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With Soviet ships plying the waters of the South Atlantic (bottom left) and the United States depending on the area’s transoceanic Passages as an alternative to the Panama Canal, the Western allies should put the Malvinas (Falklands) dispute aside and develop a joint maritime strategy for the region.
Most of the world has not fully understood what Argentina suffered in the recent past. The republic faced a strongly ideological terrorist aggres- s,on that ended only with the nation’s return to democratic in 1983. The 1982 conflict with Britain for control of he Malvinas (Falklands) Islands disturbed the foundation °f Argentina’s relations with the Western alliance. Indeed, ajthough its culture and history place the nation unques- honably in the Western world, the troubles of the last Vears have progressively isolated Argentina from Western toreign policy.
Now that is changing. Argentina has been emerging r°m its isolation, attempting to match its interests with he global interests of the West and to demonstrate that its oreign policy is rational and predictable. It is imperative at these efforts succeed, for Argentina occupies a vital 0cation in the strategically important South Atlantic, a region of great interest to the Soviet Union. Two things must happen to ensure stability in the area: Argentina must settle its conflict with Britain; and the Western nations °uld develop a regional maritime strategy for the South Atlantic.
The South Atlantic possesses two important interoceanic Passages, the Straits of Magellan and the Drake Pas- Sa§e. Its African coast includes political, economic, and s°cially unstable countries and areas of interest to the So-
viet Union. Approximately 66% of oil shipped to Western Europe and about 26% of that shipped to the East Coast of the United States crosses the South Atlantic, and it is the theater of an aggressive Soviet shipping policy. It has significant fishing areas and underexploited oil reserves. It is the world’s second-largest reservoir of polymetallic nodules and the region with nearest access to the Antarctic continent. The South Atlantic includes countries with important fields or deposits of strategic materials such as chromium, nickel, gold, diamonds, uranium, and platinum. Still, these waters are patrolled by fewer naval forces than are the oceans of the Northern Hemisphere.
The main actors in the area are Argentina, Britain, Brazil, Uruguay, and the fishing fleets of various nations. Also important though somewhat distant actors are Nigeria and South Africa. The confluence between the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans makes Chile a factor as well.
These nations use the South Atlantic principally for fishing. It is also a transit zone to and from Antarctica and the interoceanic passages. Britain’s military presence has included excluding Argentine ships from the waters around the Malvinas since 1982. Other nations also may be collecting intelligence in the South Atlantic because of the increasing activities of Soviet-bloc nations.
The area is strategically important to the United States as an alternative to the Panama Canal. Although the unsettled conflict between Argentina and Britain disturbs the stability and the firmness of the Western alliance, the threat in the area comes from the growing Soviet presence.
The years of terrorism and the conflict with Britain produced a significant change in Argentina’s society, particularly in its armed forces. Since the return to a democratic system in 1983, Argentina has been participating in the international community, consolidating the modernization of the nation’s political and social structures, and getting involved in new forums, markets, and regions.
It was in this spirit that Argentina faced its relations
Pr,
°<*edings / March 1989
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Wlth Chile. The nations were caught in a state of permanent tension because of a dispute over the Beagle Islands, nt given their origins, strategic interests, and common Perception of the future, they should cooperate in the international scene. Years of successive negotiations finally ■^suited in a peace and friendship treaty that should serve as a stimulus for Argentina and an example to all parties 'nvolved in the conflict for the Malvinas.
At stake in the South Atlantic are concrete interests: •sheries; natural resources; maintenance of sea lines of communications, bases, and support positions; and access *0 Antarctica. The sovereignty and the rights of nations in e region cannot be exchanged: They are not negotiable, hat is negotiable are resources, strategic points, technol- °gy, and even international support.
The Argentine naval strategy and the larger national JJitlitary strategy need two vital elements: the legitimacy of e government and the stability of the area. The return to emocracy has secured legitimacy; stability is based on . e increase of bilateral relations through cooperation and lntegration agreements among Argentina, Brazil, and Uru- j=Uay, and the Argentine/Chilean peace and friendship reaty. But they are not enough; effective stability requires e Participation of all American nations, mainly the more eveloped ones, by means of really efficient instruments ar>d not merely declarative ones. The achievement of this ^ability is threatened by the unsettled conflict between rgentina and Britain over the Malvinas, South Sand- Wlch, and Georgias islands, and by a more active and growing Soviet presence.
The British military presence and the fishing and reSearch activities of Eastern-bloc nations raise the risk of §enerating crises that would implant the East-West con- lct in this area, giving the Soviet Navy a pretext for inter- V(jntion. Experience shows that in the presence of a dimin- shed negotiating capability, the Eastern bloc generates °Cal conflicts in support of its global interests. Within this context, the Soviet Navy’s strategy keeps gaining impor- ance through a permanent and active presence at sea. If e occasional strategy of regional conflicts couples with a . °°al maritime strategy, soon there will be no areas—• deluding the South Atlantic—where the Soviet influence go unfelt.
. The Soviet Navy has not yet acquired support positions !a the far south of the continent. There has been some lnternational criticism of fishing agreements among Argentina, the Soviet Union, and Bulgaria, on the grounds at they extend Soviet influence. But Argentina took this Measure to avoid overfishing in the region. The move was necessary because of the British exclusion of Argentine niPs from the waters around the Malvinas.
To counteract the potential Soviet threat and to reach c°mmon American objectives, a regional maritime strat- gy f°r the South Atlantic should be developed. The na- re of this area demands that it be considered as a unified °ck rather than separate national territories. The South- ast Pacific and the Southwest Atlantic clearly represent an actual strategic area.
ndividual nations should not limit this strategic point of 'ew by being unwilling to adopt global strategies, because the idea that national sovereignty could be thus tied up in East-West conflicts is erroneous. It is an error common in important sectors in the region; in spite of their support of the Western way of life, many people do not understand that it necessarily involves a nation beyond its own geographical frontiers.
One way Argentina can cooperate within this global framework is to offer the necessary logistic facilities to all nations that proceed to and from Antarctica. The Argentine Navy could also offer Western naval forces its bases and support positions for combined operations.
In a global conflict, the South Atlantic waters would certainly attract the Soviet naval forces, because they can project power to the region from their recently obtained positions in Africa. These waters could also be a transit point for the Soviet Navy’s strategic redeployment.
Western operations in this area would require a unified command, a structure capable of starting operations with maximum haste and efficiency. Combined action forbids improvisation. Permanent efforts are required to achieve operational integration. Combined exercises like UNITAS and Americas, the latter recently proposed by the Argentine Navy, can become an excellent instrument to achieve these goals.
In a global war, most U. S. naval forces would be fighting the Soviets in other waters, making it imperative that the nations concerned with the South Atlantic combine forces and decisions into a joint maritime strategy. In accordance with these strategic considerations, in the last few years the Argentine Navy has moved toward a force structure capable of acting as a containment force.
In a complex and interdependent world, national objectives cannot be obtained unilaterally. Self-sufficiency is a thing of the past.
The South Atlantic may one day constitute a battleground of two cultures, two global visions, two sets of fundamental values. Does not a regional, intracultural, nonideological confrontation like the unsettled conflict between Argentina and Britain weaken the strength of the West?
We also wonder who should be concerned about and responsible for contributing solutions to this disagreement whose consequences so far transcend the interests of the direct protagonists.
We hope for the South Atlantic to be turned into a stable area, a preserved ocean where cooperative strategies may be effectively carried out, allowing regional interests to be compatible with Western global interests.
Argentina has already signalled its desire for peace and cooperation through treaties and agreements with every nation in the region. But this picture is seriously affected by the conflict that faces Argentina and Britain, a conflict that compromises the stability of this vital region.
This article was written by students in the higher strategy course of Argentina’s Naval War School. Coauthors with Captain Stella were Argentine naval officers Captain Julio O. Lavezzo, Captain Alberto A. Olcese, Captain Horacio A. Fisher, Captain Guillermo F. Botto, Commander Alberto J. Philippi, and Commander Jose M. Maurizio, and Colonel Angel J. Segura, Argentine Army.
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Proceedings / March 1989