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We will be asking ourselves this question within a few decades if we do not build more carriers now. By 1997, for example, the Coral Sea (CV-43), shown off the coast of Libya earlier this year, will be 50 years old—and she was originally intended to serve 25 years. Overhauls can extend her service life— but cannot make her last forever.
weap°nS
Naval aviation is facing a critical period. The impending rapid decline in active large-deck carriers significantly clouds the future of sea-based naval aviation.
Without a doubt, as events during the past 12 months in the Mediterranean region have proven, sea-based tactical air power remains the focus of America’s general-purpose naval forces, which our allies rely upon to protect important national interests in this “era of violent peace.” Equally clear is carrier-based naval aviation’s central role in the Navy’s Maritime Strategy. Indeed, the former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins—writing in the Naval Institute’s January 1986 special supplement, The Maritime Strategy, p. 12—stated clearly the importance of the Navy’s carrier battle groups in any future conflict with the Soviet Union:
“The battle groups are central to defeating Soviet air, submarine, and surface forces. To apply our immense strike capability, we must move carriers into positions where, combined with the U. S. Air Force and allied forces, they can bring to bear the added strength needed on NATO’s Northern or Southern flanks, or in Northeast Asia. Further, selective use of naval forces on the Central Front could have an important stabilizing impact.”
However, unless major issues regarding existing and future aircraft carrier force levels and requirements are addressed soon, within a comprehensive and long-range framework, the Navy’s ability to carry out the Maritime Strategy will be subject to more doubt.
Force Levels and Concepts of Operations: The U. S. Navy’s carrier force level now is comprised of 14 active large-deck carriers—13 deployable carriers and one carrier undergoing a service life extension program (SLEP) overhaul. Table 1 shows the current carrier force, which includes two World War II-era ships, the USS Midway (CV-41) and USS Coral Sea (CV-43). These two ships were completed in 1945 and 1947, respectively, and since have been extensively modernized; the Coral Sea, for example, is the first carrier to deploy an all-F/A-18 fighter and attack air wing. The fleet also includes eight conventionally powered carriers (CVs) and one nuclear-powered carrier (CVN) built between 1952 and 1968, and three Nimitz (CVN-68)-class nuclear-propelled carriers, which were commissioned between 1975 and 1982. Three additional ships of the Nimitz design are under construction, with the Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) expected to join the fleet late this month or in November.
Aircraft carriers have had a central role in the U. S. naval force structure since the 1930s. During World War II, the carrier became the dominant element of U. S. sea power. Since 1945—in time of peace, international crises, and war—the aircraft carrier has remained the focus of the U. S. Navy’s conventional force operations. Furthermore, through the mid-1980s no successor to the large-deck aircraft carrier is yet in sight. The Soviet Navy has even begun its own CVN building program; the first carrier was launched in December 1985 and a second ship is under
construction. (As many as four, or perhaps even six eight, Soviet CVNs may be at sea or under construction 2000-2010.) Meanwhile, France expects to comniisS1°. two CVNs during the 1990s. Despite some observe ^ charges that the age of the “big-deck dinosaur” is °v J and despite the acknowledged vulnerability of carriers and all other surface ships—to some form of attack, W* deck aircraft carriers are the preferred alternative U. S. naval forces are required to support national p cies. The carrier is the most “flexible” warship ever gj capable of operating across the entire spectrum ofarlTI j forces and delivering an almost infinite variety ^ weapons—merely by changing the mix of her ernbar aircraft. . ^
From 1945 to the present—from postwar planning retaliatory nuclear-armed naval air strikes against the viet Union to the capture of the Palestine Liberation seajackers of the Achille Lauro—the carrier and bet, wing have been the principal components of U. S. n operations. The use of carriers in the Korean and Vie
conflicts proved their value in an era of nuclear '■ ^ and “limited” war. In the early stages of the K°rean . jn when the enemy had overrun all of the tactical ainie ,0 South Korea, the only effective air support avails ^ U. S. ground forces in the Pusan Perimeter was fr0lTI
Table 1 U. S. Carrier | Navy Carrier Force Commissioned | Level Age 1986^ | In 2000 "5" 53 |
Midway (CV-41) | 10 Sept. 1945 | 41 | |
Coral Sea (CV-43) | 1 Oct. 1947 | 39 | 45 |
Forrestal (CV-59) | 1 Oct. 1955 | 31 | 44 |
Saratoga (CV-60) | 14 Apr. 1956 | 30 | 43 |
Ranger (CV-61) Independence | 10 Aug. 1957 | 29 | 41 |
(CV-62) | 10 Jan. 1959 | 27 | 39 |
Kitty Hawk (CV-63) Constellation | 27 Apr. 1961 | 25 | 39 |
(CV-64) | 27 Oct. 1961 | 25 | 39 |
Enterprise (CVN-65) | 25 Nov. 1961 | 25 | 35 |
America (CV-66) John F. Kennedy | 23 Jan. 1965 | 21 | 32 |
(CV-67) | 7 Sept. 1968 | 18 | 25 |
Nimitz (CVN-68) Dwight D. Eisenhower | 13 May 1975 | 11 | 23 |
(CVN-69) Carl Vinson | 18 Oct. 1977 | 9 | 18 |
(CVN-70) Theodore Roosevelt | 13 Mar. 1982 | 4 | 14 |
(CVN-71) Abraham Lincoln | (Oct. 1986)* |
| U |
(CVN-72) George Washington | (Jan. 1990)* |
| 9 |
(CVN-73) | (Jan. 1992)* | ■---------- | 57 |
Lexington (AVT-16)** | 17 Feb. 1943 | 43 |
|
♦Under construction **Training ship
Purtha'r m'ss'ons into North Vietnam.
errnore, in 215 instances in which the United
States
’ers-
()bjectiv7Can be used more deftly to support U. S. policy •, •s ar|d, therefore, have been called upon most fre- ,'le oPe'n “Cold War” and ‘‘Hot Peace” since 1945. 6red on atL°ns °f (he carrier battle groups (CVBGs) cen- lhe America (CV-66), Saratoga (CV-60), and
Was th*1 ^'eet's carriers. This naval tactical aircraft power Army,? c*ec*sive factor in preventing the North Korean the Ser°T^ dr'v'n8 the U. S. and South Korean forces into T°nkin 1 ^Ur'n§ the Vietnam War, carriers in the Gulf of nan^o a^nched the first air strikes against the North Viet- tactiCaj‘ . ava^ aircraft flew more than half of all U. S.
parpo^Ployed its armed forces for crisis-management aloneGS *r°m through 1975, naval units participated anoth'nT1101'6 than half and with other U. S. forces in NaVy ^ of all incidents. From 1955 to 1975, the U. 5 as involved in about 92% of all situations in which tQffig 1 rtary force was relied upon to influence the outworn ,Q'aternational crises and conflicts short of war. forCes r ^ through mid-1985, moreover, U. S. naval tfi°st 0j- sP°n<Jcd to 51 international incidents and crises, Carihk which were geographically concentrated in the
Sign? 3nd the Middle East’
instn,mCantly, when U. S. naval forces were used as sou ktS State P°licy> carrier-based tactical air power 6rations • m°st frequently—'n more than 60% of all op- ses, Ca[.Slnce the mid-1950s. According to Navy analy- nationai *er battle groups participated in 35 of the 51 inter- re$p0r), ‘tcidents (69%) to which the U. S. Navy CV/ev^ between January 1976 and July 1985. Of these ^thini t re?P°nses> 22 (63%) occurred during the Reagan SO periL[at*0n’ c°mpared to 13 (27%) during the 1976— c°njun . ’ Most of the carrier force responses were in ^a$t, l('n with incidents in North Africa and the Middle §>0n far fast, and the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf reSoT ftost were typified by the potential for escala- §*tst igo e Use of armed force which occurred in the Au- 'vith and March-April 1986 Gulf of Sidra incidents r ^lore0va
> u er> because of their easy mobility, freedom Wibiu. Country constraints, operational and tactical ?e Princ'’ 3nd capabilities for a graduated impact upon aCeShj *Pal decision-makers in international crises, sur- C?rrier«^>S^ 'especially the multifaceted large-deck aircraft
9Uei
Coral Sea in the Central Mediterranean during March and April were only the most recent evidence of the aircraft carrier’s continued usefulness in the peacetime “gunboat diplomacy” role, to use Sir James Cable’s term (see “Gunboat Diplomacy’s Future,” Proceedings, August 1986, pp. 37-41). Since then, however, the Navy conducted flight operations from the Forrestal (CV-59), challenging Moammar Gadhafi’s “line of death” in the Gulf of Sidra.
The Navy’s concept of operations employs a wide range of combat capability both in direct support of and within the CVBG. The CVBG’s strength derives from the sea- based tactical aircraft which provide tremendous range and depth of tactical war-fighting capability across the four major functions required to attain and maintain maritime superiority: air combat, antisubmarine warfare, antisurface ship attack, and close-air support/interdiction in support of forces ashore. The manned tactical aircraft is the Navy’s most distributable asset. It can be quickly deployed, its armament can be tailored to meet the specific mission and threat, and it can be constrained to a variety of levels of engagement, as the Navy’s responses in October 1985 to the Achille Lauro seajacking and the March and April 1986 strikes against Libya clearly demonstrated. This great versatility and mission effectiveness provide the carrier-based air wing with its predominant ability to meet national objectives across the broad spectrum of U. S. global involvement. At its most fundamental point, the Navy’s ability to carry out U. S. military strategy depends to a significant degree on its ability to support tactical air power at sea, and to “point, aim, and shoot”—to deliver weapons where and when the President commands.
Present Trends—An Uncertain Future: In January 1981, the new Reagan Administration quickly proposed three principal areas of defense buildup: strategic offensive forces, rapid deployment conventional forces for crisis response, and “naval superiority.” Upon becoming Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman presented his plan to achieve a fleet comprised of 600 “battle group-capable” warships, the sine qua non to reach and maintain the goal of naval superiority over the Soviet Union. This program was a prescription for reversing the precipitous decline in U. S. naval power in the post-Vietnam period, during which the Navy dropped from more than 1,000 ships in 1968 to only 453 ships in 1980. By 1990, under this plan, according to Secretary Lehman, the Navy will have more than 700 battle group and non-battle group ships in the fleet. Indeed, in 1982, President Ronald Reagan summarized his goals for the U. S. Navy:
“Maritime superiority for us is a necessity. We must be
able in time of emergency to venture in harm’s way,
controlling air, surface and subsurface areas to assure
carrier classes and specific ships, it is easy to derive large number of possible force level “futures” f°r
Navy’s carrier force. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the exten ° con
-life
class-
sive effect on force levels—in the absence of new struction beyond CVN-73—using two sets of service
1986.
increase in fiscal year________________
with annual increases after inflation averaging 7 fu-
ident Reagan’s previous budgets. The implications ^ ture Department of Defense (DoD)—and cj’/^udget
Proceedings
access to all the oceans of the world. Failure to do so will leave the credibility of our conventional defense forces in doubt. . . . We are building a 600-ship fleet including 15 carrier battle groups.”
In fiscal year 1983, President Reagan and Secretary Lehman garnered congressional approval for funding two aircraft carriers in a single fiscal year, a feat unmatched since World War II. The rationale for the two Mmi'rz-class carriers, the Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) and George Washington (CVN-73), was based on the requirements for meeting expanding threats to U. S. interests and naval forces from the Soviet Union and other countries, and to carry out wartime operations in support of the nation’s maritime and military strategies. Fifteen deployable CVBGs are essential to meet those needs as a minimum essential force; many more are needed to conduct operations at a prudent level of risk. Perhaps more persuasive to Congress, however, was the administration’s argument that buying two CVNs in one year made ‘‘strong business sense.” A cost savings of $754 million (fiscal year 1983 dollars) was possible, compared to two traditional singleship procurements, because of reduced escalation from early delivery ($304 million), economic order quantity savings ($250 million), reduced start-up and other nonrecurring costs ($100 million), and improved planning, manpower utilization, and productivity ($100 million). Furthermore, this strategy promised to provide each carrier two years earlier than the traditional approach of buying the ships individually, in separate Navy Ship Construction (SCN) funding requests. Since then because of additional production efficiencies and reduced escalation estimates, another $700 million in savings has been made.
The Navy will be confronted with numerous carrier planning issues during the next two decades and will have a direct impact on the strategy for and timing of the requests for follow-ons to CVN-73. For example, the Navy proposed the current SLEPs for the Forrestal (CV-59) and the Kitty Hawk (CV-63) classes (seven carriers) to Congress as an inexpensive means—compared to new construction—to increase the ships’ service lives from a nominal 30 years to 45 years and maintain the required CV force levels. (The current “philosophy” is that SLEP will add 15 years to a carrier’s service life after completing the overhaul, not just allow the ship to reach 45 years of age.) Yet, some skepticism of even the earlier goal of a 45-year service life is evident, with several observers in the Naval Sea Systems Command remarking that at best only 40 years is possible. If so, plans must soon be approved for replacing these ships with new-construction carriers, assuming the goal of 15 CVBGs is to be maintained. Alternatively, we may need to extend these carriers’ lives to 50 years, if not beyond—an astonishing proposition given their originally intended service lives of only 25 years, according to mid-1950s planning assumptions. Other issues, such as the eventual relief in the early 1990s of the Lexington (AVT-16) by the Coral Sea or another fleet carrier, will also affect force levels and shape the Navy’s plan for future carriers.
By varying the critical planning assumptions relating to
64 assumptions for the carriers older than the Nimitz 1
This cursory analysis clearly demonstrates the nee begin planning in 1986 for CVN-74 and follow-ons, pp haps even including a new-design CVN for these fu carriers, and the likely requirement to extend the class ships’ service lives beyond a nominal 30 ye^ Otherwise, it will be increasingly difficult to maintain 15-CVBG force, which is the linchpin of the Navy s ^ time Strategy.
CVN-74? When?: The issue of timing is contentious politically charged for reasons other than naval stra ^ and mission requirements. Shipyard employment and P ductivity levels will also be affected by any sign1'1 delay in the start of a follow-on to CVN-73. For exaI11jjon there will be a significant decline in the construe ^ “learning curve,” and a concomitant increase in cos ^ each year the gap widens between the launching of ■). 73 in 1989 and the start of CVN-74—perhaps $23 lion per year beginning in fiscal year 1989, according some analysts. Similarly, spokesmen from Newport ^ Shipbuilding, the only U. S. shipbuilder currently 4 ^ fied to build CVNs, have noted that it will be physl^fe. impossible to replace, on a one-for-one basis, cam .jj, tired at the ends of their 45-year service lives, starting ys the Forrestal in the year 2000. The four Forresto ^ were laid down at two shipyards between 1952 and ^ and are too close together to be replaced at exac ^ years of age by only one shipbuilder. These issueSjjVeS eventually drive the decision to increase the service „ of some of the carriers receiving service life ex p overhauls to 50 years or more, to accommodate Ne News’s production capacity. ^_ ,the
The CVN-74 was first included in January 19 ^
last year of the Reagan Administration’s fiscal yeaf |a„- 88 five-year shipbuilding program. Proposed f°r 1 inning purposes” and, according to some observe tended as a backup if Congress deleted CVN-73. jn in the House had advocated, CVN-74 was not inc u the fiscal year 1985 or the 1986 SCN programs. cllts
By the summer of 1985, the prospects for deeP were apparent in President Reagan’s defense P. ^tur® made necessary by the nation’s uncertain economy ^ and projections of record budget and trade dem* sS areas of the defense budget were vulnerable, aS ^aftri debated either an “inflation-only’ ’ increase or a inflation” increase in fiscal year 1986. This c prgS'
Navy—programs of the Gramm-Rudman-HollinSsejec-
deficit reduction act of 1985 and the 1986 and 1 poS' tions could be serious as well. For these reasons, sible inclusion of the seventh Nimitz CVN m segsi' year 1988-92 program will heighten congressiona
nr l* / Oct®1*
Carrier
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
e*"Won (AVT-16) _J7^1 Coral Sea AVT-43
^ay(cv.41) -----------------------------------
^orsl Sea (CV-43) -----------------------------------
°^(CV-59) I®_____________________
Sa;ato«(cv.60) _______________________
an9er (CV-61) ___ . ,
'adenenw L. I---------
C 6 (cv-62>-____________
p aWt( CV-83)
illation (CV-64) .................... ,
ennWy (CV-67) ___________
, Forrestal AVT-59
65 ?
"SEEP
SLEP
-HE
-HI
-HE
^e(CVN.65)
7,b(CVN-68)
6'sr '
-HE
C0-er(CVN-69>
nso'> (CVN.
70)
°°S6V« (CVN-
^;0VN-72>
^co/n
(CVN-7
■71)
"HE
l9,0'i (CVN-
73)
-HE
Carriers
15 13 14 14 14 14 13 14 14 15 13 12 12 11 10 10 8 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 o 0
'gUre 2
CV/CVW Force Level Projections: Case 2
Carrie
>H0ri
Hr,
(AVT-
91. 92 93 94 95 % 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Co,
a7 (CV-,
16)
41)
■J521
Forrestal AVT-59
-in?
■£*«*<*>
<CV-59>
\Tfy-60)
9er (CV-61)
-HE -HE —0
6Ae,
-HE
sC:nce(cv-62)-
SLEP
-0
Hte// * CV'63> QEEED-
Cn____________
H (Cv-66>
-HE
-HE
'7 (CV.
67)
-5CEP-
-0
5LEP
-0
—rcsHsri-
'Oiver
Ncvn.;
(CVN-69)
70)
-HE
V N'72)
-HE
(CVN-7- ------------------------------
1-73)
UeWo,
'Vable
Carriers
15 13 15 16 16 13 12 12 11 11 11 10 9 9 9 8 7 7 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 0
Note: Boxed number indicates carrier's age at projected retirement date. SLEP = service life extension program. COH/RF = complex overhaul/nuclear plant refueling.
tivity to Navy funding requests for such “big-ticket” items as the CVN, Trident SSBN, or SSN-21 programs. Supporting this judgment is the fact that in early 1983, an otherwise “good” year for DoD and Navy budgets, both the House and Senate budget committees recommended extensive reductions in the Reagan Administration’s planned increases in the fiscal year 1984 DoD requests. Meanwhile, congressional critics, most vociferously Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), questioned the previous year’s buy of both CVNs 72 and 73. The “problem” facing the Navy was perhaps summarized best by the headline of a March 1984 commentary in the Washington Post by Walter Pincus: “Our Carrier Admirals Could Sink the Budget.”
The political nature of the question of when to build CVN-74 and follow-on ships has been recognized already. In a speech in Newport News on 18 January 1986, commemorating the centennial of Newport News Shipbuilding, Senator John Warner (R-VA) argued not only for. an early start on CVN-74 but also for the need for a two-ship, multiyear procurement package. Senator Warner tied his case for CVNs 74 and 75 to the extremely high estimated cost of modernizing and refueling the Enterprise (CVN- 65) (“it may cost nearly as much as a new ship”), the need to replace the Midway in about the year 2000, and the requirements for 15 deployable CV/CVNs. More to the point of politics, Senator Warner stated:
“I have conveyed these views to key people within the Administration, most specifically the Secretary of the Navy. And I am confident that the Administration will, after weighing all the facts, agree with my judgment, and we will see such a proposal from the Navy shortly.”
About three weeks later, in an interview with the Newport News Daily Press (9 February 1986), Secretary Lehman acknowledged that the Navy will need to begin building five Nimitz CVNs before the end of the century, to replace the aging ships in the 15-carrier fleet. Beginning with long-lead funding for CVN-74 in fiscal year 1992, which would be a “modified repeat” of CVN-73 and would replace the Midway in the year 2000, Mr. Lehman stated that the Navy will put a new carrier in the budget every other year to replace the four Forrestal CVs. The Secretary of the Navy recognized that this strategy would still create a gap in carrier work at Newport News Shipbuilding, yet he noted that there will probably be no funds available for carrier construction until the 1990s:
“Ideally we’d like to keep the workforce stable at the yard. If we had sufficient money, we’d probably move up construction to keep the workforce stable be-
cause we are going to continue to build carriers throu^ the ’90s to replace the Forrestal class.”
What is not disputed openly—yet—is the need additional Nimitz-class carrier, at least for the CVN- While advocates of smaller carriers remain in the 8e and House and in the Navy/DoD community, that t has been analyzed numerous times since the early'111 1970s, most recently in 1983. The answer continues to j on any measure of capability and cost-effectiveness, the basic Nimitz design is without equal.
The Nimitz design is 22 years old this
preliminary design of CVA(N)-68 was begun m 1964. The fact that the basic concept has been in Pr0[0 tion longer than any other carrier class in history attes the Nimitz design’s general excellence. Significant.. jn provements have already been made in the design, ^ the constraints of the existing hull dimensions avw ^
budgets. As a “modified repeat” of the CVN-73, - t 74 will incorporate these and other improvements to ^ the future requirements of the U. S. Maritime Strategy to defeat Soviet and Third World threats to U. S. >ntef ^ However, because of the future need to replied® ((,e mid-1950s to late-1960s building program to reP aC,^V' Forrestals, Kitty Hawks, and the John F. Kennedy . ,e 67) after fiscal year 2000, there is sufficient time to a ^ at a new design for a follow-on class of large-dp ^ riers. Assuming an early (fiscal year 1992 or earlie ^
for CVN-74, this proposal takes into considerati° ^
- ot w“ ,
likelihood that some of these existing CVs, five
• „ uP2fa°
could receive a proposed magazine protection v ^ along with the standard SLEP overhauls, coU^rTied”
aiwug wuu uit bianuaiu uvcmaun,
tended somewhat beyond their originally “progra^e- 45-year service lives. Furthermore, a new-design, ^ a(1 deck carrier (conventionally or nuclear powere )^ ^ economical alternative when such a large build' ^jot1 gram is in the offing. This would permit the conSl. n afld
of new and innovative approaches to carrier
design
aft
In January, even as CVNs-71, -72, and -73 were under construction—CVN-71 shown at Newport News Shipbuilding—Senator John Warner, in a speech commemorating the shipyard’s centennial, began to push for an early start on CVN-74, or, better yet, a two-ship (CVN-74 and -75), multiyear procurement package.
66
ab,ecarr0ns called for maintaining just 12 active, deployed frS’ a Soal requiring at most that only CVN-71 be - -a°n§ w’th the CV SLEPs. Even with the e deployable CV/CVN force to 15 ships,
a new-
very i 6 °Perat'ng *n the year 2030 and beyond. (At the °f ^ east’ a redesign of the interior spaces and electronics “mu? . I'n‘tz class should be pursued.) If approached as a erate . P^multiyear” package, moreover, it would gen- shiov^f^attt economies of scale and production at the ^ouldri-much.,ike the CVN-72/-73 “package deal,” and tieipati stimulate other shipbuilders’ interest in par- ,'n aircraft carrier construction, thus adding a Petition factor” to the equation. t\v0 y3n exarnple, assume a fiscal year 1991 start (with long-lead funding) for CVN-74; that the Mid- retaine|jCt'ret* 'n fiscal year 1999; that the Lexington can be 20oo- as Navy’s training carrier until fiscal year Kitty’U* ^east ^-year service lives for the Forrestals, receiv avv^s> and John F. Kennedy; that the Enterprise decjj ?.a complex overhaul and refueling (which was tired • m late April 1986); and that the Coral Sea is re- CV/cv\}SCa^ ^ear 1992. If all these events were to occur, 199§ ■ ^ would not have to be started until fiscal year
tervaj follow-on ships begun at 18- or 24-month in- ThiSwa ter then, to preserve the 15-CVBG force level, deck o . allow at least ten years for a new-design large- to he determined.
itz (jes- tae major reasons for staying with the basic Nim-
exceiig'^11 S*nce mid-1960s, aside from its inherent
builcjjnace’ Was the fact that since then no extensive CVN
assumm. Program was intended. Late 1970s’ force-level ulPtion
ign j - “ .
as long r8e'deck CVN was an uneconomical alternative ‘•ne t0S 38 sufficient margins remained in the Nimitz base- ence. .j,acc°mmodate upgrades identified by fleet experi- ttiargijj 6 (“'fN-73 has nearly reached the limits of those •
,id-Cth lhe future prospect of having to duplicate the e'ght Qy S to late-1960s building program to replace the fiscal yeS and Ihe Enterprise between fiscal year 2000 and '°s°Phy arf2!|* ^’ mther than continuing with the 1986 phi- Qy modified-repeats” of the mid-1960s-design ^sigof N, there is sufficient time to arrive at a new ^f the m/ tae CV/CVN-75-class carriers. As the Secretary led-repea ^ ^as Indicated, CVN-74 would still be a modi- !ard effj ■ f-^N-73 to take advantage of existing ship-
o 'n cvTCies- fiut because of the constraints already fi^N-74 . -73, with some proposed modifications for foj.'^hcd by the available margins, there is good ae!>ign ne follow-on ships to be built to a new carrier
jected to cost at least $1.2 billion each, with some estimates running as high as $1.6 -to- $1.8 billion. The entire SSN-21 program is presently estimated to cost $38 billion for 30 submarines. Concurrently, cruiser, destroyer, and frigate force levels will encounter abrupt reductions in the mid-1990s to early 2000s. Follow-on ships to the 29 Ar- leigh Burke (DDG-51)-class guided missile destroyers, the DDGX, and numerous “battle force-capable” frigates (FFX/FFGX) will be requested; otherwise, battle group escort requirements will not be satisfied. In addition, a follow-on class to the Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class cruisers (and perhaps also the Iowa battleships) must be planned for introduction in the first decades of the 21st century. If these and other projected naval ship procurements are linked with requests in the early 1990s for funds for new aircraft (“in the thousands,” according to Navy spokesmen) to maintain 14 carrier air wings and three Marine air wings, and for CVN-74 and other large-deck carriers, there is great concern that not enough money will be available to meet all of the Navy’s needs during the next 20 years, especially as competition intensifies with the other services for increasingly scarce defense funds.
This prospect seriously undermines the Navy’s continuing ability to carry out its Maritime Strategy, which is fundamentally based on the essential core of sea power provided by the large-deck carrier battle group. Two broad choices exist; provide the funds to maintain a 15-CVBG force and support the Maritime Strategy; or do without and make radical changes to that strategy, with all its potential perils to U. S. national security. Certainly, there are gradations between these two poles of naval policy, the implications of which need to be considered thoughtfully and carefully.
The April 1986 attacks on terrorist targets in Libya underscored the high value of carrier aviation in “peacetime.” No permission was required from any country to launch the highly successful strikes from the high seas. This should be compared to the experience of the U. S. Air Force F-111F fighter-bombers and tanker aircraft, which were based in Great Britain and denied overflight privileges by France and Spain, greatly complicating the operation. In the initial planning for Operation El Dorado Canyon, a critical question was, “Where are the carriers?” The Navy in 1986 must also ask, “Will we have the carriers we need in the future?” Without serious consideration of the vitally important issues facing the Navy during the next few years, and without a commitment to thorough planning for the future, the answer could be “No.”
Choices: If the requirement to maintain a deserved °5ce °f at least 15 CV/CVN battle groups is the n tarou§b°ut the remainder of this century and vr CVNf y!’11 W*H almost certainly mandate an early start bis ^,1 and perhaps additional large-deck carriers.
navaje|nta** difficult decisions by America’s political ehds t0. eaders. During the next decade, the Navy in- ,tack su.e§ln Procurement of the Scmvo//(SSN-21)-class Marines, the first four units of which are pro-
Dr. Truver holds the first Ph.D. in the field of Marine Policy Studies. He has written extensively on naval, maritime, oceans policy, and international legal issues, including the major study of the international law of straits passage and its implications for U. S. and world interests in communications through the Strait of Gibraltar: International Straits of the World: The Strait of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean (1980). He also contributed an article on Red Sea minehunting and minesweeping to the May 1985 Naval Review Issue of Proceedings and an article on “Maritime Terrorism, 1985” to the 1986 Naval Review Issue. Dr. Truver is head of the Naval and Maritime Policy Department, National Security and Warfare Analysis Group, at Information Spectrum, Inc.