This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
By Commander Bruce Stubbs, U.S. Coast Guard
In 1982, Oliver North wrote to the President’s national security adviser, “The basic problem is lack of a clearly defined ‘National Defense’ mission statement for the U.S. Coast Guard . . . ” He was right.
As a staff member for the National Security Council, North was trying to stop efforts to, in effect, convert the Coast Guard into a civilian agency. It is unfortunate that he did not have a publication like Warfighting to back him up. Few policy documents existed then, or now, to explain the Coast Guard’s multimission domestic and national security roles.
In simple, easy-to-understand, clear English, General A1 Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, establishes a guide—a common set of assumptions, ideas, values, and attitudes. It is not a checklist, it does not contain specific techniques and procedures. Instead, it has broad policy in the form of concepts and values.
Why has the Coast Guard not published a similar manual? Currently, there is no written philosophy describing the Coast Guard’s multimission capability. In lieu of well-justified, articulated concepts, the service relies on advertising slogans. “Guardians of the Sea,” without a supporting common philosophy, is nothing more than a catchy phrase. The organization needs something that explicitly formalizes its missions, programs, and elements into a strategic definition and vision.
Warfighting provides a framework for planning within the Marine Corps; it is sure to influence future force structure. But the book is not strictly an internal publication, written for the benefit of its own leadership. It will also serve as a means to generate increased awareness and support of the Marine Corps among influential decision makers, organizations, academia, and think tanks.
Doctrine that defines the ways in which the Marine Corps is different from the Army has always been important to the Marines; almost once every 11 years since 1829, attempts have been made to restrict or eliminate the Marine Corps. Presidents Andrew Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Harry Truman all tried to abolish or greatly weaken the service.
The Coast Guard, on the other hand, has never formally described how its forces are operationally employed, in war or peace. What does Title 14,
U.S. Code mean when it states that the Coast Guard shall “function as a specialized service in the Navy in time of war?” What is the essence of the Coast Guard? What do Coast Guard leaders
“The Coast Guard’s Warfighting-type publication would lessen union parochialism in the Coast Guard’s three major communities . . . and lead to a common vision of the service.” mean when they refer to the service’s multimission capability? What is the Coast Guard’s relationship with the Navy? Is it another, competing navy, or the program manager for coastal gunboats, or combat search-and-rescue experts, or what? Does the Coast Guard have a role in the maritime strategy? What is the connection between its domestic and defense missions?
A publication similar to Warfighting would answer these and other questions. In addition, by adopting a strategic vision of itself the Coast Guard could express itself more effectively to the public that assigns its resources.
There is no Coast Guard manual that describes the relationship between the majority of the world’s navies and the U.S. Coast Guard, in terms of missions and equipment. The possibility of using this relationship to further foreign policy and national security goals through an integrated program of overseas training teams, personnel exchange, and port visits has not been explored. Nor has the Coast Guard’s capacity for great flexibility of action when responding to international situations.
The sight of U.S. Coast Guard white hulls rather than U.S. Navy gray hulls would be much less threatening, and could even open closed doors.
Such a manual would provide consistency in the Coast Guard’s procurement decisions. In the area of policy, the Coast Guard needs to link operations and training. It would determine the extent to which national defense requirements drive the selection of replacement platforms; lacking doctrine, platform replacement can be framed strictly in domestic missions or budgetary terms, ignoring national defense considerations.
If the Coast Guard had developed and published a consistent, long-term view of its defense role, it might not have purchased the foreign aircraft that have had logistic problems. Doctrine would have helped decision makers to understand that the aircraft’s lack of Department of Defense (DoD) logistics support would be a significant mission-limiting factor during wartime.
The Coast Guard cannot be a reliable, effective military service if its platforms are not supported by the DoD.
As in the other armed services, many Coast Guard personnel strongly identify with a particular mission or program. The Coast Guard’s Warfighting-type publication would lessen union parochialism in the Coast Guard's three major communities—maritime safety, defense operations, and law enforcement—and lead to a common vision of the service.
The Coast Guard’s integrated contribution to national domestic policy, national defense, and foreign policy requires formal expression, and someday, a review of “Guardians of the Sea,” the informal title of “Coast Guard Manual 1-1, The Basic Operational Doctrine of the United States Coast Guard,” is bound to appear in Proceedings. Until it does, read Warfighting as an example of how it should be done. Semper Fi!
Commander Stubbs is the commanding officer of the USCGC Harriet Lane (WMEC-903) and a previous contributor to Proceedings.
Proceedings / Naval Review 1990