
support of other institutions
- The Navy’s mission during crises—crisis management, intensified precautions for defense, and the crisis-oriented execution of maritime tasks
- The Navy’s wartime mission
- The Navy’s designated area of operations—the sea areas of the European Northern Flank, where the territorial waters and exclusive economic zones of the members of the European Community are situated, and through which vital sea lines of communication are routed
- The ability to accomplish essential missions such as intelligence gathering and reconnaissance, mine countermeasures, antisubmarine warfare, and antisurface warfare outside the Northern European Flank
- The ability to operate in and out of area as part of an alliance (Membership jn an alliance includes the right to cooperation on the basis of solidarity and commitment to the common cause, commensurate with own capabilities.)
Thus for the German Navy the development of security policy does not mean a general reorientation. Its future tasks rather will reflect the continuity of the current conceptual foundations. One should not fail to recognize, however, that the ‘aim’ of the mission assigned to the German Navy and hence the required effort will change. Thus it will be possible at the national and at the alliance levels to give up—gradually—the concentration on countering a seaborne Warsaw Pact attack conducted in conjunction with a land attack against our central front. At the same time, the operational orientation will shift from countering an existing threat to preparing for general maritime defense.
The undisputed capabilities of the Soviet Navy, however, will remain an important datum point that must be kept in mind. This huge navy has a potential that demands our general attention because it is capable at any time of restricting or denying our right of free, unimpeded use of our own territorial waters and of the high seas. In this context, we must realize that the slowly diminishing offensive capability of Soviet ground forces will permit the gradual emancipation of the Soviet Navy from its supporting role on the central land front. As this process continues, the Soviet Union may assign its navy the classic far- ranging role of a great power—whose area of operation
can no longer be predicted by simply looking at its bases.
The Soviet Navy calls for our particular attention because it is an immediately available, combat-ready, modern super-navy—right on our door step.
Defining the naval warfare assets the German Navy will require in the future, we must consider not only the national mission but also the commitments arising from our Membership in the Atlantic Alliance. In defining our requirements we had to bear in mind that:
^ Modem ships cannot be expected to maintain any reasonable level of operational readiness if their crews are at cadre strength.
* The German Navy cannot plan on reinforcements.
^ Any mobilization will be restricted to technical personal required to perform secondary tasks.
^ Increasing the number of ships and aircraft will depend °n warning time sufficient to buy off-the-shelf replacements or develop new equipment.
► Nothing short of coordinated operations—air, surface, and undersea—will ensure lull exploitation ol the existing capabilities.
The Peacetime Mission: This mission includes visible presence at sea aimed at demonstrating our national will; reconnaissance and intelligence gathering; and participation in common activities within the lramewoik ol the Atlantic Alliance—the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, Standing Naval Force Channel, and Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean.
The Navy’s contribution to detente is another peacetime mission. Because of the political and military changes in the East-West relations, naval forces will be employed even more than they are today in shaping and lostcring international moves to preserve peace. The German
The End of the East German Navy
By Lieutenant Commander Siegfried Gates, U.S. Navy
The German Democratic Republic ceased to exist on 3 October 1990 and a new Germany emerged to face a future filled with an uncertainty unmatched since the grim hours of what some Germans called “Zero Hour”—the end of World War H. Restructuring a society and economy held back by 45 years of communist rule will not be easy.
The questions of armed forces Unification and what is to become of the Soviet armament with which East Germany’s military was equipped concern more than equipment compatibility and political differences. Their cost must be reckoned in human terms.
The East Germans: In the past no Warsaw Pact ally of the Soviets enjoyed a better reputation for trustworthiness, training, readiness, discipline, and military bearing than did the German Democratic Republic’s (GDR) People’s National Army—or, in German terms, the Nationale Volksarmee.
Today, career soldiers who once enjoyed the prospect of a secure future are faced with early retirement or discharge and no guarantee of a pension.
Officers and enlisted men have been crossing the border into West Germany not only to shop with their newly acquired German marks, but to assess their prospects for retention in the unified armed forces or possibilities for employment in the civilian sector. Others cross to consult with their West German military counterparts in an effort to reorient their thinking in the areas of leadership and management—and to acquire as much reference material as they can stuff into their suitcases and ugly little cars called “Trabbies.”
Individual prospects for retention are clouded by the German government’s intention to reduce the size of its armed forces significantly. The perception of a diminished threat and the desire to prove to the world, and to the Soviets in particular, that there is nothing to fear from a unified Germany, have created overwhelming political pressure to reduce military spending. In January 1988, West Germany had
- personnel in its armed forces; East Germany had 173,000—although by September 1990, the East German total had dropped dramatically to about 90,000.
The figures most recently agreed to by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev call for a total German armed force end- strength of 370,000 men. Since Germany’s goal is to absorb about 50,000 personnel from whatever remains of the old East German forces, West German forces must be reduced to
- to meet the total.
Proposed German armed forces strengths by 1994 are:
- Army—240,000
- Navy—25,000
- Air Force—105,000
- Total—370,000
Draftees from East Germany called up at reunification will be inducted directly into the German armed forces and will have the same rights, pay, and privileges as those from any other part of the country.
The most pressing problems concern the fate of East German career officers and those soldiers who, prior to reunification, enlisted for a specific period of time. All who were serving prior to reunification will leave active
Navy’s contribution to such measures includes port visits, participation in international conferences on maritime security, and responding to other missions directed by the government.
The Navy also meets commitments under international law and bears responsibilities outside German territorial waters, including international search and rescue operations, protection of the oceans against environmental pollution, and supporting fishery agencies or fishing fleets.
Other national tasks include ship degaussing and merchant marine officer training; antipollution operations; the collection and transmission of oceanographic, hydrographic, and nautical data to the Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency; combating crime at sea, e.g., drug trafficking or arms smuggling; and rendering support to authorities in fulfilling domestic tasks such as support of federal and land authorities, maintaining public order, and
disaster relief.
The Crisis Mission: The government may employ the Navy to support national as well as international actions aimed at coping with developing or full-scale crises. Mobility and a comparatively low risk of escalation—as long as such operations are limited to the high seas—qualify naval forces especially for this kind of task. Friendly relationships developed in peacetime between navies and bilateral or multilateral agreements are additional factors forming a solid basis for the successful completion of such tasks.
A high degree of operational readiness is a prerequisite for successful maritime crisis management. A decisive task under this heading is, and will continue to be, to prepare for securing the sea lines of communication and for the direct protection of merchant shipping by an in
old will have their cases reviewed on an individual basis, while those over 55 will be pensioned. Those selected for active duty will serve a two-year probationary period during which they can be discharged on short notice if background investigations reveal activities that would make them unacceptable as soldiers of the Bundeswehr.
Officers will be screened individually—to include personal interviews—by an independent committee that will determine fitness for further service. Similar committees were used in 1955 to weed out former Nazis
What will happen to these former East German torpedo-boat sailors is uncertain—there is not room for all of them in the German Navy and the civilian economy may have to absorb them.
duty and revert to standby status. Pay grades and ranks may be retained pending selection by the Ministry of Defense.
Individuals under age 50, officer or enlisted, may be selected for service in the German armed forces. Applicants 50-55 years
and other unacceptable former Wehrmacht personnel when the groundwork was being laid for the West German Bundeswehr.
Those individuals under 50 who are not selected for duty in the armed forces will continue their reserve status for six months of inactive duty, during which time they will receive 70% of their average salary; they will then be discharged. As an option, individuals may forgo the six-months service and settle for a lump sum payment not to exceed 7,000 marks. Those individuals 50 and older will be allowed to remain in the same duty and pay status for nine months. If eligible, they will be allowed to retire immediately. If they are not selected for active duty, they will be allowed to retire after the nine-month stand-down ends.
Weeding out the unacceptable individuals is only the first step toward the post-unification armed forces. Those East Germans who are retained will have to learn the ways of the West German soldier.
While this may seem a daunting task, there is historical precedent for it in Germany. When the West German armed forces were reestablished in 1955, planners recognized that a new leadership philosophy would be required if the excesses of the past were to be avoided. The
creased presence on the spot ensured by appropriate deployment of ships; and reconnaissance, surveillance, shadowing and, if need be, countering intruders.
In a crisis, the German Navy will prepare to shilt the emphasis of tasks both nationally and with respect to the Alliance, paying special attention to naval control of shipping and fishery control.
The War Mission: The German Navy contributes to national security as well as to the security ot the alliance by executing its mission to deter seaborne operations against Germany and its allies and restoring, if need be, the integrity of national and allied territories as well as political freedom of action.
Few operational commanders will ever state that they have surplus or even sufficient forces. But the adequacy of forces will be scrutinized publicly by self-appointed experts, as well as by members of parliament with considerable experience in all matters of dclcnse budgets. Only a dispassionate and credible approach will in the end be accepted by our political leaders.
The force requirements that follow arc based on the German Navy’s contribution to the security of Germany and the Atlantic Alliance. The adequacy, and hence the credibility, of the Navy’s contribution to maritime defense becomes less and less calculable if referred to a specific friend-foe scenario. The force requirement is determined instead by a complex approach that must above all take into consideration:
- Our vital maritime dependence
- The intended degree of emphasis ot our political role in matters of maritime security, including the exploitation ol the sea
- The expectations of our allies with regard to our contri-
'dea became the Sclutle flier Inhere Fuehrung (School for Inner Leadership), which included political training in addition to leadership and management. It was established in Cologne in 1956 and moved to Koblenz in 1957. The officers and enlisted men who attended these courses formed the core of the new German armed forces and their studies reflected the democratic ideals of the new German state. The curriculum included courses in economics, leadership, politics, and international law. The school has evolved and is now called the Center (Zentrum) for Inner Leadership. It is more than a civics classroom for staff officers, but its original function has not been forgotten. It will expand to fulfill an old-new mission of retraining the former East German soldier.
The Soviets: When the Soviets leave, they will insist on payment for the barracks, airfields, and practice ranges—which they confiscated as prizes of war in 1945. If the past is any indication, anything still useful that is not permanently attached or needed to keep the building from falling on the Soviets will be taken back to the Soviet Union.
One thing they cannot take back is the environment, and the German government is concerned about its condition. For years open barracks latrines, offal from animal pens (for livestock kept to supplement their rations), leaking petroleum products storage areas, and unexploded ordnance on live-fire ranges, have damaged the environment and polluted the area’s streams and rivers. The clean-up will come at Germany’s expense.
The remains of World War II-era weaponry, which include chemical weapons and 380,000 tons of Soviet ordnance plus an estimated 20,000 metric tons of modern chemical weapons stored in containers of questionable integrity, causes some to fear that the new Germany is on the brink of an ecological disaster that must somehow be averted before the land can be used again.
Whatever pace the Soviets set themselves for pulling out of Germany will be determined by economics back home, availability of housing, and the level of confidence they have in the new political order in Europe.
The German Navy: The German Navy will lose a total of
- officers and sailors. The desired result is a smaller, more modern, and flexible navy ready for the 21st century.
In considering the fate of additional equipment and personnel
that will become available upon reunification, it must be remembered that manpower and weapons by themselves create considerable pressures on the Ministry of Defense and the Navy. The additional manpower and equipment resulting from reunification only increase those pressures.
Following is a list of East German Navy assets at reunification:
- 23 Frigates
- 52 Guided-missile patrol boats
- 24 Mine warfare vessels
- 20 Fighter-bombers
- 14 ASW helicopters
- 20 Search-and-rescue helos
- 10 Tenders/support ships
The German Navy is probably not going to keep many East German ships. The Soviets do not want the ships—and neither do the Germans—so they will be scrapped or sold. There has been considerable negative press in Germany caused by German (East and West) sales to the Third World, especially in view of events in Iraq and Kuwait. Fear of adverse public reaction will probably prevent sales abroad. 1 think that the ships that can be demilitarized credibly will be converted and sold to the private sector and that the remaining ships will be scrapped.
Commander Gates, a surface line otficer, is attending the German Armed Forces Command and Staff College in Hamburg, Germany.
I he German Navy considers shipborne helicopters indispensable; here, crewmen on the guided-missile frigate Karlsruhe load a Mk 46 torpedo on a Lynx. Many German ships are multipurpose; guided-missile patrol boats like the Puma (right) can also lay mines. A 'lype- 341 and a Type-340 patrol minesweeper lie alongside the nine supply ship Steigerwald (next page).
bution to maritime security
^ What we expect with regard to the capabilities and preparedness of our allies to help safeguard our maritime security interests, even outside our area of operations and °utside the NATO assistance area ^ The effect of arms-control measures ^ A rationale for the resources to be expended
For any objective assessment of the adequacy of the German naval contribution against the background of these factors, we must define the tasks to be performed.
Detailed requirements are defined by the typical tasks in crisis or war. This alone will ensure that the resulting units will be able to accomplish their main defense mission. Any other tasks will thus be within the capabilities of these forces. If in the end we are convinced that the force composition thus derived will be able to successfully defend our maritime interests, there is no doubt that it will be able to cope with all other tasks, too.
The typical tasks to preserve free and unimpeded use of the sea in our area of operations are in the North Sea and adjacent waters:
^ Surveillance and reconnaissance of the entire sea area ^ Support to convoys or military transports ^ Barrier operations in narrow passages.
Frigates equipped with helicopters, antisubmarine warfare aircraft, submarines, mine warfare units, and naval lighter-bombers are essential for these tasks.
In the Baltic we see the following typical tactical missions:
^ Surveillance and reconnaissance of the entire sea area ^ Repelling amphibious warfare forces and fighting surface combatants
^ Protection of passages and coastal waters
For these missions we need fast patrol boats, minelaying and mine-countermeasures units, and naval fighter- hombers.
Frigates: Our contribution to securing the sea lines of communication in the North Sea and its adjacent waters consists of 12 operational frigates or destroyers and nine operational ASW maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). These 12 ships can form three task groups of four ships; each group will have its own logistic-support ship and could be employed in different screening or support situations— primarily against submarines.
This contribution is of a magnitude comparable to that required for a complex screening operation and is considered adequate against the background of our maritime dependence. To ensure that 12 ships are available at any time for a prolonged period and in a sound training status, a total of 15 or 16 ships is imperative.
Maritime patrol aircraft: The nine operational aircraft assigned to NATO are intended for long-range surveillance, reconnaissance, and ASW. Under favorable conditions, one aircraft can defend an ocean area ot approximately 5,000 square miles against submarines. Although MPAs are particularly well equipped for autonomous search and for engaging submarines, their chances increase when they are employed in conjunction with ships and submarines.
A typical option might see them employed together with ships and submarines in barrier operations in the narrow passage between the Shetlands and Bergen, Norway. To cover this 160 nautical-mile-gap against submarines, a continuous presence of three to four submarines and two or three MPAs is required. Yet to maintain two or three aircraft on station continuously means having as many as nine aircraft available. To ensure that nine aircraft will be available, a total of 12-14 must be on hand.
Submarines: The mission of submarines is to attack surface forces, to interrupt supply lines, and to conduct barrier operations. They confront any opponent with incalculable risks and are a decisive portion of our basic precautions. Requirements in the Baltic dictate at least three to four submarines on station, while an ellective barrier mission in the North Sea calls for the same number. We must have at least 12 operational submarines to maintain at least seven submarines on station for a prolonged period; this number, in turn, indicates that a total of 18 submarines would be necessary to support simultaneous operations in the North Sea and the Baltic.
If we cannot afford to buy more than 12 submarines, this number will permit us to execute missions in the Baltic and in the North Sea cither alternatively or, with very reduced effectiveness, simultaneously. This latter option would be acceptable only in times of crisis.
Patrol boats: The tasks of our future patrol boats arc presently assigned to our guided-missile patrol boats.
They reconnoiter, fight surface combatants in the extended coastal zone, and lay and protect mine-fields. They are employed in groups of three or four. Since they are not autonomous logistically and have limited endurance, they must return to safer rear areas for support by tenders.
The size of their area of operations is such that five groups are required, three of which will be deployed while the remaining two are being resupplied. Under these circumstances, we have determined that 9-12 boats deployed and 6-8 boats in the rear area are the minimum required; this leads to a total of 15-20 operational boats, which in turn means that the overall number in the fleet must be 20-26 vessels.
Mine countermeasures ships: In the Baltic Approaches, the tasks are either mine-laying or mine countermeasures (MCM), whereas in the North Sea—and especially in the approaches to the harbors—we expect MCM operations only.
Minelaying can be done by MCM units assisted by other units such as guided-missile patrol boats. The MCM capacity we require for the tasks in our North Sea and Baltic area of responsibility amounts to eight operational minesweepers and 14 operational minehunters, backed up by two additional minesweepers and two additional mine- hunters for a total of 26 MCM ships. Assuming an extended warning time for the future, the necessary minelaying requirements can be assured with this force plus our projected patrol-boat force.
Naval fighter-bombers: The present number of Tornado naval fighter-bombers was calculated on the basis of sorties required for the initial and subsequent combat days under the conditions prevailing at the time. This approach is no longer applicable today.
Naval fighter bombers are used for reconnaissance and for engaging surface forces. Their specific capabilities must be used throughout the area of operations in both independent and coordinated missions. We have 110 aircraft, in order to maintain 72 operational at any given time. This number should suffice for the future and will enhance the fleet’s capability to fulfill its overall mission.
Helicopters: Helicopters are required at sea for ASW or third-party/over-the-horizon targeting and on land for search-and-rescue missions. We shall do without helicopters capable of engaging surface forces after the existing combat helicopters have been phased out; the targeting mission in support of our patrol boats will then be assumed by ship-launched drones.
Since all operational frigates must be equipped with two helicopters—the decisive means for ASW and target acquisition—24 operational helicopters are required. That means a total of 32 helicopters for the frigates. Adding eight helicopters for search and rescue results in a requirement for 40 helicopters in all.
Logistic support units: Our frigates must be able to operate at sea for prolonged periods without returning to a base if they are to accomplish their mission. For logistic support they rely on supply units to stay on station. Since we plan for three task groups, we must have three operational supply ships of adequate capabilities and size. Four ships are necessary to guarantee this availability.
To maintain two rear-support points for two guided- missile patrol boat groups, we need two operational tenders and one backup, for a total of three. Simultaneous MCM operations in the Baltic and in the North Sea require one tender for each area, plus backup—another three tenders. Thus, the total requirement is six tenders.
The composition of the fleet makes allowance for the three-dimensional character of the typical tasks to be accomplished in crisis and war, and guarantees the capabilities required for the coordinated employment of naval warfare assets.
In light of German demographic development and of the huge budget problems ahead—as well as of the omnipresent peace euphoria—this fleet probably represents just about all we will be able to man. to fund, and to explain. It will at the same time be significant enough to bring adequate weight to bear in matters of maritime security, at all levels.
The size and the composition reflect both the dependence of our country on the sea and its capability to meet its commitments as a member of the Atlantic Alliance.
Vice Admiral Braun is the Coinmander-in-Chief of the German Fleet.