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^dmiral “Ace” Lyons, ^ommander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, met with Proceedings Managing Editor John Miller in Los Angeles ?n 3 April to discuss major issues and U. S. interests in jhe Pacific theater. Admiral ^yons is a former commander of the Second P'eet/NATO Striking Fleet.
r°ceedings: The Maritime Strategy as received a great deal of attention °Ver the past year or so. It has been ne of the most debated topics in our Pages. Despite a respectful tip of the at to other theaters, most of the strat- discussion seems to center on the °rth Atlantic and the G-I-UK Gap.
. °w do you see the Pacific Fleet play- |n8 in the national Maritime Strategy? Vons: You’re quite correct. The Mari, me Strategy discussion is dominated y considerations of the Euro-Central dan tic theater. In 1981, when I had j e Second Fleet and the NATO Strik- JJS Fleet, we brought about much of at focus by changing our strategy to j elude operations in the Norwegian .ea- I view the Norwegian Sea as a ATo sea. It’s surrounded on three th eS ^ NATO countries, and we need e Use of those waters to reach those aHies.
. On the other hand, not much attenis given to the Pacific—at least in niedia—in discussions of the Mari- , e Strategy. But it is in the Pacific at the Navy-Marine Corps team 0rnes into full play, and can make the Ipatest strategic difference in a U. S.- °v'et confrontation—because I believe t c have the wherewithal in the Pacific take the Soviets out of the equation. n(l that is a significant contribution.
Proceedings: Do you believe that this awareness of the importance of the Pacific is well understood in our highest circles of government and among our allies, or is a greater educational effort needed?
Lyons: I do not believe that the Pacific’s strategic significance is fully understood, either within government circles or throughout the country. In my view, the needle of history is now pointing toward the Pacific. Since 1980, our total trade has been greater with the Pacific nations than with our traditional trading partners in Europe.
In 1985, our two-way Pacific trade was $185 billion—40% more than with Europe. In 1986, it was $215 billion—almost 50% more. We have a greater interdependency today than ever before in our history with the Asian mainland nations. People forget that two-thirds of today’s world gross national product exists within the Asian Pacific rimland. The number one and number two economies of the world— the United States and Japan—border on the Pacific. By 1991, two-thirds of the world’s population will live in the Asian Pacific region.
All the critical components of our modem weapon systems which include our F-16s and F/A-18s, our M-l tanks, our military computers—and I could go on and on—come from East Asian industries. I don’t see change in that, during the foreseeable future.
Someday, we might view that with concern, and rightly so. Certainly, the East Asian industries have really become an extension of our own military-industrial complex. I would personally like to see a lesser dependency on those industries. You can accomplish that in two ways—either stockpile or learn to compete better. But even if we do those things, there is still going to be a fundamental interdependency that will not change, and I think that if it’s managed properly, it can be very healthy.
Proceedings: In light of that, do you see the current trade flap with Japan as having any impact on joint military endeavors, or is that something that’s working along a different track?
Lyons: We shouldn’t mix the two. We do have an imbalance of trade, and that certainly has to be corrected. We have to achieve greater entree into the Japanese markets. The problem that we have on the trade side should not cross over into our military relationship, which is a very healthy one. This relationship is the key to maintaining our overall deterrence equation and, hence, stability—all of which equates to peace. Our primary objective is to maintain the peace through the proper level of deterrence. We do that through a variety of bilateral alliances, treaties, and relationships with our friends throughout the Asian Pacific region.
Proceedings: In 1983, when I was the Operations and Plans Officer (G-3) at III Marine Amphibious Force, there was a shift in emphasis, and Japan was becoming the centerpiece of our Western Pacific strategy. Some definite moves were taking place to increase
Japanese participation and establish direct linkage between the Marines and the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force, to have combined training at Hokkaido, and other things that were new and different. The Japanese—at least the military people—appeared to be willing to move out as fast as consensus-building would allow. I know further enhancements have taken place in the past four years. Do you believe that military relationship is moving ahead at an acceptable pace?
Lyons: The whole question is this: Is Japan doing enough for its own defense purposes? The Japanese, ten years ago, laid out a program which they are achieving today. They’re not there yet, but they’re well on the way. It’s a good program, and is enhancing their self-defense capability. But is it enough? I don’t think so, because I think the Japanese have the wherewithal to do more for their own selfdefense needs. I’m very satisfied at this point with the progress that the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force has made—and our ability to interoperate with the Maritime Self-Defense Force, which all contributes to maintaining the proper level of deterrence. Having said that, however, I think the Japanese can do more in improving their Air SelfDefense Force, and certainly their Ground Self-Defense Force.
I am not talking about Japan achieving a power projection capability. I do not see that as the objective, nor do I see that as a requirement. Such a capability is not necessary to maintain the proper level of deterrence. But Japan certainly has the right to improve its capabilities in the self-defense context.
Proceedings: In the Atlantic, much is made of the contributions that allied navies can make in assisting the U. S. Navy in controlling sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and antisubmarine warfare in certain areas. Do we have an overall expectation of allied navies in the Pacific to assist in missions of this nature, or are most of their efforts and attention centered on their own coastal protection?
Lyons: We do not have the 16-nation treaty relationship that tightly binds the nations of NATO together. We have nothing like that in the Pacific. We do have a series of bilateral alliances— with Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, to mention several—but no over-arching alliance structure. And let me hasten to add that we enjoy excellent relationships with our treaty allies and other friends in the
Pacific theater, with whom we conduct a number of training exercises—both bilaterally and multilaterally. We do 80 or more exercises a year. As we sit here, our annual Team Spirit exercise progresses. We put 21,000 sailors and Marines into South Korea on 3 April. We also have a very good level of interoperability with our sister services, the U. S. Air Force and U. S. Army, in these exercises.
But the bulk of the mission in the Pacific—the military key underpinnings for maintaining the deterrence equation—falls to the Pacific Fleet. We have roughly 330,000 military personnel in our armed forces in the Pacific, and 250,000 of them—including 80,000 Marines—belong to the Pacific Fleet. We have 267 ships today, and something on the order of 2,000 aircraft—including 700 or 800 Marine aircraft—within the Pacific Fleet. This is entirely different from the Atlantic European theater, where the allied contribution is something on the order of 10:1, certainly on the maritime side. This is a point that people often overlook.
Of course, there are other aspects. I mentioned the preponderance of trade that must continue to flow, regardless of the situation—the critical material that must flow from East Asia to the United States at this time. A lot of people forget— or don’t realize—that we take more oil out of the port of Valdez in Alaska than we import from the Persian Gulf. That is a critical oil SLOC for us. This has not been lost on the Soviets, and it accounts in large part for our putting in a new North Pacific strategy. We’ve done a number of things in that context, and I will go over them for you separately.
The other point that people forget is that the Pacific-Indian Ocean theater is big—102 million square miles. If you take the Mediterranean and put it in the Pacific, it’s a dot by comparison. You just don’t get anywhere quickly, and we have to get to a lot of places. One of the lessons that we continually fail to learn—certainly it should have come out of World War II—is that the totalitarian is not deterred by words. He only recognizes strength and the will to use it. I can’t have the fleet moored to the piers in San Diego, Long Beach, San Francisco, and Seattle and achieve deterrence. In order to achieve deterrence, you must have presence. To have presence, I must have access.
This really gets to the heart of the difference we have with New Zealand, where that issue has been misrepresented by Prime Minister David Lange. We’ve never asked New Zealand to endorse our strategic nuclear policy; that’s never been the issue. The issue has been about New Zealand living up to its responsibilities as an alliance member—with the particular responsibility being to provide port access for our ships, for rest and recreation and for maintenance. So Mr. Lange’s denial of access has reduced our presence and weakened deterrence somewhat.
It’s made a chink in the alliance— which nevertheless is still alive and well today, being exercised by the United States and Australia. The only ones who can take comfort from Mr. Lange’s action reside in Moscow. And you have to ask yourself, with the Soviets’ thrust in the South Pacific, “Has Mr. Lange’s action enhanced stability in the South Pacific?” I think the answer is clearly, “No.” Has his action enhanced the security of New Zealand- Again, I think the answer is clearly. “No.”
Proceedings: To expand on that alliance theme—it appears that we may have dodged a serious bullet by coming in with some fishing agreements of our own, after it became evident that the Soviets were using this route to make some serious inroads. Taken on balance with the New Zealand situation, do y°u see us moving into healthier relationships in the South Pacific?
Lyons: As you know, fishing agreements provide the entree for the Soviets in the South Pacific. A lot of people may say, “That’s rather innocuous. Why are we so upset over a fishing agreement? Why are we so interested in this area?” Well, again, I have to return to World War II. To restore frce' dom to those island nations in the South Pacific, we suffered more than 300,000 casualties. That represented more than one-third of our total casualties in World War II. The South Pacif'c is an area that encompasses 25 million square miles, along with key strategic sea lines of communication. Frankly. 1 have to admit that Kiribati and Vanuatu are not household names for the American public. But to those who can remember World War II, the names Tarawa, Guadalcanal, and New Hebrides really mean something. And that’s the area we’re talking about.
The Soviet thrust into these islands was aimed at economically depressed people, with few natural resources Wil'1 which to work. What principal resources they have are the fish in their exclusive economic zones—their EEZ-S-
Of
course, opposition to our con-
We
Ve overcome that. We’ve entered
0 when the Soviets, in 1985, conned an agreement with Kiribati for s -7 million, which permitted the Soviets to buy their way into 2 million ^Uare miles of the South Pacific, it 'd Wake up a lot of people.
c uding fishing agreements can be attributed, in part, to the American Tuna °at Association and the Magnuson which declared tuna to be a minatory fish —not a regional one. Well, ■nto a fishing arrangement with the 15 tjarions of the South Pacific Forum. 1 "°Pe that Congress will support that ^Tangement and provide for necessary Unds—which, I think, are a fair ex-
*lange for our overall interest in that area.
We’re aware that the Soviets had a •shing arrangement that they entered lnto with Kiribati; but it was not reneWed. They have entered into a new °ne with Vanuatu. They’ve just con buy their way into the country. This is an old Soviet ploy. It’s old wine being served up in a new bottle. Certainly, the up-front money is very attractive to these small island nations. In certain places like Kiribati, it can represent 10% of the gross national product. But while the up-front money looks attractive, we have to look beyond that— first it’s economic dependence; then political subversion and intimidation; and eventually it’s domination. The fishing agreements are just an entree.
What else do the Soviets get with fishing agreements? Trawlers, we know, have a secondary mission of intelligence collection. With the fishing fleet they also get oceanographic research vessels. These are essential to charting the bottom, the currents, and the environment for future submarine operations. In the case of Vanuatu, they’re also going to have port access—a key element they were not able to achieve with Kiribati. Tie this with bachev’s speech in July of last year, where he announced that the Soviets are now a Pacific power, and that their objectives in the Pacific are peaceful. I don’t see deeds matching his words. Who was involved in the following; the bloody coup in Aden in January of last year; the invasion of Afghanistan, which is in its eighth year; the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia; and the brutal shoot-down of the KAL-007 jet, with 55 Americans, including a U. S. congressman, on board? And who is still occupying terrority seized in World War II, and refusing to return the northern territories to Japan? In fact, when 1 was in Japan in December, I read a press account of a statement by the Soviet minister, with regard to the northern territories. He said something along these lines; “Well, when Japan entered into the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States in 1960, we considered that a hostile act. We have no intention of returning the islands.”
au^ed an agreement for $1.5 million finual fees. We estimate the value of c fish, on an annual basis, to be only ^mewhere between $600,000 and e0°.0()0. That’s got to be the most ^Pensive fish in the world! No entre- eneur could enter into such an ar- ^ngeinent; he’d go bankrupt. There- re> the Soviets have to be going after °rc than the fish. They’re willing to
other actions that the Soviets are taking, and you can see a sophisticated Soviet approach in the Pacific. Another aspect often overlooked is that the island states do not have the resources to monitor the actions of the Soviets. This responsibility will have to be assumed by others—the Americans, the Australians, and even the New Zealanders.
We can go back to Mikhail Gor-
Deterrence requires presence. And maintaining presence across 102 million square miles of the Pacific/ Indian Ocean theater requires far- ranging deployments and a demanding tempo of operations. Here, Battle Group Bravo forms on flagship Kitty Hawk (CV-63) in the Arabian Sea.
How arrogant can a nation get? I think this shows the true mentality of the type of people we’re dealing with in the Soviet Union. You can't take anything for granted. When you do business with the Soviets, there’s no free lunch.
Proceedings: With regard to the Soviets, of course, their only two strong client states in the Pacific—North Korea and Vietnam—are hardly examples of what other nations of the region aspire to. Along that line, you recently called their bluff on the statement that they weren’t really doing much at Cam Ranh Bay. The photographs that were released and published around the world showed exactly what they had done since the Americans left. What is the extent of the threat the Soviets pose from Cam Ranh Bay to our operations today?
Lyons: When we talk about the Soviet threat, we need to look at it in its broadest perspective. When I talk about the Soviets, I like to go back to what they’ve done, and get a feel for the trends. In 1960, the Soviet Pacific Fleet had something like 200 surface combatants; today, it has almost 500, of which more than 130 are submarines. And it’s not just a quantitative buildup; it’s a qualitative buildup as well, with the introduction of the Kirov nuclear-powered cruiser in the fall of 1985, and the Sovremenny and the Udaloy guided-missile destroyers—all the lead ships of their respective classes. Of course, the newest class of Soviet attack submarines, the Akula, is in the Pacific.
There’s been a comparable buildup in Soviet air forces and land forces as well—their air-launched cruise missiles, their strike bombers in the Pacific, Backfires, soon to be followed by Blackjacks, and their latest fighter interceptor aircraft. There are roughly 1,600 aircraft or so in the Pacific air forces. In terms of Soviet land divisions: they had 20 in 1960; today, they have 54. We should also not overlook the fact that more than one-third of their intermediate-range ballistic missile force is positioned in East Asia.
But aside from the force levels the Soviets have established in the Pacific and Indian Ocean, they’ve been very successful in establishing a ring of bases that stretches from Dahlak Island in the Red Sea, which is owned by Ethiopia (but the Ethiopians aren’t allowed access), through the former U.K. base at Aden (South Yemen), to Socotra Island in the Gulf of Aden. Certainly, flying from the airfields in Afghanistan Soviet aircraft can cover all the important sea lines of communication in the western Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. They have a per- manant Indian Ocean task group. In fact, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, I said at the time that the invasion was the most dramatic of any changes to the strategic equation in that part of the world.
When you come out of the Indian Ocean, you’re going to find the second most dramatic change to the strategic equation, and that’s the Soviets’s permanent presence at Cam Ranh Bay. When we left Cam Ranh Bay in 1975, there were two piers; today there are seven. And on any given day, you’ll find 20 to 30 Soviet surface combatants, three to five submarines, a squadron of fighter interceptor aircraft, strike bombers, antisubmarine warfare aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, surface- to-air missiles, naval infantry, cruise missile assembly areas, and vast storage areas. In short, the whole place has basically quadrupled in size. And we’re also seeing some activity over in the Cambodian port of Kampong Som, which we’re watching carefully. I think this all comes into sharp focus when you consider the importance of our facilities in the Philippines—at Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base.
I shouldn’t forget to mention that certainly the Soviet Pacific Fleet today is the largest of their four fleets, and the Soviet presence at Cam Ranh Bay is the largest of their forces outside of the Soviet mainland, except for those involved in the invasion of Afghanistan and, of course, what they have in the Warsaw Pact countries. But certainly, from the forces they keep at Cam Rantl Bay, they can cover all the important sea lines of communication in the eastern Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca. Their modern cruise missiles can really strike just about anywhere m Australia. The Soviet forces there do have a nuclear weapons capability, which, in a war-fighting sense', exceeds that of the entire Australian Navy.
Proceedings: You have covered developments of the Soviet Navy in the Pacific. Will you provide us with a similar overview of the U. S. side of the equation?
Lyons: We have also made certain improvements in the Pacific Fleet— headed by the introduction of our F/A- 18 aircraft, our Los Angeles (SSN- 688)-class attack submarines, Aegis cruisers, Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers, LAMPS III helicopters, OHver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates, and the introduction of Tomahawk nus" siles. We have the carriers Vinson (CVN-69), Enterprise (CVN-65), and—just arriving in the Pacific Fleet—the Nimitz (CVN-68). We have the technology, but, most importantly, we have the people. We have the finest people I’ve ever seen in my more than 40 years in the Navy. They’re the ones who put it together; they’re the ones who make it happen. I consider them our national treasure.
With the technology produced by American industry, our fine people, and the assistance of our allies, I am confident today that I can carry out my responsibilities. Should push come to shove—let me tell you—we don’t pla” to lose!
Certainly, you can find a lot of experts who have rolled through Subic Bay—a lot of self-appointed experts-' who say that we have other basing op'
Sub
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'ic is our key logistic supply depot supporting Indian Ocean operations, p In order for us to remain a Western acific power—which I consider essen
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•■ons. Well, let me tell you—there are n° othcr good options. In fact, our use the facilities in the Philippines is the *ey strategic dimension of deterrence in tie region. In my view, if we leave the 0viets unchecked to sit astride the key ^ea lines of communication in the ottth China Sea, in the Straits of j^alacca, and the Eastern Indian cean, we would, in effect, be turning Ver our friends and allies to Soviet Political and military intimidation and eyentual domination. It would cause a oange in our relationship with nations 0 East Asia. That’s a point that’s neyer talked about.
In order for me to exercise the same ype and amount of military presence j'ad warfighting capability that I have 0(%, using facilities in the Philip- P'nes, I would need two to three times e amount of resources that I have aay—jn certain categories—if I were l?rced to leave. And we all know that d never get such an increase in remittees. We also must never forget that to maintaining the proper level of errence and stability and the ’ ^ace'—I see us remaining in those fa- 'ttes. Let me hasten to add: no mater Where I travel throughout the re- ®.l0n> nobody wants us to leave. They recognize the key role that those Cllities play in maintaining regional ability, and that’s both inside and outside the Philippines. During the elections of 1986, the facilities were not an issue. And the fact that President Corazon Aquino says she’s going to “review the agreement” when it comes up for review doesn’t bother me. I’d do the same thing.
Proceedings: We’re aware of the hospital ship Mercy's visit to the Philippines and her endeavors in winning grass-roots support for the Americans. Do you see us providing more material support to President Aquino, as well? Lyons: Let’s take the Mercy. The Mercy was an idea I got last July. We’ve seen democracy at work in the Philippines for all the world to see, and I think the media did a tremendous job in covering that peaceful transition of power—really done by the people. It was a tremendous victory. I’ve seen none of that freedom of choice ever displayed by any countries dominated by the Soviet Union. But, of course, there’s an essential euphoria that goes with a transfer of power, and people hope that there’s going to be a better life ahead. Corey Aquino needs some early successes.
We have a two-part program for the Philippines. First, to help the Filipinos reconstitute the economy and get that turned around. Then, support the fundamental changes that are necessary, not only in the economy, but in the political and social structure, as well. That’s a long-term program, probably 10 to 20 years. But she’s promised her people a better quality of life. So here we had this hospital ship that was going to be finished about December 1986, and if we took her to the Philippines, we could assist in trying to raise the quality of life of the man in the street. You can talk about hundreds of millions of dollars of aid, but to the individual that’s just an abstraction. He doesn’t see anything; he doesn’t feel anything. But if we can fix his teeth or take care of his wife’s dysentery, or take care of his child’s disorder—that’s real. They can feel it. They can see it. It means something. The bottom line is that we’ve raised their quality of life. That’s the whole objective of the Mercy's mission. The ship is mixed- manned. There are 50 Filipino medical personnel aboard, and 50 Americans. It’s a joint effort, proposed by President Ronald Reagan to Corey Aquino during her visit in September 1986.
She accepted, and we had the task of putting the mission together. I think it has worked out very well. It’s primarily oriented toward the civilian populace, to raise and to sustain that environment of hope, because that’s what we have to do. I have every confidence
The jointly staffed (50 Filipino and 50 American medical personnel) hospital ship Mercy has helped raise the quality of life in the Philippines, winning some grass-roots support for U. S. presence as well. But more help from allies is needed.
The November 1986 visit of three U. S. Navy combatants to China was a harbinger of more normalized navy-to-navy relationships and enhanced regional stability.
that the situation in the Philippines is going to come out correctly—that is, democracy and the will of the people will prevail.
You know, reconstituting the economy of the Philippines is not the sole responsibility of the United States. While we can continue to play a leadership role, the greatest benefactors from stability and a viable economy returning to the Philippines are the nations of East Asia—certainly Japan and South Korea, from the standpoint of secure sea lines of communication. I think they have to make a greater effort in contributing to the restoration of the economy and the institutions within the Philippines. I would also see the nations of ASEAN, of which the Phil- lipines is a member, also contributing. Everybody is having some economic difficulties these days, but help can be in terms of what each ASEAN country can contribute from its expertise. I think the symbolism is much more important than the actual amount they give. If the ASEAN countries would come forward in a unified way, I think it would be very helpful and useful. In the case of Japan or South Korea— those nations are in a much better position today to give substantial monetary aid to the Philippines. They are doing some, but they need to do more.
Proceedings: There’s one country we haven’t touched yet, and that’s, of course, China. We had a visit by three U. S. Navy combatants there in November 1986. How would you characterize the visit and the way it worked out? What has happened since, and what do you see in the future as far as having a stronger relationship with the Chinese Navy?
Lyons: I think that was a historic ship visit, and I was certainly honored to lead the three ships into Qingdao, China. For a one-line statement on how it went, I think it far exceeded the expectations of both sides.
Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has said our military relationship with China is built on three pillars: high- level visits; functional military exchanges; and technology exchanges, where we both agree. I see the port visit as strengthening all three pillars. It was also more than that. There was a personal relationship that was developed during that visit, not only between the leaders of the Chinese Navy and myself, but between our sailors and their opposite numbers, as well.
The Chinese clearly made every effort to make this visit a success. They made us feel like members of the family, and I think we were able to achieve all our objectives during that visit.
Some people are concerned about the relationship that we are evolving. As President Reagan has said, “A China that is more self-confident in its ability to defend itself can be a positive factor in regional stability.” I support that view. Let me hasten to add—right here—that we’re not talking about providing a power projection capability or any other capability that would permit China to threaten its neighbors. In fact.
our relationship is not meant to threaten anyone, and should not be viewed in that context. Rather, it should be viewed as making China more selfconfident in its self-defense capability so that it can be a positive factor in regional stability and hence global stability.
The things that we are doing in the navy-to-navy area deal with things tha[
I will term “inside the lifeline.” The Chinese are fine professional seamen-' had an opportunity to visit several of their ships. They’re very proud of the>r ships, but they’re operating with 1950s technology. There are a number of areas we see where we could assist them in making improvements. Certainly we’ve discussed with them the application of the LM- 2500 gas- turbine engine; we’ve discussed Mk--^ and Mk-32 torpedo tubes. We’ve discussed logistics, shipboard management, and training. None of these should be viewed as threatening. And none of these should be viewed as pr°' viding the Chinese with a power projection capability. They have not sought such a capability.
I think the way that we’re proceeding is taking a very careful, pragmatic approach. Neither we nor the Chinese want to do anything that’s going to be destabilizing or be seen as having the potential for raising uncertainty in the region. The objective is to enhance regional stability. Certainly China recognizes its military shortcomings and its need for modernization.
Probably the next question you migb1 ask would have to deal with some of the changes that have come about in the Politburo and their way of doing business. Let me hasten to say that have not seen that impact on our mil1' tary relationship. Our military relationship is proceeding in a positive way-
As far as our relationship for the fu' ture, we would expect more port visits- but in a more normalized way. In JanU" ary 1986, we had a meeting at sea, where we did certain evolutions together. I see more of those in the future. I see us exchanging training mis' sions, and I see us evolving to a relationship that should enhance the overall stability of the region.
Proceedings: We have not addressed the Third Fleet or the Northern Pacific' Fortunately, Vice Admiral D. E. Hernandez—Commander, Third Fleet—lS also contributing an article. Thank y°u Lyons: Admiral Hernandez will cover these issues well. Thank you.
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