A rescue attempt sparked U. S. Arctic operations, leading Navy Lieutenant Edwin De Haven to become a pioneer explorer in the area. De Haven’s Advance and Repulse, shown entering Lancaster Sound, didn’t get much farther north than this, but they opened the door for future attempts to reach the pole.
The genesis of the U. S. Arctic programs was an 1849 appeal from Lady Jane Franklin to President Zachary Taylor for assistance in searching for a British naval expedition commanded by her husband. Sir John Franklin. The disappearance of this party—last seen by Europeans near Lancaster Sound in 1845—led to scores of rescue attempts over the coming decade. Most were mounted by the British. But Lady Jane’s petition resulted in an American effort under the command of U. S. Navy Lieutenant Edwin Jesse De Haven.1
De Haven’s ships—the Advance and Rescue—were provided by Henry Grinned, a prominent American merchant and a student of world geography. In honor of his benefaction, this enterprise became known as the First Grinned Expedition. Grinnell’s ships, however, were Navy-manned and equipped at government expense.
In the summer of 1850. De Haven’s party departed the United States, proceeded through Lancaster Sound, and joined British units searching for Sir John Franklin. After sharing in the discovery of the British explorer’s first winter camp at Beeehey Island, De Haven sailed north through Wellington Channel, one of the routes outlined in Franklin's original instructions. At this point, the Advance and Rescue became frozen in the ice and were driven to the north. They sighted a new territory, now known to be a westward extension of Devon Island, which De Haven named Grinned Land. Later, the (low of the ice pack reversed, forcing the ships eastward to Baffin Bay. The expedition was finally freed from the grip of the frozen sea in In the summer of 1851, but by that time unusually severe conditions in the Canadian archipelago were reported. That factor, plus concern over the health of his scurvy ridden crew, caused De Haven to end his cruise.
While the tangible results of this expedition were modest, they were rich in significance for the future of U.S. polar activities. Even though his ships did not advance north of the 76th parallel, De Haven’s experiences renewed interest in the theory of the open polar sea advanced by Matthew Fontaine Maury and other authorities- Maury, a famed U. S. Navy hydrographer, had special influence on American thinking. He based his hypothesis upon the correct observation that the coldest regions in the northern hemisphere are south of the Arctic Ocean. Maury also supported his belief in a large body of open water upon reports that whales and other air-breathing animals frequented the far north. Regarding the search for Franklin, Maury's views led to the belief that the British explorer may have taken advantage of an unusually warm summer to enter the unfrozen polar sea but was prevented returning to civilization by the girdle of ice in lower in latitudes. Searchers hoped that Franklin and his men were surviving by hunting and fishing. Maury's speculation provided a powerful impetus for future American expedidition to head for the North Pole in their quest for the Franhlin party.2
Another long- range influence of De Haven’s operation was the appearance of a notable new U. S. explorer, Elisha Kent Lane, who had served as a naval surgeon with the First Grinnell Expedition. Despite a serious heart ailment resulting from rheumatic fever, Kane was determined to live life to its fullest. After establishing himself as one of De Haven’s most resourceful officers, the young surgeon returned to the United States and delivered a series of lectures that made him a well-known public figure. Of greater significance, Kane was also determined to return to the Arctic to seek the open polar sea, which he was convinced held the key to Franklin's disappearance. Incidental to this operation, he spoke of reaching the North Pole. He was the first American explorer to embark on this objective, which dominated the American imagination for many years.
Kane’s expedition received both governmental and private support. Kane served under special orders from the'' Secretary of the Navy, which allowed him full pay. The Navy provided other officers and men, although they were supplemented by civilian scientists and Hans Hendrik, a young Eskimo hunter from Greenland. Henry Grinnell once again offered the Advance. Grinnell also obtained funds to equip the cruise. The enterprise became known as the Second Grinnell Expedition.
The northward route that Elisha Kane pioneered, later known as the “American route to the Pole,” started in Smith Sound at the northern end of Baffin Bay. In the early 1850s, this area marked the northern limit of European geographic knowledge of this region. Kane planned to establish a base above Smith Sound from which dog- driven sledge and boat parties could reach the open waters that presumably lay beyond the masses of ice extending to approximately the 80th parallel. Although Kane’s plans were based on Maury’s teachings, he was also indebted to recent observations by the British explorer, Edward A. Inglefield in 1852, while leading another Franklin rescue party, Inglefield became the first Western mariner to sail through Smith Sound. At that time, Inglefield reached Cape Sabine on Ellesmere Island at 78° 28' north latitude and observed a large ice-free bay to the north. This sighting suggested the exciting possibility of an easy route to the pole.
Kane’s achievements included driving the Advance through heavy ice to a new far-north position on the coast
of Greenland at 78° 37' north latitude. At this point, whic Kane named Rensselaer Harbor, the ship was frozen into the ice. But, as planned, the expedition then journeyed by sledge to establish supply caches for use the following spring when a party with small boats would be sent to the open Arctic Ocean. During these operations, Kane be came the first white man to encounter the Eskimos of the Smith Sound region, including those from the villages o Etah and Anoatok, who were destined to play a critica role in future polar expeditions in this area.
Kane could not achieve his most ambitious objectives because most of his dogs died from disease and bears plundered his food depots. Nevertheless, he and his men charted the perimeter of a large, new area, which came to be known as the Kane Basin, and were the first to sight the enormous Humboldt Glacier. A sortie made by Willi3111 Morton, one of Kane’s seamen, and the young Eskimo Hans Hendrick reached Cape Constitution on the Greenland coast at approximately 80° 58' north latitude in Juno 1854. At the northern edge of the Kane Basin, Morton and Hendrick sighted another narrow, ice-free passage leading toward the pole. That body of water, believed to be an arm of the open Arctic sea, was named Kennedy Channel m honor of the U. S. Secretary of the Navy John Pendleton Kennedy.
During the next two winters, Kane’s ship remained frozen in the ice off Greenland. The crew insulated the Advance with moss, grass, and snow, which offered some protection from the extreme cold. But in 1855 the expedi' tion abandoned hope of freeing the brig. At this point- Kane left his base at Rensselaer Harbor and sought safety in the Danish settlements of southern Greenland. This trek by sledge and small boat, which depended upon the inspired leadership of Kane with assistance from the Smith Sound Eskimos, did much to guarantee the expedition's fame.3
One of the Second Grinnell Expedition’s notable legacies was Kane’s development and application of Arctic travel and survival techniques. Learning from the experience of British Arctic parties and his own observation of Eskimo methods, Kane became an American pioneer m using dogs, sledges, and pre-established caches for movement through the polar region. He was also one of the first explorers to heed the Eskimos’ preference for undertaking long journeys during the winter, when the ice and sno^ were firmest. Kane’s study of Hans Hendrik’s hunting practices convinced him that it was possible to live off the land in the Far North. As a medical doctor who faced the problem of scurvy during the First and Second Grinnell Expeditions, Kane further recognized that the native diet—notably the consumption of raw meat—offered an effective preventive to that disease. Finally, Kane adopted Eskimo construction practices in protecting his ship from the rigors of the Arctic winter.
Kane’s navigational practices were of additional interest for students of later polar expeditions. The positions determined by fixed equipment near Kane’s base in Rensselaer Harbor were highly accurate. Yet, when his advance parties left that area, the limitations of their portable sextants- artificial horizons, and pocket chronometers became evident. For example, because of the sun’s relatively flat, low path at high latitudes, it was difficult to determine Precisely the apogee of the sun at local noon. In triangulating the Kane Basin, Kane and his men also depended upon an erroneous base line and relied to some extent on dead eckoning, which was “hardly more than a guess” in the rocky shores and the rough ice belt” of the Kane Basin.It is not surprising that the expedition’s reported positions in field were in error by approximately 30 to 50 miles.4
Kane died of heart failure at the age of 37, but his fame Propelled explorers to continue his polar quest. One of these was another medical doctor, Isaac I. Hayes, who served his Arctic apprenticeship under Kane in 1853-55. Hayes began to plan his own operation in the mid-50s, evidence finally came to light indicating that John ranklin and his men had perished in the Canadian Arctic uring 1847-48. With the humanitarian objectives gone, Hayes stressed the need to continue Kane’s effort to reach the open polar sea and to collect scientific data on the region north of Smith Sound.
After five frustrating years, by 1860, Hayes was able to obtain the financial support of a group of private benefactors. Not surprisingly, one of these was Henry Grinnell. Purchasing a small schooner that he named the United States, Hayes departed from Boston in July 1860. He called on the Greenland settlements and added Eskimo dogs and hunters to his party, including Hans Hendrik. As Hayes continued to sail along the coast of Greenland, he encountered heavy ice conditions and was frozen in for the winter off Etah, some 80 miles southwest of Kane’s Rensselaer Harbor. Nevertheless, from this location, Hayes investigated the periphery of the Greenland ice cap and then crossed Smith Sound to reconnoiter the Ellesmere coast. He reached the approximate position of 80° 11' north latitude, but, to his disappointment, did not sight the open polar sea.5
A more famous polar explorer of this era was Charles Francis Hall. This colorful engraver and newspaper publisher became fascinated with the north after reading of Elisha Kane’s exploits. Hall also continued to be intrigued by Sir John Franklin and his party, despite the apparently reliable reports of their demise in the region of King William Island. Hall’s first two visits to the north were primarily to investigate the fate of Franklin’s expedition.
For the fourth time, Henry Grinnell came to the financial aid of northern exploration by raising funds for Charles Hall. With these resources, Hall booked passage on a whaling ship that departed from New London, Connecticut, in 1860 and proceeded to Baffin Island. During the next two winters, as the ship became frozen in the ice, Hall lived much of the time with the Eskimos of the region, developing a deep friendship for them and an admiration for their ability to survive in a seemingly hostile land. However, Hall was unsuccessful in persuading the Eskimos to travel with him to King William Island before he returned to the United States in 1862.
The explorers were assisted by merchant Henry Grinnell in their Arctic explorations. None reached the North Pole. Twenty years after De Haven’s attempt, Hall was forced to abandon his ship, the Polaris, when she was almost crushed by the ice—the ship’s engineer, Emil Schumann, sketched the ship’s perilous situation.
From 1864 to 1869, Hall once again journeyed to the Arctic. This time, his base was the Melville Peninsula north of Hudson Bay. He lived with the Eskimos in that region for most of this period and became proficient in native hunting and travel techniques. In 1869, Hall succeeded in reaching King William Island by sled. He discovered relics belonging to Franklin’s men, before they perished from starvation and exposure more than 20 years earlier, and confirmed the unlikelihood of survivors living in the area.
These lengthy visits to the far north prepared Hall for his great life’s work—a voyage toward the North Pole. Hall persuaded Congress to authorize an official expedition administered by the U. S. Navy and supported in its scientific aspects by the Smithsonian Institution. The expedition’s vessel was a 140-foot naval tug, the Polaris, specially modified for Arctic service. This sturdy ship departed from the United States in July 1871 with a crew of 25 officers, men, and scientists. In addition, eight Eskimos, including the experienced Hans Hendrik, joined the ship to act as hunters and sled drivers.
Although troubled by cases of increasing insubordination by several members of the party, the Polaris was fortunate to encounter an unusually mild Arctic summer. Hall navigated with little difficulty through Kane Basin and Kennedy Channel and finally through two bodies of water never before seen by nonnative travelers. They named these Hall Basin and Robeson Channel, in honor of the expedition’s commander and the Secretary of the Navy, George Maxwell Robeson. As the Polaris reached the northern end of Robeson Channel at approximately 82° 11' north latitude, she faced the Arctic Sea. But any belief that this would be an open expanse of water soon disappeared. Instead, Hall and his men viewed a frozen surface stretching as far as the eye could see.
At this point, weather conditions deteriorated, and heavy winds and masses of ice drove the ship to the south. When it appeared that the Polaris might be crushed, Hall was able to reach relative safety in a small bay on the Greenland coast at 81° 37' north latitude. With proper gratitude, he named this position Thank God Harbor. They covered the ship with snow and ice to protect the crew for the winter season, much as Elisha Kane had enclosed the Advance. Then, in October 1871, Hall and three companions went on a two-week reconnaissance by sled to the north to prepare for a polar attempt the following spring. After moving along the Greenland coast, the party climbed a high point of land, from which they could see the northern tip of Ellesmere and the eastward tendency of the Greenland shoreline. This led Hall to speculate that both positions were islands, rather than southwar extensions of a major polar landmass.
If Hall had lived, he might have been the first to con firm the insularity of Greenland and Ellesmere and to u° dertake a long journey on the polar sea ice. But, imme ately after returning to his ship, Hall was stricken with an illness. He died two weeks later. An official U. S. Navy investigation eventually concluded that Hall had suffers stroke, even though the explorer had suggested in his tin days that he had been poisoned by a malcontent crew member. Amazingly, this view was tested scientifically in 1968, 97 years later, when Hall’s frozen body was examined in its icy grave at Thank God Harbor by a party directed by Professor Chauncey C. Loomis. Body samples taken during this long-delayed post mortem were eval ated in a Canadian laboratory and revealed that Hall ha • indeed, ingested fatal amounts of arsenic during the las weeks of his life. Loomis noted that this poison may have been self-inflicted since arsenic compounds were common forms of medicine in the 19th century and Hall had re jected the care of the expedition’s surgeon, Emil Besse with whom he had a strained relationship. Nevertheless, Hall was murdered, Dr. Bessels must be considered the prime suspect.6
In tracing the continuing polar quest, we must turn to effort to reach far northern latitudes via the Bering Straits. This route had special fascination in the 1870s becaus explorers believed that the warm Japanese current, penetrating deep into the Arctic basin, opened an easy sea route to the pole. In seeming contradiction to this new version an open polar sea, the German geographer, August Peter mann, also postulated the existence of a major contm north of the Siberian coast. Petermann argued that t landmass stretched across the Arctic basin, presenting 7 land bridge that could lead explorers to high latitudes-
The leader who set out to test these theories was anotne American naval officer, Lieutenant Commander George Washington De Long, whose polar interests had been aroused when he led a small-boat voyage to norther0 Greenland waters during 1873 in search of Charles Hall's party. De Long was the last American explorer to receive advice and assistance from Henry Grinnell. Shortly befor Grinnell’s death in 1874, he suggested that De Long seek the support of the American newspaper magnate, James Gordon Bennett. As the publisher of the popular New York Herald, this wealthy young man was always seeking interestingesting copy, and he agreed to endorse De Long’s efforts' By the late 1870s, Bennett and De Long acquired a steam bark, soon renamed the Jeanette, and obtained congressional approval for an expedition from the Pacific towa the North Pole. Although the expedition was administers by the Navy, Bennett bore most of the expenses.
In the summer of 1879, the Jeanette sailed from Sa° Francisco and shaped a course for Wrangel Island. Expl°° ers had suspected this territory existed long before Wes em mariners sighted it in 1867 when an American whaling ship succeeded in reaching the area through the heavy ice normally found off the Siberian coast. Petermann and other authorities were convinced that Wrangel was part of the presumed polar continent.8 Therefore, De Long planned to establish a base in that area from which to hunt an overland sledge journey to the top of the world.
The Jeanette was soon locked in the ice near Herald Island and, but De Long expected his ship to drift to Wrangel, which was only 40 miles eastward. To his dismay, the speed of the polar pack made landing an impossibility. And, as the ice propelled the Jeanette past Wrangel, the crew realized that this position was a relatively isolated iland. In the succeeding 21 months, the ship continued a long drift through the Arctic Ocean. Observations during this period revealed no other large landmass in the shallow seas off Siberia, although they discovered three small islands. Finally, in July 1881, at a point north of the 77th Parallel, the Jeanette sank after being crushed by the polar ice, and her crew was forced to make a hazardous retreat y sled and small boat to the Siberian mainland. During this phase of the operation, De Long and a number of his comatriots died. Despite its tragic ending, however, the exedition helped disprove facile theories of an open polar sea and of the presumed Arctic landmass near Russia, and provided valuable insight into the polar basin’s hydrography. Some years later, the discovery of wreckage from the Jeanette near Greenland offered further evidence of the prevailing currents in the Arctic Ocean.
No American attempted to reach the pole during the 80s. The 1890s were dominated by the obsessive determination of Robert Edwin Peary to become the conqueror of the pole. Peary was a U. S. Navy civil engineering officer, although he was on leave of absence during most of his northern expeditions. His famous dictum that “the more dramatic your expeditions are, the more incompetent you are,’’ indicated the high degree of planning and order that he introduced to polar exploration.9 His methods became known as the “Peary System.”
Peary’s remarkable persistence is shown by his repeated spirits to the Arctic for more than 20 years.10 On his first expedition 1886, he made a relatively short journey on the Iceland ice cap. Beginning in 1891, he concentrated on exploring northern Greenland in anticipation of using that area as a base for a polar assault. During this period, Peary mistakenly identified Peary Land as a separate position, rather than as a continuation of Greenland. Four years later, the explorer made his first attempt to cross the tortured surface of the frozen Arctic Ocean, followed by a similar expedition in 1899. But, in 1902, Peary’s now considerable experience with the relatively rapid eastward drift of the ice off Greenland caused him to shift his starting point for the pole to Ellesmere Island. During that year, he reached 84° 17' north latitude before he was forced to return to the coast. Throughout all of these operations, Peary depended upon the assistance of the Smith Sound Eskimos, who were integral members of his explores teams.
Following the rebuff of 1902, Commander Peary returned to the United States to plan further operations. With mancing provided by the Peary Arctic Club, composed of a number of wealthy Americans who continued the tradition of support from the American business community exemplified by Henry Grinnell, Peary built a superb steam schooner, the Roosevelt. She was specially designed for Arctic operations. In 1905, the Roosevelt carried Peary’s party to Cape Sheridan on the northern coast of Ellesmere. Early the next year, Peary set out once again across the polar ice, only to be stopped by a large lead of open water at 87° 06' north latitude. On his return to the Canadian archipelago, Peary made another erroneous observation, when he claimed to sight a territory, now known to be nonexistent, that he named Crocker Land.
In 1908, at the age of 52, Peary began his final attempt on the North Pole. After forcing the Roosevelt through the summer ice to Cape Sheridan, overland parties established a base at Cape Columbia, some 100 miles to the northwest. This position at 83° 07' north latitude marked the northernmost point on the American continent and was only 413 miles from the pole. From his large party, which included 50 Eskimos and approximately 250 dogs, Peary formed five separate sledge teams; he headed one himself. The overall plan called for these groups to move in relays, starting in March 1909, to break a path and lay down caches of food and fuel. Slightly below the 88th parallel, on 1 April 1909, the last of the advance parties turned back. At that point, accompanied by the strongest Eskimos and dogs and Matthew Henson, the most capable non-Eskimo member of his expedition, Peary set out to achieve his lifelong goal. His report showed that he traveled eled the remaining 133 miles to the pole, reaching it on 6 April. He then made a rapid return to Ellesmere in order to reach the coast before the spring thaws began to break up the polar ice.
but he distrusted the accuracy of his chronometers
The Peary System’s success resulted from a number of factors, not the least of which was the expert assistance provided by the Eskimo sledge drivers. Although Peary did not depend primarily upon hunting for his rations and lacked the cultural sensitivity for native peoples that was typical of many other Arctic explorers, he willingly adopted many Eskimo techniques. For example, in order to minimize the weight carried by his teams, heavy tents and sleeping bags were replaced by Eskimo-built igloos and special clothing made by Eskimo women. A few simple modifications allowed these clothes to become sleeping gear at night. Peary also refused to carry small boats; he was convinced that during the cold season chosen for his travels any leads encountered would soon freeze over. Each of his men, however, carried a sealskin bag. As the Eskimos had known for many years, these could be inflated and used as emergency floats to ferry sleds across open water.11
Peary’s navigational techniques did not differ materially from those of his 19th century forebears. He relied primarily upon latitude observations based on measuring the sun’s extreme altitude with a hand-held sextant and artificial mercury horizon. By timing the sun’s daily apogee or determining the sun’s true bearing at this point, he could also determine longitude, but he did not appear to make these computations while on the polar ice. In addition, Peary used odometers and compasses for dead reckoning. This imprecise technique, however, was not the primary basis for Peary’s claim to reach the pole.12
The accuracy of Peary’s navigation is open to serious question, particularly because he used hand-held equipment. Peary was also faulted for failing to take longitudinal observations. Under these circumstances, even those authorities who support Peary as the substantive discoverer of the pole are unwilling to guarantee that he reached that precise position.13
Shortly before Peary announced his achievement, a former associate, Dr. Frederick A. Cook, stated that he had reached the top of the world one year earlier—in April 1908. Cook’s account revealed an expedition of great daring and extent. Lacking his own ship or the other materia and human resources of Peary’s large party, Cook made a long, difficult sledge journey from the Smith Sound area to Axel Heiberg Island, with a small group of companions. His report indicates that he departed Axel Heiberg in March 1908 and traveled some 520 miles across the frozen sea’s rugged surface, accompanied by two young Eskimos. After reaching his goal, Cook returned to the Cana dian archipelago and spent the winter of 1908-09 °n Devon Island. During his expedition, Cook sighted a territory that he named Bradley Land which, like Peary's Crocker Land, is now known to be mythical. Throughout much of this 14-month operation, Cook lived off the island.
For navigational guidance, Cook attempted to determine longitude by timing the sun at its extreme altitude hence the results of these computations. He also made limited use of shadow observations and depended extensively upon dead reckoning techniques. Nevertheless, as was true for Peary, his proof of reaching the pole depended primarily upon latitude computations derived from the somewhat imprecise observation of the sun’s altitud with hand-held sextants and mercury horizons.14
It is extremely difficult to prove scientifically the reports of either explorer. Neither was accompanied by other navigators who could take confirming observations- Nor could later expeditions validate the physical evidence Peary and Cook left, since their cairns had long since drifted away on the polar ice. In the last analysis, therefore, proponents of Peary and Cook must depend on the credibility of these leaders, reminding one of Norwegian Roald Amundsen’s astute observation that the “character of the explorer ... is always the best evidence of his claim of achievement.”15 Character judgments, however, are highly subjective and are unlikely to command universal acceptance.16
Although the Peary and Cook expeditions are of major interest, other American polar explorers during this period preferred Spitsbergen and Franz Josef Land as bases of operations. One of these individuals was a colorful journalist Walter Wellman, who in 1894 and 1899 made short passages on the sea ice from both of these islands. In 1907 and 1909, Wellman, apparently inspired by Salomon A. Tree’s pioneering balloon attempts in the late 1890s, returned to Spitsbergen with a large airship named America hich made two unsuccessful flights.
During the succeeding decade, the world’s major nation's were absorbed by World War I, and most Arctic exploration was put on hold. In the 1920s, when interest in reaching the pole resumed, aviation technology, which had improved dramatically since the early part of the centuiry received special attention. Roald Amundsen, the Norwegian discoverer of the South Pole, working with Lincoln Ellsworth, an American, demonstrated the feasibility of aerial operations in 1925 by flying from Spitsbergen in two fixed-wing aircraft to within approximately 120 miles of their goal. In the next year, another Amundsen-Ellsworth flight was made in the Italian- dsigned airship Norge. During a 72-hour flight, this expedition not only reached the top of the world, but crossed the entire Arctic basin and landed near Nome, Alaska.17
Only two days before Amundsen began his successful flight, his ambition to become the first aviation discoverer of the North Pole was preempted by Richard E. Byrd and his assistant, Floyd Bennett. Flying from King’s Bay, Spitsbergen, in a three-engine Fokker aircraft, these pioneers reported reaching 90° north latitude on 9 May 1926. As was true for so many other American explorers, Lieutenant Commander Byrd was a naval officer. During his discovery flight, however, he was on leave from the service, and his trip was financed by private sources.
Considering the controversy over the positional accuracy of previous Arctic expeditions, it is not surprising at Byrd gave special attention in his reports to navigational details. He noted, for example, that the sun compass, a device projecting the sun’s shadow onto the hands of a 24-hour clock, determined the aircraft’s longitude and allowed them to steer a due northern course. The speed of advance along this meridian was determined by dead reckoning. When they reached the pole, they obtained confirmed sun sights by sextant and artificial horizon. Byrd’s precise return to his takeoff point in Spitsbergen was another indication, in the aviator’s estimation, of the accuracy of his dead reckoning.
Five years later, an underwater approach to the pole, discussed hypothetically since the 19th century, was attempted for the first time by Sir Hubert Wilkins. Although Wilkins was Australian, his submarine, the Nautilus, had been a U. S. Navy vessel. In addition, many individuals associated with the expedition were American nationals, including Simon Lake, the original designer of the Nautilus who modified the craft for Arctic duty; and Sloan Danenhower, a former U. S. naval officer whose father had served with Lieutenant De Long during the Jeanette operation. Danenhower commanded the submarine under Wilkins’s general direction and insisted on maintaining positive buoyancy in order to allow the submarine to slide along the bottom of the ice on inverted runners and to surface automatically in leads and polynyas to replenish her air supply. A large screw installed on the superstructure was designed to bore an airway in case they encountered solid ice. Unfortunately, the inability to retract this screw at a critical point; the failure of the submarine’s diving planes, possibly as a result of crew sabotage; and inherent limitations in the submarine’s capabilities restricted the Nautilus to a short cruise under the polar pack near Spitsbergen. Nevertheless, as was true for the pioneering aeronautical attempts of Salomon Andree and Walter Wellman, the primitive Nautilus expedition later inspired more successful operations that could take advantage of advances in technology.
Following World War II, aerial navigation over the pole, including regularly scheduled commercial flights, became commonplace. Another activity during this period was the habitation of large ice islands as they drifted through the polar sea. By establishing scientific stations on these platforms, they became, in effect, the 20th century equivalents to De Long’s Jeanette. Probably the most famous U. S. ice station was manned by an Air Force team under the direction of Colonel Joseph O. Fletcher. This island, known as T-3, was only 103 miles from the pole when Fletcher arrived in 1952, and he hoped the natural drift would lead it across the 90th parallel. Although this did not happen, they collected valuable oceanographic and meteorological observations over the next two years. Later, other ice islands manned by Air Force teams and by parties associated with the U. S. Navy’s Arctic Research Laboratory at Point Barrow, Alaska, yielded additional scientific data that increased human knowledge of the polar regions.18
The quest for the North Pole also continued to dominate the imagination of U. S. explorers. In 1968, an unusual expedition claimed to be the first to reach the North Pole over the surface since the days of Cook and Peary. Ralph Plaisted, a businessman from St. Paul, Minnesota, led this party, which traveled by 12 horsepower snowmobiles from Ward Hunt Island off the Ellesmere coast. The party received supplies from supporting aircraft. Plaisted’s team reached the objective on 19 April and later returned to its starting point by air. Air Force planes, using modern navigational equipment, verified Plaisted’s achievement.19 Eighteen years later, a team of six U. S. and Canadian adventurers, led by Will Steger of Minnesota, reached the North Pole from their base at Ward Hunt Island.20 In this 56-day, 500-mile trek, they directly imitated Peary by relying solely on dog-driven sleds.
Another notable operation in the Arctic occurred in 1969 when two U. S. Coast Guard icebreakers, the Staten Island (WAGB-278) and Northwind (WAGB-282), and the Canadian icebreaker John A. MacDonald escorted the tanker Manhattan on a westward voyage through the Northwest Passage. The Coast Guard’s deep knowledge of navigation in this region was also demonstrated by the role of its representatives in designing a special down-breaking ice bow for the 150,000-ton tanker and the invaluable aerial reconnaissance of the ice-choked passages of the Arctic Archipelago provided by Coast Guard aircraft operating from Greenland. This pioneering transit by a large merchant vessel through the legendary Northwest Passage demonstrated the feasibility of using these waters for commercial purposes, including the shipment of oil produced in the far Arctic regions.21
A dominant aspect of post-World War II polar exploration was the renewal of submarine operations. They had been largely abandoned after Wilkins’s attempt. These voyages became possible because of the almost limitless underwater range of nuclear propulsion plants and dramatic improvements made in navigational equipment.
Appropriately, this story begins with the USS Nautilis (SSN-571), the world’s first nuclear-powered submersible.22 In 1957, that vessel, commanded by William R- Anderson, made a polar attempt north of Spitsbergen.
Damage to a periscope, suffered while surfacing in the Polar pack, and the failure of the vessel’s gyrocompass, foorced the Nautilus to turn back at the 87th parallel. But, in April and July 1958, the submarine returned to the Arctic this time using the Bering Straits approach. The April operation was blocked by the shoal water of the Chukchi Sea and ice ridges that extended to unexpected depths. In July, however, the Nautilus found a submerged sea valley the Cape Barrow area that presented a deep-water passage beneath the polar pack. Then, in a classic 96-hour, 1800-mile underwater voyage across the largely uncharted Arctic Ocean, the submarine reached the pole and continued on to the edge of the polar ice north of Greenland. This cruise demonstrated the feasibility of a new merged sea route that reduced the distance from Lon- on to Tokyo by 4,700 miles. Commander Anderson also kave credit to the instrumentation that was essential for his operation’s success. Of particular importance was sonar equipment used to trace the profile of the overhead ice. In addition, inertial navigational instrumentation, improved gyrocompasses, and the more traditional techniques of ad reckoning were of major importance.
Luring the summer of 1958, another nuclear submarine the USS Skate (SSN-578), commanded by Compander James Calvert, reached the pole from the Spitsbergen area.23 In addition, this vessel surfaced in the leads and polynyas that are common in the polar pack during the summer. In March 1959, the Skate returned to the region to determine if she could also ascend through the frozen sea in the coldest month of the Arctic season. By choosing areas of thin ice known as greenhouses from their underwater appearance, using closed circuit television to observe the overhanging pack, and by employing her sail area as a battering ram, the Skate was able to surface a number of times. Navigationally, these ascents were significant since they allowed the submarine to take sun and star sights to confirm locations obtained from dead reckoning and inertial navigational equipment.
In February 1960, the USS Sargo (SSN-583), commanded by Lieutenant Commander J. H. Nicholson, used the Pacific approaches to become the third submarine to reach the pole. Then, in August and September of the same year, the USS Seadragon (SSN-584), commanded y Commander George P. Steele, made another Arctic cruise, which originated in the Atlantic. This cruise included the first submerged transit of the Northwest Passage before the vessel proceeded to the pole. She also demonstrated her ability to operate safely in the area of icebergs, despite the notorious instability and enormous depths of these formations.24
Looking back at the many decades of U. S. polar activity an observer must be impressed by the continuity of these efforts. To be sure, the humanitarian concerns of early expeditions seeking to aid Sir John Franklin were set aside when the tragic fate of his party became known. Yet, from the earliest days, American explorers also had a genuine interest in geographic and scientific discovery, and this concern is equllay evident today. The use of Eskimo techniques of Artic survival aspect of the early period of exploration, was superseded by the application of advanced technology in the 20th century. Whatever methods are used, the need for special adaptation to the exotic Arctic environment is another continuing strand in the quest for the North Pole.
1 De Haven’s expedition is discussed in John Edwards Caswell, Arctic Frontiers: United States Explorations of the Far North (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), pp. 13-20 and in George W. Comer, Doctor Kane and the Arctic Seas (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1972), pp. 71-101.
2Comer, Doctor Kane and the Arctic Seas, pp. 79—80; Frances L. Williams, Matthew Fontaine Maury, Scientist of the Sea (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1963), p. 202.
3Farley Mowat, The Polar Passion (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1967), pp. 103— 104, stresses Eskimo contribution during the Kane expedition. Oscar M. Villarejo, Dr. Kane’s Voyage to the Polar Lands (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965), pp. 53-55 and passim comments on dissension within Kane’s party.
4Comer, Dr. Kane and the Arctic Seas, pp. 259-63.
5Caswell, Arctic Frontiers, pp. 32-41. See also Hayes’s own account, The Open Polar Sea (New York: Hurd and Houghton, 1869).
6Chauncey C. Loomis, Weird and Tragic Shores: The Story of Charles Francis Hall, Explorer (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971) pp. 336-54.
7Caswell, Arctic Frontiers, pp. 73-76.
8Augustus W. Greely, Handbook of Polar Discoveries (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1909), pp. 189-90.
9 ’Quoted in John Edward Weems, Race for the Pole (New York: Henry Holt, 1960), p. 30.
l0Coverage of Peary’s expeditions is based on ibid.; Caswell, Arctic Frontiers', Jeanette Mirsky, To the Arctic (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1970); Markham, The Lands of Silence', J. Gordon Hayes, The Conquest of the North Pole (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934); and Mowat, Polar Passion.
11 Donald B. MacMillan, How Peary Reached the Pole (Boston, MA: Houghton, Mifflin, 1934), pp. 128-30, 157-58, 172-73. Stefansson’s comments on Peary’s use of Eskimo techniques also are of interest. They appear in The Friendly Arctic: The Story of Five Years in Polar Regions (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943), pp. 128—29, 135. See also Robert Edwin Peary, Secrets of Polar Travel (New York: Century, 1917).
l2Discussions of Peary’s navigation appear in MacMillan, How Peary Reached the North Pole, pp. 283, 291; and Markham, Lands of Silence, p. 357.
13See, for example, MacMillan, How Peary Reached the North Pole, p. 291.
14Accounts of the Cook expedition appear in Mowat, The Polar Passion, p. 23784; Theon Wright, The Big Nail: The Story of the Cook-Peary Feud (New York: John Day, 1970); and Hugh Eames, Winner Lose All: Dr. Cook and the Theft of the North Pole (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1973). Markham, Lands of Silence, pp. 354-55 offers critical comments on Cook’s navigation.
l5Quoted in MacMillan, How Peary Reached the North Pole, p. 283.
16 Enumerable volumes discuss this controversy. Among those favoring Cook or opposing Peary are Hayes, The Conquest of the North Pole', Mowat, Polar Passion; Wright, The Big Nail; and Eames, Winner Lose All. Examples of pro-Peary books are L. P. Kirwan, A History of Polar Exploration (New York: W. W. Norton, 1959); Mirsky, To the Arctic; and Weems, Race for the Pole.
17 Mowat, Polar Passion, pp. 287-88.
18Paul-Emile Victor, Man and the Conquest of the Poles (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963), pp. 278-82; John C. Reed, “United States Arctic Exploration Since
1939,’’ in Herman R. Friis, ed., United States Polar Exploration (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1970), pp. 26-28; John C. Reed and Andreas G. Ronhovde, Arctic Laboratory (Washington, DC: The Arctic Institute of North America, 1971), passim.
19See account in The New York Times, 26 January 1969, p. 26.
20 The New York Times, 2 May 1986, pp. 1, 36.
21 Virgil F. Keith, “Across the Top,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1970, pp. 60-69.
22William R. Anderson with Clay Blair, Jr., Nautilus 90 North (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1959) is the basic account.
23Excellent coverage of this operation appears in James Calvert, Surface at the Pole. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963).
24George P. Steele, Seadragon Northwest Under the Ice (New York: G. P. Dutton, 1962).
Dr. Allard graduated from Dartmouth College in 1955 and holds advanced degrees from Georgetown University and the George Washington University. He is a senior historian with the U. S. Naval Historical Center, Washington, D. C. He has been associated with that organization since 1956. He serves as president for the North American Society of Oceanic History, a trustee of the American Military Institute, and as a director for the American Committee on the History of the Second World War. Dr. Allard is also an adjunct professor at the George Washington University, where he currently teaches courses in the field of military history. He has written a number of studies and articles relating to naval and maritime history.