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Contents:
Our Peaceful Navy
Battleships Command Respect
Special Trust and Confidence
Bulldog Ductus Exemplo—The Platoon Commander
What Quieting Means to the Soviets Women on the Front Lines
Flag and General Officers of the Naval Services
RPVs and FFGs—A Good Tactical Match
Why Doesn’t the USNI Board Represent the Membership?
The First Day of the War
Bucher on the Pueblo
Lighting Lamps Not Stars
Keep Pilots in the Navy
Readying the Surface Navy
You’ll Never Catch a Dolphin in a Shipyard
The Public Affairs Front
Safe Ship Control: It Takes Two Far Eastern Navies
Personnel Puzzle
Ultra and the Walkers
Waste Not
“Our Peaceful Navy”
(See G. O’Rourke, pp. 79-83, April 1989; C. J.
Carver, pp. 24-28, June 1989 Proceedings)
Captain H. Robert Keller IV, U. S. Air Force—Recent months have seen a tidal wave of articles written around the theme “Is Gorby For Real?” most of which fall on either end of the political spectrum. Those written by academics tend to follow the line that glasnost will bring about an era of democracy, peace, and plenty for the world. Those written by military professionals usually shortstop discussion by writing off Soviet reform as a Kremlin plot. Neither perspective is particularly helpful in assessing the challenges ahead for the U. S. military. Captain O’Rourke’s article was right on target and is one of the few to say, “Hey, we’d better look at this and consider what if?”
The Soviet Union may indeed be playing an updated version of the “Internationale,” and we would be wise to plan for the worst-case situation (i.e. the failure of Soviet reform). If, however, this does turn out to be a sincere effort to redirect the energy of the Soviet people, we are going to face major public and economic pressures to revise our strategy and force structure. The services are already beginning to feel the pinch and I doubt if it will get any better. Simply denying the good intentions of the Kremlin will not cut too much ice when a carrier group, bombardment wing, or combat service support brigade is on the chopping block. We will need sound arguments and counterproposals to defend our tangible assets. We must be prepared to make changes, not merely react to them.
Although it is not likely that the Soviet Union will Finlandize itself in our lifetime, we must remember that the improbable can happen. It takes comparatively little time for the international order to change, making our national objectives and the strategy to obtain them obsolete. Simply look at the order of battle of any service arm before either World War. I doubt if the most astute Marine Corps officer of 1912 or the best Air Corps flier of 1930 would have guessed how radically his world, or his service arm would change in the near future.
We, too, may be on the edge of a fun damental shift in the international or and should not, as military professions j disregard the “what if” questions 1 Mikhail Gorbachev has placed before u • Only the most flexible minds and pohci ^ will carry us into the next century- 'n lectual honesty and professional resp sibility dictate that the debate over future of our forces should continue, outside events overtake and impose a sions upon us.
Battleships Command Respect
Commander J. Bond, Royal Navy ( tired)—U. S. Navy cruisers and ba ^ ships have fired tens of thousands rounds of 6- , 8- , and 16-inch shells s^ cessfully since 1949 with only three^p^^ pellant fires inside turrets: the St- (CA-73) during the Korean War. Newport News (C A-148) during the ^ nam War, and the USS Iowa (BB-o T ^ none of these cases did the uncontm ,
combustion of the ready charges SF' to the magazines. Safety design fea ^ confined the fires to various upper middle turret levels. Loss of lne ^ moderate. That’s a pretty go0C* ajr
aVafliis
record—much better than the nav service or the submarine service- accident should be investigated W
--------------------------------- - , tn1'
view toward improvement, of cours > the basic battleship design is soun ■ |, U. S. battleships are the only s*1l^nnu- atively immune to the effects of n° ^ clear naval warfare. In fact, W pretty well against nuclear attacks ,s the tests in the late 1940s. T° je- “modem” tin-can navy—cruiser stroyers, frigates—is pathetically ',u js able. As Britain learned in the Faj j Conflict and as the United States w . in the Persian Gulf, a single Exoce ^ missile can totally disable anc*^Qg. to these ships. These missiles have 3 ^
500-pound warheads. A modern c^sjiy although not likely to be sunk, can ^ be disabled as a flight platform W eVeii missiles. But the missiles won penetrate battleships. Armor that signed to resist the impact of two-
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aid
61) is a relic, having been ongi commissioned in 1943, refurbished, recommissioned by the Reagan admia|S tration, but that’s as far as one can S based on the facts. The Iowa is one 0
ioned P
four battleships to be recommissioi part of the 600-ship Navy program ated by former Secretary of the Na ' John Lehman. History books have doc mented their prowess, but detractors main, one contending that their mib*^
Gro
“Special Trust and Confidence^
(See H. G. Summers and R. D. Heinl. PP- 102, May 1989 Proceedings)
Captain J. L. MacMichael, V■ S■ ^a'L ^
tu;. —- ----- --- rlpnd 'W
tr
the
Unger—also missed the mark
flic p°'
sted-
is not that officers cannot be trust that, as officers, they have a sPeC' b) sponsibility to lead their subordinuL precept and example.
inch shells can shrug off Exocets. And nobody else has any 16-inch shells to fire at U. S. battleships.
All navies were premature in scrapping World War II technology. Those giant tankers in the Persian Gulf withstood gun attacks from “modem” frigates, and most sailed away. None of them could withstand one torpedo broadside and one minute of five-inch shelling from a World
War II U. S. Navy destroyer. The U. S. Navy should keep the battleships and bring out and recondition the Salem (CA- 139)—the only serving rapid-fire heavy cruiser in the world. Even her armor is better than today’s tin cans, and her rate of fire is fantastic. A battleship can fire 18 rounds of two-ton shells per minute for an extended time period. The Salem can fire 54 rounds or more of one-halfton shells per minute for an extended time period. How rapidly can today’s missi <• ships fire, reload, and how long can the) keep firing?
Peter W. Harris—As a U. S. Naval Academy graduate who recently left ^ tive naval service after 12 years, I exception to the recent flurry of article denigrating the military use of battl ships. One can argue that the Iowa (p _
initi'
use is vestigial—prowling off the si of weakly armed nations such as nada, Lebanon, and Nicaragua. ifl While I was a Navy pilot stationed an aircraft carrier off the coast of N non in the mid-1980s, I was involve several missions: attempting to free n. hostages, flying cover for the United tions Peacekeeping Force in Leban^ and dealing with terrorism and the viet-backed regime of Syria. Often aircraft would return from missions . died with bullets or having been 1 .f upon by Soviet-supplied surface-id missiles. Our naval forces were set interfered with, however, when the ^ tleship New Jersey (BB-62) joined us the coast. -,,-
Issues in the Middle East remain c ^ plex and the enemy is often diff*cU ^ identify, but one constant remains- tential adversaries respect the Navy a tleships. A platform that can hur ^ Volkswagen-size warhead more thau^_ miles with considerable accuracy L mands respect.
This article was consistent: dead from beginning to end. Wrong m e, ginning by implying that most of L ^ R. D. Heinl’s points were still { Colonel Summers—as well as * Secretary of State George Shun^ ^ former Lieutenant Elizabeth^
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In the early 1980s I commanded a frigate homeported in Norfolk. Urinalysis was still fairly new, and there were some widespread misgivings about the validity of the tests. So whenever a percentage of the crew was tested, the command senior chief and I also were tested, regardless of whether it was our turn. Positive results occurred almost immediately. Grumbling about the accuracy of the tests stopped because the captain and the senior chief were tested too; crew belief in the tests’ accuracy rose; my increased confidence was reflected in my ability to award nonjudicial punishment based on test results. After more than 20 weekly tests the senior chief said, “This ship has a reputation on the waterfront. It you’re ordered aboard and do drugs don’t unpack your seabag, because you’re not long for the ship or the Navy.” I asked what he and the chief petty officer mess thought of this development, and he said, “We think it’s great!” The tests were effective, and drug use declined to less than 2% yearly. While I admit that the testing procedures necessarily intrude on individual privacy, they provide a worthwhile and essential outcome for safety at sea—a virtually drug-free environment.
I cannot conceive of requiring enlisted crewmembers to undergo a drug test— whose results can ruin their careers— while simultaneously exempting officers as a result of “special trust and confidence.” This sort of privilege by position smacks of student draft deferments, or perhaps the exemptions Congress has granted itself from laws that apply to the rest of the country. Thousands of sailors and chiefs would see that for what it is— a double standard. Furthermore, officers would have to face the loss of self-respect that comes from knowing your subordinates are being required to do more than yourself. In my opinion, those who think that any exemptions from drug testing are warranted are themselves part of the nationwide drug problem.
Finally, I don’t know the state of the drug testing “fiasco” in other services, but in the Navy that description is wrong. The testing program is well run, widely accepted, and has successfully enforced the illicit drug standard set by then-Chief of Naval Operations James Watkins— “Not on my watch. Not on my ship. Not in my Navy.” To the overwhelming majority of officers on active duty, this is now a nonissue. I recommend that Proceedings address some real problems.
my outprocessing from Ubon Royal Tm1 Air Force Base in 1971 but with a differ ent outcome. The procedure was to re ceive a registered container for the ufl sample, submit to a search in the nia lobby of the clinic, and provide the sani pie under supervision (mirrors on ceiling). Just before providing the sanl, pie, a young security policeman ask my permission to search me. My ir*stl five response was, “Certainly not, but you have the authority to do it.
ahead.” I was the first individual to1 lenge the procedure. He did not have authority to conduct a search.
hal'
the
The security policeman’s first read11, was to attempt gentle persuasion, you realize this might delay y° call? Why don’t you cooperate^- ^
■Don1
good of the whole program?” Tbe n ^ step was to sit me at a desk with a cop) , the Uniform Code of Military Justice a to place a guard at the door. . f
After an hour or so of this, the c ^ nurse came in and placed a teleph°ne ^ my elbow. It promptly rang and a volC. . the other end said, “This is the commander. Get your ass out in the and get searched!” “Yes, sir" see. ^ like an appropriate response at the and so the incident ended. I learned that the legal and social actions had no contingency plan for a case this, so they generated this ad h°c
sponse on the spot.
I believed then and still believe such procedures are demeaning. The satisfaction I derived was in knowinf
0
only
0
VV3S
the legal basis for the whole business ^ called into question and that the ^ commander had to intervene PerS°.j0n- in my case and in several others. I rj* ^ alized that he had a right to searc ^ individual he wished on his facility- ^ have regrets that I didn’t press my ^ lenge harder. Lieutenant Unger dim she paid the penalty. Certainly, b 1 Navy’s loss.
,, pdf'
Lieutenant Commander Richard .y, tridge, U. S. Naval Reserve Just when the very concept of “an 0 and a gentleman” seemed defunct ^ U. S. Navy, with no senior °^)ce[lO0
ing to come to the defense
of a y°
Colonel Andrew Borden, U. S. Air Force (Retired)—Three cheers for Lieutenant Unger! 1 had a similar experience during
female officer valiant enough to sjaI’ 0f for that concept, a stalwart in the a retired U. S. Army officer has ^ forth and restored this officer’s fa' there is hope for the officer corPfj j„|'s When I first read colonel R- D- ( classic treatise on “Special Tru ^ Confidence” as a junior officer 3 ago, I noted an almost immediate L ^jjji in both the officers and those who
/ J-b'
”h them on an official basis. My squad- r°n ^ates (including the skipper) and I ^s°lved that we would not accept denning treatment and it stuck because e host command apparently spread the 0rd that it would be so.
As "ess
J’age,” which was defined as “doing at is right regardless of the conse- eriees to himself.” I was proud of my
an active-duty naval officer, my fit- report included a grade for “moral
’’'arks
"lore
lr> that area as I know of no quality important in an officer.
his sordid and paranoiac drug war has its if ’nnocent victims than drug abuse aU ’• in Vietnam, our people were not °wed to win but were required to fight
that none of my officer classmates felt affronted by the policy or believed it to be out of place.
Lowered expectations invariably lead to lower standards of conduct and performance. If the services cannot uncompromisingly rely on only the highest expectations of personal honor on the part of the officer corps without the current damnable “show me” programs, they are suffering from an evil far worse than drugs.
“Bulldog Ductus Exemplo—The Platoon Commander”
(See G. K. Holcomb, pp. 115-118, November 1988; P. F. Donohue, pp. 20-22, February 1989; A. DeNunzio, p. 30, March 1989; G. C. Allen, pp. 28-29, May 1989; K. Estes, pp. 8688, June 1989 Proceedings)
Commander Timothy H. Meyer, U. S. Navy—I am disappointed at the level of anti-surface warfare officer (SWO) propaganda reported in Midshipman Allen’s comment. I would think that the leadership at the Naval Academy would want to
a"d die
anyway. It is equally immoral to
an •
il. ” ’hat the drug war cannot be won as ^ being conducted but to continue to
Colonel
innocent people in the attempt.
Summers deserves the grati-
nf
t0 °’ every officer for calling attention (juhe intolerable situation that exists. Lie Sen’or officers, rather than chastising |e_,tenar>t Unger for demonstrating the Sejvership they have not exhibited them- heh,6S °r remaining silent, should rally O* Colonel Summers and do what is cersa anci right. It is not for senior offi- shoi 1 alone’ however. Every officer SUsd hollow the example of Elizabeth n Unger or seek another profession.
(j ^enont Commander J. M. van Tol, of l \avy—I suspect that a fair number
^bout?*» T' - - o
ijw. • True to the old American prag-
gr,,atc ’radition, they will point out with Prop Sa’’sfaction that the drug-testing is jU.arri works. Drug use in the services qnelsPutably down as a direct conse- •j^Ce °f testing programs. steee services, however, are paying a
readers are sincerely asking themes* “What’s Summers fussing
Out
en if ■ ’ “
t ’ l[ intangible, price for stamping
at particular evil through random
sp 8- The policy of “sure, we repose gojna trus’ and confidence, but we’re a „8 ’° check just to make sure” makes a" off- 6ry °f ’he fundamental notion of of p ICer’s honor. Devaluing the concept alrea'|Sona’ honor in the officer corps has sy,had a corrosive effect and is re|ati'r demonstrated by the fact that so ir,,. W'yfew officers feel strongly about
fgrit
Post„Cn * was stationed at the Naval fo^fdnate School in Monterey, Cali- ’hat ’ ’he physics department insisted sign , udents (all officers) in its classes st5tina ^aPer at ’he start of each quarter "tOfg® ’hat they would not cheat. Even StsaPPalling to me than the implica- such a requirement was the fact
y issues.
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ing). Does this mean that those ‘want to go Navy air, sir” are now
ensure that all midshipmen weigh their service selection options concerning postgraduation career opportunities in all unrestricted line communities on facts, not myths. I suspect that the ludicrous portrayal of surface warfare professionalism enunciated in the comment may be tolerated by “the system” in order to make certain programs (read submarine warfare) appear more attractive.
Midshipman Allen suggests that candidates for appointment to the Naval Academy be screened “more carefully” and be “made aware that if they want to come to the Academy they had better want to be surface warfare officers.” I didn’t need the candidate guidance office to tell me about surface warfare or any other postgraduation option before I gladly accepted an appointment to the Naval Academy. The catalogue stated the Naval Academy’s mission quite clearly for me: to produce professional officers for the
Navy and Marine Corps. Unless times have changed dramatically, most high school seniors have enough to think about just picking a college and major, never mind what postgraduation career opportunity to pursue.
As was the case with my acceptance of appointment, my decision to remain at the Naval Academy never was conditionally predicated upon my postgraduation opportunities. As is probably true today, in 1973 many of my classmates (myself included) were unable to pursue our “first choice” at service selection. What I don’t remember then was that those of us who could not pursue our first choice were any less “enthusiastic” (read motivated) about doing the best job we could following graduation.
I also note that for the first time in my memory, the Naval Academy did not meet its aviation ceiling this year at service selection. The principal reason I’ve heard for this lack of aviation apphcan' is the additional year of obligated servic required of aviation candidates this ye (from six to seven years following wtn~g
being
“forced to go SWO”? I don’t think oo<j year additional obligated service won have made much of a difference in 1“ to our “enthusiasm” to go air.
1 am not upset with Midshipmen Alwjj" I am disturbed by the system that cu vates the thought process revealed in comment. I think it is clear we nee provide more facts on which midship11 can base service selection decisw What’s not as clear, but may war^ consideration, is that we need to P more admissions emphasis on rn0tivaar)(j than technical academic competence assign more officer “motivators” t0 staff at the Naval Academy and fe “recruiters.”
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The Soviet Navy
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___________________________ J
“What Quieting Means to the
Soviets”
(See R. R. Pariscau and L. F. Gunn, pp. 4648, April 1989; C. J. Carver, pp. 24-28, June
1989 Proceedings)
Aviation ASW Operator First Class Gary Leigh, U. S. Navy—Dr. Pariseau’s and Captain Gunn’s article is timely, informative, and unfortunately very true. As an operator of both shore-based and airborne acoustic processors for the past nine years, I have seen firsthand the Soviets’ acoustic revolution at sea. To face this challenge we must admit that the Soviet submarine threat we now simulate in antisubmarine warfare exercises no longer exists. Too many times we have used wartime scenarios as a means of establishing crew confidence and getting our qualification requirements up-to-date. This is easy to accomplish when the aircraft’s or ship’s on-board processors are a generation ahead of the simulated threat. We will not have this advantage in wartime. The Soviets are not going to instruct their growing fleet of Akulas, Oscars, and Typhoons to turn on augmentors or to limit themselves to certain geographical limitations to make us look good.
It is time to train as we would fight. Exercises should be structured so that desired training is accomplished realistically. Exercise submarines should be used to teach us to recognize the quieter threat. We must put our new processing systems and ourselves to the test. We can meet the threat only if we face it now, and the invaluable lessons we learn today will give us the edge in experience tomorrow.
The authors also make a strong case for hardening the airfields used by our maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) in preparation for possible SS-N-21 and SS-N-24 missile saturation attacks. The U.S. Air Force and our allies have recognized the threat against airfields from air and cruise-missile attacks by Soviet forces in Europe and have taken precautions. Until we develop a vertical or short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) long-range ASW- capable aircraft (perhaps a derivative of the SV-22) that doesn’t need a runway, we should follow their example. This should also include the hardening of hangars and ASW command-and-control centers. If the Soviets are shifting antisurface warfare tactical doctrine from sea-launched cruise missiles to torpedo attacks, and Soviet naval aviation assets are unable to destroy our MPA sites, a submarine-launched attack would be logical. This could disrupt allied long-range ASW and sea lines of communications defense. The attack could be carried out without exposing valuable surface units to retaliation. Perhaps worst of all, 1110 rale would be affected by giving °a “hunters” a bitter taste of being l"e
“hunted.” 1
Those of us in the cat-and-mouse ga'11'j of ASW must avoid being close m'n<*e in the face of Soviet submarine techno ogy advances. We must think along un conventional lines to develop the seat methods and tactics to ensure that a J confrontation ends in our favor.
“Women on the Front Lines”
(See B. J. Coyle, pp. 37-40, April 1989 Proceedings)
“Personnel Puzzle”
(See C. H. Becraft, pp. 41-44. April 1989 Proceedings)
£
Lieutenant M. E. Nelson, Jr., U- . Navy—Commander Coyle proposes women serve in combat or com related billets if they volunteer for billets. That option is not available ^ males. According to Coyle, we leara, during the racial turmoil of the 1960s “separate, but equal” is not the way 8°-
Equal opportunity will come " each officer and sailor is subject to same Navy detailing process. If the c bat exclusion law is repealed, I hope Navy will maintain a policy of tsS orders, not invitations, based on sex-
Lieutenant R. H. Brubaker, U• ^ J]
(Retired)—Here we go again! The Ay, Proceedings presents a double-ban^ attempt to rationalize the fashionable1 that there is no longer any justification ^ denying women assignment to co i billets. Considering the preponderate , articles and letters published in .
ings recently that favor women, I sa7 jp- that the Editorial Board has been hr ^ washed by the militant feminists. U we being conned on a potentially df ous course by the pervasive attitud ^ such change is inevitable, therefore ^ must accept compromise rega
probable detrimental consequences • ^
attitudes have no place in the milimO^j embrace them is tantamount to PlaA(y. Russian roulette with national seen
U.S'
Commander Thomas P. Gallagher, ]f:
Navy—The Navy should take the dealing with Congress on the enl° upt issue of women serving in c°f:zens Congress’s insistence that U. S. cl are willing to see their sons in c°
but not their daughters, ignores the realities of modem combat and modem U. S. naval operations. As the pool of “manpower” declines, restricting women from “combat” units wastes talent that may prove critical to “manning” future naval units.
Women in the armed forces are a part of our combat forces in every respect:
► As of 1 March 1989, about 1,500 women have received imminent danger pay for participating in support operations in the Persian Gulf. Most were Navy personnel.
► An East Coast-based Navy tender announced that an all-female gun crew had qualified for the ship’s defense during general quarters.
► A female surface warfare officer (SWO) was selected to command a surface ship.
► Women may be assigned temporary active duty on board naval combatants for as many as six months for personnel qualification standards testing, as long as the ship is not expected to be involved in combat operations.
► More women are qualifying as SWOs, which requires knowledge of all surface capabilities, including weapon systems.
► The Coast Guard announced that women assigned to their ships would stay with those ships if the Coast Guard is assigned to the Navy in time of national emergency, including war.
► The routine nature of women’s assignments to Coast Guard ships, including those involved in the war on drugs, is hazardous.
Women may also be assigned to Navy combat logistics force and repair ships because these ships are considered noncombatants. But most surface ships on deployment travel in groups, usually with a carrier battle group. Will these ships be less of a target during a conflict because women are assigned to them?
Women have proved that they are capable of performing every job that men do at sea. If we want female officers to become warfare specialists, then we should want them to participate in warfare. If not, we have made a promise we cannot keep and wasted the taxpayers’ money training female officers in areas the nation’s taxpayers allegedly do not want them to operate.
Arguments about separate messing and berthing facilities are smoke screens. Ships’ facilities can be separated with minor modifications, during overhauls or extended availabilities.
The Naval Academy sends out mixed crews on yard patrol craft and sailboats for weeks at a time. Bancroft Hall at the Naval Academy is the world's larges coed dormitory.
Professional men and women with tn proper leadership and guidelines can op erate and live together, even under stress- We sell ourselves short when we expo otherwise.
The Navy should help Congress get0 board.
“Ultra and the Walkers”
(See E. D. Smith, pp. 110-119, May 1989
Proceedings)
William T. Christie—Captain Smithy grasp of the material is excellent. 11 only when he gives into the admits J irresistible urge to speculate on the t pact of Soviet exploitation of U. S. c° munications that he errs. To suggest the failures of the Son Tay raid and Iranian hostage rescue mission resu from Soviet tip-offs to the North namese and Iranians is very dangerous. leads us down the same path that cauS the military to deny that its communlC^ tions were insecure. The implicatt°n- course, is that we do everything P fectly, and if not for Soviet meddling unfavorable providence) all our °P jS tions would have been successful-
YOU CAN SEE
THROUGH IT.
WITH STHI VIDEO
both
c3tioi
rrtise
Tk
ne Soviets may have known about
rescue missions from our communi- ins- But they would hardly compro- SUch a successful intelligence opera-
P°Uru
ic‘ng on the supporting aircraft.
achi,
^position is seductive and makes it easy r us to avoid facing up to our mistakes. ^ Common sense tells us that if the North letnamese knew in advance about the . °n Tay raid, they would have been wait- 8 °n the ground, not just with prison j ards and a barracks of Chinese advis- l S' Likewise, the Iranians surely would j.Ve reinforced the embassy (which they not do until after the raid) and been nait'ng in ambush at Desert 1. This does ,l niinimize either the damage done by Walkers, or the extent of Soviet pene- ion of our communications. But the cts do not support Captain Smith’s con- um°ns in this area.
ev.n ^ filing the North Vietnamese to Innate Son Tay and then restraining 1,1 from crushing the raid force and
Both
H,as!eved complete surprise, but Son Tay |a(. an intelligence failure and Iran a vio- su;°n °f most of the principles of war and the^ful raid operations. In Grenada, Labans were ready and waiting beer^0 dlcy had discovered a Special Op- l0ns Unit that was preparing to secure
the airfield. The Rangers had not planned on parachuting in and the only reason they were not massacred was the poor position of antiaircraft guns and the fact that the Cubans were dug in waiting for an amphibious assault.
Instead of looking for easy explanations, we should be learning from our mistakes.
“Flag and General Officers of the Naval Services”
(See pp. 233-262, May 1989 Proceedings)
Editor’s Note: We published two photos of Rear Admiral Jimmie W. Taylor: one beside his name (page 241), and one beside Rear Admiral James E. Taylor’s. The proper entry is published here for those who wish to correct their flag lists.
“Waste Not”
(See R. A. Guida, pp. 73-78, April 1989
Proceedings)
Richard E. Sanderson, Director, Office of Federal Activities, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency—Commander Guida admirably captures the fundamental nature of the serious environmental challenges federal facilities face. He identifies the “environmental consciousness” needed to create a cultural change in the way we operate. Including his article in your magazine will go a long way toward achieving that end for the Navy.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published its “Federal Facilities Compliance Strategy” or “Yellow- Book” (Federal Register Vol. 53. No. 242, December 1988) recognizing differences between federal facilities and private industry. The book outlines the EPA’s primary policy and guidance for compliance monitoring and enforcement activities at government-owned or -operated facilities and land. Fully implemented, the “Yellow Book” should result in better consistency in EPA interaction with federal facilities and clarify many problem areas discussed in the article.
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“JPVs and FFGs—A Good Tactical Match”
I (Jef R D. Watkins, pp. 97-98, September ®8; J. C. Nixon, p. 88, December 1988
I ”oceedings)
^(>rnmander C. E. Wheeler, U. S. Navy, ^Slstant surface operations officer, ^Wander Cruiser Destroyer Group Mve, and former executive officer USS c°yle (FFG-39)—While I agree with 'financier Watkins’s contention that aiotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) would a ,a valuable tactical asset for a surface ^tl0n group (SAG) or carrier battle ^oup (CVBG) commander, 1 disagree p1 1 his choice of the Oliver Hazard fcTp ^FG-7) class as the host platform RPVs, and specifically with the coni' of operating a LAMPS-III helicopter an RPV from the same ship.
Uj ae author seems to begin his argu- //nt hy stating that the Oliver Hazard C*ass ‘s not °Perati°nally well q , to the battle group environment, its 'If ttle contrary; this class has proved tleS to be a versatile addition to any bat- ec(f°np. The balance of endurance and Can°my» sensors, weapons fit, aviation ^Pabiljtjes, and sea-keeping qualities a su^e 'he battle group commander with aiP capable of use in diverse roles. S(v] ,riTlC(l with Harpoon and Standard p^i-lVlR missiles, the Oliver Hazard sUri? C*ass ‘s Just as capable in the anti- si)j ace warfare (ASUW) role as most the s' an<^ w’th a LAMPS helicopter and s^ VQ-89 system, it is a deadly antiin t^1 arine warfare asset. Its capabilities H0(c antiair warfare (AAW) arena, while Itoocl an Aegis cruiser, are also Etou ’ wtlether integrated with battle al0 P defense in depth or in the standee p ,n°dc. While critics may argue that Seara/"T °f both a three-dimensional air Wei|Ctl rac*ar and an ASROC system as are | .as fbe installation of the 76-mm. gun ^abilities, this is simply not the case. Rpyc Oliver Hazard Perry class and ► y'1 ,are not a good tactical match: claSs b°ugh the Oliver Hazard Perry itiai| Can use JP-5, it does not do so nor- toPDy- ^Ven if the ship’s fuel tanks were be he °Pf with JP-5, this fuel could no;
fittC(j'^'Capable ships, the frigates are
, sb'Ps- Thus, if RPV-handling thirigLrs or cranes were required, some- Would have to be removed from the
lln8s/ July 1989
ship. This would be a hard choice; there is hardly any nonessential gear located topside on an Oliver Hazard Perry-class ship.
► The author fails to make any distinction between the four sub-classes within the overall class. The variables are basically the SQQ-89 system, Link 11, roll- stabilization fins, and the LAMPS-III/ recovery assistance, securing, and traversing system.
► Operating the LAMPS-III helicopter and RPVs from the same ship is not a good idea because the RPV would duplicate the capabilities and degrade the performance of the LAMPS-III system. The LAMPS-III already provides the “eyes” hundreds of miles ahead of a SAG, while providing electronic support measures and airborne early warning coverage as well (see “Helicopter Tactical Employment For the 1990s” by Lieutenant K. Ireland, September 1988 Proceedings). As Commander Watkins stated, the RPV would provide reconnaissance data as far out as 350 nautical miles from the launch point. If the Oliver Hazard Perry ship operated say 50-100 nautical miles ahead of the SAG, the LAMPS-III could provide basically the same coverage, distance wise:
Ship ahead of
SAG 50—100 nautical miles
LAMPS-III
ahead of
ship 100-120 nautical miles
Radar ahead of
LAMPS-III 160 nautical miles
310-380 nautical miles
The LAMPS-III can collect electronic warfare information and remain on station longer than the RPV. These are significant tactical advantages.
One of the superior features of the Oliver Hazard Perry class is the ability to embark two helicopters. This enables the ship to maintain a helicopter airborne continuously on station for extended periods of time, whether in the ASW or ASUW role. Were one of the helos to be replaced by an RPV, this capability would be lost. An additional drawback is that the ship must go dead in the water to recover the RPV, but would not have to go so for a helicopter.
The bottom line is that the LAMPS-III already provides the capability the RPV ostensibly would add.
The RPV might work better in nonaviation-capable combatants.
(Continued on page 74)
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UNMANNED AIR VEHICLES (UAV)
Comment and Discussion
“Why Doesn’t the USNI Board
Represent the Membership?”
(See J. C. Scharfen, p. 102, April 1989; M. J.
O’Donnell, p. 85, June 1989 Proceedings)
Commander Keith Rapp, U. S. Naval Reserve—As a 25-year member of the Naval Institute I must agree with Colonel Scharfen’s proposals for change. Would not the free election of reserve/retired officers and enlisted personnel demonstrate the single Navy concept, or is such talk mere lip service used to mask the two-Navy reality? Does not the present policy also imply that retirement from the Navy—active-duty only please—means an accompanying loss in the gray matter?
How do we go about making Colonel Scharfen’s changes?
“The First Day of the War”
(See J. B. Stockdalc, p. 12, February 1989 Proceedings)
Captain R. N. Livingston, U. S. Navy (Retired)—One must be aware that the unexpected is to be expected and as Admiral Stockdale says, “the man who scales that pyramid has thought of that beforehand, and mentally prepared himself to make the most of each episode from the moment it first reveals itself. You’ve got to be there with the right stuff
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when the moment strikes.”
Admiral Stockdale then illustrates his point with the negative events of 5 August 1964 that occurred during the first air strikes of the Vietnam War. The rest of the story that Admiral Stockdale didn’t relate, and which I think is worth telling, provides the positive side and brings his point into sharper focus.
At the time of the patrol (PT) boat attacks on 4 August 1964, Air Wing Five had more than half of its complement of A-4 attack aircraft on the beach at Naval Air Station Cubi Point, Philippines. These aircraft were ordered to launch at first light on 5 August and recover on board the USS Ticonderoga (CG-47) in the Tonkin Gulf as soon as possible. I was with this group. We had no real idea of what was going on until we landed on board ship. As soon as we got the ready room, we were told that a restrike was to launch as soon as our aircraft could be refueled and armed. The strike group would consist of four F-8s and eight A-4s. The F-8s were loaded with rockets for flack suppression. Four A-4s were loaded with three 500-pound bombs and 20-mm. guns and four were loaded with 2.75 rockets and 20-mm. guns. The crews were chosen and we went to the aviation intelligence spaces to plan the mission.
The target was to be a restrike of the oil dump at Vinh. We had hardly begun planning the mission when word came down that the target had been changed and we were to strike a target near Dong Hoi, just north of the demilitarized zone where some PT boats had allegedly been sighted. We quickly put away our planning for Vinh and began the planning for the new target. Before that could be satis- factorly completed, we were called to “man aircraft.” Then to make matters worse, once we were strapped into our aircraft, we were told that the target had again changed and that we were to hit Vinh as originally planned! To add insult to injury, the ordinance crews had not been given sufficient time to completely arm all of the aircraft. My aircraft, for example, had no 20-mm. gun. Despite all of the confusion at this point, the launch was begun.
There seemed to be very little order to the launch. As pilots and aircraft were
ready, they were taxied to the catapu and launched. We proceeded to the re dezvous point. After an inordinately 1° time for rendezvous, caused by the u ganized launch, we finally got the etg A-4s together, but the F-8s had ^
joined. Because we had wasted so m1
time and fuel trying to get the
strike
group together, we either had to head for the target or abort the strike. The^
leader, a lieutenant commander, ^ to proceed toward the target and *e^ey
F-8s try to get joined en route, never did. Admiral Stockdale related part of the story. From this point on was all improvisation. In the initial p ning we never planned the tactics would use at Vinh before the target been switched. . n0ll
We crossed the beach at Cape MU1flUt having gone low level several ml LSe to sea and proceeded up highway guided by the column of smoke tha suited from the initial strike. We proached the target from the sout slightly west. As Vinh came into s’S we popped up to about 8,000 feet in 0 to roll in with a pullout toward the ^ As soon as we had cleared the I°w we begin to receive antiair fire fr°nl ^ island in the river and an addition® e located to the east of Vinh. The s ^ leader immediately broke off the se ^ division of A-4s (the ones with the rockets) and sent them to flack supP ^ while the first division continued t f tack on the oil tanks. Without any tun
communication, we performed a ^ wheel” roll-in around the target each pilot selecting his own aim P^ng Staying low after pullout and Proceern to out to sea, we joined up for the re the ship. Our bombs were essentia ^ target and we returned to the Ticon with all aircraft unscathed.
Admiral Stockdale said. “Wars
tarts-
ca-
And skill, competence, guts, nerV ’ all reerism, fear, and cowardice & mixed up in one big fat ball on t first day. And nobody seems to t rjsc time to sort it all out.” Some the above the chaos, however, and ta^( js initiative and do heroic things- ^ what wins battles. Admiral Sto emy makes a highly pertinent point. I ° example shows that there are tno have the “right stuff.”
/ Jab
19»9
easily
cause they could have been too
scut
‘we hadn’t received an effective
“Bucher on the Pueblo”
(See L. M. Bucher, pp. 38-39, February 1989;
D. M. Karcher, p. 20, April 1989 Proceedings)
Captain Paul R. Schratz, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Commander Bucher criticizes the Navy high command for poor intelligence support in the Pueblo (AGER-2) incident, yet he is far less critical in judging his own dereliction in surrendering his command without attempting any resistance. Unclassified information suggests a different interpretation.
The Pueblo was partly a victim of the blind spot in the American character that subconsciously degrades intelligence operations. Ships on intelligence missions seem to fall between the cracks as far as operational control is concerned. The USS Liberty (AGTR-5), a similar ship on a similar mission in the Mediterranean a few months before the Pueblo tragedy, had been attacked by the Israelis and suffered a severe loss of life because she was lost sight of during the height of the Six-Day War. Like the Pueblo, the Liberty seemed to have no operational commander. Commander Bucher’s boss, Rear Admiral Frank L. Johnson, advised him “not to appear provocative.” So vague a mandate could hardly set aside the normal responsibility of the captain for his command at sea. The Nuremberg trials made clear that an officer cannot hide behind the chain of command or the orders of his superiors.
Bucher clearly was not alert to his responsibilities. He had been well briefed by the commanding officer of the USS Banner (AGER-1) (his predecessor in the area) on the Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean harrassments the Banner had suffered. Yet the Pueblo's officers were not prepared. Statements attesting to this appear frequently in the record. Since Bucher’s statements reflect a high degree of self-interest, one must look to other sources such as North Korean radio intercepts, largely overlooked by analysts, which clarify the tactical situation at the time of capture.
The North Koreans probably got the idea of capturing one of the Navy’s intelligence-gathering step-children from the Liberty incident in the Mediterranean. A Warsaw Pact general officer stated as much publicly. The capture of a U. S. man-of-war on the high seas was a risky operation, however, so the North Koreans had to be almost certain of success.
The seizure was carefully planned and the tension had been deliberately escalated. In November 1967, six months after the Liberty attack and two months before the Pueblo's, North Korea protested at Panmunjom that “an armed spy ship of a thousand tons” was operating off its coast. (The Pueblo was 968 tons.) Reflecting the rising tension, renewed hostilities along the Demilitarized Zone in December 1967 resulted in 131 U. S. and South Korean soldiers killed and 294 wounded. South Korean fishermen were captured at sea; a South Korean patrol boat was blown out of the water.
On 6 January 1968, less than three weeks before the incident, the North Koreans again warned against using spy ships off their coasts, stating that they were determined to take countermeasures. On 11 January, the day Pueblo departed Sasebo, Japan, the North Korean radio repeated the warning of the sixth. The Pueblo's departure was no secret. Security for U. S. operations from Japan was notoriously loose; bar girls told at least four of the crew where their ship was going.
On 12 January, the Pueblo reached her operating area; on 19 January, four days prior to the seizure, the U. S. government was notified by North Korea that it considered dispatching of “spy boats” a provocative act. Two days later, 21 January, North Koreans attempted to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung Hee. Here Bucher is correct in stating that vital information was not made available to him. Also on this day a patrol vessel observed the Pueblo carefully as she passed close aboard en route to Wonsan. The next day, two armed patrol vessels circled the Pueblo at close range and certainly noted (again) that no attempt was made to remove gun covers.
Bucher was sufficiently alerted to realize the situation was critical. He broke radio silence to send an emergency report. But the North Koreans undoubtedly noted that it took 14 hours for the Pueblo to get her high-priority message off. At noon the following day, the fateful 23rd, a Soviet-built subchaser, at general quarters, circled at 500 to 1000 yards. Again the Pueblo made no attempt to remove her gun covers—stated to be a five- minute operation despite Bucher’s claim that they were “frozen”—and made no semblance of defense. The Pueblo was challenged and her identity was radioed to the North Korean headquarters. The patrol vessel then demanded, "Heave to or I open fire.”
Here the question of self-defense being “not provocative” enters. Failure to attempt even a show of defense became the most provocative act of all. At 1252, four torpedo-armed patrol boats joined the fray with their guns manned. The subchaser attempted to board; the Pueblo began to destroy publications but made no attempt to scuttle. The water was “too cold for the crew to survive” yet the publications were not thrown overboard ne
recovered from the bottom of the sea 1 divers.” It was asinine that the ship ried so many unneeded intelligence PuD lications and no less so that Bucher ha neither a priority of destruction nor a fea sible plan for disposal.
On the critical question of readiness, one gun captain did not know how open the ammunition locker. No one w trained to use the gun: contrary to expl|C orders, few gun drills had been conducts in the whole year of operations. The cap tain had requested “destruct mec nisms” for the special equipment board yet failed to pick them up in Sase before departure. Demolition charges the ship had been denied but, as stated ; Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, s valves were pointed out that could knocked off with a sledge hammer; the location for mounting the sledge suggested. Bucher claims that beca tling system the ship would sink °j\
partway.” A noncompartmented s
with the flood valves open would S1 like a rock. f ..
The key to the North Korean
knowledge that Bucher would make
attempt to defend—tested beforehan can be inferred from the message £ North Korean commander sent to his at 1306 on the critical day. The mcssa from the on-scene commander to base ^ not ask for permission to open *'r^'(oVv stated simply, “Intend to board an ^ to Wonsan.” This is clearly not sage one would send in seizing a u ^ States warship on the high seas; ll ,g appropriate only in the certainty tha vessel would not resist. . g(j
The CO of the Pueblo had convm the enemy he would not resist an e dereliction brought disaster. 1 hesuC. was not that he was unable to defen (0 cessfully, only that he was unW‘ a defend. The North Koreans carried o clear, step-by-step plan with a f0'^'step conclusion, and they verified eac ^ with the base as the plan unfolde ■ Bucher made the show of defens® every CO must make in carrying ^ responsibilities, it is wholly unlike 1 f the incident would have gone any fu Nor would we have learned of jn ciencies and organizational fadu intelligence-gathering.
I do not mean to be unfair or unS' niefl. thetic to Pete Bucher and his ^ Bucher did a heroic job in keep'^^g crew together in prison camp and PL^[lia| up morale. But had he carried out n security procedures while in c° that need would never have arisen-
i juiy
Lighting Lamps, Not Stars”
*S<>f P. M. Walsh, pp, 92-93, April 1989;
Tis;
T. E.
:za> P- 14, June 1989 Proceedings)
Gui
nnery Sergeant Edward J. Herterich,
■ S. Marine Corps (Retired)—I am sur- Pfised that any officer—or any seasoned Pet'y officer— would suggest delegating Responsibility to a subordinate. Responsi- ' uy is never delegated; it remains with e ‘Boss.” Authority may be delegated.
Keep Pilots in the Navy”
^" Golightly, pp. 32-36, December SS; J. P. Unger and W. T. Brockman, pp. 16- ‘to February 1989; E. P. Carroll, p. 29, March 89 Proceedings)
Readying the Surface Navy”
(See L. p. James, pp. 30-35, August 1988;
• T. Deutermann, pp. 33-34, October 1988;
• A. Mehling and R. S. Cloward, p. 27,
^°vember 1988; S. L. Morrell, p. 14,
Uer • r
Cember 1988 Proceedings)
y°u’ll Never Catch a Dolphin ln a Shipyard”
(■See J
p' Doty, p. 23, December 1988 r°Ceedings)
Jewtenant Steven Douglass Scroggs,
' S- Navy, submarine force—
K. Morrow, p. 92, September 1988;
L
^leiJtenant Golightly’s article and com- rejRnts from other junior officers (JOs) in
silli
* of professional fulfillment. It seems
dj . — issues express concern about the i S|Htisionment of JOs resulting from a
It is true that the job for which a young college graduate is hired has no rigid definition. But the raw potential of a young naval officer should enable him to apply his motivation, integrity, and adaptability to his assigned duties. Lieutenant Golightly speaks of the aviators’ “elan” and “high professional standards.” Is this the same group of warriors from whom it would be “utopian” to expect self-initiated tactics and systems study? Lieutenant (junior grade) Morrell bemoans the loss of “knowledge and much motivation” young surface warfare officers experience in adjusting to JO life after graduation from school. I assert that many of these obstacles are self- constructed and that drawing on the experience of senior enlisted members and officers in the fleet today is the key to overcoming them.
JOs obviously are eager to get into the thick of it and perform their duties competently. This is a welcome and healthy sign of the population that will inherit the leadership of tomorrow’s Navy. But the exasperation that an individual frequently feels should not be translated into the attitude that a JO has no control over his own professional development. By blaming external sources for personal dissatisfaction a person is shunning a basic responsibility one inherits with a commission— the responsibility to complete the assigned task with the available resources to the best of one’s ability. That includes not only the immediate demands of running a division, but also the personal commitment to develop as a professional warrior.
examples where he had difficulty getting stories that could have benefited the Navy had the Navy cooperated. He does not add “if they were accurately reported.” This caveat is necessary because the record shows that on important stories, when public opinion is on the line, the media will, more often than not, stick it to the military. Some examples:
► By propagating the myth that the Vietnam War was unwinnable and by making it an unpopular war.
► By perpetuating the myth that we suffered a military defeat in Vietnam when, in fact, we did not. The military left in 1973 without having lost a major engagement, including the Tet offensive, a major defeat for the Viet Cong yet reported by the media as a victory for them.
► By not reporting that Congress lost that war in 1975 by cutting off aid to the South Vietnamese, as they have recently done to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters.
► By criticizing and denigrating the rescue of the Americans in Grenada— successful, in part, because the media were excluded.
Mr. Offley blames reporters’ inexperience and military stonewalling for past sins. Certainly they are factors, and one begets the other; but mainly, it is the media’s conversion over the past 40 years
la-|,ne that today’s disgruntled JOs are Uj !n8 to take personal responsibility for e'r own professional development.
0rnPlaints about the trials presented Pini- °^'ccrs direct from the training ha h me Can 136 heard in any gathering of liat Worlc'ng JOs- Many believe that the arcer'a* ar|d administrative taskings they On re9u*red to oversee, whether in an too rat'0nal unit or a shipyard, encompass °0 t|,'UlC^ dme, are weighed too heavily if lc'r evaluation, and seriously impede th„not eliminate tactical education from : 'r Schedules. The Proceedings authors
>lude
th,
eir
that training of officers both for
ademanagerial and warrior roles is in- Ptiri Uate' To these claims I point out that toy <f many -IOs take today in their ability are dates both claims. The resources off Undeniably available, although their «*** use depends upon the JO and the fund’s commitment. The junior of-
tou:
must take the initiative to leam the
shmndane basics of systems and leader- to f "diile striving for tactical knowledge e an effective warrior.
“The Public Affairs Front”
(See B. Baker, pp. 114-117, September 1988;
E. Offley, pp. 82-87, February 1989
Proceedings)
Captain Richard S. Reade, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Captain Baker’s thesis is that the Navy “must use the media to reach the U. S. public” and to do this effectively, it should provide better training to commanding and executive officers on coping with the media. These are points well taken, but he was too moderate on the reason for the need—the horrendous track record of the media in reporting and misreporting military events.
Despite Captain Baker’s most tactful treatment of the media’s transgressions, however, military journalist Ed Offley takes umbrage and claims that “the Navy itself must bear an equal share of the blame for the uneven news coverage on the military beat.” He then cites four
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81
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profound objective beyond acquiring^ frigates: “Both Australia . . ■ and . ^ Zealand ... are working within tc^ cost limits. If the program is a sUCt ' ... the run should be continued. •; Perhaps as many as four extra s would be involved. . . . Much will • • depend upon the performance of the
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Scan Converter
For Video Taping,
Video Projection And Video Transmission
• Record real time training exercises
and operations.
• Archive operational tactical data.
• Replay display data for post
operational briefing.
The RGB/Videolink supports the Standard Navy Desktop Minicomputer and other RGB displays ilk
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TECHNOLOGY
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from objective reporting to advocacy journalism that is the underlying problem. This must be recognized, addressed, and included in media relations training. Then Captain Baker’s excellent recommendations for dealing with the media become all the more pertinent.
“Safe Ship Control: It Takes Two”
(See P. T. Deutermann, pp. 90-94, January
1988 Proceedings)
Captain T. F. Davis, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Deutermann says a mouthful in a well-written article suggesting a logical way to keep our ships from running aground or into each other. Many others have tried similar suggestions, all to no avail. No one is listening.
A navigation piloting school will lean toward the combat information center (C1C) as the most important tool in negotiating harbors and channels. They teach a good course at Dam Neck. But devoted instructors become discouraged when the teams they receive to teach are sprinkled with mess cooks who obviously are not regular members of the CIC piloting team, or even more so, when they never see a commanding officer, an executive officer, or a navigator, and seldom even meet the CIC officer. Quotas must be filled.
When the “Team” returns to the ship, only they know what they have learned. The CIC officer probably will not organize routines to meet the school’s teachings. The CO, XO, and navigator may well not understand what the team is trying to do or say.
The odds are that the ship will function as before, doing it the CO’s way. Wouldn’t it be nice if the entire ship- control team—bridge and CIC personnel together—were taught at the same time by experts?
Has anyone ever seen a ship stop in a channel and the CO insist he would not continue until the bridge and CIC iron out their differences?
Forget the proper names (which depend on ship size) and picture this routine: The surface plot announces that Contact “Alfa” is on a reciprocal course and a head-on situation exists wherein one ship must alter course to starboard.
The CIC officer consults with the Nav Plot, which announces that a course change to the right would run the ship aground.
The CIC officer, experienced in the Rules of the Road, announces to the navigator that special circumstances exist and we should stop and contact the other ship.
The navigator tells the CO, who has already made up his mind to increase speed and come left 30° in order to enter Thimble Shoals Channel. Bad news!
These folks, including the CO, con have been well trained by spending man; hours on a bridge simulator, the cost which is infinitesimal compared with 1 1 cost of a single grounding or collision- Good luck Captain Deutermann-—! i11 probably the only one listening.
“Far Eastern Navies”
(See J. V. P. Goldrick and P. D. Jones, PP 166, March 1989 Proceedings)
Commander Louis D. Chirillo, U- ^ Navy (Retired)—Regarding the An tralia-New Zealand defense cooperati (ANZAC) 12-ship frigate program. , ?° of what the authors presented signing
tralian builders.” The added objects® to use the frigate program to enhance mobilization base down under. Deve j ing a warship-building capability material supplier resources in Aus and New Zealand and ensuring their pabilities for the long-term future are .p high-priority goals of the ANZAC Pr°Ject- r,eneral
The office of the Director Ge ^ Naval Production in the Australian ^ partment of Defense-Navy (DoDN) plemented a number of prudent ^ sures. Recognizing that eX1 shipbuilders did not have Pr0"urJte management experience commem , with the effort suggested by an estin'(j0i- cost of nearly five billion Australian^, lars, shipbuilders who wished to pa ^ pate were required to do so as me111 .|1, of competing consortia. The lflt e.nter- elude Australian and New Zealand 1 nationally operating heavy-constm ^ firms that have experience 111:1,1 huge projects such as for erecting ^ t0 and bridges. Also, each was reqmr propose an existing frigate design- s
As the authors noted, the two ®'y0ss now in contention are the Blohm jje Meko-200P and the Royal ben ^ M-Class as proposed respective Australian Marine Engineering Co .p tion (AMEC) and Australian .u(1is Systems (AWS), the two conso
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Understand, the German firm Blohm & and the Dutch firm Royal Schelde are consortia members.
The LST-5B UHF SATCOM transceiver meets DoD satellite architecture/interoperability specs. With three-year warranty. Call 602/441-4380. Or write: P.O. Box 2606, Scottsdale, AZ 85252.
Motorola life.
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For the severest of shipboard shock and vibration requirements, look to A & f’s new 50 Hz enclosure. Test reports available.
In a move that is unprecedented by any "avy> the DoDN engaged me in April- 1988, eight-months before the ten- Crs were due, to teach DoDN and both c°nsortia functionaries the logic and prin- U'Ples of the world’s most effective ship- nnding methods. I introduced the ap- Ptoach developed by Ishikawajima- ^arima Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. (IHI) Japan as disclosed to me during my °rk for more than a decade as a manger r the U. S. government and industry ational Shipbuilding Research Program.
The methods feature a number of in- strial disciplines that have been pro- niuied over the last 35 to 70 years— r°duct organization as advocated by the uttagement guru Peter Drucker, statisti- ^ control per the teaching of Dr. W. Ed- ards Deming, and group technology.
li k ^ave *3een we** d°curnented in Eng, "-language textbooks for many years (I not in the context of shipyard opera- ns- As one observer noted, IHI’s '9Ue contribution was to put them to- j Per as one fabulous, constantly self- c Pr°ving manufacturing system that is ^Pable of building ships, including war- (^PS> and many different products other
talk 6 Plann'ng before each design phase sl. er than after the fact. This enables the ^'Pyards to feature a shift of outfitting .a Painting work from on board a com- ed hull to organized work flows in- 0(je ships before hull erection. The meth- the ^aVe caused the traditional yardstick, lau amount °f outfitting complete at 0j nching, to be replaced by the amounts L .°utfitting and painting complete at ^■laying!
•he uCause 'he effectiveness of the IHI „ nods are profound, as already demon-
Simply put, the improved methods in- mtut, -
Slrated
v,ated by Avondale Industries, Inc., near be ",Orleans, and MIL, Inc. near Que-
in North American shipyards op-
Nevv
bec
bay > ^°t*1 and AWS are likely to
letime after mid-1989. And depend- °n the bid responses, first delivery
U, -e Included pertinent commitment in 5rv'r tc,'ders that were submitted in Janu- Sq *989. Contract award is expected
'ig C Hi6 — >
er|9' l*6 about 1993 and subsequent deliv- ,s at about one-year intervals.
$UC 'V's*1 the ANZAC ship project every It could be a framework upon
a modern Australian warship- capability may emerge as a world
es*gn
Ij, i l * 1 ‘ I1IUJ VlUVlgV UO M VV V7I
Si eI- It has the potential for creating a 'be r,Cant mobilization base upon which u- S. Navy could rely.