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The damage control (DC) readiness that saved the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG- 58) was not an accident. It resulted from an aggressive command involvement; innovative, hard-nosed training; and an internal organization that was both well- disciplined and able to operate autonomously in response to dynamic circumstances. These characteristics are critical if we are to minimize the effects of damage and, in the worst case, to save a ship after a catastrophic hit. To ensure the survivability of our forces in combat, such standards must become the fleet norm. Only when the command takes on the challenge and makes DC a way of life can this be achieved.
A review of the DC focus in Middle East Force (MEF) 1-88 ships (of which the Samuel B. Roberts was a part) and the USS Glover’s (FF-1098) training at the Royal Navy’s operational training facility at Portland, Great Britain, offers some thoughts for organizational-level efforts that can enhance DC readiness well beyond their cost.
Organization
► Limitations of the Current Administrative Organization: Day-to-day DC too often turns into the ship’s unwanted stepchild, particularly in destroyers or frigates. To introduce a higher measure of experience and perspective into the process, the Navy has assigned responsibility for DC to two of the ship’s most experi
enced officers, the executive officer and the chief engineer (CHENG). But the XO is principally concerned with second-incommand-type issues that only he can solve, so inevitably his attention as the DC training “czar” is diverted. And the typical destroyer or frigate CHENG on his first department-head tour is still moving up the department-head learning curve. Although double-hatted as the damage control officer (DCO), he is focused understandably on propulsion- related problems to prepare the ship for operational propulsion plant examinations, inspections and surveys, and on the basic requirement for the ship to be ready to get under way on demand for operations. As a result, he, too, ends up bypassing DC as a concern except where it ties into Repair 5 readiness.
DC matters, therefore, are left to the damage control assistant (DCA), typically a junior officer who has had less than two years’ experience. Although we hope that all DCAs are qualified by training and aggressive by mandate, the reality is generally much different. The DCA is arguably the most demanding junior officer billet on board, requiring the officer carefully to balance resources between competing repair and DC needs. Simply put, the DCA must be a selfstarter—an aggressive, competent officer able to act autonomously to make things happen, regardless of day-to-day support. The job demands that the DCA be directly involved in the training of all crew
Underwater Explosion Damage to the Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58)
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biIast relocates much auxiliary machinery. DECK PLATING AND PIPING FROM LOWER LEVEL J TO UPPER LEVEL
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GAS TURBINES CANTED OUTBOARD BY BLAST
FUEL TANKS RUPTURED
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76 MM AMMO ; MAG 01-231-0-M
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PASS TORP MAG ;1-212-0-L 1-220-0-M
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members. Significantly, the position often requires the officer to prevail among his peers and seniors when internal manning priorities are being sorted out. Too often, the decision favors production and parochial departmental concerns rather than DC readiness. Probably just one of many ensigns or lieutenants (junior grade), the DCA is further in the often untenable position of having to battle his peers for the undivided attention ot the damage control petty officers (DCPOs) and for adequate time to train repair locker and fire party personnel- Regardless of command backing, this job requires a lot of moxie.
A ship with a freshly minted DCA tends to have a sluggish DC maintenance and training program unless the hierarchy (the commanding officer, XO, °r CHENG) steps in and provides direct, hands-on guidance. Exacerbating this problem, the DCA is double-hatted as the internal repair manager and, notwithstanding the new DC rating, must spot his resources between high-priority Pr°" duction work and the less immediately rewarding DC maintenance and training- Finally, the ensign or lieutenant (juni°r grade) DCA who is pursuing his own qualifications for officer-of-the-deC (OOD), engineering officer-of-the-watc
(EOOW), or surface warfare officer (SWO) simply lacks the level and length of experience to maintain a strong ship board DC organization. Generally, h<- performs solely from classroom notes an can add little or no practical experience to invigorate his approach. ,
Foremost, we should limit the DCA * responsibilities to DC. The DCA shou be assigned permanently the rated personnel and a fair share of addition personnel. DCPOs and their alternates should be assigned primarily to the DCA, to be released to parent divisions on y when all planned maintenance system (PMS) and corrective maintenance are accomplished.
And second, we should increase t grade and experience required for 1 DCA billet. The DCA should be SWOj qualified, preferably on a different hu split tour, to ensure that he has a broade perspective than a homegrown one. 1 DCA must be a top one-percenter, a ready EOOW qualified, and not on “get-well tour.” . ,
► DC Command and Control in Batt i- Assigning a more experienced and 0 cused DCA improves the continuity 0
r°utine DC readiness efforts, but it does n°t address the question of DC effectiveness in battle. The officer principally ^ncerned with DC in battle needs to ave a wide breadth of experience both in C and in other shipboard operations. Ven if the DCA is upgraded, he will not ave the years of experience and maturity essential to command and control DC successfully.
Successful shipboard DC invariably reflects the degree of command involve- rt'ent in the process. The level of DC teadiness of the Samuel B. Roberts was Certainly a result of all-hands involve- ^nt. But much more, it showed the exPertise of the commanding officer and his c°nimitment and that of his ship to DC.
To flesh out our battle organization and er)sure some standard of command in- v°lvement in the process, we need to in- stltutionalize command expertise and Participation.
The XO should be the general quarters C deck czar, with a charter to move ub°ut the DC deck as a monitor and j'oubleshooter, in intercom contact with be repair lockers, DC central, and the O- He should serve as a set of mobile, ra>ned eyes to assess situations and, fre- SUently, restore direction and connectivity as a crisis unfolds. In this role, the XO implements rather than shadows the CO.
. The CHENG, as the DCO, should stay "n central rather than in main control.
ealistically, others (including the main impulsion assistant and leading enlisted Propulsion engineers) can handle propul- S|°n. But the DCA, if alone, can be Quickly overwhelmed in battle. The DCO '>vh° monitors overall DC efforts has the Seasoning that is critical to keep the big Pmture in mind and help the DCA focus 0,1 specific problem areas.
Training ► Individual Qualification Requirements: A strong DC organization is not possible unless the officers, chief petty officers, and leading petty officers understand the details of the requirements of DC and the high priority that they must assign to this mission.
To better equip the XO and the CHENG to take on their critical roles, the Navy should increase their pipeline training to provide for additional hands-on DC training. One option would be to assign them to training command mobile teams so they can participate firsthand in fleet training efforts.
Junior officers must become competent in the details of DC. No junior officer should leave his initial shipboard tour without having a functional grasp of DC readiness, ranging from PMS requirements and equipment capabilities to repair team procedures. The command must work directly with the division officer to emphasize the division officer’s key role in DC. The CO, XO, and department heads must make a substantial, hands-on effort to show the junior officer how to do business. Beyond this, each junior officer should qualify and serve as a repair locker officer or assistant, demonstrating the ability to respond to DC requirements in combat. Qualification for repair locker officer should take its place alongside OOD, EOOW, and combat information center watch officer as one of the fundamentals to establish a career.
All chief petty officers and petty officers first class should qualify and serve as repair team leaders, assistants, or onscene leaders. Regardless of rating, it is absolutely imperative that the enlisted leadership have a firm grasp of shipboard DC. We have learned repeatedly that in a crisis, nonengineering ratings in ad hoc
Without a disciplined organization, the Samuel B. Roberts never would have survived to be carried home by this Dutch heavy lift ship. Small combatants in particular must take oft-neglected DC more seriously.
teams will probably practice DC. By requiring the senior enlisted personnel to be knowledgeable, we can best ensure that both crisis response and day-to-day efforts remain at the highest level.
► The Mechanics of Training: The U. S. Navy has the best training assets in the world, and shows other navies what can be achieved in an artificial setting. Additional dynamics of ship scheduling, however—including competing requirements and short-fused taskings—can cancel a ship’s long-standing training plans. Therefore, we must increase our flexibility and capacity to use our trainer facilities. Despite the costs associated with the program, probably the only means of immediately increasing this capacity is to run double shifts at the trainers and—rather than drive the ship’s schedule to allow for trainer availability— accommodate short-notice availability of ship teams to fit into the trainer schedule. Perhaps the requirement for additional instructors could be made up from training aids division assignments from shore- based staffs. This would further broaden the DC knowledge level as these personnel, in turn, return to sea assignments.
The best opportunity to enhance training, however, remains at sea on the same ship where a team could expect to practice its lessons. The lessons of fleet training group (FTG) and flag officer sea training (FOST) are valuable, but the most value comes from applying the lessons of MEF 1-88. This four-ship transit group conducted DC training each day for two to four hours, using a wide-ranging list of scenarios. The afloat squadron commander and an embarked fleet training unit (FTU) mobile training team directed the effort, enabling MEF 1-88 to achieve a consistently high degree of realism. This sustained training gave the ships of MEF 1-88 a critical edge in real- world DC readiness.
Striving for maximum realism, multiple smoke generators simulated damage results. Depending on the tactical situation and the individual CO’s preference,
Sending Shipboard Organization BacM
The
and
effect would be to combine all combat systems, DC,
Damage control (DC) is a ship’s final form of selfdefense. Recent experience in the Falklands Conflict as well as the attacks on the USS Stark (FFG-31) and the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) offer vivid reminders of this fact. Although the U. S. Navy has modified ship designs and issued new equipment, it must change the standard shipboard organization to improve ships’ DC readiness.
DC should be placed in the hands of a department head who is on an equal footing with the currently existing department heads. Under this proposal, a line department head would be assigned deck seamen, damage con- trolmen, hull technicians, and machinery repairmen; he would be given responsibility for maintaining and repairing the ship’s hull and major DC equipment, as well as coordinating the ship’s DC training. In addition, this proposal would scrap the current, unworkable DC maintenance concept (referred to as the EDC1 workcenter in the Atlantic Fleet and as ER09 in the Pacific Fleet) and assign responsibility for each DC maintenance team to a particular department head (see Table 1).
Shipboard organization has evolved slowly since World War II (see Table 2). Then, there were five major line departments, each typically with two to four divisions led by a department head and an assistant department head. Junior officers came aboard as assistant department heads and, during the war, would relieve the department head when his experience was needed on a larger or newly commissioned ship. This system provided continuity of leadership.
As new ships were built in the 1950s and 1960s, the “traditional” organization replaced the World War II organization (see Table 3). Although for many years ships had carried a department head-level navigator on the books, he has been replaced by the new operations officer, who has also absorbed the communications function. The navigator is now a junior officer or—quite often—the executive officer.
The most serious casualty of these postwar reorganizations has been the loss of the construction and repair department, formerly under the ship’s DC officer or first lieutenant. The weapons officer has absorbed his deck seamanship and ship’s appearance function, while the engineer has taken on the vital DC and repair functions. The increasing importance of electronics and missile systems and the loss of large deck divisions needed to operate manpower-intensive gun systems largely caused these changes.
Although the new organization was not intended to reduce the emphasis on DC, it did just that. Planning for DC training has been put in the hands of a junior officer, the damage control assistant (DCA), who must compete against his own superior as well as the other department heads to gain precious hours of training time and funds for his DC teams. The engineer, of course, is the damage control officer (DCO) now, but engineers are not actually expected to perform those duties; the Standard Organization and Regulations Manual of the U. S. Navy recognizes this by requiring the DCA to attend the planning board for training in addition to the engineer officer. The engineer is more concerned with mobility, and therefore has delegated nearly all of his DC responsibilities to the DCA.
Our current shipboard organization has also degraded the way we perform DC maintenance. The current DC maintenance organization is fatally flawed because it splits the responsibility for DC maintenance between the non-department head DCA (not the DCO) and the head of each department (including the DCO). But the authority to order men to accomplish this maintenance lies strictly with the parent department head. This system contradicts a basic tenet of military leadership: anyone charged with the responsibility for accomplishing a task must have commensurate authority over those who do the work.
Yet another shipboard organization has evolved in am swer to computers that now provide the link between search radars and weapon systems, a task formerly accomplished by a human (see Table 4). This new organization seeks to improve the capability of combat systenlS by keeping all equipment interfaces under the cognizance of the combat systems officer. This has done nothing t0 change the status of DC.
The proposed organization (Table 1) will leave these combat systems changes untouched. Responsibility for the deck would be taken from operations, and responsibility for DC and repair functions taken from the engineer. All of these would be combined under the DCO °r
first lieutenant, as in the World War II organization.
propulsion/electrieal personnel under a single cognizant officer. The ship’s captain would then have a departmc head in charge of each of his areas of combat capability—weapons, propulsion, DC, and command and control.
Under this proposal, each piece of DC equipment would belong to one department head. The DCO woul retain control over major pieces of shipwide DC equipment, including repair lockers and P-250 pumps, as we as being responsible for maintaining compartment check-off lists (CCOLs), compartment air testing, and watertight fittings. Although it may seem burdensome to saddle the DCO with all watertight fittings and CCOLs, these tasks will become much less manpower intensive when the DCO can use the in-rate knowledge of his damage controlmen to perform the maintenance proper y the first time. Each department head would be directly responsible for the “standard” DC equipment in his as signed spaces, including fire stations, purple-K-powder, carbon dioxide bottles, battle lanterns, and ventilation
Scenarios were allowed to run as dynamic events, where casualties cascaded if not ealt with properly. Ships were filled w'th smoke and progressive damage and brought dead in the water, while ad hoc teams were formed to keep up with the intense scenarios. Using FOST-style flooding boxes for drill patching and shoring drills added to the realism. These flooding boxes, placed in spaces served by main drainage systems, hook up to firemains and can simulate damage and
ickHhe Future By Lieutenant Commander W. E. Dewes, U. S. Navy
systems. Each department head would also control DC Shipment that is strictly related to his spaces or equipment. The engineer, for example, would be responsible °r his foam-generating and Halon systems in the main sPaces, while the combat systems officer would maintain al1 magazine sprinkling systems. All DC maintenance 'v°uld appear on each department’s regular planned ma'ntenance schedule; the DC maintenance work center Concept would be eliminated. DC would continue to be an all-hands effort.
This proposed shipboard organization has one principal Purpose: to improve the DC and combat capabilities of ()Uf ships.
besides solving the problems already mentioned, this Proposed organization would have many other beneficial snic effects. It would:
. Relieve the engineer of a responsibility that he lacks llrile to carry out adequately, allowing him to concentrate providing main propulsion and stable electrical power
Provide department-head-level responsibility for deck Seamanship, which—since the first lieutenant would have the means to repair and refurbish all areas topside— should result in improving the ship’s appearance and the performance of deck seamanship evolutions
► Provide the CO with more experience on board the ship by having four line department heads instead of three. This can improve a ship’s combat readiness in a Condition 111 steaming situation
► Combine under one department head the personnel who make up the bulk of topside repair lockers. This would improve the proficiency of the repair locker by providing a stable organization and a better training program
This proposal would remove many of the current system’s impediments to forming an effective DC organization. Although this plan will not be easy to implement— finding a fourth line department head for all ships will be particularly difficult—there are ways to solve this problem. Not every ship requires the same level of experience for all department heads, nor is it necessary that every department head graduate from the department head course at the Surface Warfare Officers School. Every ship has outstanding junior officers who can fill a “fleet up” billet as a department head. We must not keep ourselves from solving the problem by making the solution too hard.
The Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigate provides the example of how this proposed organization could be tested rapidly with minimal personnel disruption. The ship is currently organized as in Table 4, except that the combat systems officer performs the operations function. This leaves the third line department head, who is called the “ship control officer,” as a department head in search of a job. Transferring the DC division (and the DCA) from the engineering department would be relatively easy. The ship control officer would become the first lieutenant or DCO, and would take on the duties outlined earlier. The ER09/EDC1 organization would be dissolved. In this proposal, the ship control officer would retain responsibility for external communications. while the combat systems officer would maintain radio equipment and interior communications circuits.
Damage control is important enough to justify a department head’s primary attention. In today’s violent peace, we may not have the luxury of working up an effective damage control organization while at sea. The organization must be in place—ready to handle any contingency at any time. We must simplify our organization and increase emphasis on damage control—and we need to do it now.
Commander Dewes is currently assigned as combat systems officer on the USS Thach (FFG-43). Previous assignments have included first lieutenant. fire control officer, and navigator in the USS Benjamin Stoddert (DDG-22); engineer officer in the USS Pegasus (PHM-1); and damage control assistant in the USS Long Beach (CGN-9). Me also attended the Naval Postgraduate School and Navy Nuclear Power School.
flooding through manufactured holes and splits.
MEF 1-88 ships also practiced at-sea assistance, and each ship rotated through the roles of distressed and assist vessels. Typically, a scenario would call for serious damage to the distressed ship. The relief vessel would approach, determine assistance requirements, send over a survey group followed by an assistance team, and tow the distressed vessel.
During MEF 1-88 operations, ships were encouraged to develop hybrid organizations to sustain DC readiness through the months of Persian Gulf deployment, when DC posture had to stay at such a high level. Scenarios that are typically avoided in peacetime training, such as the routine rigging of casualty power, were included routinely. As a result, this group of deploying ships achieved an exceptionally high level of readiness and was able to respond easily to the mining of the Samuel B. Roberts.
The MEF 1-88 experience shows what can be accomplished using resources at hand. Such DC training should be included in all fleet exercises and transits to deployment. FTU teams and embarked staffs should conduct training on ships about every three days; during the intervals, the crews should train internally and apply the lessons learned. It is not enough to know how to fire weapons offensively and defensively; we must know how to save our ships when the hits inevitably come.
Repair Team Effectiveness ► Manning: With the exception of the CHENG and Repair V, no department head benefits directly from assigning top- notch personnel to repair teams. So without a strong command involvement, repair teams often turn into junior personnel training groups, as more experienced personnel seek to “fleet up” from the relatively arduous duty of the repair team
Smart Ships Will
By Lawrence A. Schaffer
The design of crucial military systems is necessarily a series of “what if” exercises. The Aegis system is designed to be impenetrable from outside attack, but what if a hit occurs, damaging the lifeblood of the system—the 400Hz power- distribution system? In the development of each Aegis subsystem, careful consideration was given to every possible battle-related scenario. The design of the or duty fire party to less physically demanding tasks. This phenomenon is unacceptable. Not only must most members of each repair team have met their personnel qualification standards, but the team must be manned with a fair share of the highest quality personnel available on board. The membership of these teams must remain constant to ensure the highest degree of continuity.
Not surprisingly, the Glover found that assigning these enlisted surface-warfare- specialist-qualified personnel—with their extensive knowledge of the ship and her systems—to the teams significantly enhanced the teams’ effectiveness. Such personnel tend to think on their feet better than their contemporaries and are able to act autonomously under widely varying circumstances.
If the ship’s battle bill and manning level permit, the number of leaders assigned to each repair team should be doubled. Besides increasing the number of personnel being trained in practical DC, this adds tremendous flexibility, since each team must deal with multiple damage sites. And if the repair locker is rolled back by progressive damage, having more people helps the team establish connectivity and control as the team assistant proceeds to the alternate command and control location.
► Organizing the Team: In such matters as flexibility, U. S. Navy teams are the best in the world. In battle, however, the speed of post-hit investigation and application of urgent DC actions is critical to save the ship. To streamline the process the Navy should, when the tactical situation permits, apply a lesson the British learned in the Falklands Conflict: at general quarters, disperse all but a cadre of the team, in pairs, throughout each locker’s area to focus on unmanned and critical spaces (particularly machinery and equipment spaces whose loss would be unacceptable). After the ship is damaged in battle, these pairs, outfitted for urgent
Survive
power-distribution system is notable in this regard.
Damage to the distribution system at any point sets into motion a rapid series of events. Within 25 microseconds, fault isolation units limit current to damaged lines or loads, allowing the balance of the system to receive normal, undisturbed power. Circuit breakers then disconnect these loads within milliseconds. If any
DC action, would report back to the par' ent locker and stay to provide first aid » feasible. If the central locker did not receive a damage report from the pairs, >■ would consider it had received a de facto positive report and would investigate an take action. Dispersing pairs would expedite the discovery of damage; permit immediate DC actions in remote areas, increasing the prospects for saving the affected space; and eliminate the possibility of a single hit destroying an entire repair locker party.
Clearly, there are some tactical situations that require a different course o action. In the case of the Samuel B. R°D erts, the decision to move personne higher in the ship and leave lower leve s unmanned prevented the mine from taring any lives. Nevertheless, in most bat tie situations ships should be trained to disperse teams to administer autonomous first aid and to vary the approach as tm tactical situation evolves.
Summary .
The current influx of materials unC*eJ the ship survivability initiative is critic in enabling our ships to respond to dam age. But materials alone will not brin- about as much readiness as we nee ■ Moreover, it will be years before all snip share the type and quantity of equipme now deploying to the Middle East F°rce_ Upgrading our training and organizati will ensure that the new equipment w ^ be properly used when received and, ' the interim, enable crews to attain 1 highest level of DC readiness, using ma terials at hand.
Commander Glass is presently the chief staff 0 1 of Commander Destroyer Squadron 22. PrevioU^gg signments have included chief engineer in the Milwaukee (AOR-2) and executive officer of the Glover fFF-1098). Commander Glass also con^afriS damage control training in the Samuel B. R° 1 (FFG-58) while en route to the Persian Gulf- portion of the distribution line has bee^ damaged, automatic bus ties isolate the portions, allowing power to flow throug redundant paths to vital loads. Fina r twice the amount of needed power capa^ ity is online at all times, and P°w sources are separated in the ship to ensu that even if one or two power converts^ are damaged, the Aegis system will n lose power.