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The rapidly changing political- economic situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe makes strategic planning in the Soviet armed forces difficult, >f not impossible. The military leadership—led by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, Chief of the General Staff from 1984 to December 1988—has “signed on” to Executive President Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika, or restructuring of the Soviet economy.1
Through the late 1980s the Soviet Union continued to produce military equipment in record numbers and to improve quality. United States intelligence agencies estimated that Soviet defense spending had risen in 1988 by approximately 3% (in constant rubles). But the Soviet economy could no longer meet both civilian and military demands, especially in high-tech areas. Gorbachev Promised the Soviet armed forces that, by cutting force levels and production now, be could provide them with high-technology forces in the future through the restructuring of the Soviet economy.
Perhaps Soviet military leaders saw the Gorbachev policies as a repeat of First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev’s military cutbacks in the late 1950s, when he cut more than two million troops from the Army and ordered the scrapping of the Navy’s outdated battleships and cruisers. At the same time, however, Khrushchev accelerated development and deployment of tactical and strategic missiles, nuclear Weapons, and space systems. The result- mg Khrushchev-era forces could better threaten the West than could the military forces developed by Khrushchev’s predecessor Josef Stalin, who believed primar- tly that masses of troops could defeat the West.
Now, 30 years later, something similar to the Khrushchev-era “revolution in military affairs” may be taking place. The Soviets have halted production of tanks, several types of aircraft, and other Weapons and are reducing troop strength. Older surface combatants and submarines are being towed to scrap yards, while operating days for the active fleet are being cut drastically.
But beyond these force reductions, today’s military leaders are unhappy, and some are criticizing Gorbachev’s actions publicly. Dissension at the senior level includes criticism of the release of thousands of officers from active duty because of the cuts in troop strength. Officers with technical skills should do well in the civilian economy, which suffers from a shortage of skilled labor, but most officers enjoy better pay and benefits in the military. Also, senior officers are protesting the release of thousands of conscripted college graduates before they have completed their normal military obligation.
Further, evidence indicates that the public image of the military is suffering as perestroika so far has failed to fill Soviet shop shelves with food and other hard-to-find consumer goods. Still, the image (and reality) persists of a large military force that consumes enormous amounts of resources. Recently, officers on the nuclear-propelled battle cruiser Kirov revealed their frustration with this new public image: “Why have they begun venting their fury on us? You go on official business, and the people say behind your back: ‘A parasite living off the state’ ... we ask for nothing, just treat us as human beings.”[1]
Elsewhere, recruits are failing to show up when called for conscription. And, in some of the individual republics, including the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, social pressure is mounting for soldiers to “walk away” from military service. (Of the five military services, the Navy appears to be one of the least affected by this current anti-military situation.)
Even before perestroika, the Soviet military was experiencing problems, as modem weapons were outpacing the ability of the Soviet society to support them. For example, three-year Navy conscripts simply could not operate the systems on modem ships and aircraft. As a result, more of the technical burden fell on the shoulders of the officer corps—most of whom are long-term professionals—and on the warrant or michman ranks.
The warrant program is open to qualified enlisted men under age 35 as well as to qualified civilians. Most enlisted candidates have completed a term of service as a conscript, but some with sufficient prior training are recruited directly from “boot camp” to warrant military technical schools. After graduation from the schools they are promoted to the rank of michman. Some former servicemen who have returned to active duty from the reserves are also promoted to michman. Increasingly, however, warrants are being brought in from two-year civilian technical schools and colleges.
On board ship, the michmanii are assigned to each division, normally as deputies to junior officers with direct command authority over petty officers and seamen. The peacetime complements of three Soviet warships appear below and indicate the high percentage of officer and warrant ranks needed for modem warships.
Now, political-economic changes in the Soviet Union are exacerbating the military’s problems. The loss of Eastern Europe means that ground forces no longer have a staging area for an assault on the West; for the Air Forces the lack of intermediate-range missiles means that airfields in Western Europe cannot be struck at the outset of a conflict before NATO can launch aircraft.[2]
In this deteriorating environment, Soviet military leaders are attempting to develop a military strategy for the future.
| Slava-ctos cruiser | Sovremennyy- class destroyer | Nuclear attack submarine |
Officers | 84 | 37 | 32 |
Warrants | 75 | 43 | 21 |
Enlisted | 370 | 290 | 15 |
At this writing, the development and deployment of advanced systems in three military areas—space systems, strategic missiles, and naval forces—appear to be continuing at a high rate.
- Space systems. These can be effective “force multipliers” that can increase effectiveness of many weapons. For example, satellite targeting can make long- range weapons more effective, and space activity can greatly improve precision navigation and hence weapons guidance on earth.
While Soviet space activity declined in 1989—74 successful launches compared to an average of almost 100 over the past ten years—activity in military-related programs remained high. (The United States had 18 launches in 1989.) The development of advanced anti-satellite (ASAT), space surveillance, and data relay satellite systems also continues.
- Strategic missiles. Improved land- based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) continue to be deployed as do submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The new road-mobile SS-25 and rail-mobile SS-24 Mod 1 are being produced in place of earlier, fixed-site ICBMs, providing an increase in missile accuracy as well as survivability.
The sixth and last Typhoon strategic- missile submarine (SSBN) has been built, but production continues on the Delta IV- class SSBN, with one of each class launched in 1989, providing 36 advanced SLBMs with an estimated 264 multiple warheads. The 16 missiles in the Delta IV are the first Soviet SLBMs with accuracy to provide a hard-target kill capability.
Also being improved and deployed are air- and submarine-launched strategic cruise missiles, including the naval SS-N-21, given the nickname “Toma- hawkski” in the West because of its similarity to the U.S. Tomahawk.
► Naval forces. The impressive Soviet naval construction programs of the 1980s are continuing. In 1989 the Soviets launched nine submarines: three nuclear attack submarines (Akula, Sierra, Victor III classes), two strategic missile submarines (Typhoon, Delta IV), and four diesel-electric units of the Kilo class (with one or more expected to go to foreign navies). The submarine tonnage launched in 1989 was the highest since 1986. And, as previously noted in this column, beyond quantity, the Soviet submarines are now of high quality.
Similarly, nine warships, frigate-size or larger, were launched in 1989, including the fourth 28,000-ton, nuclear- propelled Kirov-class cruiser. The major surface warship news in 1989 was the start of sea trials and flight operations for the carrier Tbilisi. According to the U.S.
director of naval intelligence, those trials occurred “well ahead of our estimates.”[3] 2 * [4] He observed, “The fact that flight operations were conducted so early in Tbilisi’s sea trials suggests the Soviet Navy felt the need to convince policy makers of the carrier’s importance and viability during last fall’s budget debate.”
Delivery of the 65,000-ton Tbilisi provided the Navy with a greater tonnage of new surface ships in 1989 than in any year over the past two decades. Further, there are indications that a fourth full- deck carrier, the second of the 75,000- tons Ulyanovsk class, will be laid down next year. However, according to Western intelligence sources, a fifth Kirov- class nuclear cruiser has been cancelled.
Some in the Western intelligence community believe that these continuing programs are the result of pipeline momentum—using components, machinery, and systems ordered several years ago. This viewpoint presupposes that there will now be a wind down in these programs, especially in naval shipbuilding.
Those observers who believe otherwise point to the continued production of full- deck carriers. Carriers have traditionally been among the first warships cancelled by fiscally constrained navies. In addition to their huge costs and crew requirements, they are expensive to operate and require specialized aircraft, escort and replenishment ships, etc. The current Soviet carrier program has survived opposition from such distinguished opponents as Georgi Arbatov, head of the prestigious Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, who has been an adviser to top Soviet leaders, and even some senior naval officers.
A key question for today’s Soviet military leadership is how to employ these forces in the context of the massive cutbacks and other problems plaguing their forces. The current political-economic restructuring in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will force Gorbachev and his successors—even if they turn out to be right-wing hardliners—to look inward at least through the 1990s. This is the viewpoint held by U.S. Director of Central Intelligence William H. Webster. He recently told the Congress that even if Gorbachev was ousted from office and succeeded by reactionaries who favor a rapid rebuilding of the armed forces, “there is little chance that Soviet hegemony could be restored in Eastern Europe.”[5] He continued:
“A successor regime would face
the same types of economic and political pressures that President Gorbachev has, and would probably continue to pursue arms control agreements with the West. It would be unlikely, in addition, to seek a broad reversal of the changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe, or to try to revive the Warsaw Pact.”
This view of an abatement of the Soviet threat is in marked contrast to the views of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and the U.S. service chiefs. The Secretary’s current annual report to Congress states:
“The events of 1989 have reduced the threat of a sudden Soviet attack in Europe; they clearly call for a review of U.S. defense policy priorities in the 1990s. However, as we respond to these positive developments, we have a responsibility not to get ahead of events. Much remains unsettled, the Soviet Union remains a nuclear superpower, and U.S. interests over the coming decades will face a growing number of potentially serious threats from other sources. In short, the opportunities are great, but so are uncertainties and risks.”[6]
Similarly, in January, Cheney told a Houston audience that changes in the Soviet Union “are potentially reversible,” and that “it would be very risky business for the United States to make policy based on the assumption that the transition we now see in the Soviet Union will continue on a peaceful, orderly basis.”
Thus, the Soviet military leadership is attempting to develop a forward-looking strategy for their “transition” period to the high-technology weapons hoped for from Gorbachev’s perestroika, as well as a strategy for the 21st century when those weapons become available. A failure of the long-term Gorbachev program—■ assuming a continued emphasis on the three weapon areas now being pursued—- would present the Soviets with a strategic planning challenge: to develop a superpower strategy based on space, strategic, and naval forces.
[1]Komsomol’skaya Pravda, 5 November 1989, p. 4. The Soviet armed forces consist of the Ground Forces (Army), Strategic Rocket Forces, Air Forces, Air Defense Forces, and Navy.
“Rear Adm. Thomas A Brooks, USN. statement before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee,
‘Akhromeyev subsequently became a personal advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev.
14 March 1990.
■'William H. Webster, Director of Central Intelligence, statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 1 March 1990.
[6]Dick Cheney, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, January 1990), p. iii.