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Afghanistan is largely a vast expanse °f extremely rugged terrain ranging from desolate, rocky deserts to mountains rising higher than 25,000 feet in some Places. The summers in Afghanistan are unbearably hot; the winters are bitterly c°ld. This formidable environment has provided the equally formidable Afghan resistance fighters, the mujahideen, with an excellent situation for conducting guerrilla warfare. The narrow roads, winding through small valleys with sheer walls rising on either side, do not permit effective employment of the Soviets’ heavy niechanized forces. As a result, the Soviets have become so dependent upon aviation for tactical maneuvering that 80% of aH Soviet operations in Afghanistan are supported by aviation. This massive use °f aviation has given the Soviets the opportunity to experiment, developing new and greatly improved tactics.
Transport Aircraft: The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 involved about 280 transport aircraft in a massive single-lift operation. This repreSents approximately 38% of the Soviets’ total military transport force, and sug- 8ests the importance that the Soviets Place on power projection operations, even in a militarily weak country such as Afghanistan.
After the invasion, the Soviets continUed to use transport aircraft as the primary means of logistical support for more than 100,000 combat troops deployed in Afghanistan. Isolated outposts are resupplied by parachute drop, while even such significant bases as Khost and Gardez— held by at least a battalion—require air resupply. Despite this heavy emphasis on mrborne logistics, no transport aircraft “tre permanently based in Afghanistan. Bather, they are rotated from permanent oases in the Soviet Union.
The Soviets have used their transport mrcraft for a variety of missions. Sensor- equipped An-12 Cubs and An-26 Curls conduct aerial reconnaissance for air stnkes, and radar-equipped Cubs and 11-76 Candids serve as airborne command posts. The versatile Cub has also been used to provide battlefield illumination for night operations and as a bomber, rolling bombs down its aft cargo ramp. A typical cluster of battlefield illumination flares dropped by the Cub can light an area of roughly three square kilometers for ten minutes.
Bombers: The Soviets have used the Tu-16 Badger bomber aircraft almost exclusively as a part of their “scorched earth” campaign. The Badger is a medium-range bomber with a bomb-load capacity of 19,800 pounds and a service ceiling of 40,350 feet. It can deliver ordnance from altitudes that are well out of range of any Afghan rebel antiaircraft weapons. The Badger performs its high- altitude carpet-bombing missions primarily with general-purpose bombs aimed at villagers and agricultural targets. The Soviets intend to destroy the economic structure of Afghanistan that supports the mujahideen. During the Soviets’ April 1984 offensive in the Panjshir Valley, an estimated 30 Badger bombing sorties were flown for each of three days. These sorties were followed by coordinated attacks by fixed-wing attack aircraft, helicopters, and artillery.
Most bombing targets are possible mujahideen staging areas within a day’s march of roads, Soviet garrisons, airfields, and pipelines. Bombing is driven by intelligence information on guerrilla activity and food production. The emphasis on destroying the agricultural base and villages has resulted in huge casualties among civilians rather than the rebel troops. It is much easier for the Soviets to target villages that may shelter the mujahideen than to target the elusive guerrillas in the mountains.
The Soviets are believed to be basing their medium bomber force at Termez in the Uzbekistan Soviet Socialist Republic, just across the Afghan border. The Soviets do not want to risk basing their Su-24 Fencers and Tu-16 Badgers in Afghani-
Like the British 100 years before them, the Soviets found the Afghan terrain and mujahideen nearly impervious to conventional tactics, and thus have emphasized aviation support—which also suffers setbacks.
Soviet An-12 Cubs (right) are used as reconnaissance platforms for air strikes and as airborne command posts. The much-feared Mi-24 Hind (opposite) has become an effective convoy and column escort.
stan because of occasional mujahideen attacks on airports with Chinese-made 10-mm. rockets and mortars.
Fixed-Wing Fighter!Attack: In 1985, Soviet fighter/attack aircraft strength was estimated to include eight 12-aircraft squadrons in Afghanistan, and an equal number in the Soviet Union supporting operations in Afghanistan. The Soviets have built or improved several key allweather airbases in Afghanistan: Herat, Shindand, Farah, Kandahar, Kabul International, Baghram, and Jalalabad. Aircraft also operate from such Soviet bases as Mary, Termez, and Kushka.
The MiG-21 Fishbed was the first Soviet fighter/attack aircraft to be used in Afghanistan. It was designed as an air-to- air fighter aircraft and converted to an attack role. Ill-suited for an attack role in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan, the MiG-21 met little success in supporting Soviet ground operations.
Problems with fixed-wing attack were compounded by an apparent hesitancy by Soviet pilots to press home their attack. According to one U. S. journalist who witnessed five Soviet attacks by fixed- wing attack aircraft, the Soviets appeared to fear antiaircraft guns. They were observed dropping 250-kilogram bombs from 5,000-foot altitudes and firing 57mm. rockets beyond their range, the rockets visibly falling short. Many bombs failed to detonate, breaking open on impact. And many cluster bombs failed to deploy.
Since 1980, the Soviets have used the Su-17 Fitter and the MiG-23/27 Flogger in Afghanistan. In 1982, they introduced the Su-24 Fencer and the Su-25 Frogfoot. The Fencer, based in the Soviet Union at Termez, is a twin-engine, variable- geometry wing aircraft that is all-weather capable. The Frogfoot is a near duplicate of the Northrop A-9, with a heavy-caliber Gatling gun in the nose and ten hard points for up to 10,000 pounds of bombs and rockets. One squadron of Su-25 Frogfoots is based at Bagram.
Soviet fixed-wing attack aircraft tactics vary little, regardless of the type of aircraft flown. The aircraft generally operate in pairs. The lead aircraft makes a low-level approach to drop its ordnance— usually cluster bombs with drogue chutes—and then circles to fire unguided 57-mm. rockets. Meanwhile, the second
86
aircraft circles overhead releasing flares to counter the SA-7 heat-seeking surface- to-air missile threat. The aircraft have also been observed to release three sets of four heat flares as they climb out of their bombing or rocketing attacks on mujahideen positions.
Fighter/attack aircraft are seldom used against targets of opportunity. Close air support is limited and is almost always provided by helicopters rather than fixed- wing attack aircraft. The main targets of the fixed-wing attack aircraft are villages that could serve as guerrilla bases, hardened mountain locations, controlling heights, and narrow creeks leading toward main valleys. The Su-17 and MiG- 21 are used in missions for which only general accuracy is required. The MiG- 23/27, Su-24, and Su-25 are used when greater accuracy is desired.
The Su-25 is considered by the mujahideen to be the most effective attack aircraft and is much-feared in Afghanistan. It is used against point targets in rough terrain, with great accuracy. Resistance fighters reported considerably improved Su-25 accuracy in the Soviets’ April 1984 Panjahar Valley offensive. The ranges at which they scored direct hits were much greater than in previous battles, with no indication that “smart bombs” were used. These bombing runs were performed at very low altitudes by pairs of aircraft in separate attack runs.
The munitions used by the Soviet fighter/attack aircraft in Afghanistan include various heavy-caliber cannon, 57mm. and 80-mm. unguided rockets, a variety of bombs such as 500-kilogram fuel-air explosives, general-purpose high explosives, and cluster bombs ranging from 225 to 500 kilograms. The use of white phosphorous and incendiary bombs as well as chemical canisters have also been reported.
Helicopters: The helicopter has been the single most effective weapon the Soviets have used against the Afghan rebels. About seven Soviet 30-aircraft regiments and several independent flights and squadrons—approximately 275 helicopters—are operating in Afghanistan, and more than 100 others operate in support from the Soviet Union. The helicopters that have been used in Afghanistan include the Mi-4 Hound basic transport helicopter, the Mi-6 Hook heavy transport helicopter, the Mi-8 Hip transport and assault troop-lift helicopter, and the Mi-24 Hind assault helicopter.
The Soviets have defined eight key helicopter roles. In descending order of priority, they are:
- Destroying fighting forces
- Destroying equipment
- Gathering intelligence
- Adjusting artillery fire
- Inserting tactical troops
- Transferring weapons and equipment in untrafficable areas
- Delivering supplies
- Evacuating the wounded
The weapon system most feared by the Afghans is the Hind, which is used for close air support, convoy escorts, bombing villages, patrolling, and search and destroy missions. The Hind has heavy armor around critical engine and drive train components, bullet-proof glass over the cockpit, titanium belly armor, and it can carry up to 16 troops. Its weapons include a 12.7-mm. machine gun in the nose (the Hind-F reportedly has a 23mm. or possibly 30-mm. gun), as many as four rocket pods with 32-mm. or 57mm. rockets, and two hard points, each capable of carrying up to 250 kilograms of a variety of bombs, including high explosives, white phosphorous, incendiary, and cluster bomb units. The Hind can also carry delayed-action incendiary pods and chemical canisters.
Early Hind tactics showed that their pilots had little fear of the enemy. Hind crews operated with impunity, engaging Afghan rebels from a low hover. Other tactics included diving attacks from 1,000 meters altitude using machine guns and various bombs and rockets. At the end of the pass, the Hinds would break away with sharp evasive turns and terrain-hugging flight. These tactics were employed by several Hinds in a circular pattern that has been described as a wagon wheel.
New tactics were employed by the Soviets after unexpectedly high initial
Proceedings/ February 1987
helicopter losses. Scout helicopters began to operate at high altitudes, to acquire targets and to direct Hind attacks. The Hinds now start their attack 7,000-8,000 meters away from the target. They run in at low altitude and then pop up to an altitude of 20-100 meters to fire their weapons. The pop-up occurs at the maximum range of the weapon system. Another tactic has been to send in one helicopter at
high altitude to draw ground fire while the wingman remains low behind a t'dgeline, ready to retaliate against ground fire.
The Soviets have also developed tac- tlcs for escorting columns or convoys in guerrilla territory. A Hind will fly ahead °f the column to land troops who provide forward security at key locations, such as Possible ambush sites. This Hind then Provides overhead security for these forward troops. Other Hinds circle the advancing column to protect its flanks, htnce the column has traveled past the security outpost, the troops are picked up °y their Hind. The process is then rePeated in leap-frog fashion. Pilots in Afghanistan have been given some flexibil- '[y m engaging targets of opportunity, f'fso, the Soviets have increased the ef- setiveness of their close air support through the use of airborne forward air c°ntrollers (FACs), the large-scale use of phom was verified in the April 1984 anjshir Valley offensive. They fly in retrofitted Mi-4 Hounds or Hinds, both sing y and in pairs. Targets are designated y smoke and/or white phosphorous rockets fired from the FAC helicopter.
This marking round is followed immediately by a helicopter or fixed-wing attack. The timing for these coordinated attacks has been finely honed, allowing no time for the mujahideen to react to the marking round and escape.
The Mi-8 Hip helicopter is a versatile workhorse, and serves as the primary tactical troop-lift helicopter. The Hip can carry 28 troops or 8,820 pounds of cargo.
It is also considered by Western analysts to be the most heavily armed helicopter in the world: it can carry 128 57-mm. rockets in four packs, or four Swatter antitank missiles, and has a 12.7-mm. machine gun in the nose. Its ability to provide its own ground fire suppression is valuable for assault missions.
Using the Mi-8 Hip and Mi-24 Hind, units as large as battalions have been lifted as far beyond the front lines as 50 kilometers. These units then link up with the advancing main body of mechanized forces. The troops of the airborne regiments, the air assault brigade, and one specially trained battalion per motorized rifle division are frequently used for helibome operations.
The Soviets use helicopters to lay minefields and chemical blocks to deny the use of narrow creeks and caves to the mujahideen. The Hip can carry two mine dispersal units and can sow 144 mines. Dispersed randomly, the mines are used to disrupt mujahideen lines of communication or are scattered in front of a force to halt it. Since the mujahideen have learned to distinguish the shape of the PFM-1 mine, the mere discovery of the mine brings caravans to a standstill, creating sitting ducks for Soviet helicopter attack.
However, the Soviets have experienced some problems with the Hip. A former Afghan Air Force pilot, now with the guerrillas, reported that the Hip’s exposed, non-crash worthy fuel system was not popular with Hip crews. The Hip’s performance has been poor in Afghanistan’s high altitudes and temperatures. Trim control is considered extremely inadequate. He also reported that the 1,500-hour rotor life and time-consuming engine changes were problems.
Operational since 1952, the Mi-4 Hound has been used primarily as a basic cargo transport helicopter in Afghanistan. It can carry up to 11 troops or a maximum payload of 3,835 pounds. However, the Mi-4 can also be armed with guns and rockets, and has been used for a variety of missions—as a FAC helicopter, for example. It has been spotted hovering out of ground fire range, observing areas being bombarded very accurately by artillery. Mi-4s have been used to precede Hind attacks. The Hounds attack rebel positions with rockets and machine guns, hoping to draw fire from the mujahideen, who then become targets for the Hinds. Hounds have also been used as decoys, circling overhead and ejecting heat flares during helicopter and fixed-wing attacks on rebel positions.
Although they are poorly organized and lightly armed, the Afghan rebels have used terrain to their best advantage in fighting the Soviets’ mechanized army. Finding themselves completely ineffective in applying their armored columns and tanks against a guerrilla force in steep, rugged mountains with many narrow valleys, the Soviets soon began to use their aviation assets extensively.
The initial tactical use of aircraft by the Soviets was generally clumsy and ineffective against the elusive mujahideen. This flaw was particularly noteworthy because the Soviets had total air superiority over the mujahideen, who have no aircraft and are armed only with optically sighted antiaircraft guns and minimally effective SA-7 heat-seeking surface-to- air missiles.
Nevertheless, the Soviets have overcome many of their initial problems. They have introduced new fixed-wing aircraft that are more accurate and effective in the ground-attack mission. Pilot proficiency has improved, as has the dependability of munitions. But the most notable changes have been made in tactics and command and control procedures. The Soviets have learned from
their combat experience: they have demonstrated the ability and—most important—the desire to operate more flexibly in the face of rapidly changing tactical situations.
Captain Cardoza is the commanding officer of Detachment A of MWHS-4 at 4th Marine Air Wing Headquarters in New Orleans. A 1978 graduate of the Naval Academy, he received his wings as a helicopter pilot in 1981 and received conversion training in the CH-46 Sea Knight. He served as flight line officer and flight officer in HMM-161, and earned designation as functional check pilot and division leader before being transferred to Quantico in 1985 to attend the Amphibious Warfare School, the unclassified files of which produced most of the reference material for this Professional Note.
The SH-60F: New Capabilities for the Battle Group
By Commander George Galdorisi, U. S. Navy
1986 was an epochal year for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) defense of the Navy’s carrier battle groups (CVBGs). The Defense Department and Congress responded favorably to the Navy’s request for a new inner-zone ASW helicopter, the SH-60F—40 years after the first flight test of a tethered acoustic device, 35 years after the Navy took delivery of the first operational active-sonar ASW helicopter (the H-19), and on the 25th birthday of the Navy’s oldest SH-3 Sea King helicopter.
For decades, the Navy’s response to the Soviet submarine threat has been to field multi-faceted forces with complementary capabilities. The Navy has employed ASW defense-in-depth to allow CVBGs to carry out the National Command Authorities’ objectives vis-a-vis the growing Soviet submarine threat, which exhibits quantitative and qualitative improvements every year. (See Table 1.) The ASW defense-in-depth approach features a layered ASW concept designed around choke point interdiction, outer- zone passive ASW, and inner-zone active ASW.
The role of shore monitoring facilities, land-based maritime patrol aircraft, attack submarines, and mines is to interdict Soviet submarines that must pass through strategic choke points en route to our CVBGs. This approach will probably eliminate a significant number of those Soviet submarines that have not sortied at the onset of hostilities.
The vast mid-to-outer ASW zone around the carrier is patrolled and fought by: attack submarines operated in direct support; carrier-based S-3A ASW aircraft; light airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS) helicopter-equipped cruisers, destroyers, and frigates; and other ASW assets. Relying primarily on passive
Flanked by an SH-60B LAMPS III helo, the SH-60F test bed reels in its dipping sonar. SH-60Fs will provide inner-zone ASW and SAR when they begin replacing the SH-3 Sea Kings at the end of the decade.
acoustics and operating in waters that are not too cluttered with noise to mask target noises, these forces should certainly eliminate a fair proportion of attack submarines attempting to reach the carrier. However, as threat submarines become quieter, increasing numbers will be able to evade the passive acoustic systems of this zone. What of the inner zone?
The main characteristics of the inner zone are noise, confusion, and the need to counter a threat that is—or soon will be—within firing range of the carrier. The noises made by the CVBG’s ships create high acoustic background levels, severely limiting the effectiveness of passive sensors. Active sonar, however, is not degraded by these high background noise levels. With its ability to bring an active sonar rapidly to bear in the inner zone, the carrier-based, dipping sonar, ASW helicopter is uniquely suited to combat critical inner-zone threats— where there are no second chances.
In the three decades since its introduction, this helicopter has evolved from a machine with very limited capabilities to a highly effective, all-weather system capable of independent detection, classification, localization, tracking, attack, and reattack of hostile submarines. In a profession in which differences of opin-
60F
.. — "*» wiy ouppv/il. 1 lie U1 1*UUU
j Perates with its major supply points and ^mediate-level maintenance facilities ^ ore. The two H-60 models’ common- 1 y permits both aircraft to use the sup-
and SH-60B support. The SH-60B
Table 2 SH-60F Weapon System
4.3-hour Mission Endurance -with-
- Sealevel, 90°F, no-wind,
out-of-ground-effect hover
- Two Mk-50 torpedoes Unequalled Reliability
- 119 mean flight hours be
tween critical failures
- 0.965 mission reliability MIL-STD-1553B Tactical Data
System
- Dual, redundant mission
computers
- Multi-function keyboards
- Tactical data link to other
aircraft and ships AQS-13F Tethered Sonar
- Concurrent sonobuoy proc
essing capability
- High-speed reeling machine Automatic Blade Fold
Main- and Tail-Rotor De-Icing Rescue Hoist Emergency Flotation Meets Secondary Mission without Reconfiguration
- Cabin that accommodates
stokes litter
- Accommodation for crew
of four
- Accommodation for two
passengers
- Accommodation for five
rescuees
- Inherent crash survivability
features
Growth Capability for:
- Sensors and weapons
- Aircraft gross weight
- Additional tactical data sys
tem functions
Table 1 Soviet Submarine Threat Summary
275 Soviet attack submarines 10 submarines constructed each year
17 new submarine classes since 1970
All classes quieter and faster than predecessors
ion on strategy, tactics, and weapon procurement are the norm, there seems to be universal agreement that carrier-based, dipping sonar, ASW helicopters are an indispensable part of CVBG ASW.
Since 1961, the SH-3 Sea King has served as the carrier-based ASW helicopter, but its numbers are dwindling and its age is degrading its ability to serve a., a front-line ASW platform. The approximately 100 SH-3Hs in the fleet are insufficient to support current and planned air Wings with a bare-bones minimum of six aircraft per squadron. Furthermore, many SH-3s are approaching their 10,000-hour design service life, and maintenance man-hours per flight hour are hovering around 30, an extraordinary number of hours for an aircraft that routinely flies more than ten hours every other day. The mission-system growth of the H-3, as it Solved from the SH-3A to the SH-3H, added so much weight that the SH-3H's endurance is less than desired.
The Navy’s vigorous response is the hH-60F, which capitalizes on the proven design of the Navy’s SH-60B LAMPS III ^eahawk helicopter. The Seahawk has een in the fleet for more than three years and has amassed more than 50,000 flight hnurs in demanding, high-tempo CVBG operations. The aircraft exhibits a two-to- nree order of magnitude improvement in ^liability and maintainability over comparable weapon systems.
The SH-60F airframe is manufactured °n the same production line as the SH- odB, providing outstanding economics of jjcale with a straightforward conversion r°m sonobuoys to dipping sonar as the Primary ASW sensor. All tooling and Manufacturing expertise is in place, aiding for an initial operating capability efore the end of this decade.
Owing to its commonality with the H-60B, the SH-60F airframe requires °n|y minimal testing. In addition, the N/ASN-123 tactical navigation system j*.nd the AQS-13F tethered sonar are denatives of current fleet systems and re- <T1're minimal testing.
a maximum gross weight of 21,880 . °Unds, the SH-60F is no larger or heav- than the SH-3H, but it has a more than '' greater useful load in a hover under <*ndard day conditions, and can easily ofrry two torpedoes on missions in excess 'our hours while enjoying a sea-level Qash-speed of 154 knots.
6H-60Fs deploying on the carriers pro- 1 e a synergistic benefit for both SH- ply and repair facilities on board the carrier—a giant step forward in improving the combat readiness of perhaps as many as 12 H-60 aircraft per CVBG.
The truly state-of-the-art SH-60F airframe includes the following features:
► Main Rotor System: Blending high performance, reduced maintenance, and low vibration, the main rotor’s 18° of twist provide outstanding performance in a hover. Full-blade articulation is made possible by lubrication-free elastomeric bearings that reduce maintenance. Rotor vibration is minimized by a bifilar absorber. Maintenance is “on condition” with no specified overhaul intervals.
- Tail Rotor System: The bearingless tail rotor is virtually maintenance-free. No lubrication is required and all-composite construction reduced the number of parts to 87% of older tail rotor designs. Maintenance is “on condition.” A 20% cant provides a vertical lift component.
- Main Transmission System: Five modules, comprising the 3,400 shaft horsepower system, are interchangeable left to right and independently filtered. There are no external lubrication lines. The transmission has continued operation for more than one hour after complete loss of lubrication. Maintenance is “on condition.”
- Engines: The T700-GE-401 engine is fully marine-adapted to reduce corrosion. The engine has low specific fuel consumption and a contingency power ratio. Maintenance is “on condition.”
- Hydraulic Systems: The aircraft has totally separate and redundant hydraulic flight control systems. An electrically driven back-up (third) hydraulic pump can replace either main pump. A utility (fourth) hydraulic system operates the rescue hoist and sonar reeling machine.
- Electrical System: The aircraft has two high-capacity, 30/45-kilovolt/ampere generators powered by the main transmission system and an auxiliary power unit- powered 10/30-kilovolt/ampere back-up generator.
- Fuel System: Full capability for the four-hour inner-zone mission is provided. Internal fuel tanks are crash-resistant and ballistically tolerant. Self-sealing, breakaway fittings and a suction feed/crossfeed system reduce the risk of post-crash fires. Fuel dumping at a rate of 800 pounds per minute is regulated by the pilot. Helicopter in-flight refueling (HIFR) is an integral part of the system; all tanks can be single-point or HIFR pressure refueled.
- Flight Control System: Dual, widely separated flight control paths link the pilots to jam-proof, tandem, main rotor servos that are ballistically tolerant. Each servo is powered by two separate hydraulic systems for safety. Stabilator control is redundant fly-by-wire.
- Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS): The digital AFCS provides enhanced handling qualities and features a dual stability-augmentation system. Autopilot features include altitude-hold and airspeed-hold. Automatic approach
and departure features are provided for the dipping mission.
As remarkable as the SH-60F airframe is, it can be thought of merely as framework housing five avionics subsystems integrated by a MIL-STD-1553B multiplex bus, providing a digital interface medium for the four crew members— pilot, copilot, acoustic sensor operator, and tactical sensor operator. The major avionics subsystems are: the tactical data and display subsystem, navigation subsystem, communications subsystem, sonar subsystem, and armament/stores subsystem. These avionics systems offer extraordinary reliability through architecture redundancy. They feature dual buses, dual redundant processors, and a tertiary backup bus controller. The five avionics subsystems include:
- Tactical Data and Display Subsystem: Situated on the dual redundant 1553B data bus are four control and display units at the primary crew stations. Avionics system control is exercised through these units, including communications, navigation, weapon system use, and ASW mission control. The copilot and tactical sensor operator also have access to a monochromatic, multi-function, ASW mission tactical display.
- Navigation Subsystem: The navigation system mechanization is a straightforward dead-reckoning solution employing Doppler/automatic heading reference systems with an air data sensor backup. Stored winds are continuously computed in the primary mode and may be used during periods of Doppler failure. A tactical navigation (TACAN) receiver gives range/bearing to both fixed TACAN installations and shipboard TACANs, and a bearing indication to deployed sono- buoys.
- Communications Subsystem: This system is centrally controlled by a microprocessor unit which provides for:
• Radio selection and tuning
- Crew intercommunication system selection
- Acoustic audio distribution and recording
- Sonar communications
- Antenna switching
- Emergency communications
- Emissions control (EmCon) control
- Sonar Subsystem: The primary mission sensor is the AQS-13F dipping sonar subsystem, consisting of the acoustic transducer, a high-speed reeling machine with 1,500 feet of cable payout, sonar multiplex unit, sonar data computer, azimuth- range indicator, and miscellaneous display-control elements. Data from the transducer includes passive acoustic monitoring, active transducer target echo, and bathythermal sensor information. The acoustic sensor operator is the primary user of the information from the azimuth-range indicator. By overlaying cursor and by “marking” a target while cursor tracking, the operator enters target data into the tactical segment of the system.
- Armament Subsystem: Targets are engaged with the Mark 46 torpedo or the newly developed Mark 50 torpedo. Each is capable of accepting an initial target bearing and then tracking and destroying a submarine. Before hover launch, the armament system controller programs initial homing information.
The SH-60F’s outstanding aircraft design and superb mission system capabilities give it superb weapon system attributes, which are summarized in Table 2.
Perhaps the key feature of the SH-60F is its ability to arrive rapidly at the helo dipping station, quickly attain sonar contact on a submarine at extended ranges, and put a weapon on target. Enhanced reliability, almost twice the sonar range, and the ability to carry more torpedoes are key ingredients. In addition, the outstanding AFCS system provides the wherewithal to “get there from here.”
The improved flight characteristics of the AFCS system result in much shorter dip-to-dip time, which equates to a much higher probability of detection and kill. Compared to the SH-3, the SF1-60F has:
- The ability to engage automatic approach at any altitude, airspeed, or angle of bank within the maneuvering envelope of the aircraft
- Higher V(velocity)-cruise/V-max dip- to-dip (135 knots+)
- Higher V-max for seating the sonar dome (100 knots)
- Faster acceleration
- Faster deceleration and shorter transition to a hover (45 seconds from 150 feet)
- The ability to maintain departure schedule during turns on break dip
- Deeper transducer depths (1,500 feet)
- Faster sonar raise-descent (21.1 feet per second—15.3 feet per second)
- Lower pilot workload
- Rapid stabilization over sonar
Once in hover, the SH-60F launches torpedoes that can be set to “snake” along the azimuth to the target rather than conducting a helical search as required for a fly-in delivery. A dipping sonar fire control solution provides the best air- launched kill available.
The SH-60F’s qualities coupled with state-of-the-art sonar and acoustic processors enable a squadron of six SH-60Fs to provide the battle group commander with a high degree of inner-zone ASW protection around the clock and in all weather. It has the endurance to meet the double-deck cyclic operations carrier schedule while carrying full stores (Figure 1) and/or provide a search and rescue vehicle with the ability to pick up multiple rescuees (Figure 2). In addition, the SH-60F has a slightly smaller “deck multiple” than the larger SH-3H.
The SH-60F has outstanding growth potential that will allow it to accommodate the follow-on sensor and weapon improvements that are always necessary
Start and Takeoff (5 minutes at maximum continuous power)
Maximum Loiter-on-Station Time: 3.6 Hours
to maintain the advantage over a constantly improving threat. In addition to Providing a host platform and test-bed for the Navy’s advanced lightweight sonar. Potential growth for the SH-60F includes: ^ Adding radar and/or forward-looking infrared radar
^ Adding the global positioning system ^ Adding night vision devices ^ Increasing in maximum gross weight to 23,500 pounds
► Host platform for the UYS-2 advanced acoustical signal processor In an era when constrained defense budgets and increasingly scarce personnel and material resources force battle group commanders to do more with less, the SH-60F is, arguably, the key to the critical inner-zone ASW defense of our carrier battle groups. The right system at the right price will be making its presence known before the end of this decade.
A frequent Proceedings contributor, Commander Galdorisi is the commanding officer of LAMPS III squadron HSL-43. A 1970 Naval Academy graduate, he has served in LAMPS I and LAMPS III squadrons on both coasts. His most recent afloat assignment was with Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group Three on board the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63). He received a master’s degree in oceanography from the Naval Postgraduate School and graduated from the Naval War College with highest distinction. He has been associated with the LAMPS III weapon system since 1981.
SNAP: Taming the Paper Tiger
8y Captain William H. Rush, U. S. Navy, with Shirley S. Jahn
When I entered the Navy 44 years ago, * Was unprepared for the sea of forms that fngulfs the transition from civilian to white hat.” As I advanced through the tonks, I found myself navigating ever- toounting swells of paperwork. Now, I find the metaphor has changed, but not toe problem. As a commanding officer in today’s Navy, I face a colossal ‘‘paper figer” with an appetite that could happily Consume every bit of the fleet’s energy. I nave dedicated this last tour of my naval career to demonstrating that our Navy can ’ante, or at least control, the paper tiger— "to do it by automating our labor-intense functions.
The Navy recognized early on that toodern business computers had a place °n board ships of all sizes and missions, as a management tool for relieving the administrative burden. Unfortunately, the jtolution seemed to create yet another cadache—the proliferation of hardware and software in non-tactical automatic ata processing (ADP). Proliferation is expensive: a 1975 task force found that e Navy was purchasing hundreds of dif- erent systems to do identical jobs—word Processing, data-base management, lo- §lstics, supply, maintenance, administration, personnel, and training. Each unit was taking advantage of this new technology in different ways. Many ingenious sailors were designing systems for their ships; but when the sailors transferred, the systems collapsed.
We tackled this new problem by creating the Navy Management Systems Support Office (NAVMASSO) as the Fleet Central Design Activity (CDA). The objective was simple: provide a standard automated tool to help fleet sailors manage information and reduce paperwork.
The 1980 CNO Objective Number 5 (“. . . to reduce the administrative burden on the Fleet”) generated the establishment of the Shipboard Non-tactical ADP Program (SNAP), which aims to standardize and integrate the Navy’s nontactical hardware and software, enabling fleet sailors to move from sea to shore, ship to ship, type commander to type commander, and even fleet to fleet without missing a beat. Integrated data bases will allow the systems to exchange realtime information. Methods will be developed to transmit information quickly to type commanders, system commanders, and others. The flow of paper will decrease, and reports and information re
quired by the fleet sailor will be produced by on-board systems. The possibilities boggle the mind, but they are real, and attainable fairly soon. These systems are receiving Navy-wide acceptance because they so clearly give sailors more time to accomplish their assigned tasks, and let the fleet devote its energy to readiness, instead of endlessly pushing shifting mounds of paper up a pitched deck.
A disciplined, Navy-wide automation standard allows us to do our jobs better and execute our policies more efficiently. We are automating maintenance, administration, supply, finance, payroll, and medical functions. The systems will work only if people use them in a disciplined manner. We need the systems discipline to perform our tasks in a certain way through an automated medium, and the professional discipline to stick close to
the way we are directed to do business, rather than the way we choose to.
SNAP is managed according to OP- NAVINST 5230.16, under the policy direction of the Fleet Non-tactical ADP Policy Council. The council provides fleet non-tactical ADP support, defined as the automation of non-tactical functions of fleet operational and direct- support units, afloat and ashore. Under the SNAP umbrella are the following three major programs:
- SNAP 1 replaces obsolete fleet computer hardware with modem, third-generation hardware and real-time, on-line, multiprocessing capabilities. These systems are installed on board: .destroyer tenders, combat-stores ships, repair ships, submarine tenders, multipurpose aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships; in Marine Corps air wings; and at selected shore sites.
- SNAP II provides ADP equipment to ships that have never had standard equipment. Receiving SNAP II hardware are: ammunition ships, salvage ships, oilers, fast combat-support ships, miscellaneous command ships, replacement oilers, submarine-rescue ships, guided-missile cruisers, nuclear-powered guided-missile cruisers, destroyers, guided-missile destroyers, frigates, guided-missile frigates, amphibious command ships, amphibious cargo ships, amphibious transport docks, dock-landing ships, tank-landing ships, nuclear-powered attack submarines, nuclear-powered fleet ballistic-missile submarines, battleships, and selected shore sites. SNAP II offers real-time data-processing capability.
- The Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System (NALCOMIS) will use SNAP I program hardware to provide fully automated, real-time processing capability for organizational and intermediate-maintenance data collection.
Approximately 601 SNAP installations, comprising 108 SNAP I and 493 SNAP II activities, are targeted to be made by the end of fiscal year 1989. Based on a projected ten implementations per month, Figure 1 depicts NAVMAS- SO’s growing role in providing non-tactical ADP support to the operating forces. Table 1 provides a summary, by ship type, of SNAP implementations as of 31 October 1986.
NAVMASSO provides “cradle-to- grave” support for all non-tactical automated information systems (AISs) operating on SNAP hardware. This includes designing and developing the AIS, training shipboard personnel in the system’s operation and use, loading the data base,
implementing the system, and—most crucial, perhaps—assisting the fleet throughout the system’s life.
Fleet-assistance teams on each coast and forward-deployed units in Subic Bay, the Philippines, and Sigonella, Sicily, respond when users report trouble. Sometimes the teams simply clarify misunderstood procedures or correct faulty programs; in other cases, they visit users to assist, instruct, or retrain them on-site. In all cases, NAVMASSO tracks trouble reports to ensure that assistance teams respond promptly and that problems are in fact solved.
Feedback reveals that fleet sailors’ initial fears and apprehensions about working with automated processes have largely evaporated. The “user-friendly” SNAP software makes the system easy to master. As a result, the fleet has universally accepted NAVMASSO’s systems and is asking for automation of even more functions. In sum, responses have indicated that:
- SNAP greatly simplifies administration by maintaining a large, rapidly retrievable data base.
- Shipboard logistics data bases can synchronize with those ashore to ensure timely and accurate configuration and logistics support—a big step toward improving fleet material readiness.
- Fleet transactions with the Navy Finance Center and with the Navy Manpower and Personnel Center are expedited, resulting in better personnel services and upgraded financial- and manpower-management capabilities.
- Many ships’ reports are now fully automated, allowing senior personnel to devote more time to management.
Looking back on the last four years, it is fair to say that NAVMASSO has exceeded most of our sponsors’ and managers’ expectations. But it has not met all of our collective goals. Three significant conditions are relevant:
- Our original mission was to develop discrete systems tailored to the specific needs of cognizant managers. We concentrated on creating specific modules for the supply, maintenance, and aviation communities.
- The functional descriptions and system decision papers for the SNAP I and SNAP II programs do not provide the baseline necessary to integrate the systems; this will occur progressively.
- Without an integrated baseline, we cannot measure the effectiveness of our applications design and programming.
These are systems issues that require attention.
We have management questions to address, as well. SNAP is a major tactical-support program that will affect both the fighting Navy and the logistics, support, and corporate elements that sustain it ashore. It is a billion-dollar effort to improve fleet-unit readiness and sustainability. Yet, while the Navy applies vigorous oversight and control when developing tactical or strategic systems, and methodically integrates the systems as they are acquired, it has been less rigorous in adopting the non-tactical SNAP system.
The program participants can all improve their effectiveness. The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations’ warfare sponsors, system commanders, fleet commanders-in-chief, and central design agents’ representatives should come together quickly to define (not approximate) the program’s parameters. We can do this through the Fleet ADP Policy
Table 1 SNAP Installations by Ship Type (31 October 1986)
SNAP I SNAP II
Configu ration | A | B C | D |
|
|
AD | 0 | 9 |
| AE | 1 |
|
|
|
| AGF | 2 |
AFS | 0 | 7 |
| AO | 1 |
|
|
|
| AOE | 4 |
AR | 2 | 2 |
| AOR | 7 |
AS | 0 | 12 |
| BB | 3 |
CV | 3 | 12 |
| CG | 14 |
LHA | 0 | 5 |
| CGN | 5 |
LPH | 2 | 5 |
| DD | 25 |
MAG | 0 | 14 3 |
| DDG | 7 |
TAF | 1 | 2 |
| FF | 19 |
Shore |
|
|
| FFG | 45 |
Sites | 10 | 16 | 3 | LCC | 1 |
| 18 | 84 3 | 3 | LPD | 7 |
Total |
|
|
| LSD | 3 |
SNAP I Sitesm |
| LST | 8 | ||
|
|
|
| SSN | 1 |
|
|
|
| Shore |
|
|
|
|
| Sites | 8 _ |
| Total SNAP II sites | 161 | |||
|
|
|
|
| — |
Council, our corporate directors’ board.
The Chief of Naval Operations is committed to automating the Navy. Millions of dollars, tremendous personnel assets, and extensive special studies have convinced the Navy that the centralized SNAP approach is the best way to bring this about. But it is not an easy task. If “just anybody” could do it, it would have been done long ago.
The Navy is breaking new ground in ADP—consolidating responsibility, chipping away at uncontrolled proliferation by standardizing and centralizing systems. The Navy Management System Support Office’s position is to “stay the course.” Our goal is an expanded central design agent that can serve a 600-ship Navy and numerous shore activities with standard software systems.
As commanding officer of NAVMASSO in Norfolk, Virginia, since July 1981, Captain Rush has been responsible for the Navy’s non-tactical automated information systems, including SNAP. He attended the University of South Carolina, and began his naval career in 1941 at the age of 17. He was commissioned in 1955. After attending Aircraft Maintenance
School, he served in aircraft-maintenance and safety billets in numerous commands. Captain Rush also commanded the Logistics Systems Development branch of the Naval Aviation Logistics Center at Patuxent River, Maryland, and the Naval Aviation Logistics Center Detachment East in Norfolk, Virginia.
Mrs. Jahn has had a 31-year career as a civilian employee of the Navy, culminating in her current position as technical director of NAVMASSO. She has also served as director of command support at NAVMASSO, and in numerous other supervisory positions in naval data-processing agencies. Mrs. Jahn has attended many technical courses in computer systems and management techniques.
Fiber Optics Go to Sea
By John Rhea
The spaghetti-like coils of copper cables in naval ships are being systematically replaced by a new technology— fiber optics. As ships become more advanced and require more on-board information-processing capability, the need for improved communications becomes compelling. Using photons rather than electrons for signal transmission, fiber optics can circumvent many of the logistics and security shortcomings of copper cables and radio communications.
Tiny strands of optical fibers routinely carry 90 million bits of data per second in commercial telecommunication's applications over distances of 200 kilometers between repeaters. Optical fibers capable °f sending more than a billion bits for 100 kilometers have been demonstrated in the laboratory, and the industry is working °n trillion-bit versions capable of spanning an ocean without any repeaters.
A major Navy and Marine Corps con- Cem is intra-system communications. An early fiber optics application linked sensors and signal processors in the Marine Corps’ AV-8B Harrier vertical/short takeoff and landing attack aircraft. The Navy has begun to use the weight-saving and electromagnetic interference (EMI) Properties of fiber optics by “rewiring” >ts Aegis cruisers with fiber-optic data buses in on-board computers.
These tend to be conventional commu- f'cations applications, for example, a closed-circuit television system on board lbe mtty Hawk (CV-63). But the cost savings can be substantial. One estimate or an aircraft carrier radar cable was $ 1 ^dlion for copper cable; a fiber-optic version of the same cable was estimated to cost $30,000. A modern destroyer requires 150 miles of copper cable (costing V~$150 per meter installed) and 75% of 11 is used for information transfer.
An advanced underwater Navy application, known as Project Ariadne, would place a network of fiber-optic cables on the sea bottom to collect acoustic data. These cables would connect conventional sensors to land-based computers for analysis. This would be a major breakthrough for a new generation of optic fibers— single-mode fibers—because a principal objective will be to minimize repeaters. Initial cable purchases are expected to be in 50-kilometer lengths, but 100-kilometer and greater lengths are now possible.
Today’s state-of-the-art optical fibers can carry tens of thousands of times the signals a copper cable of comparable weight can carry. This yields significant logistical savings in manpower and equipment required for deployment of tactical communications systems, as well as for intra-system applications in which weight and volume are at a premium.
EMI immunity is another important consideration. Signals can be transmitted through electrically noisy areas with extremely low bit error rates and with no susceptibility to electronic jamming.
Optical fibers enhance security because they radiate no telltale emissions. Even if one component in a system is detected, it is impossible to trace an optical cable to other components electronically. Pick-up coils and inductive devices commonly used to tap signals carried over copper cables are useless because optical cables emit no radiation. Sophisticated tapping techniques can be defeated by the measurable power loss caused by microbending within special optical cable designs.
Optical fibers also have two big advantages in a nuclear environment. The first is their electromagnetic pulse immunity, which allows signals to be transmitted during a nuclear event. Destructive high- energy voltage and current pulses are not conducted to the receivers and transmitters. Optical fibers also recover within minutes of being exposed to high radiation weapon bursts; this is particularly true of the new single-mode fibers.
The tensile strength of optical fibers is steadily rising, which should be good news for designers of such systems as Ariadne. The theoretical tensile limit for silica-clad fiber is in excess of 800,000 pounds per square inch (psi). This strength assumes that the fiber has a pristine surface free of any flaws from which fractures originate. To assure a functional strength, the fibers are proof-tested by applying a tensile load to the entire length of fiber. Proof-test values of 50,000 psi are standard for commercial-grade fibers; 100,000-psi values are available on special order for military applications.
Optical fibers are made of liquid silicon and germanium tetrachloride and then drawn into fine strands to achieve unprecedented levels of transparency. A pane of ordinary window glass one inch thick permits half the available light to pass through it; high-quality optical glass used for eyeglasses and microscopes can be ten feet thick before half the light is dispersed or absorbed. Multi-mode optical fibers can be 2.5 miles thick, and single-mode fibers 12 miles thick. Unlike multi-mode fibers, which operated at 850 nautical miles and were limited to distances of 10-15 kilometers between repeaters, single-mode fibers have the potential of unrepeatered spans measured in the hundreds of kilometers.
Many of the initial military fiber-optic applications were made when only mature multi-mode technology was available, but today’s single-mode optical fibers offer even greater advantages to system designers; reduced attenuation for
This fiber optic waveguide can carry more than 1,000 simultaneous phone messages—the same as the 256-wire copper cable. Fiber optic replacements for fleet cable systems have cost as little as 3% of the cost of a copper wire replacement.
longer distances between repeaters, greater band width, which in turn allows future size and weight reductions and system upgrades, and improved radiation hardening.
Until recently, most fibers were multimode: the signals were carried along strands of very pure glass at several wavelengths. However, not all of the information got to its destination because some of the light was absorbed by the glass and some was dispersed into different wavelengths.
Single-mode fibers use a single wavelength, usually around 1,300 nanometers* (because the least light is dispersed at that wavelength) or 1,550 nanometers (because the least light is absorbed there). The signal also travels faster in singlemode fibers: although all radiated signals travel at the speed of light, time is lost in multi-mode fibers because the signals at different wavelengths do not all begin or arrive at the same time.
♦One nanometer equals one billionth of a meter.
Since the single wavelength used in single-mode fibers no longer has to bounce around within the glass strands, they can be made much smaller— typically less than ten microns (millionths of a meter) in diameter as opposed to 100 microns for multi-mode fibers. (By comparison, the average human hair is 100150 microns in diameter.)
In addition to the lower attenuation and thus greater distances between repeaters, single-mode fibers are more radiation- resistant than multi-mode fibers because single-mode technology involves less dopant in the silica-core matrix and thus fewer color centers to darken. By comparison, a radiation dose of 3,700 rads on a multi-mode fiber results in a signal loss of about 12 decibels some ten seconds after exposure, which effectively shuts down the system. A single-mode fiber under the same conditions loses less than three decibels.
As an example of how fiber optics can revolutionize future military systems, consider that the current standard data bus for transmitting multiplexed signals in an aircraft operates at one megabit per second. This is at least two orders of magnitude below what fiber optics can deliver in the same application.
Likely to drive the military to faster data buses in future aircraft is the Defense Department’s very high-speed integrated circuit (VHSIC) program, which envisions integrated circuits that are orders of magnitude faster and more powerful than the current generation. In the next few years, VHSICs will be mandatory on all new military systems, and a one megabit per second data bus will never be able to keep up with the new components.
Another possibility that excites system designers is what they call a “stealth ship.” A ship built of composite materials would be well-nigh invisible to enemy radars. The problem is what to do about the radiation leaking from the copper cables. Metallic hulls ground these signals and disperse them into sea water, but a composite hull could not. Fiber optics could solve this problem; the result would be a much quieter ship.
Research on new optical fiber materials promises to greatly improve system performance. Theoretically, non-silica fibers using halide glasses could reduce attenuation to the point that a single cable could span an ocean without repeaters. The search is on for new materials to replace today’s germanium-doped silicon fibers to carry the signals, better lasers and light-emitting diodes to send and receive the signals, and better connectors to enable fiber-optic cables to be spliced.
The Naval Research Laboratory and Japan’s Nippon Telegraph and Telephone are investigating new fiber-optic materials that could carry signals across an ocean—or even around the globe— without requiring repeaters anywhere in the network to boost the signal strength. The researchers’ goal is to use light much farther into the infrared spectrum—above 2,000 nanometers—than do silica fibers. The two leading candidates are oxide- based fibers containing a germanium- antimony mix, and halide-based fibers containing mixes of such materials as zirconium, barium, aluminum, and gan- dolinium in compounds with fluorine and chlorine.
Optical communications technology offers system designers many advantages over radio, satellite, and wire communications. With their inherent performance advantages and declining costs, made possible by wider use in the commercial marketplace, fiber-optic systems are becoming fundamental elements of the advanced military systems to be fielded in the 21st century.
Mr. Rhea is a freelance writer who has written extensively about technology issues for U. S. and foreign military publications. He is a former military editor of Electronic News and Pentagon correspondent for Aerospace Daily. He is a graduate of the University of Illinois and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
A National Drug Interdiction System________________
By Operations Specialist First Class Ralph F. Couey, U. S. Navy, and Radarman First Class David R, Coletta, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve
For years, federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies have battled to end the smuggling of drugs into the United States. But faulty coordination and scarce resources have persistently diluted their efforts. In 1981, the U. S. military became a limited partner on the interdiction learn when an amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. 1385) authored the Department of Defense (DoD) to support civilian agency operations against narcotics smuggling. This failed to strengthen the government’s hand as much as it might have, because law enforcement officers’ limited knowledge of f*oD procedures prevented them from Using military resources effectively. Enforcement operations continued to be fragmented; agencies failed to share intelligence. Meanwhile, drug profits soared so high that smugglers stopped counting their cash and took to weighing
Clearly, some central coordinating body was needed. The answer was the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS), announced by President Ronald Reagan in March 1983. The system’s task is to coordinate efforts by Hie federal, state, and local agencies responsible for combating drug smuggling. *1 operates through regional centers in New York; Miami; Chicago; New Orle- ar>s; El Paso, Texas; and Long Beach, California; and one subregional office in Honolulu. Authorization for the military f° assist law enforcement agencies in interdicting drugs is contained in COMTH1RDFLT OPORD 230 (“Navy assistance to Law Enforcement”), SECNAVINST 5820.7A (“Cooperation 'S’tth Civilian Law Enforcement Officials;
Comitatus Act”), and DoD Direc- dye 5525.5 (“DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement”).
. The regional centers’ common mission ls to collate intelligence, assess threats, Set priorities among targets, identify resources, recommend actions, follow up Se>zures, maintain statistics, and coordinate interdiction operations staged by m°re than one enforcement agency.
Because smugglers use varying methods to ferry drugs across different U. S. orders, each NNBIS center develops a uuique way of coordinating resources to Counter the threat. But the Pacific region airly pictures the range of agencies in- olved in NNBIS and the complexity of e system’s mission.
Manning the Pacific Regional Center in Long Beach, California, are personnel from the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the U. S. Customs Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Immigration and Naturalization Service; the U. S. Coast Guard; U. S. Navy; U. S. Marine Corps; U. S. Army; U. S. Air Force; and the intelligence community. The center works closely with the Los Angeles Police Department, sheriff’s departments in Los Angeles and San Bernardino counties, and the Western States Information Network.
The Pacific region is larger than the other NNBIS regions combined, and faces a 360° threat:
- From the west: The “Golden Triangle” in Southeast Asia is a major source of marijuana, hashish, heroin, and opium. The drugs are sometimes shipped through the American Trust Territories of the Pacific, because from there the smugglers need not undergo a second U. S. Customs Service inspection upon entering the continental United States.
- From the east and the Gulf of Mexico: Cocaine and marijuana shipments arrive in the Pacific region via air and overland routes.
- From the south: Smugglers fly air routes studded with hills and mountains that shield them from radar detection. Air strips (often no more than dirt roads or dry lake beds) in the 15,000-square-mile Mojave Desert often serve as the smugglers’ drop points. Heroin and marijuana (produced in Mexico) and cocaine (shipped through Central and South America) are smuggled across the 1,600- mile Mexican border by vehicles and pedestrians.
- From the north: Cocaine, marijuana, and illegal pharmaceutical drugs are shipped through Canada by land and sea.
Since President Reagan declared “war” on drugs and named narcotics smuggling a threat to national security, DoD has played a stronger role in detecting and tracking smugglers. In each NNBIS regional center, a DoD representative now coordinates all military assistance in interdiction operations. That assistance ranges from requesting military ships and aircraft to watch for suspected smuggling vessels to stationing Coast Guard tactical law enforcement teams (TacLETs) on Navy ships.
Military units assisting drug-law enforcement agencies take care to observe Posse Comitatus prohibitions against using military forces as police agents in U. S. territory; failing to observe the guidelines can give courts cause to dismiss cases that law enforcement agents may have been developing for years. The 1981 amendment permitting greater DoD involvement clarified this prohibition. Although Posse Comitatus does not affect the Navy statutorily—as it does the Army and the Air Force—the Navy adheres to the act’s restrictions as a matter of policy. Consequently, Navy personnel assisting in anti-drug-smuggling operations may not:
- Interdict vehicles, vessels, or aircraft
- Conduct searches or seizures
- Arrest, stop, or frisk anyone
- Conduct surveillance, pursue suspects, or act as informants, undercover agents, investigators, or interrogators
- Engage in other activity that subjects civilians to any regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory exercise of military power
With Coast Guard enforcement teams riding Navy ships, the services stand shoulder-to-shoulder, blocking drug runners who try to penetrate U. S. borders.
Acting through NNBIS centers, the Navy may assist drug-law enforcement agencies by:
► Assigning Navy liaison representatives to each NNBIS regional center. These billets are filled by intelligence specialists and signalmen, and by operations specialists qualified as antisubmarine air controllers or air intercept controllers, intelligence specialists, and signalmen. The liaison’s task is to secure Navy assistance in antismuggling operations,
coordinate Navy and Coast Guard joint operations, and ensure that the Navy’s interdiction support conforms to Posse Comitatus policy guidelines.
- Carrying Coast Guard TacLETs on board Navy ships, which usually patrol larger areas than do Coast Guard vessels. (In an interdiction, the Navy crew targets, tracks, and overtakes a suspicious vessel; the TacLET then disembarks the Navy ship to search and, if justified, seize the vessel and its cargo, and arrest its crew. During the boarding, the Navy ship shifts tactical control to the appropriate Coast Guard area commander and hoists the Coast Guard ensign. Recent Navy policy revisions have clarified that a TacLET embarked on a Navy ship holds the same boarding, pursuit, and enforcement authority as it would on a Coast Guard vessel.)
- Participating in the vessel-sighting program. (The Navy supplements limited Coast Guard assets for wide-area maritime searches with Navy E-2, P-3, and S-3 reconnaissance planes, ship- and shore-based helicopters, and ships. As they perform their assigned missions, these units post lookouts for suspicious vessels and notify the Coast Guard and the NNBIS of any sightings.)
These supporting roles are the most effective contribution to drug interdiction that the Navy can make.
Exceptions to Posse Comitatus restrictions may be granted by the Secretary of
Defense (SecDef). The SecDef approves such exceptions only when the civilian agency heads involved testify that serious U. S. interests are threatened. Navy personnel may also act to prevent loss of life or destruction of property when civilian law enforcement agents are unavailable.
Two recent operations show how NNBIS works in practice:
- Authorities were alerted that the merchant vessel Eagle-I was heading for the West Coast loaded with contraband narcotics. Despite an extensive search by the Navy and Coast Guard, the vast ocean area made it difficult to spot her. The NNBIS issued then a vessel “lookout” to all Navy ships and aircraft patrolling the West Coast. Several days later, the USS Belleau Wood (LHA-3) reported sighting the Eagle-I off Everett, Washington. The Coast Guard subsequently seized the vessel and 500 pounds of cocaine with a street value of $23 million.
- The Coast Guard asked for assistance in locating a freighter suspected of making a cocaine-smuggling run to the Los Angeles area. NNBIS Navy liaisons notified West Coast Navy commands, and found Navy ships and aircraft to aid in the hunt. The searchers covered 4.5 million square miles—far more water than the Coast Guard and U. S. Customs Service could have searched on their own. But here we see how frustrating the war against drug traffickers can be: despite a massive, coordinated search the freighter was never found.
Fine-tuning the NNBIS coordination of drug-law enforcement agencies and the military has been slow. But as the system becomes better known and more agencies understand its use, NNBIS is getting results. During 1985, agencies in the Pacific NNBIS region seized at or outside U. S. borders 346 pounds of heroin, 265 pounds of opium, 1,100 pounds of cocaine, 70 pounds of hashish, 100,000 pounds of marijuana, and 2,000 units of other illicit drugs. The value of the seizures is more than $160 million. Statistics through October showed seizures were growing; cocaine seizures, for example, were up 500% from 1985 to 5,500 pounds. Several million dollars’ worth of property was also seized. The bad news is that experts estimate that law enforcement agencies are interdicting only 10% of the drugs being smuggled into the United States.
Continued congressional support for the NNBIS is critical. Every mile of border left unguarded opens a floodgate through which narcotics will flow into the United States.
Extended hearings on a threatened $230 million cut in the Coast Guard’s fiscal year 1986 budget, for instance, forced a two-month curtailment of drug patrols. This created a priceless smuggling opportunity—those months fell on the opening days of the marijuana harvest.
Editor’s Note: West Coast and Pacific area Navy commanders can schedule a presentation on the NNB/S, Pacific Region, or obtain addresses of other regional centers, by telephoning the authors at (213) 514-6378 or 6382, or by writing The National Narcotics Bordet Interdiction System, Pacific Region, 400 Oceangate Suite 810, Long Beach, California 90822-5399, Attention Navy Liaison Representatives.
Operations Specialist Couey enlisted in the Navy in 1980. He was assigned to the Ouellet (FF-1077) from 1980 to 1985, and has made three deployments to the Western Pacific. Qualified as a tactical air controller, he is currently a Navy liaison to the Pacific Regional Office of the NNBIS in Long Beach, California.
Radarman Coletta enlisted in the Navy in 1977. He has served in the Fleet Air Control and Surveillance Facility at Virginia Capes, Virginia, and on the Vogelgesang (DD-862), and the New Jersey (BB-62)- He made deployments to the Western Pacific, Medi' terranean, and Caribbean, participated in the United International Antisubmarine Warfare exercise and the global cruise of the New Jersey, and qualified as an antisubmarine air controller. Now in the Coast Guard Reserve, he serves with the Pacific Regional Office of the NNBIS.
Today, more than ever, the Navy faces a slow degradation of its shore establishment’s mission capability and flexibility. This threat derives from encroachment— any non-Navy action in the vicinity of naval activities or operational areas that inhibits, curtails, or could potentially impede shore station performance.
Encroachment threatens from many directions. Population growth and attendant land development pressures often result in proposals for developments that are incompatible or inconsistent with naval operations, especially near air stations. This spurs the Navy’s competition with other elements of the public sector and with the private sector for energy and mineral sources, port facilities, beachfront properties, air space, and other scarce resources.
Environmental regulations and other federal rules have exacerbated encroachment problems. Many regulations require the Navy to consult, work with, and/or obtain the consent of other government bodies to effect Navy actions. Environmental litigation that temporarily halted Work on the extreme low frequency (ELF) facility in Wisconsin cost the Navy about $15 million. In addition, the General Services Administration continuously reviews Navy land holdings to identify excess property.
Legislative encroachment, often involving congressional intervention, has become a serious concern: those with vested interests channel their encroachment efforts into the political arena for resolution. In 1984, as a result of a legislative action, the Navy lost land, buildings, and, more important, operational capability at Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, California.
Encroachment can also occur when the
Navy initiates mission changes at shore activities or other changes that elicit concern or adverse reactions from elements of the neighboring community. For example, the Navy initially faced public opposition to basing air cushion landing craft vehicles at Virginia Beach, Virginia. Citizens around Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada, are legitimately concerned with the Navy’s proposed mission changes for strike warfare and F/A-18 aircraft training.
To combat encroachment, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics (OP-04) established a land use compatibility (LUC) program. The program’s objectives are to maintain mission capability and operational flexibility within the shore establishment and to protect the capital investment the Navy has made in land, buildings, and structures.
The key elements of the LUC program are:
- Professional staff support provided by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command and its subordinate engineering field division commands
- Quarterly Pentagon review of serious encroachment issues to orchestrate Washington support
- The air installations compatible-use zones program for Navy air stations
- Technical studies
- Encroachment abatement awareness and training seminars around the country for shore station commanding officers (COs) and their senior staffs
- Chain-of-command responsibility to assign appropriate resources to adequately manage encroachment on both individual issue and programmatic bases (Success in fighting encroachment almost always depends upon the activity CO and how well he orchestrates Navy interests with those of the local community and private sector.)
The following elements are required to control encroachment successfully:
- Sensitivity: Attendance at one of the OP-04-sponsored encroachment training seminars will ensure that managers understand encroachment.
- Early awareness: Station COs must constantly observe and forecast community development plans and participate in the community to be knowledgeable and effective advocates for Navy interests. The Navy needs to be proactive rather than reactive, anticipating potential problems and intervening where necessary.
- Community participation: Integrating Navy needs and planning with community and private sector planning often highlights potential encroachment problems before they surface. As a major local landowner and employer, the Navy must establish credible relationships with the surrounding communities and participate in local/regional decision making.
- Clarity: When addressing encroachment issues in the community, only information that can be clearly articulated and supported should be used. Avoid the tunnel vision trap; there are two sides to every issue.
- Balance: Encroachment is rarely a matter of absolutes. It is often necessary to strike a balance between Navy requirements and potentially conflicting community requirements. A negotiated solution with a clear understanding of the bottom line required to support mission requirements is often the key. Navy activities are not untouchable; accommodation can forestall bigger losses.
Encroachment can jeopardize mission capability and flexibility. A strong, proactive—yet flexible—approach stands the best chance of solving current and future encroachment challenges.
Commander Tanner is the deputy assistant commander for facilities planning at the Naval Facilities Engineering Command in Alexandria, Virginia. He was formerly on the staff of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics (OP-04) at the Pentagon. He received a B.S. in civil engineering from California State University at Sacramento and an M.S. in public works from the University of Pittsburgh. A civil engineer corps officer since 1969, he is a member of the Society of American Military Engineers.
Reserve Engineering Duty: A New Initiative
By Lieutenant Commander Richard A. Guida, U. S. Naval Reserve
Ask a naval reservist what type of duty he or she would prefer, and the answer will usually be to work with the equipment, whether it is a ship, missile, or aircraft. There are several explanations, ranging from the natural allure of high- tech gear to emulating the active forces. But possibly the most compelling reason is simply the desire to do something new and challenging during weekend duty or the annual two-week active duty for training (AcDuTra).
In the engineering duty community, working with the equipment usually means dealing with ships undergoing overhaul, repair, or conversion at shipyards or maintenance facilities. While the warfare specialties enjoy drilling holes in the ocean with their operating ships, the engineering duty officer finds a ship most appealing in the midst of an overhaul, where she is stripped to her bare essentials and exhibits the delicate vulnerability of a patient on an operating table.
To manage an overhaul properly requires special talents, experience, and, most importantly, availability to oversee the work continuously. It is this last prerequisite that has prevented the use of engineering duty officers in Naval Reserve units assigned to shipyards. Providing technical and administrative support for shipyard operations during weekend drills is one thing; conducting an entire overhaul on a ship only during weekends
is simply unthinkable.
For naval reservists to participate effectively in overhaul work on a combatant required a fundamentally new approach, one that solved the continuity problem, but assured that the job got done right and on time. Failure would not only prevent a second chance, it could affect the readiness of a fleet unit and reinforce the notion prevalent in the minds of many active-duty officers that reservists cannot be trusted.
Every great initiative requires a first step. In this case, the impetus came from within the Naval Reserve engineering duty community. In late 1984, Captain Allen Braverman, the commanding officer of the reserve unit assigned to the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, proposed to shipyard management that his reserve unit manage the overhaul package on the helicopter amphibious assault ship USS Inchon (LPH-12). At the time, the ship— which displaces 18,000 tons and is more than 600 feet long—was completing service off Lebanon with embarked Marines. Plans called for her to return for an eight-month overhaul at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard beginning in April 1985.
The reserve effort, as originally proposed, called for reserve officers to manage the entire overhaul package, which included repair work, 40 ship alterations (shipalts) to upgrade ship systems, and installation of a new suite of communications equipment and sensors. The shipyard reserve unit and its detachments included less than 50 officers, not enough for continuous coverage during the overhaul. Accordingly, reserve engineering duty officers from across the country were to be solicited to perform their annual AcDuTras at the shipyard; 102 reservists would eventually take part.
In any bureaucracy, revolutionary concepts are painfully slow to develop. As a first-of-a-kind effort, the proposal quickly drew institutional objections from the Navy. Shipyard senior managers expressed understandable concern about reservists working directly in the shipyard’s domain. The shipyard work force was responsible for the physical work, and any serious problems would reflect badly on the shipyard. Coordinators from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations responsible for reserve policy matters—concerned about any potential crack in the reserve image—interposed administrative worries about organizing such a large undertaking. And many in the engineering duty community questioned whether reservists knew enough about shipyard operations to manage the work properly.
In January 1985, the shipyard commander, Rear Admiral Thomas U. Seigenthaler, decided that the concept warranted a limited trial. The reservists did not manage the entire overhaul; in-
stead, the scope was reduced to the package of 40 shipalts, with a total value of roughly $17 million.
The Philadelphia Naval Shipyard reserve unit formed the management team and worked out the details of overhaul continuity. A plan emerged calling for teams of four to six reserve officers to Perform 17-day AcDuTras (beginning on a Saturday and extending through the Sunday two weeks later) from just before the ship’s arrival in early April 1985 until most of the shipalt package had been completed and the ship entered the system testing phase in late September. Each team would begin its AcDuTra on the last Weekend of the preceding team’s tour, which permitted two days of turnover. After the ship system operational testing Period began in September 1985, the reserve officer teams would spend 14-day AcDuTras (beginning on Monday and extending through the Friday of the following week), with one full week of overlap owing to the increased tempo of activity leading up to the propulsion plant •ight off examination on 1 November 1^85 and sea trials later that month.
The reserve officer teams would fill several key billets, such as type desk offiCer, combat systems/design liaison offiCer. ship superintendent for combat systems, and ship superintendent for hull, mechanical, and electrical equipment. When available, a Supply Corps reserve officer was to act as the management team’s supply officer to help sort out the complex process of ensuring that the necessary material was properly staged for each shipalt.
When the ship arrived on 17 April *985, the overhaul commenced. To get Parted on the right foot, the first team of reserve officers was drawn from the Phil- a<telphia Naval Shipyard reserve unit. Captain Braverman’s orders were simple: ollow all the shipalts, find the problems, ensure that the right groups in the shipyard are talking to one another to fix them, and take credit for nothing. In other words, manage the project. The reserve officers attended shipyard meet- ’ngs, developed interfaces with the pro- Oction, planning, design, and supply departments, and dealt with senior shipyard management as required.
. The management style that evolved 'deluded two meetings each week of Cap- ten Braverman and the reserve group, for status reports on shipalts. On the Satur- ay midway through each group’s duty Period, an interim status report was writ- on and submitted, and on the turnover "teekend, a final status report was comPeted. Captain Braverman reviewed ese reports and mercilessly queried each member of the group to determine his depth of understanding on each problem and how vigorously he was pressing for a solution. It only took one such session to get everyone’s attention. Captain Braverman’s no-nonsense style evoked specific memories among those reservists who had worked or served on nuclear- powered ships. The result was a determined commitment to get the job done right.
At the working level, a professional, but friendly, relationship developed between the reservists assigned as ship superintendents and the civilian work force in the production shops; the fact that the reservists are civilians 50 weeks per year contributed to the rapport. The Inchon's officers quickly discovered, as well, that the reserve officers constituted a substantial resource; before long, reservists were being asked to assist the ship’s force in managing its portion of the overhaul work.
Like any large endeavor, the overhaul produced the unexpected:
- An AN/SPN-35A radome and target mast intended for installation were “lost” in the supply system. Happily, one of the officers assigned to the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard reserve unit was a senior civilian working at the Ships Parts Control Center in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. Through his efforts and intimate knowledge of the supply world, the equipment was located and provided to the shipyard before it limited progress.
- New high-pressure air compressors were to be placed in the ship’s fireroom, but the plans assumed that the units were built by the Worthington Company; in fact, they were of a different design manufactured by Ingersoll-Rand and would not fit in the space. Reserve officers mediated a compromise solution that placed one unit in the fireroom and one in an aircraft elevator machinery room.
- An emergency boiler feed pump being tested before installation vibrated excessively, so the shipyard planned to find and install a replacement unit. Reserve officers noted that the shipyard test procedure specified rotation rates well in excess of the pump technical manual procedures; when the pump was retested to the technical manual requirements, it passed.
Overcoming the problem of maintaining continuity for 102 Naval Reserve engineering duty officers working on weekends and AcDuTras, the successful Inchon overhaul has led to additional reserve engineering-managed projects.
► When the flight deck sprinkler system was tested during sea trials, 19 sprinkler heads failed, emitting “gushers” rather than the normal spray action. The amusing sight of multiple geysers on the flight deck did not last long. The problem was traced to damaged or missing helicoils that hold the sprinkler head balls in place. Rather than replacing entire nozzle assemblies—an expensive and timeconsuming job, reserve officers present during the sea trials found a simpler solution: only the helicoils and balls were their home states. By occupation, more than 50% worked as engineers, another 25% as engineering managers, and 12% as merchant marine personnel. The latter deserve particular mention, because their experience derived from recent operation of marine propulsion systems and other shipboard equipment enabled them to make unique contributions to the overhaul. More than 30% were captains and commanders and about 25% were lieutenant commanders. (See figures 1 and 2.) As Captain Braverman observed dur- ducive to this approach. These ships will be overhauled during three-month selected restricted availabilities (SRAs) every three years. A Naval Reserve unit could manage the entire work package much the same as the Inchon effort, drawing upon more than 700 engineering duty officers in the drilling naval reserve community. In fact, Captain Braverman and the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard reserve unit conducted just such an effort on the Oliver Hazard Perry, which commenced an SRA in May 1986. The work
Total Participants = 102
replaced. The fix worked perfectly.
In planning for the overhaul, one of the biggest concerns was with assuring continuity within the reserve management team. The weekend turnovers dealt with this problem extraordinarily well. Captain Braverman told each incoming group that until they were satisfied with the turnover they received, he would not let the finishing group depart. With that incentive, turnovers were thorough; in fact, at one point in the middle of the overhaul, the Inchon's officers told Captain Braverman that the reservists who had just completed the turnover knew more about what was going on than the ship’s force, which had been there from the beginning.
The Inchon overhaul was completed within budget and ahead of schedule on 5 December 1985. The ship’s commanding officer, Captain Andrew Grannuzo, cited in a note to Captain Braverman . . the invaluable assistance you and your entire cadre of professionals provided during this overhaul. Your program participation . . . [was] in many areas critical to on- time completion.”
It is instructive to look at the profiles of the 102 reserve officers who participated in the project. Almost 50% had master’s degrees in science or engineering and 14% had doctorates. More than 30% were registered professional engineers in ing the overhaul, there was enough talent on hand to form a successful engineering consulting company.
Another important facet of the reserve officer effort on the Inchon was the opportunity for the engineering duty officers to complete preparation for the qualification program that they are required to perform for full certification in the engineering duty designator (1445). This includes performing an AcDuTra at a shipyard, finishing naval correspondence courses in marine engineering, and studying qualification program material on a variety of subjects relevant to engineering duty work. During the overhaul, 76 of the reservists completed one or more phases of their engineering duty qualification program, and a large proportion qualified to perform the duties of a shipyard-type desk officer, ship superintendent, combat systems/design officer, and other shipyard positions.
Having shown that they could do the job, the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard reserve unit is developing a manual to document its experience for other engineering duty reserve units to use in conducting similar work on conventionally powered ships at other shipyards or maintenance activities. The Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates in the Naval Reserve Fleet are particularly con-
effort was completed on schedule in August 1986, with 59 reserve officers participating on the SRA management teams.
There is no more meaningful training for an engineering duty officer than to oversee overhaul work at a shipyard. It entails contact with every facet of shipyard activities, and quickly makes one a believer in the adage: “The devil is in the details.” If the purpose of reserve AcDuTra is to provide meaningful training that enhances each officer’s mobilization readiness, then the Inchon overhaul and Oliver Hazard Perry SRA were unqualified successes. But equally important, the two projects demonstrated that, given the opportunity and the leadership, reservists have the experience, knowledge, and fortitude to benefit the Navy materially- That is a lesson worth remembering.
A participant in the Inchon overhaul and author of ‘‘Nuclear Survivability” in the December 1985 Proceedings, Commander Guida has a B.S. in electrical engineering and an M.S. in nuclear engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, plus an M.B.A. from George Washington University. He is active in Naval Reserve Theater Nuclear Warfare (PMS-423 106), assigned to the Theater Nuclear Warfare Program Office, Naval Sea Systems Command. He is a registered professional engineer in Virginia and works as a senior nuclear program manager with the U. S. Department of Energy.