This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
In March 1983, President Ronald Reagan asked the world, “Would it not be better to save lives than to avenge them?”
It took a while for this idea to sink into the public’s consciousness. Then, gradually the public began to realize the President was challenging the scientific community to create a defense against “the awesome Soviet missile threat” so as to render these nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” More than that, he was offering “a new hope for our children in the 21st century,” pointing ahead toward the day when deterrence of war need not be based on the threat of nuclear annihilation.
Unfortunately, his call for an antiballistic missile (ABM) defense generated more media opposition than support. Pundits in the press and congressional critics labeled it “Reagan’s star wars speech,” overlooking its strategic implications entirely. They did not seem to understand that Reagan was proposing a major shift in U. S. national security policy. It was time to reject mutual assured destruction (MAD), which is an immoral premise for deterring nuclear war. He called instead for a new defense posture that will provide assured survival.
Although Reagan emphasized “it may take years, probably decades” to realize this goal, his message was both urgent and optimistic. It confirmed that his decision is based on three important considerations: (1) the President’s scientific advisor, Dr. George Keyworth, and other senior advisors have concluded that an ABM defense is feasible; (2) U. S. national security planners believe the strategy of mutual assured destruction is rapidly losing its credibility as a basis for deterrence; and (3) the intelligence community and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned with the magnitude and sophistication of ongoing Soviet ABM programs.* They have warned of the adverse strategic consequences should the Soviet Union achieve an operational ABM capability before the United States.
Judging from the initial negative reaction to his “star wars” speech, the Great Communicator failed to convince the news media that his “far-out” dream was worth having. But public opinion samplings suggest that most Americans prefer their President’s vision to the nightmare of MAD.
The Unsellable Dream?
By Brigadier General Edwin F. Black, U. S. Army (Retired)
*The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) believes the Soviet Union has assigned a top priority to the development of a nationwide missile defense system. A January 1984 CIA report cites evidence of Soviet preparation for such a system. It documents Soviet programs of laser research, the construction of six large radar complexes throughout the country, the development of an antiaircraft missile system that could also help shoot down U. S. ballistic missiles, and the establishment of new military production lines for missile defense components.
The doubting Thomases have raised a fierce clamor, but they have been unable to undercut the basic logic of Reagan’s speech. Recent samplings of public opinion throughout the 50 states confirm that three out of four Americans want something better than the prospect of assured destruction, be it mutual or not. Broad support for a new national policy of assured survival continues to grow.
Pragmatists on the White House staff recognize that such a policy has the makings of a political winner. It has something in it for everyone.
► The people are ready to support it at the polls because they are tired of their role as helpless hostages in the nuclear balance of terror.
^ Politicians attuned to public opinion see it as an opportune bandwagon for them to climb on during an election year.
^ The Department of Defense welcomes it, as it releases the Pentagon’s planners from the frustrating straightjacket of MAD and allows them to get on with their traditional uiission of defending the country from external attack. * Defense industries are quick to see the opportunities it offers to design and bid on new weapon systems.
► The National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) and its related “high-tech” industries consider it a major stimulus to space technology, particularly the fifth generation of computers so essential to the exploration of outer space.
► It opens the door for U. S. allies in Europe and Japan to work with the United States in developing the high technology needed to build a shield against incoming ballistic missiles that will be truly regional in scope.
► For the Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, it introduces a new dimension into arms control negotiations. Under the President’s concept, all nations, including the Soviet Union, would be invited to join the United States in shifting emphasis from offensive to defensive strategic systems.
► Nuclear scientists, particularly those in the national nuclear laboratories—Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore—who have dedicated their knowledge to the cause of national security, can look forward to receiving the resources needed to achieve new breakthroughs in the
X-ray lasers, fusion energy, and plasma physics.
The answer to the second question of cost remains unknown. After months of study, the Fletcher Committee admitted it is too early to make even a “ball park estimate.” One thing seems certain, however. When the time comes to deploy the ABM shield, the cost probably will be m the billion-dollar range. Fortunately, these costs will be spread over a decade or more. As public understanding and support for assured survival grow, the voters will ensure that within our country’s annual budget of nearly $1 trillion, the necessary funds are made available.
Debate over the third question—what percentage of •ncoming missiles can the ABM system intercept—is inconclusive. Although this figure would provide an indication of the system’s efficiency, the deterrent effect of a nation’s missile defense capability cannot be measured in terms of its kill ratio alone.
The balance of terror is maintained today by each superpower’s stockpile of more than 9,000 nuclear warheads. But as the Scowcroft Commission, which examined the MX project, pointed out, the deterrent effect of these arse- delay added to the time actually required to build the system adds 30% to the cost. Studies completed in 1982 concluded that under normal Pentagon procurement procedures, lead times for weapon systems have averaged 12 years. Given the requirement to deploy the first phase of the ABM shield as soon as possible, bureaucratic delays of this sort are unacceptable.
Currently, the Department of Defense is the executive agency for the SDI. Lieutenant General James Abraham- son has been appointed the single manager for the whole project. He reports directly to the Secretary of Defense who, in turn, keeps the President informed.
Among Reagan’s closest advisors are some who believe the “assured survival” concept should be raised from the status of a Department of Defense project to that of a full- fledged national security program.
One solution being studied would be to create a senior interagency Council on Assured Survival. This body would advise Reagan on the international and political aspects of the SDI and give continuing high-level support to the single manager in the Department of Defense so as
nals depends not so much on their actual numbers as on the superpowers’ perceptions of each other’s strategic offensive power and national will to use this power to achieve their respective goals. When decisions of war or Peace are based on perceptions, uncertainty strengthens deterrence. Strategic planners call this “the Heisenberg Principle” after the German physicist who developed the theory of indeterminancy.
Since the Soviet Politburo cannot know the precise kill ratio of the U. S. missile defense system, the mere fact that the United States is building one introduces a major Uncertainty into their calculations of U. S. power. Fortu- Uately, this uncertainty increases the effectiveness of deterrence and strengthens the possibility of additional years °f mutual nuclear restraint.
Finally, there is the question of organization. Americans have the illusion that any problem can be solved by fhrowing money at it. Money is necessary, of course, but jt takes a sound organization to use it wisely. Logisticians have testified that cost is a function of the time required f°r a weapon system to become operational. Every year of to accelerate the incremental deployment of the multilayered ABM shield.
It has been suggested that this council be chaired by the Vice-President and include the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy, the directors of the CIA, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Office of Management and Budget, the administrator of NASA, and the science advisor to the President. The Vice-President, who has access to the President at all times, would keep him informed on the SDI’s progress, on policy issues that might require resolution within the National Security
fields of particle physics, fusion, laser technology, and plasma research.
The President’s 23 March 1983 speech caught the Washington bureaucracies by surprise. But once they realized Reagan was serious, things began to happen. A few weeks after the speech, the National Security Council issued National Security Decision Directive 83. This established a senior scientific committee to review the technical problems associated with an ABM defense and estimate the time and cost involved in overcoming these obstacles. Headed by James Fletcher, a former director of NASA, the committee met throughout the spring and summer of 1983.
Various proposals put forward by the armed forces, the defense industries, the national nuclear laboratories, and well-respected think tanks were reviewed. The Fletcher Report was sent to Reagan in November 1983. The various suggestions received fell generally into three groups:
► Category I: Improved versions of the classic ABM systems of the 1960s, incorporating the very significant advances in science and technology achieved during the past two decades
► Category II: Systems based in space but employing current state-of-the-art technology
► Category III: More advanced space-based defenses that probably could not become operational before the 1990s
Early in this review, it was decided “star wars” was neither an appropriate nor accurate title for the President s assured survival concept. Instead, it was called the strategic defense initiative (SDI).
The Fletcher Report was reviewed at a National Security Council meeting in January 1984 and implementing guidelines were issued in National Security Decision Directive 116. The report, which Reagan administration spokesmen described as recommending “a prudent research program to determine if technologies can be developed,” estimated it would take seven years to assess the feasibility of various ABM proposals. This cautious approach prompted some defense experts in Washington to point out that it took only seven years from the time President John F. Kennedy announced the goal, for the United States to land a man on the moon.
The President’s budget for fiscal year 1985 contained for the first time a separate line item of $2 billion for research funds for the SDI. Although this is several hundred million dollars less than the Department of Defense had recommended, it is an initial installment equivalent to the cost of the entire World War II Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb. The Fletcher Committee, unable to outline a five-year budget forecast, claimed that such long-range planning would depend on progress in various scientific fields during 1984. Nevertheless, $2 billion represents a substantial increase over the $1.2 billion investment in research for ABM defenses in fiscal year 1983, and is over and above funds allocated to NASA for the ten-year space station project.
Much has been accomplished during the first year of Reagan’s SDI. The feasibility of ABM defense has been accepted by the executive branch and by its scientific advisors. There is general agreement that the ABM defense will be a layered-defense system with both ground- and space-based components. Funds have been included in the administration’s fiscal year 1985 budget specifically for this project. Thus, as far as the policy aspects are concerned, all signals are “Go.”
Differences of opinion within the Reagan administration center around four questions of implementation. First, how soon can the first increment of the ABM shield be placed in operation? Second, what is a tolerable cost for the entire system? Third, how penetration-proof must the ABM defense system be to justify the cost? Fourth, what organizational structure should be established within the government to expedite this giant, many-faceted project?
Regarding the first question, the answer is, the sooner the better. Of course, experts differ widely as to when this might be. The most ardent, nongovernment support springs from High Frontier, a public interest group, privately funded by contributions. Their estimates are on the optimistic side.
In the interest of speed, High Frontier recommends priority be given to the Fletcher Committee’s Category I. It
further recommends that work should begin on the concepts developed by Project Defender, a top secret Department of Defense ABM study conducted between 1958— 64, which was based on 1957 technology. High Frontier believes the concepts developed by this project are still valid. Once they are updated using 1984 scientific knowhow, an effective first-phase, ground-based nonnuclear ABM system will emerge. The High Frontier technical staff believes this increment of the ABM system, essentially a “point defense,” could be operational within five years at a cost of about $15 billion—less than what would be required to harden our MX missile silos. The Fusion Energy Foundation, another privately funded organization, supports this view.
While this initial system is being put in place, work would continue at high priority on Fletcher Committee categories II and III. NASA, supported by the aerospace and computer industries, could contribute much to Category II. Progress in Category III would depend on advanced technologies developed by research teams at the national nuclear laboratories, which have concentrated on
Council, and on supply or funding bottlenecks that may require the President’s personal intervention to resolve.
Advocates of these organizational changes recognize the national defense implications of the SDI and the wider opportunities it offers for world peace. Because the United States intends to shift the basis of its strategy from MAD to assured survival, a new approach to disarmament is possible.
As they see it, the timing is right. The nuclear disarmament process has come to a grinding halt. U. S.-Soviet relations are at a low. Deployments of U. S. Pershing missiles to NATO and Soviet SS-20s to the Warsaw Pact reduce the warning time of a nuclear strike on the Continent to about 12 minutes, increasing public concern throughout Europe. Japan and China share the threat posed by some 144 triple-warhead SS-20s based in the eastern Soviet Union.
Nothing would strengthen the Heisenberg principle on deterrence more than having China support the doctrine of mutual assured survival. Although Chinese and Soviet negotiators completed their fourth round of talks on nor- gional ABM defenses, China will have to decide whether to go it alone, join with the Soviets and accept integration into their ABM system, or to throw its lot in with the United States and the Free World.
The need to recognize and take advantage of opportunities like these emphasize the importance of creating the proposed Council on Assured Survival. Whatever decision the Chinese make will affect profoundly the course of history. As the United States restructures its national security policy around the assured survival concept, it will need the benefit of the wisdom and statesmanship of such a broad- based group, which is particularly attuned to the sensitive and interrelated strategic, scientific, diplomatic, and political aspects of the SDI.
In the case of China, the Council on Assured Survival would be qualified to recommend how the regional ABM defenses of central Asia should be structured to persuade China that its long-term interests are best served by association with the United States and its allies as they move forward collectively to free their people of the ever-growing threat of mutual assured destruction.
malization of relations in March 1984, little substantive progress was made. China’s fears of a surprise attack across its northern borders remain undiminished.
Despite stepped-up consultations between the United States and China, culminating in Reagan’s visit to Peking in April, neither China’s strongman Deng Xiaoping nor other senior Chinese officials have taken a public position for or against the SDI. But it would be illogical to assume the two countries have not privately discussed the mutual advantages of some sort of defense against incoming ballistic missiles.
As the United States and its allies begin to work together, sharing their advanced technologies to build re-
Editor’s Note: Since this article was written, the U. S. Army, on 10 June 1984, achieved the world’s first interception of an incoming ballistic missile warhead by a nonnuclear ABM more than 100 miles above the western Pacific Ocean. The new interceptor missile, built by the Lockheed Corporation, was an old Minuteman 1CBM, carrying a homing device in its warhead instead of a nuclear weapon. The homing system combined long-range infrared sensors with optical homing technology. The test also validated the emphasis being placed on kinetic energy research under the SDI program to develop antiballistic missile defenses.