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might secure Norway (or might not if the land battle for Norway is lost), but Norway is not significant in terms of the battle for most of Europe. Germany seized Norway early in World War II and held it through the end of the war, but that did not delay the Normandy invasion or the subsequent Allied advance in Central Europe. The defense of Norway may be of political significance in peacetime, but it is not so militarily, at least not on the strategic or operational levels.
Some argue that if the initial naval offensive succeeds, our aircraft carriers could contribute the power of their air strikes to the battle for Central Europe. Others have commented that if that is the goal, it might be more effective to remove the aircraft from the carriers and base them on land in Europe. But it is doubtful that the number of strike aircraft the fleet can muster, and their relatively limited capability to provide direct support to ground troops (because of the types of aircraft involved), would be sufficient to halt a major ground offensive.
Finally, it has been argued that a victory in the naval offensive would destroy the Soviets’ ability to disrupt the Atlantic sea lanes on which NATO depends. This is undoubtedly true, but are there not less risky ways to achieve that goal? Defense of the choke points and geographic barriers leading from Soviet bastions into the open sea appears much less risky. Soviet strength diminishes rapidly as distance from the bastions increases because Soviet aircraft, surface ships, minefields, and intelligence collection can no longer play their strong supporting roles. Is it good naval strategy to take a more risky course when one involving less risk would suffice—especially when the risk is destruction of the U. S. battle fleet?
All these objections suggest that the Navy’s maritin^ strategy may not constitute good national or naval strategy. If it does not, what does? The Navy developed >ts maritime strategy at least in part as an alternative to the extreme continentalist strategy favored by the Carter administration, a strategy that relegated the Navy to guarding convoys bound for Europe. But there are other options.
As Corbett noted, one role a navy can play in a true maritime strategy is isolating a theater of operations so that the continental opponent can be defeated in that theater. If the continent is viewed as all of Eurasia rather than just Europe, a possible theater for such an operation presents itself in Soviet Asia. Soviet land lines of communication to its eastern areas are tenuous- two rail lines, both of limited capacity, one of which a* times runs very close to the Chinese border. Much of the materiel Soviet Asia requires must be transported
Nuclear War at Sea
For at least ten years, theater nuclear warfare analysts have largely agreed that the Soviets would use nuclear weapons against NATO ships at sea only after a nuclear first strike occurred ashore. This proposition is based partly on the U. S. perception that the Soviet Navy plays a subordinate role in the military hierarchy, and on the Soviet war plan, which probably calls for a combined-arms smash across West Germany to the Rhine and beyond. This belief—that nuclear war at sea probably will not happen apart from nuclear use ashore—is an important assumption underlying the credibility of former Navy Secretary John Lehman’s maritime strategy: applying full forward pressure on the NATO flanks and the Soviet Navy, first with nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) and then with carrier battle groups (CVBGs).
Perhaps the Soviets will forgo using nuclear weapons against forward- deployed U. S. Navy forces—at least until they have shocked the world by launching nuclear ground weapons in NATO’s Central Region. But what if they do not? Have we consigned thinking about when and how the Soviets would employ nuclear weapons against the U. S. Navy to what Admiral James Stockdale called the “too-hard shelf”?
The first step in the U. S. forward strategy is to send SSNs into the Soviets’ home-water naval bastions. The goal is to lock the Soviets’ general- purpose naval forces into defending their havened strategic-missile submarines, and to destroy as much of the Soviet Navy’s strategic offensive and tactical defensive fighting power as possible. Most analysts envision this opening phase as a grinding undersea attrition campaign, lasting a month or more and taking place, in part, under and around the margin of the polar ice pack. If U. S. submarines succeeded, they would help to secure NATO’s Northern Flank, and pave the way for carrier battle groups to project naval power ashore.
But consider how strong a motivation the Soviets would have to use nuclear antisubmarine (ASW) weapons against U. S. SSNs penetrating Northern Fleet waters. The Soviets would surely perceive the U. S. operations aS tipping the nuclear balance—by jeoP^
dizing the Soviet’s nuclear-powered fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and by threatening the K<da Peninsula and other targets in Great Russia with nuclear Tomahawks. The Soviets are a cautious and pessimist people, conditioned by history to distrust the effectiveness of Russian navies. They are unlikely to respond minimal, finely calculated force to incredible threat to their survivable nuclear reserve and their homeland. The Soviets may believe that their convey tional ASW capability is insufficient , neutralize U. S. Navy SSNs. Many d' ferences between Soviet and Western ASW technology and tactics make sense once we accept that the Sovicts intend to use nuclear ASW weapons situations that deeply concern them- Looking at scenarios in which the Soviets might use nuclear ASW wesP ons raises important issues. Consider U. S. ice-hardened Sturgeon (SSN- 637)-class submarine, patrolling olfe”
2»i , * P- 7.
P:n.
v?ld> p. 10.
25en- P. X. Kelley, USMC, “The Amphibious Warfare Strategy,” in ibid, p.
by sea. If the U. S. Navy focused its efforts on sever- lng the sea lanes between Soviet Europe and Soviet ^s'a, it could potentially provide the isolated theater Corbett foresaw.
As is normally the case with a true maritime strat- ^§y, effective land action in the theater would depend heavily on making alliances with local land powers; our °Wlt ground forces would not be sufficient. Such a strategy also assumes a long war in which initial elects in Europe might have to be accepted. Again, such temporary continental losses are traditionally part of a Maritime strategy.
This is just one option; there are probably others as WeU- But it would be unfortunate if distaste for the bad strategy prevalent under the Carter administration drove Us to adopt another bad strategy. Rigorous examination °f the Navy’s maritime strategy suggests it is at best a clUextionable strategy. Perhaps it is time once again to revive the debate by introducing a new central concept and addressing the issues of a true maritime strategy.
/jini- James D. Watkins, USN, "The Maritime Strategy,” The Maritime rategy Specjaj SUppiement published by the U. S. Naval Institute, January
5John F. Lehman, “The 600-Ship Navy,” in ibid, p. 37.
6HASC hearings, FY 1985, part 3, pp. 128-129, quoted in Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Naval Strategy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), by Tom Stefanick.
7HASC hearings, FY 1986, part 3, p. 161, quoted in ibid.
8James O’Shea, “U. S. to Sink Billion into New Attack Sub,” Chicago Tribune, 20 July 1986, p. 1, quoted in ibid.
9Mahan sets forth his view of the essence of maritime strategy vis-a-vis a land power most pointedly in the last chapter of The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812 (especially pp. 386 and 402, 14th edition, Boston, 1919). Corbett delves more deeply into the philosophical underpinnings of maritime strategy in the First part of Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Conway Maritime Press Ltd., 1972).
10Watkins, p. 4.
"Watkins, p. 5.
12Watkins, p. 11.
,3Melissa Healy, “Lehman: We’ll Sink Their Subs,” Defense Week, 13 May 1985, quoted in Stefanick.
14For example, see Jack Beatty, “In Harm’s Way,” The Atlantic Monthly, May 1987, pp. 37 and following.
l5The fact that the attack submarine has little power-projection capability is not an argument against its being the capital ship. The capital ship generally has not been used for power projection. When the ship of the line was the capital ship, it was seldom used for shore bombardment, and the power-projection ship was the troop transport (as some would argue it still is). The dreadnought only came to play a major power projection role after it yielded its position as capital ship to the aircraft carrier. The fact that the Navy thinks of the aircraft carrier as its principal tool for power projection does not make it the capital ship, at least as capital ship has generally been defined.
Mr. Lind is President of the Military Reform Institute and Director of the Institute for Cultural Conservatism. He is the author of the Manuever Warfare Handbook and co-author, with former Senator Gary Hart (D-CO), of America Can Win: The Case for Military Reform.
' Vely in the Barents Sea south of the arginal ice zone. Her towed passive °hstic array detects a submarine c. er the pack ice—a Soviet Typhoon- ass SSBN. The U. S. submarine loaches
same
$SN
ap-
for a torpedo attack. In the
area, a Soviet Victor Ill-class
slowly patrolling, taking advan- environmentally caused asym- les in acoustic propagation. The
tage of ( metrie
^"geon sub detects the Victor III at rt range and immediately fires two
Mark-48 torpedoes. Almost simultaneously, the Victor III gains contact and fires two straight-running, nuclear- tipped torpedoes. The Sturgeon is sunk. The shock and acoustic effect of the detonating Soviet torpedoes disrupt the terminal homing of the Mark-48s, and they miss their target. The Victor III surfaces, badly damaged by the detonation of its own nuclear torpedoes.
The president of the United States is informed two hours later that two rela-
The maritime strategy presupposes that the Soviets will not use nuclear weapons against U. S. naval forces attempting to destroy Soviet Typhoons (above) and other SSBNs in their bastions.
tively low-yield nuclear weapons have been detonated in the Barents Sea, in an area where U. S. submarines are pursuing the Soviet Northern Fleet.
U. S. submarines are communicating
feedings / February 1988
U. S. naval planners need to consider the possibility that the Soviets may cross the nuclear threshold immediately should their SSBN nuclear reserve, embodied in this Delta IV, be threatened.
infrequently because of Soviet ASW pressure, and it may take two or more days to determine if any are missing. Now the National Command Authority must decide how to respond to this apparent Soviet first use of nuclear weapons at sea.
The response most analogous to the provocation would be for the United States to use nuclear weapons immediately against Soviet submarines. Unfortunately, we do not have a nuclear weapon that can be used against a submarine operating beneath the ice. It may not be desirable to use nuclear submarine rockets, which are currently being phased out, and the projected ASW stand-off weapon in the threatening environment of the Soviet bastions. Our ASW aircraft and surface ships are too soft to penetrate those home-water bastions. On balance, by responding in kind to a Soviet attack with nuclear ASW weapons, we lose. It is a trade the Soviets would be delighted to make.
To retaliate more drastically, U. S. nuclear attack submarines could launch nuclear Tomahawk land-attack missiles against Soviet submarine bases on the Kola Peninsula. This would be a major nuclear escalation, involving strikes against the Soviet homeland with considerable collateral damage and civilian casualties. The Soviets would respond by at least sending nuclear-tipped SS- N-21 cruise missiles against Norfolk, Virginia, or New London, Connecticut.
It is doubtful that a U. S. president would authorize a retaliatory nuclear strike against any Soviet land targets in response to a defensive use of low- yield nuclear ASW weapons—weapons that involve relatively low casualties and no collateral or environmental damage. Such a response would be morally and pragmatically excessive.
The line dividing nuclear from conventional is more blurred for antisubmarine weapons than for any other form of weaponry. It is an area in which the nation may be wiser to display restraint than resolve. Certainly, we must consider that the Soviets may launch a first-use strike of nuclear ASW weapons, and draw guidelines now to support our decisions if this should happen.
Closely linked to nuclear ASW weapon issues is the possibility that the Soviets might hurl a nuclear first strike against U. S. CVBGs. Presumably, the battle groups will be able to penetrate deep into the northern Norwegian Sea only if the Navy’s SSNs have already destroyed a significant percentage of the Northern Fleet submarines. This SSN campaign will be difficult. The Soviets will have important tactical advantages in their home waters that may more than offset the technological superiority of the U. S. subs. The Soviets might prevail in a submarine attrition campaign in their home waters without resorting to nuclear ASW weapons. If the Northern Fleet retains most of its submarines, and if the U. S. Navy loses enough of its own to make Tomahawk land-attack missile strikes against Soviet naval aviation bases uncertain, pitting CVBGs aga>nS Soviet forces threatening NATO’s Northern Flank would be highly risky-
Whether the Soviets attack U. S- Navy CVBGs with nuclear weapons before the nuclear threshold is crossed ashore will depend on the outcome oi an opening submarine attrition campaign in Soviet northern home waters—in either Europe or Asia.
The United States will win this cah1 paign if it destroys enough Soviet su marines to permit U. S. CVBGs to operate effectively in the northern wegian Sea and in Soviet home waW without suffering prohibitive losses- The Soviet Union will win this campaign if it retains enough submarines seriously challenge any penetration 0 the northern Norwegian Sea and Sow home waters by U. S. CVBGs. This
^a,npaign can unfold in three ways:
The Soviets use only conventional W weapons, and the United States lr,s- In this instance, the Soviets may ®act like a cornered, de-scented KUnk—deprived of its most reliable I ense and prone to escalate the vio- nee. They will feel great pressure to Se nuclear weapons against penetrating i' S- naval forces.
'he Soviets resort to the use of nu- ear weapons, and lose. They have Jnssed the nuclear threshold at sea and 111 not hesitate to continue to use J"01 against penetrating CVBGs in nat they will interpret as a last-ditch ®nse of their homeland. t^ he Soviets win the campaign with Without nuclear weapons. This out- ,i^e is entirely possible given the W advantages inherent in home- operations. U. S. CVBG penetra- n may be prohibitively costly unless (i re are compelling strategic reasons r are not currently apparent. n countering CVBG power projec-
:n’ the Soviet objective is to neutral' ll c to
• s. maritime strategy is predi- upon the Soviets’ selection of a
e^- S. carriers before they approach
he range at which A-6 Intruder air-
in h Can Iaunche<J and strike targets
Pri ^ ^0viet Union or other highly
Zed areas. The success of much of the u.
cated
^yltzed conventional weapon option to ^jmplish their defensive objective. ti„ ”e highly optimistic U. S. assump- appears to be that Soviet Backfire strip 6rs w'h conduct maximum-range ve . against U. S. carriers with con- firntJ°nal weapons. Coordinated Back- tj '“adgcr-tactical aviation convenes 3 re'str>kes would continue as the >ers proceed toward their targets.
<;0ecause this is the least effective lea l6t defensive option, it is the one st likely to be chosen. The Soviets ses Calcu,ate that U. S. CVBG defen- tQ . ni'ght deplete Soviet strike aircraft evels less than the critical mass re- str v h°r successful conventional tra|.es before U. S. carriers are neu- the 'Ze<d • Opting for anything less than Co111051 certain defense possible would Caradict both the Soviets’ traditional antjl0n for the safety of their homeland calli 6*r stronS|y emphasized doctrine ePe *°r raP*d neutralization of an s nuclear-delivery means. lhat ■ Vlet defensive course of action Statls more threatening to the United fhat6k’ 3nd hence more probable, is strik he Soviets would launch a nuclear and r *roni a range allowing Backfire a badger forces to be massed down 1 e and difficult-to-defend threat axis. This potentially crushing step across a previously uncrossed nuclear threshold is a possibility that U. S. planners cannot wish away.
Nuclear war at sea offers overwhelming advantages to the Soviets. Simply stated, the U. S. Navy presents targets for the Soviet fleet’s naval nuclear weapons. The U. S. Navy’s nuclear-conventional weapon capability is only marginally greater than its conventional-weapon capability alone in a fleet-versus-fleet match-up against the Soviet Navy. The vulnerability of the U. S. Navy increases by an order of magnitude if it must fight a nuclear war in Soviet waters.
Supporters of the maritime strategy claim that the threat of U. S. retaliatory nuclear strikes on Soviet naval aviation bases on the Kola and Kamchatka peninsulas would deter the Soviets from nuclear first strikes on U. S. carriers. This is not convincing. The cautious Soviets would surely assume that any CVBG approaching their homeland is going to launch nuclear— not conventional—strikes; the Soviets would respond accordingly. With some logic, they may believe that a conventional strike by U. S. carrier aircraft could not be justified by either the damage that it would inflict or the risks it would entail.
Deterring Soviet nuclear strikes against U. S. naval forces by threatening retaliatory strikes against Soviet bases is a rehash of the tired and generally discredited doctrine of mutually assured destruction, and is neither credible nor responsible. It would force a massive escalation to general nuclear warfare, the timing and outcome of which may not be to our advantage. Any consideration of a nuclear deterrence option would make the survivability of naval forces an end rather than a means of U. S. national security policy.
Clausewitz observed that war is activity. This is as true in the nuclear age as it was during the Napoleonic era. Military action is effective only if it destroys an enemy’s will and his means to wage war. Effective military action always risks prompting an enemy to greater violence. Certainly, we must not hesitate to pursue a maritime victory because we fear the consequences of winning. The stakes of war are as high as they can get—with or without nuclear weapons. We must rigorously examine the permutations and consequences of the U. S. Navy’s stated maritime strategy to determine if achieving its objectives is worth the cost, and whether the means for its execution are appropriate and adequate.
I suspect that convenience and organizational imperatives, rather than rigor, have prevailed in the U. S. Navy’s consideration of many aspects of theater nuclear warfare, particularly concerning the possibility that the Soviets may use nuclear weapons at sea before they are used on land. It is not clear that we have thought through all the implications of this, and matched it with a strategy that could win without loosing a no-win nuclear holocaust.
U. S. Navy planners should think hard about the following questions:
► What benefits and costs would the Soviets reap by using nuclear weapons at sea, given all the situations the
U. S. forward maritime strategy and the Soviets’ ocean-bastion strategy could generate? What would they be if the Soviets pursued other strategies, such as an extensive attack on the allies’ sea lines of communication or a power-projection effort of their own?
► What military and political responses would we make if the Soviets used nuclear weapons at sea before they were launched ashore? If they used them in a submarine attrition campaign in the Soviet ocean bastions? Against a U. S. Navy CVBG in the Norwegian Sea or Northern Pacific? Against a
U. S. CVBG during a Third World confrontation in the Arabian Sea?
► What—if any—changes should we make in our maritime strategy, or in our force structure, tactics, and weaponry, to deal with Soviet use of nuclear weapons at sea, and to improve our overall capability to wage theater nuclear war?
These are difficult questions, impossible to answer with certainty. Considering them could pose organizational risks to the Navy by raising further difficult questions and choices—ones we prefer to gloss over. Still, mental toughness is no less a virtue in peacetime than it is in time of war. Naval professionals—both in and out of uniform—are educated, paid, and expected to face issues squarely and resolve them. The time has come to take the prickly dilemmas of theater nuclear war at sea down from the too-hard shelf, and to examine them seriously.
Mr. Caldwell is a 1954 Naval Academy graduate, a graduate of the Naval War College, and has an M.A. degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University. After retiring from the Naval Underwater Systems Center, he was a naval analyst until summer 1987, when he began a three-year Ph.D. program in history at the University of Virginia.