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ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Coast Guard Commandant Meets the Press
Should the Navy Build the A-6F?
Where Did My People Go?
The Maritime Strategy Deckplate Leaders How Good Is Your Fix?
Correcting Flaws in the Art of Navigation Customs or Coast Guard?
Justice for the Coast Guard!
Contents:
Peacekeepers at Risk The Attack on the Stark Spetsnaz
Women in Ships: Can We Survive?
The Officer’s Ethic
Ah, Sir, about that message to Garcia . . .
I
i
“Peacekeepers At Risk”
(See W. H. Nelson, pp. 90-97, July 1987 Proceedings)
“The Attack on the Stark”
(See N. Friedman, pp. 96-97, July 1987
Proceedings)
Commander Edmonds David, U. S. Navy (Retired)—It is interesting that Commander Nelson never addresses the offensive requirements and restrictions of the Stark (FFG-31) for protection against cruise missiles. Dr. Friedman’s sidebar to the article concentrated on the Stark’s hull integrity and the protection afforded the vital electronics and command spaces. Both authors seem to have forgotten that a combatant ship should be designed primarily to fight and should be equipped with 360° offensive weapons coverage. The current Phalanx installation on the Stark does not provide such coverage. Maneuvering required to provide offensive coverage against missiles traveling at Mach .9 or better is an unacceptable solution for expeditious offensive action. One wonders what the primary mission requirements were when the Stark’s design was established.
The offensive armament requirements should be reviewed. The ship should not have to turn around to make her offensive protection effective.
The attack on the Stark would have been a potent test of the Phalanx system if she had been at general quarters. The appropriate Navy investigation must determine whether the fleet operational plan or the commanding officer’s own lack of judgment prevented him from fighting his ship in spite of her known restrictions.
I hope that we learn from this tragedy.
“Spetsnaz”
(See D. R. Kohler, pp. 46-55, August 1987
Proceedings)
Sergeant First Class Peter L. Bunce, U. S. Army—Just about everything Commander Kohler presents correlates with research I have conducted on the same subject. I might object to his use of the term “strategic direction,” in which he makes it sound like a fixed organization (“three fronts and a fleet”). As I understand the term, a strategic direction is more a geographic-strategic term than an
organization, and anything from a sing e front to three or four fronts may be as signed to a strategic direction depending on its importance. In any case, I though might expand on some points abou Naval Spetsnaz that Commander Kohler had just touched upon.
Each fleet of the Soviet Navy has an intelligence directorate, or Second Diree torate (RU), on its staff, which is subor dinate to Naval Intelligence, which in turn is subordinate to the GRU’s Fin Directorate. The Third Department ° each RU is known as the Spetsnaz De partment and directs the operations of its subordinate Spetsnaz intelligence Poin and Spetsnaz brigade. This structure i® virtually identical to that of Fronts an Military Districts (MD) in the Groun Forces. The only difference is that Front and MD RUs are directly subordinate to the Fifth Directorate.
My research supports Commander Kohler’s description of a Naval Spetsnaz Brigade organization. According to Viktor Suvorov, the Soviet expatriate quoted by Commander Kohler, Naval Spetsna- wear no distinctive uniform; instead, they normally wear Naval Infantry uniforms and are billeted near Naval Infantry barracks. This explains the confusion between the two that Norman Polmar described in the January 1987 Proceedings- A Naval Spetsnaz brigade can field approximately 100 teams, each led by an officer, with a warrant officer or senior sergeant as second in command. Other members of the teams, whose number would vary according to the mission, are primarily experts in communications or demolitions.
Since the recent series of minisub probes that have plagued Norway, neutral Sweden, and, lately, Japan, the midget submarine group has attracted a great deal of attention. The Swedish commission reporting on the incidents in 1983
described—in addition to conventional submarines making probes such as the infamous “Whiskey on the Rocks” incident—regular and crawling minisubmarines, and perhaps remote-control craft as well. Commentators quickly made the connection to Spetsnaz.
Interestingly, a photo of a tracked submarine was first published in Pravda in 1973. At the time, it was described as a “research vessel” to be carried on the civilian research (Academy of Sciences)
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ship Vityaz and to be manufactured in two versions: Argus, a manned minisub; and Zuuk, an unmanned camera carrier. India-class submarines are believed to carry the military version. (The Soviet Navy currently maintains two India-class submarines, one each with the Pacific and Northern fleets. It is normally described as a rescue submarine.)
In addition to the “normal” Spetsnaz missions that Commander Kohler described, Naval Spetsnaz has the missions of beach reconnaissance, reconnaissance and sabotage of enemy naval bases, reconnaissance of submarine approaches to fleet anchorages, and amphibious raids.
Spetsnaz's most daring known recent exploit, aside from Afghanistan, has been its reported infiltration of the group of women protesters at the U. S. Air Force cruise-missile base at Greenham Common in Britain. Jane’s Defence Weekly reported that teams of three to six female Spetsnaz soldiers apparently were rotated through the protest group, which was camped outside the base since December 1983 to protest the introduction of cruise missiles into Britain. The mission of these soldiers was to incite the protesters and to test base security. The same report voiced concern that these women, as well as other Spetsnaz troops and agents, could infiltrate nuclear bases and implant beacons that would guide in Soviet fighter bombers or AS-15 air-launched cruise missiles to the bases in a conflict.
It does not take an overly vivid imagination to conceive of the areas that Naval Spetsnaz may attack upon the initiation of hostilities (based on the fleets’ intelligence areas of interest): the Northern Fleet Spetsnaz brigade would be used to facilitate Naval Infantry landings along the Norwegian northern coast, as well as to attack important bases in Britain (Portsmouth, Rosyth, and Faslane) and France (Brest). Important bases on the U. S. East Coast (New London, Norfolk, and Charleston) would also be at risk, possibly from teams delivered by India- class submarine-borne minisubs, or from swimmers launched from conventional submarines. The Baltic Fleet Spetsnaz brigade would not need an India-class sub to move its minisubs, because the Baltic is small enough for conventional submarines to tow the minisubs, as the British did with their X-craft in World War II. The Baltic Sea brigade would be primarily interested in assisting landings in Denmark, and possibly Sweden, but could also be used in raids in northern German ports such as Bremerhaven and Hamburg. The Black Sea Fleet Spetsnaz brigade would be used in forcing the Dardanelles, and in raiding Mediterranean bases such as Athens, Naples, Toulon, Gibraltar, and possibly Rota (which might also be at risk from the Northern Fleet’s brigade). The Pacific Fleet Spetsnaz brigade would first be used with the Pacific Naval Infantry division to assist in the seizure of passage lanes in the island chains between Hokkaido and the Kuriles. Later, Spetsnaz agents, either swimming or transported by the Pacific Fleet’s India-class sub, would attack bases in Japan and the Pacific, and possibly Pearl Harbor, Tacoma, San Diego, or Long Beach.
The big question, as Commander Kohler said, is can they pull it off? There are, after all, only two India-class submarines known to exist, and although using conventional submarines to tow minisubs may be feasible in the Baltic or the Mediterranean, that is hardly the case in the Pacific or Atlantic. In either case, the bulk of Naval Spetsnaz are believed to be swimmers, so detailing a submarine to drop them off close to their target would be the only restraints on them. Infiltration would be a big “if”: a lot of the success of Spetsnaz depends on undetected infiltration, not only of countries, but of bases as well. The caliber of the Spetsnaz troops is the final question. They have a good press, and reports from Afghanistan are generally complimentary, but can an
effective special operations force 30,000 be built from a conscript military- All good questions, but unfortunate y they can only be answered in wartime- Until then, the Naval Spetsnaz is another aspect of the Soviet threat that we canno afford to ignore.
“Women in Ships: Can We Survive?”
(See R. Spillane, pp. 43-46, July 1987
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Michael D. Maxwell, U- Navy—If Lieutenant Spillane was tryuu to promote the accelerated use of women in the at-sea Navy, she convinced rne'T of the reverse. Were I commanding o 1 cer of a ship, given a choice of whether not to include members in my crew w would be 40% unavailable at sea, 're quently unable to perform their duties, physically and emotionally unsound, an have a great potential to undermine t discipline of my unit, I would not incm them.
The Officer’s Ethic
Lieutenant Colonel W. C. Gregson, U- Marine Corps—It’s no accident tha every military journal in the United States is publishing articles on military ethics- Ethical study is a growth industry in th's country, and the military has traditionally had its own specific reasons for partici' pating. Before we rush off to invent ne* solutions, such as a written code of etn ics, let’s pause to revisit some of our ol ethical traditions.
Title 5 of the U. S. Code prescribes the commissioned officer’s oath of office an requires that it be taken upon commissioning. With the exception of the president, everyone elected or appointed to an office of “honor or profit in the civil service or uniformed services” of the U. S- Government promises:
“that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or spirit of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter. So help me God.”
The commissioned officer’s obligations are often confused with those contained in the oath taken by enlisted personnel- (See, for example, Major General Clay
its
This trust demands that the officer corps e highly sensitive to the delicate rela- 1Qnship of the military to society. We ®Xlst to protect—not to police—the A°ierican people.
,, The ancient Greeks believed that nothing was more important to the RePublic than that the work of the Guard- jans be well done. They should be quick see, swift to overtake the enemy, and Str°ng- They should be dangerous to their enemies and gentle to their friends.” We rnust take care that we fully understand °Ur obligations to our system. It is cus- 0rnary to retake the oath of office at each Promotion; perhaps we should make that
commissioned leaders in particular.
• BiieJjingijan^ “Ethics and the Senior lcer,’’ Autumn 1985 Parameters', and aptain B. P. Clark, “Military and Poli- tlcs: A Bad Mix?” February 1985 ProCeedings.) The enlisted oath reads:
I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic ... I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and ... I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.”
The difference between these oaths is JJndamental. Officers often mistakenly sutne that their oath requires obedience the president and superior officers; but requires obedience only to the Consti- utton of the United States, t-crtamly, commissioned officers must ey orders, but the requirement is ad- uustrative. It is not a sworn obligation. e commissioned oath explicitly makes ., e commissioned officer’s obligation to e Constitution much greater than any nJT>entioned obligation to obey orders.
1 he intent is that the serving officer Wes allegiance to the laws of the nation.
°se laws are determined by the repre- entatives °f the people and duly interacted by those charged with that respon- ^ uity. This is the foundation of ruerican subordination of the military to Lilian government.
mplicit in the officer’s oath is the un- erstanding that “obeying orders” is no U ense for improper acts. Officers of the ■ S. armed services never surrender per- ?nal accountability. The Nuremburg tri- s after World War II and the court- |. art'al of U. S. Army Lieutenant Wil- 'am Calley firmly established the legal j, ecedent that officers are accountable ?r upholding the nation’s laws. The 1Tlerican public vests special trust and confidence in the military in general and
mandatory, so we remain aware of what our oath requires.
“Ah, Sir, about that message to Garcia ...”
(See J. Herlocker, pp. 98-99, July 1987 Proceedings)
Daniel Smith, former Gunner’s Mate Third Class, U. S. Naval Reserve— Lieutenant Herlocker’s column was one
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of the best in a long time. I wish that I had had a division officer like the lieutenant when I was in the Navy ten years ago. I was one of those who would have blindly taken a “message to Garcia.” I asked no questions, because I believed that if an officer wanted something done, then mine was not to question why. Some of those orders should have been questioned, but I carried them out as best I could. How much easier it would have been had an officer with Lieutenant Her-
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locker’s perception been giving that order—and seeing that it was unambiguous. Today’s Navy needs more officers who can lead with clear and concise orders and who can take correction from subordinates when necessary. Such officers get more respect from their subordinates when they admit to being wrong and accept responsibility. Officers who demand that orders be carried out without question can end up involving the whole department—and ultimately the ship—in their mistakes.
Officers of the U. S. Navy are not out to win popularity contests, I know, but they do need their people’s trust. To earn it, officers must occasionally humble themselves.
Michael J. Hoernemann—Lieutenant Herlocker’s whimsical article raises questions about the training of midshipmen these days. As plebes some 30 years ago, my classmates and I were also thoroughly indoctrinated with Elbert Hubbard’s “A Message to Garcia.” The lesson we learned was that we could expect to receive assignments in which only the objective would be given, and that we could achieve difficult tasks through persistence and initiative. Plebes were reminded of “A Message to Garcia” when—after being told to do something— they persisted in asking unnecessary questions about how to do it, or made lame excuses for why they couldn’t.
This fostering of a “can do” attitude is a far cry from Lieutenant Herlocker’s interpretation of the essay as an endorsement of blind obedience. I’d be disappointed if his interpretation is now widespread among midshipmen. I would be even more disappointed to learn that anyone commissioned as an ensign or second lieutenant could believe that today’s high-technology Navy operates on blind obedience.
Surely, Naval Academy training thoroughly covers the art of giving and receiving orders, and of accomplishing objectives through people. As a longtime program manager, I welcome Garcia messengers; and I am happy to be the sort of person who will, without question or hesitation, carry a message to Garcia. That is, I am happy to be known as a reliable resource who will take full responsibility and use intelligence, initiative, and persistence to somehow get the job done, no matter how difficult. Let us hope that this one little piece of Naval Academy lore can be restored to its intended purpose.
“Coast Guard Commandant Meets the Press”
(See Seminar Report, pp. 58-63, June 1987,
H. M. Covert, pp. 17-19, July 1987 Proceedings)
G. William Bolling ///—Your report of U. S. Coast Guard Commandant Paul A- Yost, Jr.’s, recent Naval Institute-sp01^ sored press conference contained seve untrue statements about an incident in volving my boat and me:
“It [my vessel, the Albert] had bee^ associated with a known smuggler once before”: untrue. ,
“[weapons] . . . which he displaye on a couple of occasions”: untrue.
“ . . .he refused the boarding : un
true.
“ ... refused to obey orders”: untrue-
You didn’t check the facts, and yoU have perpetuated damaging misinforms tion. Please address this sad vvor straightaway.
Editor’s Note: We asked Coast Guard officials to respond to Mr. Bollings comments, which they have done, as follows:
► “It had been associated with a known smuggler.”
The Commandant’s statement was based on information the Coast Guar had on the vessel from government la" enforcement agency computers. I*1 Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) com puter files indicated a 1979 connection between the Albert and two other vesse s involved in suspicious activity, including entry states the Albert was possibly in' volved with drug smuggling.” Another June 1980 entry states that the Albert was “seized in Bahamas for not clearing customs.” Additionally, a U. S. Customs Service computer system printout showed a DEA case in which the Florida-registered Albert was seized in June 1982 with 100 pounds of marijuana on board- Clearly, the documented information substantiates the past association of the vessel named Albert with smuggling- These entries are not a reflection on Mr- Bolling, since he is the new owner, but they do reflect the ship’s past activity- ► “[weapons] . . . which he displayed on a couple of occasions.”
The crew of the patrol boat CG-44404 sighted weapons on board the Albert the morning of 6 October 1986, while the Albert was anchored in the Cape Fear River in North Carolina. Mr. Bolling, armed with a rifle, advised the patrol boat that the Albert’s crew was armed with loaded weapons (with safeties off) and the Coast Guard boarding party would not be allowed on board until they provided him
with his “private code.” When the Coast Guardsmen finally boarded the vessel, they found six weapons below deck. They arrested both William Bolling and his son and seized the weapons. In a 21 September 1986 letter to Admiral Yost, Mr. Bolling stated that “semi-automatic weapons, shotguns and hand guns have been issued to my crew and they have been instructed in their use.”
- “ . . . he refused the boarding.”
At approximately 1050 on 6 October 1986, the boarding team from the CG- 44404 was refused permission to board the Albert by armed crew members until the “private code” made up by Mr. Bolling was provided.
- “ . . . he refused to obey orders.”
At approximately 1145 on 6 October,
the Coast Guard boarding officer on CG- 44404 identified himself to the Albert on VHF-FM radio channel 22. He ordered the Albert not to get under way. The Albert answered by saying, “This is Albert. I am en route Wilmington to pick up some dignitaries at the Marine Institute.” When the boarding officer repeated his order to remain at anchor the reply was, “I am en route Wilmington, Albert out!” Also, when the boarding party ultimately did get aboard and was conducting its inspection, Mr. William Bolling IV refused three separate times to comply with an order given to him by the boarding officer. There is no question that members of the Albert's crew knew they were disobeying the directions of a Coast Guard boarding officer acting in pursuit of his duties.
“Should the Navy Build the A-6F?”
(See J. Lacouture, pp. 20-21, June 1987;
R. W. Kiefer, p. 17, July 1987; D. T. Collins,
P. L. McCartney, A. H. White, J. T. Hayward, R. S. Owens, pp. 17-18, August 1987 Proceedings)
Captain B. K. McDanel, U. S. Navy, Commander Medium Attack Wing One— Simply appearing in the respected Proceedings of the U. S. Naval Institute may have lent undeserving credence to the charges Captain Lacouture made against the A-6 Intruder. A haze of quantitative ambiguity obfuscates his attack. Phrases such as “survival rates . . . considerably higher than those of the A-6,” “large sums of money,” “several . . . failures,” “many of the airplanes . . . had to abort,” and “maintenance man-hours . . . are a small fraction of those required for A-6s” are meaningless when unsupported by specific evidence. Even worse, when the accurate numbers are classified—as is the case in some of the issues
Captain Lacouture raises—publishing such generalized statements can be misleading.
Exactly what is Captain Lacouture’s assessment? As best I can determine, he is saying that:
- Penetration of Soviet-defended territory is the driving design factor for the attack mission in the 1990s.
- The Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) satisfies the design criteria, and could be ready sooner if A-6F funds were diverted to the program.
- A modified F/A-18 could accomplish the mission planned for the A-6F.
- The A-6 is having difficulty performing its mission; as the A-6F it could not survive combat in the 1990s.
Since the early days of the Vietnam War, U. S. aircrews have performed combat strikes against Third-World countries defended by Soviet-supplied weapons. We learned in Lebanon that we cannot attack with impunity in the daytime as we did in some areas of Vietnam. Over Libya, we were reminded of what tactics work against increasingly sophisticated defenses: carrier-standoff distance, minimum number of attacking aircraft, surprise, and the cover of night. The planners of the Libyan raid chose the A-6 because it is the only aircraft with the range, payload, and night low-level covertness to employ those tactics. Lebanon and Libya demonstrated that our future attack aircraft must possess at least the capabilities of the A-6.
The ATA promises to satisfy those requirements, while benefiting from stealth technology—some aspects of which cannot be incorporated into any existing air' frame, including the Intruder and the Hornet.1 This means the ATA must be built as a new aircraft, and will not be operational until the mid-1990s.2 By comparison, full-scale development ot the F/A-18—the latest tactical aircraft program and itself derived from the Yr- 17—began in January 1976. The first flight occurred in November 1978. The aircraft did not enter fleet service unti 1983 and the first deployment did not begin until February 1985, fully nine years after start-up.3 Whether that schedule can be shortened for the ATA by adding money to the program is questionable. The only funds available would be the difference in costs between the A-6b and an all-weather F/A-18. Further, the Navy’s commitment to the notional air wing concept and the expense of building large numbers of mission-specific ATAs means that the carrier air wing in the late 1990s and early 21st century will probably be a mix of old and new, small and large, dedicated and multimission aircraft. The only likely option for accelerating the ATA program is to pursue a parallel development strategy: that is> conduct flight testing, operational evaluation, and production spoolup concurrently. This is a highly risky approach that can save time and money if the systems require little or no modification. On the other hand, it could delay the program beyond 1995 if major redesign or production retooling are necessary.4
At any rate, the ATA will not be in the
fleet tomorrow, so something has to fill the gap. I do not intend to argue at length the suitability of the F/A-18 to fulfill that role. The abilities and shortcomings of that machine have been the subject of long—and healthy—debate.5 But even Captain Lacouture admits that the F/A-18 cannot perform the A-6 mission without modifications. And the changes he suggests may not be sufficient. Adding a second seat, greater internal fuel capacity, and night low-level avionics would require one to two years of development before flight testing could begin, whereas the A-6F is expected to fly this summer.6 A modified TF/A-18 will not do, either, since its back seat actually displaces internal fuel, which partially negates Captain Lacouture’s fuel gain and compounds the range problem.7
He neglects to mention that the F/A-18 has experienced its own premature fatigue cracking.8 Here, the Navy would have to review the solutions being considered to accommodate the weight increase that Captain Lacouture’s additional fuel and avionics would entail. As for agility, a Hornet carrying a maximum payload on an attack mission would handle quite differently from a Hornet equipped for a fighter mission. As shown in Table 1, the attack F/A-18 can have a wing loading as much as 43% more than the fighter configuration. Of course, all attack aircraft share this effective limit on available maneuvering “G,” as the A-6 figures in the table indicate. But the point is, Captain Lacouture’s suggestion that an aircraft can maneuver like a fighter during a heavily loaded ingress penetration—without jettisoning—simply contradicts the most basic aerodynamics.
Captain Lacouture twice mentions that the A-6 is 35 years old, implying that the aircraft has not benefited from technology advances in the intervening years. Perhaps he missed the following first- flight milestones of the A-6 and its signif
Aircraft | Table 1 Comparative Wing Loadings Gross Weight Wing Area Wing Loading (pounds) (square feet) (pounds per square feet) | ||
F/A-18 Fighter | 33,585 | 400 | 83.9 |
F/A-18 Attack | 48,253 | 400 | 120.6 |
A-6E Attack | 60,400 | 528.9 | 114.2 • |
Source: The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. | Fleet, 13th Edition. | J, |
icant upgrades: the A-6A in 1960; the EA-6A in 1963; the KA-6D in 1966; the A-6E in 1970; the A-6E TRAM (Target Recognition Attack Multisensor) in 1974; and the A-6E SWIP (System Weapons Integration Package) in 1986.9 In fact, the average age of an A-6E flying today is 15.1 years.10 And all A-6Fs will be built new. The only thing about the A-6 that is 35 years old is the sapient vision of some 1950s engineer—an anniversary we ought to admire.
The Intruder continues to serve successfully in its primary role of deep-strike interdiction because of a simple truth: the A-6 is a combat-proven platform that effectively combines range, payload, and night all-weather, low-level navigational capabilities. It is a combination unavailable in any other carrier-based aircraft in the world. Internally, the aircraft takes advantage of the most useful advances in technology. As the engineers develop the ATA, they will certainly take note of the experience gained during the Intruder’s evolution.
Meanwhile, the A-6F will ensure that the all-weather, long-range attack capability of the modem carrier battle group does not lapse against the Soviet threat. The ATA and the A-6F will be complementary, not exclusive—a valuable advantage if the ATA proves to have a high unit cost.
'Norman Polmar, “The U. S. Navy: Tactical 1 craft,” Proceedings, October 1986, pp. e
also: R. R. Ropelewski, “New Technologies O e
Quantum Leap in Future Fighter Capabilities,’ tion Week & Space Technology (AW&ST), 23 Jun
- pp. 48-9; and D. E. Fink, “Fighter Technol
ogy Advances,” AW&ST, 23 June 1986, p. H- 2“Status of Major U. S., European Defense, Aero space Programs,” AW&ST, 9 March 1987, p- ' 3John W. R. Taylor, editor, Jane’s All the World 5 Aircraft (AWA) 1986-87 (London: Jane’s Publishing Company, Ltd., 1986), pp. 451-2. . .
4General Lawrence A. Skantze, “B-1B: A Time; Lesson in Risk Management,” AW&ST, 23 Marc
- p. 11. ,
5T. W. Trotter, “One Seat Versus Two,” ^rocee.yJ ings, October 1986, pp. 75-81. See also letters ; R. R. Zimmerman and J. P. Jones in “Comment an Discussion,” Proceedings, February 1987, pp-
77 •
6“Grumman Tests First Preproduction A ° » AW&ST, 18 May 1987, p. 24.
7Don Linn, F-18 Hornet (Fallbrook, CA: Aero Pn Ushers, Inc., 1982), p. 43. ,,
8“Contractor Finds Cracks in F/A-18 Bulkhead, AW&ST, 14 October 1985, p. 25.
Baylor, pp. 418-9; and Taylor, Jane’s AWA 19$ 81. pp. 349-51. SWIP date from Naval Air System5 Command A-6 Program Office. ,
,0From data compiled in TALLY HO III: A-6 AircrdJ Configuration and Location Report, Grumman Aer° space Corporation, A-6 Field Operations, revised December 1986.
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(
and
^cal ABC affiliate in New York City also cognized a local news coup and interred my mother for playback that eve- J'ln8- Not to be outdone, Cable News etWork ran the story, as well. Meanwhile, back on the ship, I refilled from a flight to find “The Case of e Missing Matzoh,” a two-column s'0ry in nothing less than the Pacific ars & Stripes. Imagine the scene at 'P'drats that night! Also awaiting me was message from Naval Military Personnel °mmand attempting to determine the °cation of the matzoh. The action addees ^ere the ship, the Joint Military Postal ctivity, and my commanding officer. eedless to say, keeping a low profile VVas not in my mother’s vocabulary.
The eventual delivery of the packages a Week after Passover did not bring an fnd to the story. Upon our arrival in ,erth, Australia, shortly thereafter, we 'scovered “The Case of the Missing Matzoh” had also appeared in the local
b em!,er °f the Jewish congregation on
- a carrier. Of almost 6,000 sailors, r congregation consisted of no more
jnan ten at any one time. Although small to our dedication was real and
jj e P celebrate the annual Passover hol- ay, we decided to pool our efforts and ave an all-battle-group “seder” (the tra- w '°na* Passover meal). Unfortunately, jeC . '^covered that there was very little i°°d on board; most of what there s dated as far back as the ship’s com-
tsstoning four years eariier
wanning on serving dinner for 30, I l°te to my “nice Jewish mother” and ed if she could help us out by sending s a few items for the meal. This was the Pportunity of a lifetime for her. Not e,ng very pleased that I had joined the j av.y 'n the first place (“What’s a nice ^cwish boy doing in the Navy?”), she ovv had the chance to show the Navy (,°w to treat her boy. With Passover more n eight weeks away, I received a letter 0rn my mother telling me she had sent ^fee boxes of food totaling 120 pounds.
- en she described the dimensions I w immediately that the next time I
°ald see those boxes would be in the ti k ^Ppines on our way home. The weeks ed by and sure enough, three days n°r to the holiday the packages had not def aiT'veci' My mother, not admitting weat> called our congressman, the ^ *te House, and the Secretary of the ()avy—in that order. Speaking with the ^ eputy Secretary (John was out of the lce), she was assured that the packages tdd be found and promptly delivered. ^ United Press International reporter eked up on the story during this time, PW it out over the wire service. The
Perth newspaper. One month later my father came aboard to ride the ship to San Diego for the “Tiger Cruise” and—yes, you guessed it—he brought a tape of the news clip to show in the ready room.
Being a Jew has never presented any real problems to me since I’ve been in the Navy. Although it may not be a preferred career path for most Jews, I answer the question “What’s a nice Jewish boy doing in the Navy?” a slightly different way than Captain Horowitz. I say: “Keeping it a secret from my nice Jewish mother.”
“The Maritime Strategy”
(,See Supplement, January 1986; G. M. Hamed, pp. 26-28, February 1986; J. M. Collins, pp. 18-22, March 1986; R. N. Griffin, p. 25, May 1986; R. S. Hibbs and W. Pendley, pp. 83-89, June 1986; D. M. Ulmer, pp. 24-27, July 1986; J. M. Collins, p. 29, August 1986; A. Gurnee, pp. 25-30, January 1987; W. T. Pendley, pp. 22-27, April 1987 Proceedings)
William T. Brockman—The U. S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy and the vigorous debate concerning its wisdom are familiar to members of the U. S. Naval Institute. However, it seems unlikely that most citizens—even generally well-informed ones—are similarly knowledgeable.
The May 1987 issue of The Atlantic Monthly made the Maritime Strategy the
subject of its cover story. “In Harm’s Way,” by senior editor Jack Beatty, presents an informative, highly critical review of “America’s scary, and expensive, new naval strategy” to a readership that is among the most literate in the country. Proceeding’s readers may wish to take a look at what may be the first exposure to 1980’s naval strategic thinking for many Americans.
One must first get past the offensive cover art and article illustrations by Theo Rudnak. Depicting U. S. Navy ships as literal “sitting ducks” may seem clever, but it adds little to the discussion.
To summarize Beatty’s thesis briefly, the Maritime Strategy:
- Is unnecessary because Soviet submarines can’t sink all the Western merchant fleets’ 38,000 ships, so there is no need to try to bottle them up in their bastions
- Is too dangerous because our carriers will be sunk by Soviet submarines and air power if we try it
- Is like sticking “pins in an elephant” if we think horizontal escalation will force the Soviets to seek an end to hostilities
- Is suicidal, because the Soviets will use their submarine-launched ballistic missiles before we can sink the submarines that carry them
After demolishing—in his own eyes— the strategic rationale for the Maritime Strategy, Beatty tells us that civilian leaders would never allow the Navy to so risk the carriers, anyway. This brings him back to the point of his article. The Maritime Strategy had its genesis in a late- 1970’s need to justify the Navy’s budget; in the end, the 15-carrier battle groups are not suited for a NATO war at all, but are an instrument of unilateralist intervention in Nicaragua and Angola. Thus, Mr. Beatty’s ulterior point seems to be a thinly disguised attack on the Reagan doctrine via the U. S. Navy.
I hope that The Atlantic Monthly will publish an article by someone such as Navy Captain Linton F. Brooks or Colin Gray, whom Beatty quotes briefly. I am certain they could refute Beatty’s thesis.
“Deckplate Leaders”
{See W. F. Hoeft, pp. 47-49, July 1987
Proceedings)
Commander Michael E. Duffy, U. S. Navy—I applaud Lieutenant Hoeft’s analysis of the leadership challenge that faces a young naval officer. There is, however, one essential aspect that he has overlooked. As each young officer progresses professionally through his warfare qualifications, he or she gains selfconfidence. This self-confidence serves to energize both the young officer’s leadership style and his overall ability to lead. Lieutenant Hoeft cites deficit reduction and the increasingly technical nature of the Navy as indirect factors affecting leadership formation. While these determinants are important, I argue that they are secondary in their effect on young leaders; they are indirect factors on the periphery of leadership formation. One must address the attainment of self-confidence based on solid and challenging professional qualifications when examining the genesis of a naval officer as a leader.
P°r example, a ship is steaming at 2 n°ls, but wishes to slow to 14 knots i order to secure a boiler. She has 400 nau lcal miles left to go to reach port an VVlshes to arrive in 25 hours.
-= 166.7nm
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“How Good Is Your Fix?”
fee C- Johnson, pp. 111-112, February 1986
Proceedings)
Correcting Flaws in the Art of Navigation”
(See B. E. Franklin,,pp. 107-108, July 1987 Proceedings)
lieutenant (junior grade) D. P. Wood,
■ o. Navy—In navigation, precise cal- u ation and timing is the hallmark of 8°°d seamanship. But I have found that j. anV Navy quartermasters, while per- °nning their duties admirably, waste and effort through ignorance of I atoematics. While quick mental calcu- tatlons are often sufficient, there are njes when navigators must take to paper no pencil for lengthy figuring. I was s ed by one sailor how to figure the P0lnt at which a ship should slow down to 8>ven speed to arrive at an approach l mt on time if she had been gaining on Hr point and intended movement (PIM). is question came up frequently on our ’P- I have derived the following for- H’Hla to allow for a quicker solution:
D, = T(S1 x S2) - (Dt x SI)
(S2 - SI)
^here Dl = Distance to go at initial speed before slowing Dt = Total distance to go T = Time between current fix and desired arrival time
- = Initial speed
- = Final speed
this example:
Dl = the quantity you wish to find Dt = 400 nautical miles T = 25 hours
- = 20 knots
- = 14 knots Therefore:
Dl =
j^gws(20ktsx 14kts)-(400nmX20kts) (14kts — 20kts)
_ 7000-8000
-6
The solution: another 166.7 nautical HJ'les must be covered prior to slowing to 4 knots and securing the boiler.
. In today’s world of advanced electron-
lOc
’ computers, and data systems, the HJathematical skills of a naval officer are st,H in demand. Put them to good use!
“Customs or Coast Guard”
(»See R. Young, M. Griffes, and J. J. Tomaselli, pp. 67-73, August 1987 Proceedings)
“Justice for the Coast Guard!”
(See D. A. Naples, pp. 84-89, July 1987
Proceedings)
Peter A. Michel—I heartily agree with Captain Naples that the Coast Guard, because of its mission shift toward law enforcement—particularly drug-related law enforcement—should be made part of the Department of Justice. Locating the Coast Guard—which could perform some present Customs Service functions —with the Immigration and Naturalization Service and its important border patrol component, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation would greatly increase the potential for effective operational coordination.
An initial benefit of these changes would be the opportunity to reduce duplication, inefficiency, and waste. Turning over the relevant units of the Customs Service’s 80-plane “air force” to the Coast Guard, which has logistic capability and armed service pilots, would result in greater efficiency at lower cost.
Likewise, the Coast Guard should have maritime jurisdiction from the land outward, as opposed to the current situation, in which Customs has close-in jurisdiction and the Coast Guard picks up responsibility a few miles out. Along with this increased jurisdiction, the Coast Guard should be given those units of the Customs Service’s 165 surface craft “navy” that are now used for drugsmuggling interdiction.
The leaders of the above organizations have legitimate concerns about the proper use of their resources, the protection of their capabilities, and the security of their information-gathering and dissemination networks. The Coast Guard must have the authority to prevent these jurisdictional and operational concerns from compromising its ability to win the border war on drugs.
The principal benefits from these changes will come with coordinated identification, tracking, and interception of aircraft, boats, and individuals suspected of bringing illegal drugs into the United States. Stopping drugs at the border will make other aspects of the drug problem more manageable.
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