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By Russell Hibbs
Main battle tanks and aircraft carriers were needed when Uncle Joe Stalin and his successors ruled the Soviet Union, and they are still needed now when Uncle Misha officiates and Saddam intimidates. Here, F-14 Tomcats stand ready alert on board the USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) during Red Sea operations in support of Operation Desert Shield.
In December 1987, President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty to eliminate U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter- range ground-launched missiles. The treaty prohibits all ground-launched missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (300 to 3,400 miles). The INF does not include air- and sea-launched missiles.
In the period since the signing of the INF Treaty, the Soviet threat has been reduced by perestroika, glasnost, and the demise of the Warsaw Pact as a cohesive military organization. The Soviet Union has been transmogrified from an “Evil Empire” into a well-intentioned but impoverished Uncle Misha deserving of our sympathy and aid. As we watched the Soviet threat melt away, “limited
intensity conflict” became our buzzword. The military services, pushed by a Congress with visions of peace dividends, began restructuring for the reduced threat. Meanwhile, we have just conducted the largest military deployment since World War II, are confronted with massive tank forces, and are threatened with ballistic missiles armed with chemical warheads.
Regardless of the adjectives used to describe them, Third World conflicts have become more hazardous to our health. History documents the Navy’s involvement in Third World conflicts. In the period between 1945 and *989, the United States used sea power 187 times to protect its national interests. Most of those times it was used to prevent war, to limit its escalation, and to protect U.S. citizens and U.S. allies. The Navy also played a critical combat role in the Korean and Vietnam wars, in the Persian Gulf during the Iranian crisis, in Grenada, and in the raid on Libya.
Today, the Navy is again playing a vital role in Operation Desert Shield. For the first time in Third World conflicts, ballistic missiles are a serious threat to U.S. forces. (In 1986, in retaliation for the U.S. air strike against Libya, Moammar Gadhafi launched two Scud-B missiles against the U.S. Coast Guard base on the Italian island of Lampedusa; the missiles fell into the sea several hundred yards short of the U.S. base.) Some 20 countries, which are not limited by the INF Treaty, have ground-launched ballistic missiles. Not all of the missiles have the 300- to 3,400-mile ranges controlled by the INF Treaty, but they are still a threat to U.S. forces within their range.
Ballistic missiles are very attractive to Third World countries. They consider this type of missile a means of exerting pressure on and deterring attacks by neighbors, particularly those with superior air power. Ballistic missiles require a less complex infrastructure than aircraft and have a greater ability to penetrate defenses. Mobile missiles are also less vulnerable to attack than fixed aircralt installations. As Third World countries acquire intermediate- and long-range missiles, they will be able to reach targets beyond the range of their strike aircraft. In a world where military capability is a determinant of prestige, these countries see ballistic missiles as status symbols.
Third World countries have obtained ballistic missiles from the Soviet Union, from other Third World countries, and from the United States. The Soviets have provided FROG-4/7 and Scud-B missiles to numerous countries (see Table 1). Some recipients, including Iraq, have improved the Soviet Scud’s range. An increasing number of Third World countries are acquiring the capability to manufacture their own ballistic missiles.
| Table 1 | Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East |
| |
Missile | Range (miles) | Payload (lbs.) | CEP (yds.) | Origin |
EGYPT | ||||
FROG-7 | 45 | 1,000 | 550-750 | Soviet Union |
Saqr 80 | 50 | 450 | NA | French design |
Scud-B | 190 | 2,200 | 1,000 | Soviet Union |
IRAN |
|
|
|
|
Oghab (Eagle) | 25 | 650 | NA | Iran/China |
Shahin 2 | 60-80 | NA | NA | Iran/China |
Iran-130 | 80 | NA | NA | Iran/China' |
Scud-B | 190 | 2,200 | 1,000 | Syria/Libya/N. Korea |
IRAO |
|
|
|
|
FROG-7 | 45 | 1,000 | 550-750 | Soviet Union |
Fahd | 150-300 | 1,000 | NA | Iraq |
Scud-B | 190 | 2,200 | 1,000 | Soviet Union |
A1 Hussein | 375 | 300-550 | 1-2 miles | Iraq |
(Scud-B mod) |
|
|
|
|
Condor II | 500-600 | 1,000 | 650 | Iraq/ Argentina |
A1 Abbas | 560 | 1,100 | 2-3 miles | Iraq |
(Scud-B mod) |
|
|
|
|
Tammuz-1 | 1,250 | NA | NA | Iraq |
ISRAEL |
|
|
|
|
Lance | 80 | 450 | 410 | United States |
Jericho I | 50-300 | 550 | NA | Israel |
Jericho II | 300-450 | 1,000-1,500 | NA | Israel |
Jericho IIB | 900 | 1,650 | NA | Israel |
KUWAIT |
|
|
|
|
FROG-7 | 45 | 1,000 | 550-750 | Soviet Union |
I IRYA |
|
|
|
|
FROG-7 | 45 | 1,000 | 550-750 | Soviet Union |
Scud-B | 190 | 2,200 | 1,000 | Soviet Union |
Otrag | 300 | NA | NA | FRG design |
A1 Fatih | 300-450 | NA | NA | FRG design |
SAUDI ARARIA |
|
|
|
|
CSS-2 | 1,600-1,850 | 4,500 | 1.5 miles | China |
SYRIA |
|
|
|
|
FROG-7 | 45 | 1,000 | 550-750 | Soviet Union |
SS-21 | 75 | 550 | 330 | Soviet Union |
Scud-B | 190 | 2,200 | 1,000 | Soviet Union |
NORTH YEMEN |
|
|
|
|
SS-21 | 75 | 550 | 330 | Soviet Union |
SOUTH YEMEN |
|
|
|
|
FROG-7 | 45 | 1,000 | 550-750 | Soviet Union |
SS-21 | 75 | 550 | 330 | Soviet Union |
Scud-B | 190 | 2,200 | 1,000 | Soviet Union |
Abbreviations: NA—Not Available; mod—modified; CEP—Circular Error Probable (standard measure of missile accuracy)
Notes: Data on domestically produced or modified missile systems are considerably less authoritative than data on Soviet systems.
- A number of rocket systems are not listed above, including: the space launch vehicles of Israel and Iraq, the Shavit and A1 Abid, respectively; the multiple rocket launching systems such as the Brazilian Astros SS-60 possessed by Iraq and Saudi Arabia; and the Israeli artillery rocket MAR series.
- All missiles arc single-stage except the Condor II and the Jericho series which have two stages.
- Most of the missiles listed are thought to be equipped with high explosive warheads. Israel is generally believed to have a significant arsenal of nuclear warheads that could be delivered by the missiles listed here, Iraq has chemical weapons that might be adapted to the Scud-B and Scud-B modified systems.
- All missiles have reportedly been deployed except the following which are in the R&D stage: the Iranian Shahin 2; the Iraqi Fahd, Condor II, A1 Abbas, and Tammuz-1; the Israeli Jericho IIB; and the Libyan Otrag and A1 Fatih.
Sources: CRS, ACDA, IJSS, SIPRI, IDDS, NRDC, and report by Anthony Cordesman released by Senator John McCain.
The Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Control (CoCom), formed in 1949, controls the transfer of rnilitarily critical technology to the Soviet Bloc. CoCom c°nsists of all NATO countries (except Iceland), Japan, ar>d Australia. It does not control transfer of missile technology to the Third World.
In 1982, alarmed by the proliferation of ballistic mis- ^jes> President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-70, calling for the investigation of Ways to control missile proliferation. This led to agreement among seven industrial countries (the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, France, Italy, West Germany, and me United States) to establish restraint guidelines for missile-related exports. This agreement was formalized in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in April 1987. Subsequently, Spain, Australia, Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands joined the MTCR. In February ‘990, the Soviet Union indicated its willingness to further MTCR objectives and agreed specifically not to transfer mtymore Scud-B missiles, with one major exception. The Soviets refused to end exports of the missiles to Afghanistan unless the United States ends support for the Afghan rebel forces.
The MTCR mandate consists of a set of export guide- ■nes for missiles and related components and technology, aud applies to missiles capable of delivering a 500-kilo- Sram payload a distance of 300 kilometers. (This is 200 Kilometers less than the minimum range of missiles prohibited by the INF Treaty.)
Two categories of items and technology are covered by the MTCR.
^ Category I items are the most sensitive: complete rocket systems and complete subsystems, such as reentry vehicles, engines, and guidance sets.
► Category II items are items of lesser sensitivity: propellants, structural materials, avionics equipment, and so forth.
Greater emphasis is placed on transfers of Category I items. They are licensed for export on rare occasions only, where the licensing government takes all necessary steps to ensure that the item will be put to an acceptable end use.
It is important to stress that MTCR is a voluntary, cooperative arrangement; it is not binding. Unlike chemical weapons, there is neither an international consensus against development and use of missiles, nor an international legal basis for prohibiting their use.1 Some MTCR countries have been among the greatest proliferates of missile and chemical warfare technology.
Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, the Director of Naval Intelligence, has referred to the MTCR as largely ineffective and likely to remain so.2 Admiral Brooks is probably right. At a time when we are lowering barriers for technology transfer to the Soviet Union, it is difficult to raise them for technology transfer to Third World countries; leakage is likely to be high. Greed is an international constant, and “entrepreneurs” will take advantage of any chance to make a handsome profit. The MTCR has no international agency to monitor compliance or ensure enforcement.
The spread of weapon production capabilities and the competitiveness of the international weapons and technology market will limit the ability of the United States and other MTCR members to impose meaningful trade controls on missiles and their technology. Increasingly, Third World countries are sharing missile technology. In 1988, Iraq, Egypt, and Argentina formed a consortium to develop the Condor II ballistic missile. (The MTCR is credited with termination of the Condor II project.) Israel assisted Taiwan in developing the Hsiung Feng missile. The Peoples’ Republic of China sold CSS-2 intermediate- range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia and has offered to develop missile prototypes for Middle East countries.3 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney recently stated:
“As we look around the world’s potential tinder boxes, perhaps the most disturbing development we can foresee is the likely proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. ... by the year 2000, the number of developing countries producing their own ballistic missiles is expected to be up to 15. . . . And that list of 15 does not count the countries that could end up buying missiles on the international arms market.
“Included among the 15 are such countries as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea. This is hardly a list that can make an . . . audience feel comfortable. And at least six of the 15 countries will have intermediate range missiles by the turn of the century—not merely short range missiles. Missiles that can be equipped to carry a variety of warheads—chemical, biological, and nuclear, as well as conventional. Some of the same countries now developing missiles are ones that have nuclear weapons programs and by the end of the decade, the list of nuclear club members with missiles will almost surely be far larger than it is now.
“As for chemical and biological weapons, 23 foreign countries have confirmed or suspected chemical warfare programs, and ten have or may have biological warfare programs. Many of these countries have, or soon will have, ballistic missiles. Once again, that list would include Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and North Korea.”4
If we can’t stop missile, chemical, biological, and nuclear proliferation, we must look for other alternatives. Some political segments advocate attacking Iraq to destroy its ballistic missile, chemical, and nascent nuclear weapon facilities. These “neoconservatives” call for strikes regardless of whether Iraq withdraws from Kuwait.
While preemptive attacks may appear to offer quick fixes, they are not a viable policy for the United States. They would transgress our moral code and sabotage our long-term strategic interests. The June 1981 Israeli air strike to destroy Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Osirak near Baghdad has not stopped Iraqi efforts to develop nuclear weapons. The attack did reinforce Iraq’s determination to develop a means of deterring further Israeli air attacks (namely, ballistic missiles with chemical warheads).
As military analyst Colonel Harry G. Summers recently wrote, it is impossible to halt technological developments with military force unless, like the Romans at Carthage during the Punic Wars, we permanently remove all the people and salt the earth.5
How does the new threat environment affect the Navy? Is a sharp change of course necessary?
Fortunately, in spite of those who argue that all we need are light forces that can maneuver like a butterfly and sting like a bee, we still have heavy tanks. And fortunately, in spite of those who argue that aircraft carriers are dinosaurs, we still have carriers. Heavy tanks and aircraft carriers were needed when Uncle Joe and his successors ruled the Soviet Union, and they are still needed now when Uncle Misha officiates and Saddam intimidates. The United States must maintain sufficient conventional and nuclear forces to deter attack from any country and to repel attack should it occur.
In the past, when asked how aircraft carriers would survive a Soviet nuclear strike, the answer was, “As well as airfields.” When asked how they would survive Third
World ballistic missiles, the answer is, “Better than airfields.” Carriers under way are not good Third World ballistic missile targets; fixed aircraft facilities are.
Even if aircraft are protected by shelters, ballistic missiles can crater airfields and disrupt operations with chemical agents. Runways are critical to the immediate operations of an airbase. Ballistic missiles could be used to pin-in aircraft. Analytical modeling has shown that as few as six to eight tactical ballistic missiles carrying runway cratering submunitions could temporarily close an 8,000- foot runway and parallel taxiways.6 Vertical short takeoff and landing aircraft, such as the Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier, are less constrained to airfields and as a result are less vulnerable to ballistic missile attack.
We should not only ask what ballistic missiles can do to the Navy, but also what the Navy can do to ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles are vulnerable to attack by carrier aircraft and ships’ missiles. Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) has suggested that for Third World conflicts carrier air wings be composed of a larger number of attack aircraft. He submits that because of the declining Soviet threat less aircraft are needed to protect a carrier.7
Tomahawk cruise missiles on destroyers, cruisers, battleships, and submarines have a formidable capability against ballistic missiles at fixed sites, as well as against command-and-control centers, airfields, military-industrial installations, staging areas, and other targets as far as 700 nautical miles from the launch ship.
Numerous articles have been written arguing the advantages of an arms control agreement that would eliminate both Soviet and U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), such as the Tomahawk. But these articles did not consider the adverse effects of such an argument on operations in lethal Third World environments.
In accordance with the INF Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union are destroying their ground-launched missiles. Meanwhile, Third World countries continue to acquire such missiles. It is not in our interest to proscribe SLCMs for ourselves while allowing Third World countries to acquire them.
The Navy is on course and does not need any drastic rudder changes. While the present Navy force structure was predicated on the Soviet threat, it is also effective against Third World threats. In addition, it is an insurance policy against an angry bear aroused from glasnost by economic frustration.
Of course, the Navy does need to make some changes. We need more sealift. We were fortunate that Iraq did not attack Operation Desert Shield forces before tanks and other weapons arrived by sea. The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade arrived in Saudi Arabia 12 days after Iraq invaded Kuwait. The first maritime prepositioning ships began unloading the next day. By comparison, the movement of just one armored division by sea from the continental United States takes almost 36 days.8
Operation Desert Shield demonstrated the importance of forward-deployed Navy and Marine units. This importance will grow as the number of U.S. bases, such as those 'n the Philippines, decreases.
Technologically, we must continue to move ahead smartly. In the future, Third World submarines will increasingly threaten our sealift vessels. Some 41 nations besides the United States and the Soviet Union own more than 400 submarines, and many of these nations are potential adversaries. More sophisticated submarine technologies, such as air-independent propulsion, are becoming available worldwide. Air-independent propulsion allows submarines to operate quietly for extended periods of time.9 We must continue to improve our antisubmarine warfare capabilities to counter such threats, as well as quieter Soviet submarines. We must also improve our defenses against antiship missiles, which will continue to proliferate in the Third World.
Our technological edge has been decreasing. We must maintain that edge, but we must also acknowledge that even superior technology cannot compensate for overwhelming quantitative superiority. Therefore, we must maintain a reasonable force level and resist rationalization that one U.S. ship, aircraft, missile, or tank is equal to an infinite number of less technically advanced adversary weapons.
Lastly, we should take pride in our past accomplishments. Our ships and crews are in excellent condition to weather future storms, which will not be radically different from those through which we have successfully navigated in the past.
'The MTCR background is cited from the Congressional Record, 3 August 1990, p. SI2072.
5Ibid.
3Jannc E. Nolan, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World—The Limits of Nonprclif- eration," Arms Control Today, November 1989. pp. 9-14.
4Congressional Record, 3 August 1990, p. S12072.
5Col. Harry G. Summers, "Surgical strike mirage," Washington Times. 6 September 1990, p. G4. ti
'’David Rubcnson and James Bonomo, "The Role of ATBM in NATO Strategy, Survival, The International Institute For Strategic Studies, November-December 1987, pp. 511-527.
1Aviation Week & Space Technology, 24 September 1990, p. 15.
8Sea Power, October 1990, p. 43.
9lnside the Pentagon, 20 September 1990, p. 10.
Mr. Hibbs is currently Vice President for Security Affairs, Systems Research Corporation. He served more than 30 years as a Marine Corps officer and in the CIA. Mr. Hibbs has been a frequent contributor to the Proceedings and other journals.