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By Captain Lohn D. Schneider, U.S. Marine Corps
Ever-increasing battlefield mobility is resulting in a proportional decrease in the ability of some units to defend themselves. While friendly forces venture deeper into enemy territory on reconnaissance, raids, and spoiling attacks, enemy forces will be reciprocating.
Secure areas, marked by front lines and static defenses will become increasingly rare as this high-mobility trend progresses. Yet, the requirement for such secure areas will continue to exist. Certain support operations are not capable of effective performance in dug-in positions and bunkers. Logistics installations, as well as air facilities—the focus of this article—are by their nature immobile relative to tactical maneuver elements.
As high-mobility doctrine has evolved, provisions for safeguarding fixed facilities from the increased threat of rear-area attacks have been given little attention. The consensus among operational planners seems to be that rear-area units will be on their own for defense. This doctrine-by-default could spell disaster in a future conflict unless rear-area organizations, such as aviation units, undergo some sweeping changes in organization, equipment, and training. Without change, the majority of these rear-area units will be ill-prepared to defend against a coordinated attack.
Consider an expeditionary air field with a composite fixed-wing and rotarywing air group. Troops would be required to defend a 6-8,000-foot runway and its support facilities—the perimeter would be about eight miles. Current doctrine calls for Marines from the squadrons, as well as those from the Marine Air Control Group and the Marine Wing Support Group to provide for the defense of the airfield. But a closer examination will reveal that Marine aviation units are not designed to defend themselves—their mission is support with an offensive
Who will defend the airfields? Air Wing Marines (right) can fill some of the slots. Forward arming and refueling points (opposite) can contribute indirectly.
emphasis. As such, the 3,000-plus Marines at an expeditionary airfield are not organized, trained, or equipped to react quickly and decisively to an attack.
With so many Marines at the airfield, there is a tendency to conclude that manpower would not be a problem in organizing a defense. These Marines, however, are split up according to their maintenance or support specialty, and would be located close to the aircraft, radars, and equipment they support. They are further divided into port and starboard duty sections to provide 24-hour support. Pulling these Marines away frequently from their primary combat mission to man a perimeter would soon result in reduced aircraft availability and longer turn-around times.
Additionally, the lack of trucks in most Marine Aircraft Wing units presents a problem; quickly assembling these Marines and getting them to defensive positions would take a great deal of time. To avoid this general-quarters-type drill, most airfield defense forces consist of a reaction platoon mounted in a handful of small trucks (if any can be found). This may suffice for an exercise, but it would almost certainly prove too little, too late when pitted against a determined raid force.
A total absence of patrols, outposts, or listening posts (other than military police stationed at the four corners of the airfield) would allow an enemy relatively easy access to many vital sections of the airfield, especially in areas of heavy vegetation or in urban settings. Aircraft are soft targets and can be destroyed quickly by even lightly armed attackers. Finally, the air group’s lack of organic weapons other than M-16 rifles and 9-mm. pistols poses a defensive firepower problem that must be addressed.
Air field defense is not a complex problem, but no one has taken the time to solve it. Our present doctrine is inadequate, and attempting to cobble together a solution under the press of circumstances is hardly the best approach.
One solution might be simply to eliminate airfields. Helicopters, AV-8B Harriers, and OV-IO Broncos can all operate
from small, forward air strips—or can they? In reality, aircraft are tethered to an air field, and the tether is generally as *°ng as the aircraft’s unrefueled range, ^hile helicopters may stretch the tether bY means of a forward arming and refusing point (FARP), and fixed-wing airCraft may extend their striking range and hme-on-station by aerial refueling, they are> for the most part, confined to operating from a fixed base near their supporting units, because sustained maintenance requires tools, engine stands, and test equipment that cannot be moved eas- % to forward sites. Dispersal of aircraft Jor more than short periods is not feasi- ble—you cannot split up already-limited founts of equipment and numbers of Maintenance personnel. Dispersing airCraft does not eliminate the need for security either; it simply makes the aircraft harder to locate and destroy in numbers.
. A better solution would be to make airfields as small as possible, dispersing ^hen possible, and using FARPs and jterial refueling—not to extend our reach, ut to force the enemy to extend his. *ye should base aircraft on board am- PMbious shipping as much as possible. ^ 's would solve much of the Marine 0rPs’s problem while complicating that 1 ar>y attacker. Combined, these mea- *Ures would make our fixed bases less Mnerable targets.
The steps taken to reduce fixed-base ejhnerability to enemy attacks will not 'Minate the need for defense. Marine 'ation units are deficient in their abil- |- to provide an integrated, layered de- ^nse. Perhaps the most difficult defi- ency to correct is the lack of sufficient Mbers of Marines to man a perimeter a *o conduct outpost, listening post, and r°lling operations. The requirement to
maintain aircraft 24-hours a day precludes detaching Marines to form a permanent defensive unit of the proper strength. A reaction platoon will not suffice.
Unit commanders will be required to organize their units for defense of a particular sector of the perimeter, and the units will need to be dispersed around the air field so that they can react quickly. While they are forming and moving into position, security would depend on a smaller base-defense force that would man outposts and listening posts, a combat operations center, and a communications network. A small mortar unit of six 81-mm. tubes would be located centrally to provide limited fire support to patrols, fire planned perimeter defensive fires, and—most important—illumination. The reaction platoon would be a small crew-served detachment with high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles mounting .50-caliber machine guns, Mk 19 automatic grenade launchers, and some type of antiarmor weapon—Dragon or TOW.
This type of perimeter defense could be provided by Marines from the units at the airfield. Unfortunately, it addresses only one of the threats.
Disabling or destroying the aircraft that are the air field’s reason for being does not require an assault by the enemy; mortars or large-caliber sniper rifles can do the job. A well-placed .50-caliber round in a turbine engine at a takeoff power setting could destroy an aircraft. An occasional mortar round falling on the flight line or in a working area could severely affect support. These kinds of attacks are far more likely than attempts to breach the perimeter and storm the air field.
A reinforced rifle company should be attached or assigned to the air group to counter this threat by conducting continuous patrols of the surrounding area. Patrolling essentially would prevent the enemy from massing undetected for an attack, and would make it difficult for the enemy to emplace indirect-fire weapons.
Patrolling in the vicinity of the air field also addresses a relatively new problem: defense against shoulder-fired surface-to- air missiles (SAMs) fired at aircraft taking off and landing. The proliferation of Soviet SA-7 and U.S. Stinger-type SAMs has created a new breed of sniper. To assist an infantry element in its patrolling, AH-1 and UH-1 helicopters might well be required.
Effecting these changes will require modest amounts of money, but a sizable investment in planning and training. To begin, the Marine Corps must provide a blueprint for organizing and controlling the nuts-and-bolts of an effective rear- area security plan. Formulation of such a blueprint requires a hard look at who will provide the various components of any defense force; how the defense mission will degrade an aviation unit’s ability to provide sustained combat support; the weapons and training requirements; and how rear-area units can contribute to their own defense.
Training Marines to man a perimeter defense will not be difficult. All enlisted Marines receive training in infantry tactics and weapons, during recruit training and at the School of Infantry. All officers have been schooled in the rudiments of organizing a defense and have been exposed to the appropriate weapons. An alternative to the annual rifle range requalification for aviation units would be a one-week course to fire the M-203, M- 60, squad automatic weapon, and other weapons necessary to anchor a perimeter defense.
Schooling a select group of air group Marines to become proficient in the use of 81-mm. mortars, Mk 19 automatic grenade launchers, and Dragon or TOW antiarmor missiles would provide a pool of reaction-force personnel. Marine Wing Support Group Marines are a logical source of expertise for constructing defensive positions and providing a sur- vivable communications system. Weapons should be added to the air group’s table of equipment and sufficient amounts of ammunition for annual range qualifications should be made available. Brigade and larger exercises should include an air field defense problem, complete with the establishment of a full-scale communications system and construction of a segment of defensive positions around the perimeter. Squadrons should be tested on
the aspects of air field defense during combat readiness evaluations.
Marine aviation units have neglected preparations for their defense far too long. Wishful thinking and annual rifle requalification fall short of the mark. A military police detachment may stop a vehicle from crashing the gate, but a planned attack by a determined enemy would expose the house of cards that passes for current airfield defense. Brigade and Force aviation combat element (and combat service support element) commanders can avoid the chaos of organizing for defense under fire by planning and training for this vital combat requirement now.
Captain Schneider is an AH-1 Cobra instructor pilot with HMT-301. He has served with HMLA-367.
VMO in Perspective
By Captain Daniel Culbert, U.S. Marine Corps, and Captain John D. Gamboa, U.S. Marine Corps
The OV-lO’s true function remains a mystery to many of the Marines who could most benefit from this flexible and often overlooked asset. As the airframe has been upgraded over the years, the aircraft has acquired missions that were never envisioned when this multi-role jungle fighter first rolled off the assembly lines in 1966. Designed to replace the aging 0-1 Bird-dog, the first OV-lOAs went immediately to Southeast Asia, where they performed well in the forward air control role for the Marine Corps in the I Corps Tactical Zone, and as light attack aircraft with the Navy’s Light Attack Squadron (VAL)-4 in the Mekong delta.
By late 1969, forward looking infrared (FLIR) imaging systems were tested in Vietnam and a variety of weapons were retrofitted to the aircraft to increase its light attack potency. As the mission capabilities expanded, so did the demands on the aircrew. The relatively recent OV- 10D service life extension program is undoubtedly the last major modification.
So how did the OV-10 fare during Desert Storm? Depends on whom you ask. For the air and naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO) personnel, SEALs, and reconnaissance teams it provided invaluable coverage as they probed into enemy territory. For the AV-8B Harriers it was positive control in a battlefield strewn with destroyed and abandoned positions. For the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) it was positive communication links with all the task forces and constant updates on friendly dispositions. For the task forces it was a quick response to any air request or need for terminal control or maybe it was just the knowledge that the drone of an OV-10 overhead 24 hours a day meant that someone was looking out for them.
All these missions were conducted in spite of heavy concentrations of antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile threats faced daily by OV-10 crews. In the final analysis, the OV-lOs were there taking care of the grunts because that is what they do best.
The aircraft has limitations despite the latest series of improvements. Yet these limitations have not proved to be the critical shortcoming in the employment of VMO assets. Battlefield observation and supporting arms coordination have inherently been the most misunderstood aspects of what we do for a living. This longstanding ignorance is almost as pervasive in the aviation community as it is in the combat arms fields. In most cases fire support coordinators and air officers fail to realize that they have an aerial observersupporting arms coordinator available whose primary function is to observe the battlefield and link ground commanders with their aviation assets.
Integration in the planning process is critical to the success of any operation. It is during the planning phase that fire support coordinators and air officers can become more familiar with the true capabilities and limitations of this vital link. Not only do you get aircrews who are firmly committed to the fire support plan, but in many cases this same individual will be flying critical missions with a true understanding of the commander’s intent.
You might think a crash course in OV- 10 employment would not be necessary for an airframe that has been in the inventory for 25 years, yet the VMO community continues to remain shrouded in a cloud of mystery and controversy. Here are some thoughts for OV-10 customers:
Aerial reconnaissance. Arguably the raison d’etre for the OV-10, aerial reconnaissance in a variety of forms is inherent in every mission. Aircrews are trained in hand-held 35-mm. photography that can provide intelligence on short notice; the squadron maintains its own photographic laboratory. Polaroid shots dropped near a command post can provide rudimentary photos more quickly. As evidenced by Desert Storm, the retention of most photo-intelligence assets at the strategic level makes VMO one of the last remaining tactical airborne intelligence platforms responsive to the needs of the ground commander.
The FLIR night observation system on the OV-IOD, unlike night-vision goggles, senses contrasts in heat signatures and works regardless of moon or starlight conditions.
It is evident that a slow-speed aircraft capable of long loiter times is still a viable asset in today’s high-speed world- Try picking out a six-digit grid or looking through binoculars and trying to distinguish between a T-72 and M1A1 when you’re doing 450 knots through the target area—it’s hard enough at 180 knots.
Forward air control (airborne). This is the basic and most common mission performed by the VMO squadrons. The FAC(A) designation is the first tactical qualification received by all aircrew and probably the one mission most often associated with the OV-10. Support is normally requested by an infantry regimen' or battalion air liaison officer by means of an assault support request. Ideally, the aircraft will check in with the using unij and becomes an extension of the tactical air control party (TACP) to which assigned.
In addition to providing terminal control for fixed-wing close air support am1 attack helicopter close-in fire support, the OV-10 crew is capable of coordinating ah defense suppression, passing bomb dam' age assessments to the DASC, marking and suppressing targets with organs weapons systems, relaying joint tactic3 air requests, and providing communion' tions relay between widely dispersed units-
OV-lODs carry a laser designator slaved to the FLIR and can mark target for precision guided munitions—la-ser guided bombs, plus Hellfire and Mavct' ick missiles.
Aircrews spend their first year in the squadron becoming proficient in the FAC(A) mission. Although other com munities occasionally train to be FAC(A)S* it continues to be one of the primary cil pabilities offered almost exclusively w Marine Observation Squadrons. The Fa FAC capability has been revived in th^ F/A-18D community but the limitati0*1 of a high-speed aircraft with 30 to 40 min utes time on station are quite evident. “F/A-18Ds Go to War,” in Proceeding'
August 1991, p. 40.)
Artillery and naval gunfire air spotting. Infantry and artillery officers serving as aerial observers bring their skills to VMO and provide the aviation community with an indispensable link to artillery and naval gunfire assets. Air spotters are frequently used when ground observers are unable to adjust fires. The OV-10 can rapidly displace while adjusting impacts. Artillery can be coordinated for marking targets, defense suppression, and for counterbattery fire adjustment. Artillery and naval gunfire can also be adjusted at night—without illumination—using the FLIR.
Tactical air coordinator (airborne). The TAC(A) experience in the OV-10 community is the pinnacle of all qualification. Unlike the FAC(A) mission where the crew becomes an extension of a com- hat-arms unit, the TAC(A) mission requires the aircrew to assist in airspace coordination when the DASC has become degraded or becomes a casualty. The OV- 10 is capable of simultaneously monitoring tactical air traffic control, tactical air direction, tactical air request, and tactical air control party (local) radio nets assist in airspace management. The * AC(A) receives and processes requests, collects BDAs, directs all aircraft through assigned airspace—and can be given launch authority to quicken response time t° ground elements needs.
A TAC(A) usually flies in support of a mgimental-sized unit, although the aviation combat element can request one Whenever necessary. The OV-lO’s long t'me on station capability gives the aircrew the needed time to develop the situational awareness critical to the success a TAC(A). Planners frequently try to assign
one aircraft the FAC(A) and AC(A) mission simultaneously, but ese are distinct missions that cannot be accomplished simultaneously. Either mis- Sl°n requires the complete concentration the aircrew; asking them to switch mis- Sl°tis is inviting a variety of potential pr°blems.
During Desert Storm the TAC(A) was creatively employed by the artillery regiments to help coordinate counterbattery fire. Called “Quickfire,” these missions provided the immediate response necessary for effective counterbattery fire. Working closely with the target process-
The OV-10 has been an indispensable part of the Marine Air Command and Control System since the Vietnam War, but its future is uncertain.
ing centers, the TAC(A) received the mission and coordinated adjustment of counterfires, or destruction of a target with CAS aircraft controlled by OV-10 FAC(A)s or F/A-18D FastFACs. These Quickfire missions once again proved the value of a command and control aircraft aircrew with the time on station, knowledge, and experience to influence the battlefield decisively.
Finally, OV-lOs perform a variety of other missions that range from parachute- delivery of reconnaissance Marines to dropping air-delivered seismic intrusion devices. As a light attack platform, the aircraft can carry a variety of ordnance— 20-mm. guns, 2.75- and 5-inch rockets, flares, internal 7.62 mm. machine guns, and AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, the aircraft can deploy on board large- deck nuclear carriers (CVNs) and amphibious assault ships such as LHAs and LHDs.
As battlefield systems become more complicated in an increasingly sophisticated aerial environment, there will always be a place for a low, slow aircraft that can make it all happen. Helicopters and fast-FACs can do some of the missions some of the time, but when you want an aircraft dedicated to the commander’s intent the OV-10 will be there. Or will it?
As debates continue over the destiny of the aircraft and its mission the OV-lO’s future is frequently questioned. Time and again it has been the ground commanders who have saved it from certain extinction. In a future of fiscal austerity the OV-10 will undoubtedly again be fighting for its life. It may go away, but its mission will not—and we cannot afford to be without the vital services it provides.
With a first-hand view of the alternatives in sight, it is about time we start thinking more realistically about the future of VMO. It is unrealistic to assume that the missions described above can merely be distributed among an already over-scheduled F/A-18D or AH-1W community. Only a squadron dedicated to those missions will be able to perform them with more than token competency. As battlefields become more complex it will certainly require a more thorough review of the mission this unique squadron undertakes and its role in the future of Marine aviation.
Captains Culbert and Gamboa are serving as Weapons and Tactics instructors with Marine Observation Squadron (VMO)-2.
Trade the F/A-18D’s Gun for an Internal FLIR/Laser
Captain Edward M. Clarkson II, U.S. Marine Corps
^he F/A-18 proved a versatile multimission aircraft during air operations ^ Smnst lraq Qne Navy F/A-18 pilot elec- sti-ficaHy identified an Iraqi MiG-23, de- si[g^eC* w'tp an AIM-7 Sparrow mis- ajr ""and then proceeded to deliver his to'ground ordnance on his primary target. He was able to do this because he had a medium-range, radar-guided Sparrow missile available to engage the Iraqi aircraft.
Unfortunately, the night-attack F/A- 18D, a two-seat version of the F/A-18, lacks this capability when both fuselage
Sparrow stations are loaded with a combination of night navigation and targeting sensors. To give the F/A- 18D the ability to defend itself at the maximum range possible, the fuselage stations must remain available for their primary use as air-to-air mis-
The F/A-18C (above)—and the F/A- 18D—carry navigation and targeting systems on their fuselage AIM-7 stations. In contrast, the night-attack AV-8B's navigation FLIR is mounted internally (opposite).
sile stations to carry the Sparrow missile.
Developing an internal package that incorporates a forward-looking infrared sensor (FLIR) for navigation and a FLIR coupled with a laser designator for targeting is one way to do this. It may sound like heresy to fighter pilots, but the F/A- 18D’s internal gun may have to go.
Unfortunately—again—the targeting FLIR now being tested lacks a laser designator, a capability that fleet operators are demanding in the wake of the Gulf War. [See “Where We Must Do Better,” Proceedings, August 1991, pages 38-39.]
Although pod-mounted systems add flexibility to multi-mission aircraft, they exact trade-offs. In the case of the F/A- 18D, medium-range air-to-air capability—hence survivability—has been sacrificed to produce an aircraft that can perform many missions but is master of none. Further, in light of the exportation of modern Soviet aircraft and systems to Third World countries, the F/A-18D must maintain the capability to engage threat aircraft at extended range if it is to prevail in its strike mission.
In the night-under-the-weather environment, the F/A-18D requires night sensors to navigate and deliver ordnance on target. The sensors currently used are a Hughes thermal-imaging navigation system mounted on the starboard fuselage station and a Loral Aeronutronics AAS- 38 targeting FLIR on the port fuselage station. Eliminating this capability from the F/A-18D, when on a night-attack mission significantly degrades its survivability.
When faced at night with a situation similar to the one described earlier, an F/A-18D crew will have only a few choices: first, to turn and run, hoping to out-distance the hostile aircraft and its medium-range air-to-air missile; second, to honor the threat and attempt to engage the enemy with a short-range Sidewinder missile; and finally, to continue with the mission and rely on tactics, electronic countermeasures (ECM), and a fighter escort—if available—to defeat the enemy.
All of these have their drawbacks. Obviously, outdistancing a pursuing enemy in an F/A-18D loaded with air-to-ground ordnance is unlikely; the crew would probably decide to jettison ordnance and attempt to engage the enemy with their short-range Sidewinder missile. This would lead to engaging the attacker at a maximum range of about four nautical miles at closure rates in excess of 1,000 knots—at night. In this case, the attacker has accomplished his mission when the crew jettisons ordnance.
Although our night, low-level tactics are sound and our ECM equipment is capable of identifying and defeating most threats, ECM systems have their limitations and will not defeat the threat by themselves. Relying on other aircraft to deal with the attacker compromises one of the virtues of a multi-mission aircraft like the F/A-18.
Although the M61A1 20-mm. gun is a valuable and effective asset in the daylight missions of air-to-air and air-to- j ground, the usefulness of the gun at night is questionable. To engage an air-to-aif target with the gun, the aircraft must be at relatively close range—a few thousand feet.
To compound the problem, the aircrew would be using night-vision goggleS> which do not turn night into day. Further* the ability to judge distance, closure rate* and angle-off become degraded as a result of the goggles’ adverse affect on visual acuity and depth perception. The revised training and readiness manual f°( the F/A-18D dedicates only two out of 228 sorties to night strafing. This amoun1 of training is hardly enough to prepare crews to strafe targets at night and highlights the expected usefulness of the gu” in the night environment.
These factors become particularly relevant when the aircrew of the F/A-18 always has wing-tip mounted Sidewinder missiles available to them. The Sidewinder in its newest version is a p°" tent missile that can engage air threats a* short range, generally from one-half mile to four miles. The missile’s passive b1' frared seeker makes it a true fire-and-f°r' get weapon. Most versions can engage targets from all aspects and can discriminate decoy flares from the actual targo1' These make the Sidewinder a formidable threat to the enemy.
Today’s Sparrow is a capable air-intercept missile. It can engage targets a1 ranges out to 12 miles; ranges that, wW ingressing into a target, could spell thc difference between making it to the ta1"
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get or being forced to turn to engage the threat. The Sparrow’s reliability has improved greatly since the days of its first use in Vietnam. It has grown from the 1%0’s vacuum-tube and analog technology to the 1980’s solid-state and digital technology. The combination of the Spar- tow’s advanced technology and the systems on board modern aircraft have significantly improved its ability to defeat an enemy aircraft.
The current navigation FLIR in the T/A-18 provides high resolution infrared 'magery for precise navigation and Weapons delivery and is mounted on the starboard fuselage station. In addition, the navigation FLIR provides a target cuing Capability and aids the pilot in detection °f potential targets.
The targeting FLIR is still undergoing testing. When it does reach the fleet, it "nil still have some limitations. Because °f its location on the port fuselage sta- ti°n, it will not be able to slew 360 de- 8rees horizontally, which will impose some restriction on the aircraft’s approach to the target since it will be unable to slew right for target acquisition.
The F/A-18D can be improved. The mght sensor package should combine a navigation and targeting FLIR with a aser designator. The night-attack AV-8B, recently introduced to the fleet, has a nav- 'gation FLIR mounted internally in the n°se of the aircraft. The A-6E has a laser- ^aPable targeting FLIR in a chin-mounted Urret. Although these two systems are not compatible with the F/A-18D, they 'ndicate that the technology is available.
Mounting an internal laser-capable targeting FLIR would not only free the fuse. §e stations for the Sparrow but would Prove the aircraft’s overall mission ca- Ia *%■ The ability to self-designate for Ser'guided munitions is imperative in
today’s modern battlefield as proven in Southwest Asia. Without a laser, the F/A- 18 must rely on other aircraft, which often places designating aircraft in the enemy’s threat umbrella. Coordination between the designating and attack aircraft is difficult. Relying on forward air controllers on the ground to designate targets puts them at greater risk, and their equipment often falls victim to the environment and unreliable battery power that generates a weak laser output.
This task could be accomplished by designing the night sensor package like the Advanced Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance System which is interchangeable with the M61A1 gun system.
The F/A-18D also has an airborne forward air control mission, and a laser-capable targeting FLIR would improve its capabilities in this role [see “F/A-)8Ds Go to War,” Proceedings, August 1991, page 40],
The lack of a laser-designator on the F/A-18 is a lesson learned from the Gulf
War. Many F/A-18 pilots would have given up a fuselage Sparrow station for that capability. Many feel the same way about a navigation FLIR to give them that extra situational awareness at night.
But, keep this last war in perspective. There was practically no air-to-air threat after a few days and most flight time was spent at high to medium altitude looking for targets and then attacking them. Time was spent delivering ordnance and dodging bullets or surface-to-air missiles instead of the air-to-air threat.
Considering the limited space avail-
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
able, the primary mission of the F/A-18D, and the usefulness of the gun at night, replacing the M61A1 gun system with a night sensor package makes sense—even if most fighter pilots may view it as akin to emasculation.
Captain Clarkson is an A-6E bombardier/navigator. He has served with VMA(AW)-224 and VA-128. He graduated from the Virginia Military Institute.
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Get a Bonafide Night Capability
By Captain Scott E. Kerchner, U.S. Marine Corps
J\/[a'iy think that third-generation night the _ V‘s'on goggles (NVGs) have solved
fiat 'Veness—they rely on some form of lal illumination, whether starlight or °nn*ight. This makes it risky to depend him' em ^°r hhght during periods of no il- luti‘nation °r degraded visibility. The so- c0ptn ls t0 equip all Marine Corps heli- (pi r^rs w'th forward-looking infrared IR) systems. A FLIR/NVG system will provide a dependable night helicopter capability.
Infrared systems produce images based on heat differentials. By sensing this differential and forming a digital picture, a thermal image can be presented on a cathode-ray tube display in the cockpit. The image also can be projected on head-up displays (HUDs), or helmet-mounted sights. The greatest advantage to this technology is that it does not depend on natural illumination.
NVGs, though, are image intensifiers and depend on a measurable amount of
light, which they then amplify. In many remote areas of the earth such as deserts, open oceans and heavily forested regions, ambient light is unavailable on an overcast night; NVGs are less reliable in this type of situation. IR imagers will function safely in these conditions because ambient light is not needed to sense heat differential. NVGs operate at .5-,9 microns; very short wavelengths compared to IR thermal imagers. Visible light at these very short wavelengths cannot penetrate smoke, haze, and fog like modem thermal imagers. Light rain impedes NVGs
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This Marine Corps CH-53D has a chin-mounted AAQ-16 Hughes night- vision system (top). The U. S. Army’s AH-64 Apache is equipped with a state-of-the art pilot's night-vision system (below).
less than IR sensors, but both systems are severely degraded in heavy rain. NVGs are almost unusable in an urban environment, while thermal imagers are ideal in urban settings because they are unaffected by light of any type.
There are a few limitations associated with FLIR technology. Wavelength attenuation has been the most significant problem for older generation thermal imagers. These operated at wavelengths in the near- and medium-IR bands and tended to scatter in smoke, haze, and fog. Modem thermal imagers operating in the far-IR band from 8-13 microns are able to penetrate fog and smoke quite well.
Severe weather, especially heavy rain, degrades the capabilities of all IR sensors, and renders the image unusable. Thus IR does not provide an all-weather capability like radar. Radar, on the other hand, is an active system subject to detection and jamming by the enemy; IR systems are not subject to these handicaps.
There are a number of systems available for use in helicopters to augment night flying capabilities. Radar can provide very accurate obstacle avoidance. Currently two European companies, MBB in Germany and Thompson-CSF in France, are developing millimeter-wave radars that can see obstacles as small as power cables in bad weather at 500 meters. The major drawbacks to these systems are their cost, size, and weight, which combine to make them too expensive for the Marine Corps. Then, too, there is the problem of active systems that are susceptible to electronic warfare. The U.S. Army has using carbon-dioxide lasers to detect obstacles out to 1,600 meters; this laser may also have the ability to do terrain mapping, an idea with great possibilities. Again the major drawback is the expense involved, along with the relative infancy of the research, the Army and industry are conducting extensive night-vision research in conjunction with the service’s light helicopter (LH) program, but the fruits of this research are some years off.
The best bet for the current situation is still NVGs combined with a FLIR sensor. The FLIR can cover the gaps during night conditions when NVG operations are less than optimal. Of course FLIR cannot cover all the night periods when NVGs are unsuitable and crews must be able to recognize those times when the weather is unsuitable for either FLIR or NVGs. With both systems complementing each other, however, flight crews will be able to choose the best system for the existing conditions.
The Marine Corps has taken the first step to true night capability: equipping all its helicopter squadrons with the ANVIS-6, generation III NVGs. It is now time to take the next step and buy FLIR systems that will complete our quest for true night capability. There are a number of readily available, off-the-shelf FLIR sensors that can easily be integrated with the avionics packages in our current fleet of helicopters. Among these are: ►Northrop’s AN/AAS-40 Seahawk FLIR turret ►Martin Marietta’s AN/AAQ-11 Mk III turret (pilot night vision system [PNVS]) ►Hughes Aircraft’s AN/AAQ-16 Hughes Night Vision System (HNVS)
Martin Marietta’s PNVS is currently installed on the U.S. Army’s AH-64 Apache attack helicopters and has been tested on a CH-53E by Marine Helicopter Squadron (HMX)-1. The squadron is currently testing Hughes’ AN/AAQ-16 HNVS, a system that has proved highly capable and has been selected for the MV-22 Osprey. It is currently in use with the U.S. Air Force MH-60G PaveHavvk and U.S. Army MH-47/MH-60 special forces aircraft; the total system weighs less than 100 pounds. If HMX-1 determines this system is suitable for the Marine Corps, it should prove economical because of its wide use.
The squadron currently envisions two methods of employment:
►NVG primary/FLIR backup. Both pilots would use NVGs as the primary night vision device and the FLIR would be used as a backup. The information from the thermal imager would be displayed on individual panel-mounted CRTs fully compatible with ANVIS. The CRTs would have integral multifunction controls, and would display critical navigation and flight data superimposed on the FLl^ image.
►FLIR primary/NVG backup. One pil(,t would wear a helmet visor display and the other would wear NVGs. The pil°l wearing the helmet visor display would ^ fly the helicopter, while the pilot wearing NVGs would monitor the FLIR imaga on his panel-mounted display. The hel" I met visor display would project the FLl^ image on the inside of the helmet visof> superimposed with navigation and fligd1 j performance data.
These approaches allow aircrews10 1 use thermal imagers and NVGs simulta' neously, and select the system that pr°' vides the best results.
Among FLIR systems’ greatest advantages is their immunity to the big*1 ambient-light conditions of urban envl' ronments. Urban terrain flight and the associated high ambient-light levels ^ cause NVGs to shut down momentarily' thus rendering them unusable as the P* lots fly among buildings, power and cora munications lines—just when the pi'0*' need them most. Thermal imagers, 11,1 affected by bright light because the. sense heat differential, are ideal in urba11 settings—and they are passive.
Captain Kerchner is a CH-53E pilot. He has serv£ with HMH-461 and HMM-264.
Proceedings / November »
Maneuver Commanders and Fire Support
The proper employment of fire support is not generally a guarantor of victory, but failure to use it properly contributes to defeat. Napoleon’s maxim that God fights on the side with the best artillery still applies today. Successful fire support allows the maneuver commander to husband his forces for the pivotal battle in which he must close with and destroy the enemy.
In the first 20 days of the war with Iraq, U-S. and allied aircraft flew more sorties and dropped more bombs than were delivered against Japan in the final 14 ttonths of World War II. Despite the heady sensations of the first few days of Operation Desert Storm, that battle showed that we are no more able to drive a determined foe from the field with conventional air attacks today than we were 'n 1945. In World War II, it took a nuclear device to defeat the Japanese after [hey had been subjected to four years of hunger, cold, and privation. Nuclear Weapons were not employed in Europe and allied forces slugged their way across [he continent and physically occupied Berlin to defeat the Germans.
That same sort of grinding fight was n°t required to defeat the Iraqi army. Par- tlaHy, that was because our military lead- efship did everything in its power to Weaken the enemy with fire support as 'VeH as maneuver before forces were committed. Despite the early press reports and he claims of the U.S. Air Force’s Chief ; '^alf, no single arm defeated Iraq. The a,r campaign significantly weakened the ra9i army and, more importantly, sapped lts will to fight a ground battle. That j>r°und battle had to be fought, however,
0 ^berate Kuwait. In this war, as in others i •
* combined arms brought the victory. Aviators and artillerymen generally tsider that supporting fires are their Dauiw'
jck, but others must be knowledge-
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of l atlc* frequently orchestrate the work set^ arfillery and rnortar forward obey ®rs> forward air controllers, and naval
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s Us that Marines of every occupa- specialty must be able to fight with
all means available in order to accomplish their mission. Despite our institutional experience, each Marine at some point finds himself new to the fire-support business. For him, fire support and fire-support coordination can be tricky, hence the following rules of the road may help. Although lists have fallen out of favor with many, they are a useful memory aid. During World War n, Admiral Chester Nimitz kept a copy of the principles of war under the plexiglass on his desk. Perhaps we can take a small page out of his book. Although this list focuses on the maneuver commander, its tenets apply to all Marines.
Coordinate the effects of fires crossing boundaries. This is not rule number one accidentally—it is the primary principle of fire support coordination. Amazingly, it is also the rule most frequently violated. Note that the rule states that the effects of fires—not shell fragments, not blast, but the effects of fires—must be coordinated. When a commander orders illumination to light up the area to his front, he is calling for a munition with a 1,000 square meter area of coverage. He might inadvertently illuminate an adjacent night attack, patrol, ambush site or friendly position on his flanks if the effects are not coordinated. Smoke is effective in many circumstances. It can screen our forces, obscure the vision of the enemy, refract and dissipate laser beams, and obscure some night-sighting devices. A battery firing one round of smoke expects it to cover an area about 600 meters wide and persist for about five minutes. Imagine the effect if one commander’s smoke coincides with a flanking unit’s need to fire TOWs or to designate for laser-guided artillery projectiles or bombs. The effects of fires are neutral, and can hurt friendlies or the enemy—depending upon how intelligently they are employed.
Coordinate fires at the lowest level possible. During debriefs following Operation Desert Storm, fire support officers and commanders at every level hammered home this important point. The phrase “lowest level possible” generally equates to “between adjacent battalions.” During Desert Storm, the 1st Marine Division advanced north with the 2d Marine Division on its left flank; the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines—the left-flank battalion of the 1st Marine Division—entered the fire-support coordination radio net of the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines—the 2d Division’s
By Major Curtis A. Munson, U.S. Marine Corps
right-flank battalion and coordinated fires as needed. Had units involved in combat operations been required to refer crossboundary coordination problems to division level, the unnecessary delay could have cost lives.
Engage the enemy as early as possible to inflict casualties and destroy his cohesion. command and control. How far forward he is engaged is a function of the command’s target-acquisition capability. It makes sense to attack the enemy as soon as you can—which does not mean that surprise should be sacrificed, but that every effort should be made to force the enemy to react. Compel him to go where you want him to go. Use mine fields and fire sacks to canalize him. Engage him as early as each arm can be employed, culminating with the direct fire engagement supported with indirect fires short of the coordinated fire line (CFL). Obviously, aviation is the preferred means of conducting the deep battle, but every means of influencing the enemy should be used.
Our electronic warfare capacity is frequently overlooked by Marines eager to hurt the enemy, but it should be exploited whenever possible. The destruction of the Iraqi command-and-control system was as important as the damage done to Iraqi troops in helping Coalition forces end Desert Storm quickly with a minimum of casualties. Our objective in the employment of fire support is to reduce the enemy to bite-sized chunks so that maneuver forces can chew him up when they engage.
Plan fires so that the enemy, in defending against one form, exposes himself to another. The objective of fire support integration is to present the enemy with a series of increasingly crummy choices or dilemmas so that protection against one increases his vulnerability to another. There is no right answer to the way in which this is conducted because every situation is different. A quick look at a possible scenario will show how the enemy’s actions can be used against him: the enemy’s immoderate use of the electromagnetic spectrum exposes him to counterfire. Counterfire requires him to displace rapidly. Displacement exposes him to precision attack by aviation.
As an alternative, the enemy might dig in and lay wire to conceal his activities, which would render him vulnerable to position location by intelligence assets. Properly integrated fire support and in-
telligence operations will expose high value and high payoff targets. Fires can then be used to destroy his facilities and the troops manning them. The concept takes coordination obviously, but it also requires that the Marines involved have a vision of what the commander wants to
accomplish.
Mass fires whenever possible. Fires from numerous fire-support agencies brought to bear at once are more effective than lengthy missions fired by a single unit or a smaller number of firing agencies. This allows the massing of fires, all impacting at once, at the time of the target's maximum vulnerability. Addi- ttonally, it minimizes the vulnerability of °Ur own fire support agencies to counterfire.
Commanders must determine the de- s‘fedfire-support effect. The commander Jurist tell his fire support coordinator what "e expects to accomplish with fires. SimPly deciding that all enemy units must be estroyed, i.e., attacked until they are ao longer able to function on the battle- le,d, is unrealistic. His intent must be Consistent with the technical capability of e supporting agencies and the ordnance available. He must determine which types ° targets are the most important and set Priorities. Normally, he does this by is- ^aing a target-attack matrix, which ranks , target sets representing the spectrum enemy activities and sends high-value f.nrl high-payoff target information to the ^lr,ri8 agencies.
These Marine Corps 155-mm. self- propelled howitzers (top) proved able to support fast-moving units during Desert Storm. (Below) Marine artillerymen from Echo Battery, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines check fuses.
Integrate all fire-support elements. Fire support is an integrated process that includes targeting, coordination, electronic warfare, conventional and unconventional fires, assessment, and reporting. It takes practice for any orchestra to get it right, and the same is true of fire support. All of the elements should train together whenever possible.
Know the technical requirements for fire support. Air, naval gunfire, and artillery all have unique technical requirements that must be met in order to employ the systems properly. These include type and tonnage maximums and weather minimums for aircraft, and the requirement to measure shooting strength and meteorological conditions for artillery and naval gunfire. The impact of these requirements needs to be understood by the commander so that they do not hamper the scheme of maneuver and so that the overall commander can assist his fire supporters where possible.
One example of a fire support agency’s technical requirement is the sustained aircraft-availability rate, or the rate at which aircraft can be made available indefinitely. During critical portions of the campaign, aircraft can surge—that is, fly and fight at a rate well beyond the sustained rate. Whatever the can-do spirit of the aviators, this surge rate can be maintained only for a short period. A long surge period will result in an aviation element that is figuratively behind the power curve, and unable to fly at even at the sustained rate. A force commander who ignores the implications of the sustained rate can seriously undermine the support that his aviation combat element can provide.
A technical problem that surfaced during the Gulf War concerned the number of ammunition lots provided to the artillery. Different manufacturer’s lots of propellant have different efficiency, meaning that if a single gun were to shoot at the same point with propellant from two ammunition lots, the rounds might impact as much as 100 meters apart based
upon the relative efficiency of the two lots. When artillerymen calibrate their guns it is in part to account for this disparity. During Desert Storm, propellant from more thirty lots of powder was routinely supplied to firing units; accurate muzzle velocity prediction was all but impossible. Even the most concerned commander could do little to prevent that problem, but it is a consideration for the future if the commander and logistics personnel work together prior to deployment.
Do not spread-load fire support. Establish priority based upon the mission and the enemy, not your sense ot tair ness. Too often, the commander establishes the priority of fires in a way guaranteed to ensure that every unit has first call on at least some element of the Ere support available. One company will get priority from the mortars, another air, and a third artillery. This precludes carping on the part of subordinates, but is inconsistent with the tenets of maneuver warfare. If the commander truly expects to conduct the battle in accordance with his own plan, instead of the enemy’s, he needs to commit to the focus of effort. Establishment of the priority of fires does not keep the other units of the command from getting fire support. It means only that the focus of effort, the most critical element, gets fire support when and where it is required.
Reinforce success. No one is surprised at this rule when it refers to maneuver. Using the reserve to reinforce a failure is one of the first things a young officer learns to avoid. The same is true of fires. The use of fire support against a target for which it is not suited amounts to a shameful waste. Conversely, the termination of fires that are successfully being employed simply because the timetable says to do it puts Marines at risk for no reason.
Initial Desert Storm estimates allotted one week for phases one through three—the air campaign. This meant the ground campaign would have started after
a seven-day aerial bombardment. The success of the air program, the minima losses, and the devastating effects that i was having on the enemy, were sufficient | to convince Coalition planners that it should and could go on much longer. I Coalition ground forces met a disorga nized and demoralized Iraqi army on the ground, and the credit goes to the effective employment of fires—delivered m this case from the air.
A maneuver commander who unae stands and applies these simple rules can rest assured that his fire support has hun the enemy as much as possible. In doing so he has also protected his maneuver forces for the ground battle to come. It easier to close with and destroy an enemy who has already been broken into bitesized chunks by properly employed ft support.
Major Munson is serving with the concepts ^ plans section of the Marine Corps Warfight.ng Cen ter at Quantico, Virginia.
Frustrations of a Huey Pilot
cuintiwiuv --------
sole function is to keep the helicopter borne unit commander and the airborne helicopter coordinator in direct contact with the airborne assault element. Secondary missions include supporting arms coordination, helicopter escort, and special operations missions. Unfortunately, the UH-1N has reached its performance limits and can no longer accomplish its assigned tasks. The Marine Corps needs an improved model, but the current plans to modernize the aging UH-1N fleet are not “in sync” with the needs of the aircraft. , , _ . .
The aircraft’s two critical deficiencies
are limited airspeed at maximum gross weight and reduced useful payload.
Corps
Airspeed. The Marine Corps’ current collection of helicopters are capable of airspeeds in excess of 140 knots while operating at maximum gross weights. The UH-1N has a maximum airspeed of 130 knots; when operating at its maximum gross weight, this is reduced to 110 knots. The UH-lN’s missions require it to launch almost continually at or near its maximum gross weight—operate the aircraft at higher altitudes and the airspeed is reduced even more. It is obvious that a severe airspeed disparity exists between helicopters in the Fleet Marine Forces. Why should the helicopter assault element be forced to fly at a reduced airspeed merely to accommodate the aged UH-1N?
Payload. The maximum gross weight or maximum allowable takeoff weight for the UH-1N—is 10,500 pounds, and the aircraft’s basic weight is approaching 6,800 pounds. The operational weight of the aircraft—basic weight plus the aircrew and any additional equipment required to complete the mission, e.g., a hoist, a cargo hook, or gun mounts—is about 7,400 pounds. Add 1,360 pounds of internal fuel to fill the tanks and the UH- 1N weighs about 8,760 pounds. Subtract 8,760 pounds from 10,500 and the result is' 1,840 pounds of useful payload. Over the years, the basic weight has slowly been increasing as has the amount of mission-related equipment, but the maximum
By Captain Christopher R. Zelez, U.S. Marine
The Marine Corps plans to fly the aging UH-1 Huey into the 21st century 2007 to be precise. The latest version the UH-1N, has served faithfully since 1972. Since its introduction, nothing has been done to modernize or incorporate new technology into the aircraft to enable the it to keep up with the present fleet ot CH- 46Es, CH-53Es, and AH-lWs. If the aircraft is to continue in service, any upgrades must address the UH-lN’s most debilitating limitations: insufficient airspeed, limited payload, poor endurance, and inadequate navigation equipment.
The UH-lN’s primary mission is providing command and control for a heli-
copterbome assault element. In short, its .. • • irontP.r-
gross weight has remained constant. The aircraft commander must now jugg weapons, ammunition, extra fuel, carg or passengers into the shrinking pay oa Endurance. At an ideal fuel burn 600 pounds per hour, a Huey with 1,3 pounds of internal fuel should stay »' borne for about one hour and fifty "J1 , utes before landing with a 200-pound fu reserve. If more endurance is required, auxiliary fuel tank can be installed i side the aircraft. The tank weighs pounds and carries 1,050 pounds of fue _ which gets the endurance up to three ho but reduces the useful payload to /> pounds—three combat-loaded Marin • The tank is neither crash-worthy nor b' listically tolerant. . ,
To make matters worse, the heavier a craft burns fuel at a higher rate and ® older engines have become less effict The UH-1N can no longer be expected burn fuel at an ideal rate of 600 poun per hour. Realistically, the Huey is n consuming fuel at a rate of 700 pou per hour.To fly longer, more fuel is * quired. The more fuel carried, the less u ful payload remains to carry passenge weapons, or cargo. More fuel equals m weight, which means less payload a _ slower air speeds. The aircraft is trapp I Navigation. Low-level navigation I difficult at best. Precision low-level na I igation at night or in adverse weather
U.S. marine corps
The ubiquitous Huey—here a Marine Corps UH-1N lifts off during Desert Storm—first gained fame more than 25 years ago in the Vietnam War. The Marine Corps plans to upgrade the helicopter, but none of the proposed changes address the UH-lN's airspeed and payload shortfalls.
demanding and can be dangerous. The current solution—trying to read a map illuminated by a small light while flying °n night vision goggles—is unsatisfac- l°ry. No U.S. helicopter force tasked to conduct special operations missions in the dead of night is so poorly equipped. It ls true that some of our aircraft are equipped with LORAN and our CH-53s do use OMEGA but neither system is accurate enough. Both systems can suffer front weak signals or jamming. The UH- I hi and, for that matter, all Marine Corps helicopters, need a common, accurate
navigation system.
What does the Marine Corps plan to do about these problems? According to !he recently published 1992 Program Objective Memorandum, beginning in 1994 lhe UH-1N will get the APN-217 Doppler nav>gation system—eventually upgraded to accept input from the Global Posi- doning System. This system will standardize all helicopter navigation sys- jcnis in the Marine Corps as well as the ■S. Navy. This is an excellent piece of equipment and Headquarters is certainly caded in the right direction. Of course, he aircraft’s basic weight will increase. A state-of-the-art communication pack- also will be installed beginning in 94. This system—the ARC-210 f'djo—wiH have UHF, VHF-FM, VHF- M, and satellite communication capability. The only drawback here is that the Huey already has a good communication suite in the form of three radios covering the UHF, HF, VHF-AM/FM spectrum. Communications is not one of the UH- lN’s critical vulnerabilities. [But see Keys’s interview, pages 38-42, this issue.]
Finally, a yet-unfunded program will install a forward-looking infrared (FUR) system on the aircraft. According to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, the FL1R is a good idea.
It will give the UH-1N an excellent nightfighting capability. The only drawback is weight; it will add an additional 90 to 100 pounds to the aircraft’s basic weight, further cutting into the UH-lN’s available payload.
Only one of the four areas I cited have been adequately addressed by Headquarters. The proposed upgrades will do nothing to enhance the UH-lN's performance shortfalls. The problems of the Huey will only be aggravated once a replacement for the CH-46 has been identified.
While the problem of precision navigation appears to have been satisfied, the two most critical shortcomings have been neglected. The answer to slow airspeeds and loss of payload are interrelated and can be solved by the same solution; the project will cost money and involve an ambitious service life extension program to upgrade the aircraft.
According to Bell Helicopter engineers, a rotor-engine-transmission solution has been designed using the new General Electric T-700 engine mated to the transmission and rotor system presently used in the Marine Corps AH- lWs. The dual problems of airspeed and loss of payload would be solved simultaneously at a price significantly less than that of a replacement helicopter. The benefits will be that of a combat utility helicopter flying with the airborne assault element at a realistic airspeed while carrying a greater payload.
The answer to the Huey’s diminishing endurance has three possible solutions. The first, used by the U.S. Air Force, is to install additional fuel cells in the aircraft’s heater and inverter compartments. This will add an additional 40 gallons to the total fuel capacity. The second is to increase the capacity of the under floor fuel cells by a total of 50 gallons. Finally, an auxiliary fuel system could be developed using the gun mounts to carry externally mounted auxiliary fuel tanks. All of these are workable, but they aggravate the weight problem.
According to then-director of Marine Corps Aviation Lieutenant General Charles Pitman, “We are modernizing the aircraft in the inventory and replacing those that are incapable of being modernized to meet the threat or to support the missions of our MAGTFs [Marine air- ground task forces].”
It is obvious that the UH-1N should be modernized if it is to contribute to MAGTF operations in the next century. The Huey’s primary mission of command and control is viable on today’s battlefield. What good will it be if the only fleet helicopter equipped with a FLIR and the ability to communicate around the world is all alone on the battlefield? The modernization program HQMC has developed for the Huey is a step in the right direction, but without a significant effort to SLEP the aging UH-1N, it will be all for naught. The only destination for the UH-1N will be the museum.
Captain Zelez is a UH-1N pilot. He has served with HMLA-269 and with HMM-365 deployed with the 24th and the 26th Marine Expeditionary Units.
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