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finf service-aircraft team for the job. fere0rtUnate|y, Navy and Air Force dif- of a es on an appropriate Memorandum e*er ®reernent (MOA) prevent the full C)se of this force-multiplier concept.
—In the past, land-based f]Vlners supported replacement aircraft § to CVBGs over intra-theater or in
0,lle through a field of sonobuoys that £an yield data useful to counterattack. ^‘Ve-ineh gun: These weapons can hurl J'Pound antiaircraft projectiles with r^dio (VT)-fuzed explosives. They may a s° be useful for deploying suitably deigned sonobuoys. One gun could lay a Be pattern around a contact many miles the ship, in minutes, j "°cket- or mortar-launched sono- A rocket would subject the sono- , °y to much lower acceleration forces ar> would a gun. The rocket launchers Sht be similar in size to the super- aP‘d-blooming off-board chaff launchers I ready widely in use. The rocket Uncher would probably be trainable in vation and azimuth. A parachute '8ht be necessary to break the shock of ater entry. Such a system could be the
hen® Size as the World War 11 ASW gehog, which was a mortar-launched Weapon.
it 11. enter’ng the Soviet inventory make frolkelV that there will be torpedo attacks ■ m behind. The passive acoustic hom- 1 ® Astern frequently causes a wake fol- bJg path that puts the weapon in the the ktec*sonar- Attack from this angle, in e baffles, might not be detected, and
le counterattack.
^ ^ajor Bemie Fullenkamp, U. S. Air Force
na^’ng land-based tankers to support nif a'r Power promises to increase sig- (CVnntly the carrier battle group’s Sen firepower, survivability, and
atl(jera* flexibility. The choice of service eVeraircraft to perform this mission, how- cont ^Ueks t*le age-old missions-and-roles toversy between the Air Force and c Navv
sho ® Navy has been trying to fill its Pro , .e °k a>r-refueling opportunities by lan?udng its own small fleet of dedicated part °ased tankers. Nevertheless, De- l^etTlent of Defense studies and Defense (j Urces Board decisions support the as ^ Air Force and its KC-10 Extender
Sonobuoys have been laid by aircraft for years, but aircraft are subject to logistic and weather constraints. Such is not the case with sonobuoys dropped off the fantail or deployed with mortars or rockets that are ahead or to the side of the destroyer. Like chaff launchers already in use, sonobuoys can be dropped over the side or fired at the touch of a button and can start relaying data immediately. Sonobuoys have a number of advantages over hull-borne or towed-array sonars:
► Provide better signal-to-noise ratio because they can be deployed nearer the contact; and because they are stationary, they are not subject to flow noise
► Provide a longer base line for accurate triangulation
► Allow for investigation of suspicious contacts from stand-off ranges
► Do not require other means—maneuvers , active sonar, launching aircraft— that may tip off a contact that it has been detected
► Are the fastest, simplest means of collecting additional data for detecting, classifying, and localizing a contact. Deploying a towed array or launching a helo can take half an hour or more, and may become impossible in some weather.
► Do not limit the destroyer’s speed or maneuverability, as do towed arrays. Hull-mounted sonars and towed arrays are degraded by flow noise at high speed.
tercontinental distances but figured little in any employment role. Today’s better- equipped tankers will realize new force- multiplier roles in the following areas: ► Firepower—The tankers will “Rendezvous with and escort strike aircraft on transits to and from targets while remaining outside of the threat envelope.”1 In short, the tankers will permit strike aircraft to carry more bombs to the target.
In the past, if air refueling was needed on a strike mission, Navy KA-6 tankers provided it. Normally only four KA-6s deploy with each carrier. However, as strike ranges increase and the short- combat-radius F/A-18 Hornets join the fleet in large numbers, the carrier’s own air-refueling capability is stretched well beyond its limits.
As a result, A-6s or A-7 Corsairs (both of which can be configured as “buddy tankers”) must serve as tankers, sacrificing their intended role as attack aircraft. In at least one instance, the USS Constellation (CV-64), with F/A-18s on board,
A continuous sprint could supplant sprint- and-drift tactics in some situations.
► Could replace aircraft in some applications by responding faster, and at lower cost
In addition to launching sonobuoys, this proposed rocket-assisted launcher could be used to lay a mini-minefield between a ship and an oncoming torpedo. A launcher, trainable in azimuth and elevation, could quickly deploy an antitorpedo barrier. Each mini-mine would sink to a preset depth and would detonate on the rapid Doppler shift of a torpedo at the closest point of approach or would magnetically influence its fuze.
There is a real need to strengthen the ASW capacity of our ships. Although we can track hostile submarines at long range with considerable success, some get through the screen and attain torpedo- attack positions just a few thousand yards from their intended victims. The CIWS provides an effective last-ditch defense against inbound aircraft and cruise missiles. The U. S. Navy needs a correspondingly effective close-in weapon against torpedoes. We do not have one today. Let’s get started.
flew between 70% and 93% of its A-6 sorties as tankers and not as attack aircraft during one of its recent deployments.2 This issue becomes critical considering that even the Navy’s largest carriers typically carry only 34 attack aircraft. The vast majority of the remaining 56-plus aircraft fly missions for the protection of the CVBG.3 ► Survivability—Naval air operations using land-based tankers facilitate survivability in two ways. First, air refueling allows attack aircraft to operate over longer ranges and thus keeps the CVBG more distant from the threat. Second, by maintaining an air-refueling orbit relative to the battle group, the land-based tanker can provide direct or indirect refueling support to antiair warfare (AAW) fighters.4
Regarding the latter, the Soviets will most likely employ the Backfire bomber and its AS-4 Kitchen missiles to threaten the U. S. carriers.5 Although the carrier is well-defended against the missile
we will plan to modify eight KC-l^ with wing tip mounted, hose-ree drogue systems. ... I hope y° agree that the enclosed [Memoranda1' of Agreement] is a suitable charter I this effort to improve our comb>n combat capability.9
This letter came on the heels of tw° '[11^ portant events during the previous Is vember. First, on 8 November 1985,1 ^ Air Force published an extensive rep® on land-based tanker support for 1 Navy. It concluded among other thin?
that “the KC-10A provides the most
F io Als°
pom6
,sive
uire"
Since total U. S. wartime offload req1 , ment already exceeds the capability o' current tanker fleet, the added Navy & sions would only worsen that situa11 ^ The purchase of used airframes add aircraft to the fleet but raise ot ^ concerns about higher life-cycle costs
The triple drogue-configured KC-10 will become a reality this summer. The fleet can have it in fiscal year 1989, if the Navy decides it doesn’t mind its planes dipping in the Air Force’s basket.
threat, using its three-phase in-depth defensive system, one of its paramount defensive aims is to “shoot the archer before he releases his arrows.”6 Air refueling the all-weather F-14 Tomcat interceptors and shorter-legged F/A-18s by land-based tankers would keep the fighters airborne for longer durations and at a greater range and, therefore, improve the carrier’s defense.
One incident logged in January 1986 in which Libyan jets intercepted a Navy EA-3B Skywarrior electronics warfare aircraft makes a strong case for land- based tankers. Normally antiair warfare fighters would have been on combat air patrol (CAP) near the EA-3B, but the USS Coral Sea (CV-43) cannot support the longer-range F-14 and, therefore, had only F/A-18s on board. Since the carrier did not have the refueling assets to keep the CAP airborne continuously, two F/A- 18s sat on two-minute “catapult alert.” When they arrived on scene 15 minutes later, the action was over.7 If in the future the mission involves a greater threat from advanced Soviet missiles, it is imperative that the Navy keep its CAPs airborne and extend the CVBG’s outer defense perimeter. Naval air must be able to shoot down the Soviet bombers before they release their missiles at a safe distance and have a chance to come back and fight again.
Land-based tankers also allow carriers to use their own tankers more flexibly. For example, carrier-based tankers could act as shuttle tankers, moving fuel from an orbiting land-based tanker to distant CAP areas.
► Flexibility—As outlined, land-based tankers will increase the range and endurance of the combatant aircraft. Suppose, for example, it is decided to reposition a carrier so that she can immediately employ her forces. The carrier in this case is three days’ sailing from her newly assigned position. Although fast (30 knots plus), the carrier’s speed is limited by her much slower support ships. Therefore, as a general planning rule, the group can cover about 500 miles per day.8
An aircraft, on the other hand, can cover the same 500 miles in approximately one hour at reasonable cruising speeds. Therefore, if the carrier wing commander chose to lengthen the duration of his typical attack sortie by six hours, and he had land-based tanker support, he could launch his first wave before the carrier started the three-day trip. This would reduce closure time and introduce carrier air assets into the fight possibly days earlier. The distance afforded by the land-based tanker support also allows the commander to conceal his intent, giving him an added element of surprise if needed.
KC-10: The Land-Based Tanker of Choice—In a January 1986 letter to then- Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James Watkins, General Charles A. Gabriel, then-U. S. Air Force Chief of Staff, commented:
“I think we’ve now sorted out the concept of operations for the air refueling support to your fighter/attack aircraft. The Indian Ocean exercise was a perfect demonstration of what we can do for you. ... We think the KC-10, in a three-drogue configuration, is a system we need. Initially,
pability for the money spent.” that same month, the Navy and Air successfully completed an impress1 joint exercise in the Indian Ocean, durl f which Air Force KC-lOs provided refueling support for USS Saratoga (*- j 60) aircraft. As commander of the tanker aircraft, I can testify to both 1 capability and compatibility of the KC' in support of that naval mission. j The 1985 Air Force study comptjf® eight candidate tanker aircraft, includ111- aircraft in the existing force, used con mercial aircraft, and the few tanker-tyj* aircraft currently in production. At j heart of the study was a comparison ^ life-cycle cost versus capability. Alt the candidate aircraft would require ification to the three-refueling-statl configuration. .£
The study indicated that modifying 1 existing Air Force KC-135R Stra p tankers would be the cheapest opti0*1' However, that option would not add a offload capability to the tanker fl*-
as questions of quality, standard-
add
much
WlT6 reel system) and the KC-135 (a ■ 'basket and stiff hose arrangement) tankealWays made the KC-10 the Navy
ve
tvhen the Defense Resources Board approved the modification of all
ase of 40 ; _ _
hose ^'*1 add redundancy to the single-
h'ulta
tj0n sets of pods.14 This modifica-
wen
Hjation, and availability.12 The purchase 5J|KC-10s, on the other hand, would aircraft to the fleet at a price not
i more than the cost of modifying an Tuivalent number of existing KC-135s. Sooe question of equivalence is also not simple. If the conditions of the mission ary. the equivalence of the KC-10 (rela- j.Ve to the basic KC-135A) can change the average ratio of 3.0 to 3.5 or ■ Cn higher to 4.3, as shown in a capabil- p c°mparison by critical field length. °r example, a KC-10 on a 2,000-mile- 7 non misslon’ from a runway with a U °°-foot critical field length, would avc the capacity to offload 130,000 “lands as compared to the 30,000-pound "Joad capability of the KC-135A.13 •he k StUc*'V a'so 0verl00ks the fact that c k-C-10 is now the only candidate air- toa 1 'hat is itself refuelable.This capacity nre^Uel tanker to tanker adds an exposal amount of operations flexibility. resS mentioned, the KC-10 is a proven °Urce. In addition to the Indian Ocean lsSjon, the kc_io fleet provided the J 1 1986 air-refueling support neces- lr(i' *° launch the long-range F-111 strike England to Libya and back. The tent' ^eet has also maintained an ex- sin.'0nahy high launch-reliability rate “e it began operations in 1981.
•he vf KC-1° has been compatible with ^ avy mission in the past and will be feJe Con'patiblc in the future. Major difs,. Ces between the drogue refueling ancj(j|,,s used on the KC-10 (a soft-basket
ha
^er of choice
^"•Patibility took a giant leap in July
60 j/p rr*
iH0u k--10s to carry removable wing- ohase^r h°se'dro8ue P°ds and the pur-
reel system and also allow the si- l’°t)ie nC°US re^uel'n8 °f three aircraft in •bod'rCases- With decisions made to •he d ^ aircraft, and the willingness on mjSs- °f the Air Force to support the •hoy'011’ evcrything should have been •he c.n" on 'rack toward full exercise of Was °ncePt of operation. However, this fCredn« [he case, because the MO A of- '986 I ^ E>eneral Gabriel in his January etter has yet to be signed.
ord Partnership—The track rec-
eratj0 E*- S. Air Force-U. S. Navy coop- ster|j n °n joint matters to date is less than in ]Q ' hv lack of cooperation is rooted 8-standing disagreements over the
relative merits of land-based versus sea- based air power.15 However, the importance of total air power to our national strength dictates that we bring this old contest to an end. Air refueling is only one of many areas which require joint cooperation, but with the current atmosphere of “joint” thought, the time is right to start working together as a team.
Air refueling received little testing in the joint arena until the Vietnam war. During that conflict, Air Force tankers did not generally refuel Navy aircraft, either because the operational necessity did not exist or, more important, because the equipment was incompatible.16 The services expended little effort during the 1970s to correct the incompatibility, but the early 1980s saw several improvements made.
First, in July 1981, the Air Force and Navy signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to improve interoperability and compatibility between the two services. It was followed in September 1982 by a MOA on joint U. S. Navy/ U. S. Air Force efforts for enhancement of joint cooperation.17 Since the 1982 MOA, the Air Force has supported 100% of the Navy’s requests for air-refueling
1 X
support.
In September 1983, the Navy and Air Force signed another MOU, which is still current. The 1983 MOU broadened Air Force support beyond the refueling of carrier air wing “swings” and the delivery of attrition replacement aircraft, as provided by the previous MOU. The new areas included support for exercises, major naval deployments into broad ocean areas, and aircrew familiarization training incident to those activities. The MOU did not intend to keep all naval aviators qualified to refuel from Air Force tankers, and contingency or wartime refueling support remained a JCS prioritization and allocation task.
The cooperative effort hit rough air in May 1985, when the Navy’s Fiscal Year 1987 Program Objectives Memorandum request included four land-based tankers. The Navy’s operational requirement justified the need for those tankers on the • basis of missions that the Air Force currently performed under the 1983 MOU and some of its newer missions, mentioned earlier. In response, the DRB tasked the U. S. Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study and report on the issue by November 1985.19
Although the report’s cost-versus- capability comparison did not favor the purchase of used commercial aircraft, a congressional committee nonetheless appropriated $110 million for the Navy to buy and modify used commercial aircraft.20 The Senate Armed Services Committee subsequently denied the authorization on 18 March 1986. However, in the meantime, the maneuver had rubbed salt in the old wounds of the roles-and-missions debate. By July 1986 the wound had not healed, and Senators Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) and Sam Nunn (D-GA) sent a fiery letter to then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger:
“In recent days we have learned that the Department of the Navy may again be attempting to establish its own small fleet of land-based tankers, contrary to the clear and explicit directive of the Congress and the Department. . . . This blatant disregard for the directions of the Congress is unacceptable, but typical of the disdain for the law and the Congress exhibited under Secretary Lehman’s leadership. . . .
“The Air Force has a fleet of over 700 land-based tanker aircraft and the Navy wants to start its own fleet of 4 to 8 aircraft. A draft Memorandum of Agreement on tanker support has been awaiting Navy endorsement for over half a year. . . . We hope you will assure that the Navy joins the rest of the country and obeys the laws.”21
The DRB more or less put the issue to rest when later in July 1986, it decided to modify all 60 KC-lOs to the three-drogue configuration and to program the purchase of 40 sets of wing-mounted refueling pods.
Today, the Air Force would like to press on with the MOA and the follow-on MOU. The MOA is necessary to guarantee support of the new naval air refueling concepts. The Navy position has been to hold out for “dedicated tanker” support. The Air Force is willing and able to support Navy requirements without dedicating scarce tanker resources. Dedication is both an inefficient use of resources and unnecessary, because of the DRB’s decision to modify all 60 KC-lOs. The Navy needs to relinquish its requirement for dedicated tankers, and the Air Force in return must become more flexible and responsive in scheduling and coordinating its tanker assets. [1][2] [3]
Simon & Schuster, 1985), p. 221.
4U. S. Air Force. Proposed Memorandum of Agreement, op cit, p. 4C.
5Jurg Dedial, “Is there a Future for the Aircraft Carrier?” Swiss Review of World Affairs, August 1983, p. 27.
6Scott C. Truver, “Anti-air Warfare: To Get the Drop on Soviet ‘Archers,’ US Navy Needs Bows, Arrows, and Bucks,” Armed Forces Journal International, April 1986, p. 50.
7Schemmer, p. 26.
8LCdr. Mark Benson, USN, A-7 carrier pilot and Strike Operations Officer for the Commander, Battle Force Sixth Fleet (CTF60), personal interviews, 17 February-9 April 1987.
9Gen. Charles A. Gabriel, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, letter to Adm. James D. Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, U. S. Navy, 3 January 1986.
l0Maj. Gary Ambrose, USAF, “Report on the Air Force Study of Lapd-Based Tanker Support for the Navy,” HQAF/XOXFS, 8 November 1985, p. 2. “Ambrose, p. 3. nIbid, p. 2. l3Ibid, p. 3.
,4Maj. Skip Brownyard, USAF, Program Element
Manager for the KC-10, HQAF/XOOTS, personal interview, 3 April 1987; U. S. Department of Defense, report by J-5 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “Land-Based Tanker Support for Carrier Aviation,” 18 November 1986, p. 3.
15Adm. Gerald E. Miller, USN, “The Promises and Pitfalls of USAF Navy Cooperation,” Air Force Magazine, November 1982, p. 66. l6Ibid, p. 70.
17U. S. Department of Defense, Support Agreement #FB450083297001, Interservice Support Agreement Between the USAF and the Department of Navy and Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Air Force, 24 October 1983.
,8U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1987, hearings (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 1,575.
19Defense Resources Board, Memorandum for the Members of the DRB, subject: Decision on Conventional Force Issue Offsets and Modernization and Investment Issues, 1 August 1985.
20U. S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1987, hearings (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 56.
21Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn, Committee 0 Armed Services, U. S. Senate, letter to Caspar Wein berger, Secretary of Defense, 29 July 1986.
Major Fullenkamp has been interested in land-b# air-refueling support of naval air power since he the 8th Air Force contingent during the concept dc onstration exercise in the Indian Ocean in Noven] 1985. He is a senior pilot with more than 3,300 **'£ hours, the bulk of which are in aerial refueling tan ers (both KC-135 and KC-10). He has been ass*' ated with the KC-10 program since early 1982 aa held positions in 2nd Bomb Wing as instructor P1’0 flight examiner, and as Chief, KC-10 Mission De'e opment. Major Fullenkamp holds a B.S. in ^e. space Engineering from the University of Colors j Boulder, and an M.S. in Operations ManageIllt^ from the University of Arkansas and is a graduate Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Sta.. College, and the Armed Forces Staff College- now serving in Washington, D. C., as Air Force 1 son officer in the U. S. House of Representative
Seamanship—Command Training Under Sail
By Captain Robert D. McWethy, U. S. Navy (Retired)
The present generation of 44-foot Lu- ders yawls at the U. S. Naval Academy has seen more than 20 years of hard service in training thousands of midshipmen and junior officers. But with the dedication of the Audacious (NA-1) on 5 June 1987, a significant milestone in Navy sailing has arrived. The new McCurdy & Rhodes design “Navy-44” sail training craft is a cutter, its single mast being stepped slightly farther aft than in a sloop. The Audacious, the first Navy-44, was delivered by the builder, Tillotson- Pearson, in Rhode Island on 21 May 1987, to commence more than one thousand miles of offshore testing. Captain John B. Bonds, who had prepared the comprehensive test plan while Commanding Officer of Naval Station, Annapolis, and Commodore of the Naval Academy Sailing Squadron, was in charge of carrying out the underway portion of the plan. Captain Bonds’ extensive report included the comment:
“The test period confirmed our preliminary judgement that this is an exceptionally able sailing craft. From the lowest end of the wind spectrum up to the point at which she will normally heave to under authentic storm conditions, she remains tractable, predictable and controllable by relatively inexperienced sailors.”
Following dedication, the Annapolis Naval Station’s Small Craft Facility conducted a thorough maintenance evaluation. This included using the main boom
to remove the engine (a procedure the midshipmen may have to use some day), and even removing fuel and water tanks. After the craft was reassembled, she was sailed back to the building yard, where a number of minor modifications were made. These have been incorporated in follow-on craft. Eight sister ships are expected to be available by Spring 1988, but the venerable Luders yawls will be kept in service at the Academy through the end of this year.
The fiberglass Luders yawls replaced the original dozen wooden yawls of identical design in the 1960s. These craft had been delivered to the Naval Academy in 1940-41. Although the Navy-44 has the same overall length as the Luders yawl, she is somewhat larger with greater beam (12.3 versus 10.95 feet) and draft (7.25 versus 6 feet).
Specifically designed as a seamanship- command trainer, the Navy-44 is austere but incorporates the latest building techniques and a modem rig that will provide high-performance sailing during extended offshore cruising and racing with a normal crew of eight midshipmen and two instructors. These new trainers are the products of extensive planning. The Fales Committee, made up of prominent civilian yachtsmen appointed by the Naval Academy superintendent to advise him on the sailing program, took the initiative to prepare specifications. The Naval Academy Sailing Foundation then funded a design competition. The process from start to design selection and through
contracting took several years under iNj
sponsorship of the Deputy Chief of Nav
Operations (Surface Warfare) and the Co1”
mander Naval Sea Systems Comma11*
id.
.ally
The value of sail training was form- ^
recognized in 1979 when then-Chiet Naval Operations Admiral Thomas
Hayward validated the requirement 111 letter to the Chief of Naval Education an<
id
Training (CNET), who was respons^ for all Navy sail training except at 1 ^ Naval Academy. The billet, Director j1 Navy Sailing (DONS) on the staff 1 CNET, was created the following )ca _ CNET headquarters is located in PenSa
itab'
cola, but the DONS office was es
lished in Annapolis to facilitate l>alSt’_ with the Naval Academy sailing Pr gram. The DONS produces and dis[rl ^ utes sail training instructional materi:^ ranging from operation and maintenan of offshore sail training craft to windsn ing (or board sailing); oversees the 0Ptr.(1 tion, safety, and maintenance of 1 dozen offshore sail training craft. a quired from confiscations and donati°nj
N
assigned to NROTC units on the
West, and Gulf coasts and on the
East-
Great
Lakes; and advises the Commat11
tic<
Naval Military Personnel Command recreational sailing craft and water sp° centers (or marinas).
Both Naval Academy and NR^ midshipmen now have the regular oP*1s of making one of their summer cruj under sail. Their instructors, mostly tenants, also gain valuable expert6 through their own extensive pre
cr«ise
'U. S. Air Force, Proposed Memorandum of Agreement: Memorandum of Agreement on U. S. Air Force Air Refueling Support for Naval Operations, HQAF/XOXFS, September 1986, p. 4D.
[2]Benjamin F. Schemmer, “Congress Rejects Land- based Navy Tanker Fleet to Refuel Short-legged F/A- 18s,” Armed Forces Journal International, April 1986, p. 23.
[3]Edward N. Luttwak, The Pentagon and the Art of War: The Question of Military Reform (New York: