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the smaller-deck carriers and eventually to replace
most
up-to-date weapons, the Hornet serves in both an air-t0 fighter role and the air-to-ground strike role. Precede more than a decade of predominantly multiseat atf^ purchases, the single-seat Hornet stirred controversy 1 ■ before its introduction into the fleet. A major conceI"s0ie given a multithreat environment—was the ability of ^ operator to employ a variety of weapons effectively’ both primary mission areas. Close examination ° t Hornet, however, reveals that it is a markedly dme aircraft.
both
Three key features differentiate the Hornet from
by
eratioa
engineering built into a cockpit, for ease of opc- . (
one individual; and extensive employment of sophisj1^ (h( electronic warfare equipment that is integrated wit
Are two heads always better than one? The double-edged sword of advanced technology split naval aviation over the single-seat cockpit design for the F/A-18. Have advanced avionics eliminated or increased the need for radar intercept officers in the tactical aircraft of the 21st century?
For years, heated discussions have taken place within naval aviation circles about the number of people a combat aircraft needs to operate most efficiently. Specifically, the most intense debate centers around the issue of one seat versus two in fighter and attack aircraft.
As naval aviation has progressed over the years, the impact of technology upon carrier aviation seems to have brought naval air power full circle from 1950 to the mid- 1980s—from single pilot to two-person crews and now back to the lone pilot in the F/A-18 Hornet. The relatively uncomplicated tactical aircraft of yesteryear, in most cases, did not need more than a single operator to fly, navigate, and deliver the weapons of the day. Technological improvements during the 1950s and 1960s called for a second crewmember to assist with the additional cockpit functions that accompanied an increasingly sophisticated weapon system. With the dramatic gains in the computer industry in the 1970s—along with radically improved cockpit designs—aircraft such as the Hornet dispelled the belief that technological advances always complicate a weapon system. The capability of one person to employ effectively a highly automated multimission aircraft has undoubtedly brought the one seat versus two debate to the forefront—especially when options are discussed for cockpit configurations in aircraft beyond the year 2000.
It seems logical that when making plans to counter an increasingly complex surface and air threat, the Navy would use its most technologically advanced aircraft—as a matter of survival. The weapon systems of these complex future aircraft would apparently be controlled by at least two skilled operators, combining their talents to create an unbeatable airborne team. Why, then, has the Navy continued to purchase single-seat aircraft such as the Hornet and, moreover, how many aircrew should man our next generation of tactical fighter/attack aircraft?
The major distinction between the three most recently developed multicrew tactical aircraft—F-4 Phantom, A-6 Intruder, F-14 Tomcat—and all single-seat fighter or attack aircraft preceding the A-7 Corsair is weapon system complexity. As more technically advanced weapon platforms evolved, the number of functions exceeded the capabilities of a single pilot and necessitated a second crewmember. Before such anti-radiation weapons as HARM and Shrike or laser/television guided bombs (LGBs), weapons used were relatively simple to integrate with single-seat aircraft. Once visual acquisition of the target was made, the weapon was either dropped or fired and henceforth independent of aircraft guidance. With the advent of data link weapons, LGBs, and such missiles as the
AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-54 Phoenix, more sophisticate^ aircraft with the ability to guide the weapon after relea were required. .
In the late 1960s, into the early 1970s, U. S. Navy a,r' craft designs emphasized specific mission perform abj'. Aircraft with fighter and attack capabilities, such as1 F-8 Crusader and the F-4 Phantom, were to be replaced aircraft not nearly as flexible. Until the Hornet was in'r duced in the early 1980s, because of mission-specific f tures unique to each aircraft type on board the carrl j most battle group commaders could task only a Port,?ps|i the aircraft at their disposal in the strike role or to estab a defensive grid around the battle group. oll
The Hornet was designed to replace the F-4 Phantom
all A''
Corsairs. A single-seat aircraft equipped with the
its
I $ if""
single-seat predecessors and current two-seat navarap- craft: extensive use of on-board digital computers tha idly perform mission- and flight-related functions: hu . ,
- * w fea-
weapon system. Through digital computer software- ^ tures such as the fly-by-wire flight control system^ ^ radar programming are changed with relative ease, -s commodate updates to the weapon system. The gji aerodynamic feel and performance can be altered t [0 replacement of programmable read-only memory s^^jie obtain the most desirable flight characteristics- ^ other fleet aircraft have required extensive hat ^ changes to modernize their weapon systems, the gS has already undergone a multitude of software c „ improving the routine and tactical functions of its w system. As new microchips that can speed processing.^ are introduced, the capabilities of a computer-^ 0 weapon system will undoubtedly be expanded over ^ of the aircraft. When weapons such as the advance dium range air-to-air missile (AMR A AM), Harpo° ’ ^gt Maverick are operationally ready for the fleet, the will adapt for their use by reprogramming the °a ^ fe- mission computers and stores management set. A ^jj| suit, extensive rework on the aircraft’s wiring systs ^ not be required because of the flexibility inheren Hornet’s computerized weapon suit. p^at1'
Since a variety of aircraft (F3D Skyknight, . ne£)to tom, F-14 Tomcat, and the A-6 Intruder) were desi? ^ incorporate two crewmembers—one of whom watj0nof cated to the operation of the radar system—the 4U^S ^gj-its operator effectiveness in the single-seat aircrat
and c natlon' After years of technical radar improvements is both11?re^ens*ve ^uman engineering, the Hornet’s radar °ne • *Shly reliable and extremely simple to operate by ti0nsua'> for both air-to-air and air-to-ground func- simpjjf e concept of “hands-on-throttle-and-stick” has °Perat' l^e s'mu*taneous functions of flying and radar •Cr, the pilot can access radar features
nature throttle and stick, operation becomes second move h°V?r t'me' Very seWom does the pilot need to reradar f *S .nc* ^rom either the stick or throttle to perform a Would ,nctlon- In a two-seat configuration, however, it cated Certainly seem logical that the crewmember dedi- m°re Smari|y to processing radar data would function attem ectively than his single-seat counterpart, who is aircr^t'11^ to assess the same information and pilot his tagesat lhe same time. What differences and/or advan- aircraf, *St’ fhen, that could establish superiority of one The C°n^§uration over the other? and tWomOSt s'8nificant distinction between the single-pilot ■member crews is the speed of radar graphic interpretation. The Hornet pilot has access to a radar picture that is instantaneously visible to him. From this radar display, numerous decisions can be made concerning weapon employment, aircraft steerage, and the most appropriate time to exit a combat arena. In the two-seat fighter, the radar intercept officer supplies interpretive and directive commentary regarding the dynamic imagery he is viewing on radar to the pilot, not all of which is repeated on the pilot’s displays. Through an intercommunication system, cooperative decisions between the front and rear seats are made. During the course of an aerial intercept in a two- seat fighter, a finite amount of time is dedicated to the verbal exchange of data which, in most cases, is occurring with aircraft closure rates in excess of 1,000 knots. Essential information that is miscommunicated, misinterpreted, or both, could prove disastrous in the terminal phase of a multiaircraft engagement. Conversely, the single-seat operator is in a position to rapidly interpret his radar picture and determine an appropriate course of action in a given situation. When two multiseat aircraft are used “in section,” the dilemma of maintaining concise communication is intensified since four individuals must interact effectively while they pursue a common goal, while in two single-seat aircraft, half as many individuals are involved in the decision-making process, with no prerequisite for internal communication.
Although the single-seat pilot is not faced with the communication challenges of a dual-seat aircrew, his concerns do include pilot saturation and “lookout” effectiveness. In the single-seat aircraft, the number of tasks a pilot must perform in any given scenario is in all likelihood greater than that for the pilot of a multicrew aircraft. The realization that the pilot in a Hornet would be faced with this dilemma is solved in part through a cockpit design that allows rapid access to vital switches that are needed in combat situations. In his discussion of the Hornet, Rear Admiral Leon A. Edney, the first battle group commander to deploy with the Hornet, attributes the ability of the single-seat pilot to handle both the strike and fighter mission to:
”... Superior cockpit design; easy to scan flight, target and weapons systems displays and hands-on stick control function. The Hornet cockpit has been optimized for one-man operations in all air-to-air and air- to-ground modes. The pilot controls an array of real time information far superior to data available in any other existing operational aircraft. Cockpit design enables effective one-man performance by locating all time critical controls for weapons systems management
The debate is exacerbated by the F/A-18’s dual mission: fighter, represented here by two-seat Tomcats, and attack, represented by the one-seater it is replacing, the Corsair. Can one aviator handle an air strike on one mission, and be expected to fight through a sky full of aircraft and missile threats on the next mission?
77
aircra
gre. of its
in the Navy. Although the Intruder can deliver number of conventional weapons, the accuracy guided bombs is measurably less than that of the ^ ► The Intruder and Corsair do not possess air-to-air ^3! to detect or shoot hostile aircraft from beyo^ ^ range. Although the Hornet pilot on a strike/fighteaif.to- sion is in a higher task-loading environment with an air radar, his survivability will be greater in the eve air threat.
in?
The combined advantages of the F/A-18’s digital computers and software, human engineering built into the cockpit, and radar and flight operations integrated into the throttle and stick eliminate the need for a second voice in the in-flight decision process.
as well as communication on the flight control stick and
throttle.”1
This is not to say, however, that a single-seat pilot could not be overtasked; in many cases, with the Hornet’s multiple sensors (forward-looking infrared [FLIR], HARM display, and data-link display), the pilot has more information available than can possibly be displayed and viewed. Therefore, cockpit information essential to survival must be prioritized within the single-seat aircraft. Some situations could prove overwhelming, if not fatal, to a single-seat pilot attempting to survive as a single entity. For example, an attack by one Hornet against a sophisticated multiple threat (surface-to-air missile network and airborne adversaries employing long-range missiles in conjunction with electronic countermeasures) would spell almost certain disaster in most cases.
A two-man crew would undoubtedly find that same environment a challenge in terms of survivability. When comparisons are drawn between lone single- and two-seat aircraft in that scenario, conclusions often favor the two- seat aircraft. Most tacticians will agree that a two-member team will survive longer in a multithreat environment as a single entity. However, it is current doctrine within the Navy fighter and light attack squadrons that aircraft will not be employed as single-plane entities; consequently, the survivability of a section (two planes) or division (four planes) of single-seat aircraft is projected to be much higher than can be quantified in one- versus two-seat studies that focus on single aircraft tactics.
In terms of visual lookout, a two-member crew is more capable of maintaining better surveillance for surface-to- air threats and hostile aircraft than is a single pilot. Again, however, when single-seat aircraft are employed in standard formations composed of multiple aircraft, the difficulty of maintaining an effective lookout is greatly reduced. During the Vietnam War, the greatest threat to both single- and dual-seat naval aircraft over enemy territory proved to be surface-to-air antiaircraft guns and missile systems, as opposed to losses caused by enemy aircraft. With the mobility of current surface-to-air systems and the ever-expanding envelopes of these associated systems, emphasis must be placed on effective electronic early- warning devices and electronic countermeasures, regardless of cockpit configuration, in all tactical aircraft. Effective lookout may be impossible at any rate in the case of long-range smokeless surface-to-air missiles.
The Hornet often sparks debate when compared with the dual-seat aircraft operating in the fleet (Tomcat, Intruder). Since the Hornet is used in the same mission areas as the Intruder and Tomcat, opinion is divided over whether single-seat operators can accomplish missions similar to those of multicrew aircraft. A comparison of the
which it currently operates reveals the following cant differences:
- The Tomcat is a better maritime air superiority ^ than the Hornet, because of the Tomcat’s AWG-9/A ^ weapon system. However, as a force multiple1:’ aSf Hornet can augment the Tomcat in the same role an ^ result, improve the capabilities of fleet air defense 0 riers that employ both aircraft. The Hornet has e jer.aii' operated unrefueled at medium range, within the on batfle grid.
- The Hornet is the most accurate daytime visual £[
aii-
- The Intruder and Corsair are not capable of man^ fN high subsonic speeds or achieving supersonic sPeevjroH' issue of speed is less critical in low-threat combat e ^e!, ments such as those that existed in Grenada. I"10et0 most exercises that simulate modern scenarios con ^ support the fighter pilot adage that “speed is 1* ^an^
- The Hornet can be used in more mission roles in other Navy tactical aircraft. The Hornet can °Pe
ing , ne aircraft’s fuselage. With a well-executed tanked K* *nv°iving either carrier-based A-6Es or land- ^stio^1071358’ ran2e diminishes as a controversial
P|«rP
trol 6 SUrve'^ance coordination, airborne intercept con- tare 'Var‘at'sea> self-escort on strike missions against land y -j? [1]’and fighter strike-escort roles. t!je ^ Hornet is not capable of the supersonic speeds that veri mCat Can atta'n- However, in terms of pure maneu- navaf ?er^ormance> the Hornet is markedly superior to all p/^ aircraft. As Rear Admiral Edney points out: “The tarv . outaccelerates, outturns and outclimbs most mili- tfatpaircraft in the world, enabling] the pilot to concen- y Xh°H^e t^lreat anc^ not the airplane.”2 fans [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] f°rnet ^as nehher the endurance nor the unrefueled sPeeci <“orsa'r or the Intruder. However, with the binedS 31 W*1'cb it can ingress and egress a target, cornua ka suPeri°r self-defense capability, the Hornet is the c t6<^ 3 mucif more survivable aircraft than either long °rsa'r or the Intruder. The Hornet has demonstrated a refUe,raa8e strike capability out to 500 nautical miles, un- fl0Wne '. ^'th refueling at a predetermined range, it has In 0r. miSsions in excess of a 1,000 nautical mile radius, addjf 6r l° broaden the Hornet’s endurance and range, an the '°na* 2,700 pounds of internal fuel may be added in ti°n toarhfutUre’ through a manufacturer design modifica
Tomcat Class A mishap rate approached 20.0 per 100,000 hours during its fleet introduction phase, according to the Naval Safety Center.
Each carrier aircraft possesses several singular characteristics that enhance the accomplishment of the specific mission(s) it was designed to perform. A look at these aircraft, however, highlights areas that may be improved or expanded in the future if using multimission aircraft continues to be a viable option. Some of the consequences of maintaining two-seat aircraft include:
- Expense incurred in training a second crewmember: A figure of $1,000,000 is usually quoted as the cost of training a Navy pilot. Similarly, the cost of training naval flight officers is certainly comparable after training is completed at the fleet replacement squadron level.
- Salary and retirement: The wages and benefits paid to an officer over a typical 20-year career, in addition to retirement earnings, amount to millions of dollars.
- Exposure of two human lives to danger in a combat environment: Again, however, past arguments contend that the two-seat aircraft is “more survivable,” so this issue is debatable.
- Presentation of a larger target profile: Without stealth technology, dual-seat aircraft are typically larger than their single-seat counterparts both visually and on radar. Moreover, real estate on board aircraft carriers is a precious and limited commodity; the larger two seaters take up a preponderance of the allowable flight deck and hangar space.
Given the advantages as well as the limitations of today’s fleet aircraft, and keeping in mind the economic issues already mentioned, the most important developmental consideration is an aircraft’s projected combat performance. Whether the next generation of tactical aircraft is of single- or dual-seat configuration, the ideal aircraft of the future (advanced tactical aircraft [ATA]) should incorporate the following features:
- Multimission capability: Aircraft able to perform both strike and fighter roles demonstrated their value during the Vietnam War; today, the Hornet provides a great deal of flexibility to the battle group commander. In the words of Vice Admiral E. H. Martin, until recently Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Air Warfare:
“This revolutionary fighter and attack-capable aircraft has already begun changing the carrier air wing mix from the conventional 24-fighter, 34-attack blend to a new mix of 20 fighters, 20 medium-attack and 20 fighter/attack aircraft. This new structure allows the earner to protect itself with 40 fighters, press the offensive with 40 attack aircraft, or tailor-fit the aircraft mix to the task at hand.”3
- Employment of stand-off weapons such as HARM and Harpoon: The delivery of weapons at ranges beyond enemy defenses will undoubtedly improve survivability in the combat arena. Moreover, total electronic warfare integration throughout the aircraft in its early stages of design is a must when facing surface-to-air missiles and airborne threats.
- Optimal aircraft size: Regardless of the number of
79
seats, the ATA should be scaled down to occupy as little deck space as possible. Methods employed in body-blending and stealth technology would help achieve a minimal cross-section radar return for future aircraft. The ATA must, however, be designed to carry enough internal fuel and external ordnance to inflict the desired damage to a target at the required range.
- Long-range strike capability without compromising performance required to survive in a multithreat environment: Designs that upgrade existing airframes incapable of attaining supersonic egress speeds, such as the modified Intruder, should be considered as merely temporary stopgap measures, effective only in the absence of high-speed adversary aircraft.
- All-weather, low-altitude night strike capability: Systems that employ terrain-following features through an autopilot system, in conjunction with such a system as the Global Positioning System, would provide the ATA with the ability to perform weapons release even under adverse conditions.
- Night vision devices and improved FLIR: The use of night-vision goggles in tactical jet aircraft is a technology now available. Under the proper atmospheric environment, a low-altitude night attack would replicate daylij? conditions. Moreover, the development of a refined 'V1 field-of-view heads-up-display — which could Prese fixed-navigation FLIR imagery to the pilot in a one-to-03 format of the real world—would further enhance mg strike tactics.
- Improved radar systems: Radars that electronically sc 360° around an aircraft as opposed to the current 65- scans on either side of the nose are technological refl ments that may soon be attainable. In addition, as c°^g puters with expanded memory and faster processing used, a radar may eventually simultaneously scan in
an air-to-air and air-to-ground mode to facilitate targe'1 of both hostile aircraft and land targets. y
►Voice-actuated weapon systems: Such systems, m ^
currently under investigation, would undoubtedly sPe many functions that are presently performed by actuatt g series of switches. In combination with a voice sys' ’ displays may someday be printed on the visor of a PJ1 helmet, ultimately leading to a “look-talk-shoot quence. This arrangement could eliminate numerous c pit switches. , ^
The Hornet has had its share of critics. Much °
‘The Best Carrier Airplane’
Commander Raymond E. Thomas, U. S. Navy, spent the last year organizing a new Navy tactical combat squadron, VFA- 137, “The Kestrels,” at Naval Air Station Cecil Field, Florida. The new squadron, with Commander Thomas as the commanding officer (CO), is built primarily around the F/A-18 Hornet. Commander Thomas, who has racked up more than 4,000 flight hours—3,400 in the A-7 Corsair—already has more than 100 hours of flight time in the Hornet.
He warms to the task of describing the Hornet: “It’s only 10% heavier than the A-7, but it puts out more than double the thrust. Its turning capability is remarkable. It’s probably the best turning airplane in the world and one of the best weapon systems yet developed.” Praise for the Hornet is universal among the pilots of VFA-137, and the CO rates the airplane equal to or better than the F-15 Eagle or the F-14 Tomcat in the
air-to-air arena, and better than the Corsair in the air-to-ground mission.
Commander Thomas describes an air combat maneuvering engagement he and his wingman had recently flown: “We went out as a strike escort for nine A-7s, five Navy and four from the Michigan Air National Guard. Their mission was to head out over the water up to Georgia, where they were to drop some inert bombs on the range. The scenario called for two Marine F-4s and one A-4 to be out there to jump the strike group. We did a MiG-sweep before the strike group came through and found them 60 miles away, locked them up, ran an intercept on them, came up from behind, and shot all three of them before they even had a chance to turn on us. That’s the radar doing most of that.”
The heads-up display tapes of that mission show that Commander Thomas and his wing- man had a lock on the Marines long before they were even aware of F/A-18s’ presence- They disposed of the Skyha • before the Phantoms were c°t- zant of the threat’s presence-^ Once the Phantoms realize(o situation, the F-4 pilots wen afterburners. So did the Ho
and in that configuration t e heads-up display readout co firmed a closing rate of • [S knots. Not only did the Ho rapidly overtake the Phanto ^ but they had the quick loc j and a perfect shot. Splash ^ The original concept tha , mately led to the Hornet for two separate airplanes .
tailored for the fighter r° e the other for the strike ro e- However, the designers en^ up with one airplane that ^ perform both roles and do^ > well without any change o equipment other than loa 1 ^ the appropriate weapons- ^ means that all Hornet Vx. ^th required to be proficient 1 an
warfare areas and necesst extra training load on the
of aerial c u vwuuiiuumvo uu,v i,^viuv ivj t° Q * combat. Since most aircrews have been exposed
in f°ne cockph arrangement, this is understandable Perform aCt’ ma^ highly desirable for optimum combat
°nS-Seat
senti Versus two-seat debate has been fueled by strong ents different communities have for specific styles
and.
tate thea,?Ce' Ultimately, such parochial views could dic- sufr ■ des'§n and acquisition of future aircraft without batin'61!1 reSar(l l°r technological considerations and op-
As d recluirements.
t°niorr GS^nS are ProPosecl l°r the ATA that will fly from sess.. s carriers, decision makers must carefully as- thefleg6 SCat'nS configuration best suited to the needs of airCrewto counter future surface and airborne threats. The enemvCOmPlement with the capability of identifying an $ubseQ ^ Wa^ °f active or passive electronic means and edly jA launching long-range weapons will undoubt- finai tae upper hand in future combat scenarios. In the tivenessa ysis> however, both mission plurality and effec- c°nsidS combat performance should be the principal Crew grat'0ns in determining the most appropriate air- depl°ye7Plement- The fact remains that the forwarder a Carr'er wiH rarely have numerical superiority Potential foe in terms of combat-capable aircraft.
For this reason, the limited number of aircraft deployed on board the carrier must represent the best possible combination in terms of dependability, flexibility, and combat effectiveness. Whether the ATA is performing a long-range strike in adverse weather or defending the battle group against a regimental raid of hostile aircraft, expectations should be no lower than weapons on target with zero losses to enemy defenses. Tomorrow’s fleet can afford nothing less.
'RAdm L. A. Edney, “F/A-18; Adding Versatility and Punch to Battle Group Options,” Wings of Gold, Winter 1984, p. 22.
2Ibid.
3VAdm E. H. Martin, “Naval Aircraft Today," Naval Aviation News, Jan.-Feb., 1986, p. 9.
Lieutenant Trotter graduated from the University of Colorado in 1977. He was designated a naval aviator in September 1978. With more than 2,400 flight hours and 570 carrier landings, he has flown more than 1,000 hours in both the Tomcat and the Homet. Assigned to VFA-113 at Naval Air Station Lemoore, California, Lieutenant Trotter participated in the Navy’s first extended deployment of the Homet on board the Constellation (CV-64) from February to August 1985.
By John Tegler
squadrons. “It’s not exactly twice as heavy because of the two roles,” according to Commander Thomas, “but about 1.5 times the normal training load that a straight fighter or strike squadron would have. So I would suppose that might be, from a management standpoint, the most challenging aspect of trying to put one of these squadrons to sea in a combat-ready status.”
It is partially correct to say that the Homet is a direct replacement for the Corsair. But the Homet does not do exactly the same thing as the Corsair. In the morning, the Homet might launch on a strike mission and, in the afternoon, configured with different weapons, it could go out in the air-to-air role. About
Commander Raymond Thomas, CO of VFA-137, on the F/A-18: “It’s probably the best turning airplane in the world. ... If you can’t have fun flying this airplane, something is very wrong.”
81
[1]UperiorSU^StitUte f°r the A-7 and the F-4, the Hornet is
Pabijjtie ^ terms °f maneuvering performance, radar ca-
^ The H ’ k0mbing accuracy, and mission flexibility.
carrier i 0rnet's the Navy’s premier aircraft in the area of
c°nsiStean^‘n2s- During its first deployment, Hornet pilots
Sradesnt*y led air wing competition in both landing ics, t^cn<a boarding rate. With the Hornet’s digital avion- ^en the ^ut°matic carrier landing system approaches have £raft to ^ ^*ost consistent and accurate of any Navy air. The Hp, *
[7]s 'ntrod niet ^as bad a relatively low accident rate since hornet sUct'0n ‘nt0 military service. The Navy’s first two uent~fre ^a^rons are now approaching a combined acci- aCci? 'ght-hour mark of 100,000 hours. The Hornet ^ more than 150,000 hours in flying with
^ent rate atlt^ ^ar'ne Corps, and has a 5.21 Class A acci- Per 100,000 hours of flight. In comparison, the