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jj^ecember: It Wasn’t the Law
y Lieutenant Colonel W. Hays Parks, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve
hands
°* civilian casualties was in
Ch.
suit;
velt
12 a ^ ^ecerr|ber 1983, a strike force of „i Corsair and 16 A-6E Intruder ( -a'1 from the USS John F. Kennedy at( ^ and USS Independence (CV-62) th | cc* Syrian antiaircraft positions near ma Lebanese mountain villages of Ham- aana and Falugha, in response to Syrian ly, laircraft attacks the preceding day on ' ^ rec°nnaissance flights sup- ln§ fhe Multi-National Peacekeeping stnj^- 44,6 str'^c f°rce’s successful de- the C|IOn op 'ts targets was tempered by tru I °Wn*n8 °f one Corsair and one In- °theCr ^ SA.'"7 and SA-9 missiles; an- ■p. er Corsair was damaged by a missile. (,0[e ntruder’s pilot was killed and its thtTk anJicr-navigator was captured by and ^r'ans' *n *ts aftermath, speculation the jrUrnor ran amok as to the reasons for \ver°SSes' Some alleged that U. S. forces •he C| ,Placed at unnecessary risk in that Sol United States erroneously assumed late I,esPonsibility for avoidance of col- ]e y civilian casualties in the vicinity of ge1 laiate military targets. Some sug- WarCd tb‘s was required by the law of j' “°th assumptions were wrong. hon"1 f944, whi,e planning the interdic- in0 ra'l lines in Nazi-occupied France si PreLarati°n for the Normandy inva- chijj’ Pr'me Minister Winston S. Chur- strict rCcornrnended that bombing be re- eivi,.ed t0 rai* centers where collateral t0 ,‘an casualties would not exceed 100 Co,, dcadls each, or a total of 10,000 tar„a Cra' civilian casualties for the entire Ihur TUbsystem- Air Chief Marshal Ar- rna , cdder. Deputy Supreme Com- p0rcCr °f the Allied Expeditionary ti0ne,',fDr°teSted’ ar8u'n= that the limita-
the
tion p,*10 suPPorted the military’s posi c'vHiantlmately’tbe number of collatera
p. was suu.Millul
Natlhurchi.rs proposed limit. a modi
terized as the law of war. To the extent that it has enjoyed success, the law of war is less a product of civilian diplomacy than a codification of military practice; it is highly dependent on mutual respect. It imposes responsibilities but also recognizes rights of belligerents where reciprocity fails. In many respects, the law of war establishes the maximum limitations a military commander reasonably can be expected to accept in the name of huinan- itarianism and still hope to succeed on the battlefield.
With respect to attacking a military target in a populated area, there are several important points:
► A legitimate target may be attacked at any time, wherever located.
► No nation possesses the means or capability of accurately forecasting likely collateral civilian casualties at a given target, under all circumstances.
► The inevitability of collateral civilian casualties is recognized as regrettable but nonetheless often unavoidable.
► The obligation to minimize collateral civilian casualties is the responsibility of all parties on the battlefield, including the civilian population. Civilians who choose to remain in proximity to a target do so at an assumed risk.
► With respect to the attacker, the obligation to minimize collateral civilian casualties is limited to taking those precautions deemed feasible and consistent with mission accomplishment and security of the attacking force.
► The defender is obliged not to use the population as a screen in order to render a target immune from attack. (At the same time, it is not illegal for a defender to place his positions in built-up areas.)
► Not all collateral civilian casualties are
Syrian soldiers celebrate their victory over this downed Navy A-6 in Lebanon on 4 December 1983. Were the aircraft’s pilot who perished and bombardier-navigator who was captured exposed to unnecessary risk by the law of war?
P»*Oc,
of
force necessarily are the prerogative
of
ings to contribute to a fuller discussion
the responsibility of the attacker or the defender; some simply are the result of an act of war—i.e., beyond the control of either the defender or the attacker.
If a law of war treaty negotiation conference were convened today and it were proposed that the attacker assume the exclusive responsibility for avoidance of collateral civilian casualties, military leaders would undoubtedly vehemently oppose the recommendation as unrealistic. It would unlikely enjoy universal respect and be subject to abuse by an unscrupulous opponent. Yet this is precisely the highly unrealistic position Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and President Lyndon B. Johnson imposed on U. S. air forces operating over North Vietnam. Inexplicably, we assumed all responsibility for collateral civilian casualties, placing U. S. forces at undue risk in order to avoid any civilian casualties. The North Vietnamese saw this as a tactical weakness which it was only too eager to exploit. And they did.
During “Rolling Thunder,” the 196568 bombing campaign over North Vietnam, President Lyndon B. Johnson eschewed all military advice and personally selected the targets to be attacked in order to avoid air strikes of targets in populated areas. The North Vietnamese Government took advantage of this weakness by storing its military supplies, parking its military convoys, and emplacing its air defense sites in populated areas, all the while mounting a major propaganda campaign to decry the casualties among the “civilians” participating directly in the war effort—which, by the law of war, made them combatants and legitimate targets. In response to the communist propaganda, President Johnson tightened his restrictions on U. S. lives and aircraft. He incorrectly assumed responsibility for all civilian casualties while allowing the North Vietnamese to define who was a “civilian,” and the North Vietnamese were more than happy to oblige him in both respects.1
In contrast, fully adhering to the law of war but with substantially relaxed restrictions, U. S. air forces were able to accomplish more in the first three months of the 1972 bombing campaign known as “Linebacker-I” than had been achieved in the three-and-a-half years of “Rolling Thunder.”2
To the extent that details of the air strike have been made public, it is clear that mission planners did adhere fully to U. S. law of war responsibilities, but did not revert to the ways of Rolling Thunder in assuming exclusive responsibility for collateral civilian casualties. The rules of engagement required that mission planners endeavor to minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties, guidance which carries with it unstated but common-sense qualifiers: consistent with force security and mission accomplishment. The law of war is not a suicide pact, and we have not attempted to make it one.3
Nonetheless, the law of war is a foreign policy tool. Its requirements are particularly important when we are confronted with a crisis at the lower end of the conflict spectrum; a situation such as the peacekeeping force/“non-conflict” environment in Lebanon, where civilian casualties among the very citizens we were sent to protect would invite exploitation by nations and factions opposed to U. S. participation in a peaceful solution to Lebanon’s problems; or peace in the Middle East. Hence, in that a number of Syrian antiaircraft sites posed a continuing threat to Multi-National Force aerial reconnaisance missions and in deciding to carry out an air strike in self-defense against that continuing threat—another legitimate right in international law— targets were selected in which minimal risk was posed to the population.
The strike force suffered an 8% loss rate. Such a rate is unacceptable in wartime, and undoubtedly remains so even in “peacetime,” where additional risks often are assumed in order to prevent an incident from escalating into a larger conflict. There may have been reasons for those losses—operational, tactical, technological, or other, although losses never will be completely avoidable. A debate continues as to whether the naval gunfire of the USS New Jersey (BB-62) couW have been employed more effectively, an argument which always seems not only persuasive but dispositive in the biased Marine view of the author.
But this is not the time for bias or second guessing. Decisions on application o‘
the on-the-scene commander, based information available to him at the titfe of his decision.
Controversy remains. Amidst the flurry of speculation, however, it is necessary to discern what occurred, separat" ing sea stories and scuttlebutt from fact- ‘ have endeavored to start this process by pointing out that neither the law of 'v‘*r nor a misunderstanding thereof by nrns' sion planners led to the mission losses. I11 remains for other readers of the Proceed' those events, so that we profit from °uf experience.
‘See Parks, “Rolling Thunder and the Law of Air University Review XXXIII, 2 (January-Febru3^
1982) , pp. 2-23. „ ,
2See Parks, “Linebacker and the Law of War, University Review XXXIV, 2 (January-FebruaO
1983) , pp. 2-30. f,
3Partly because of the line community’s misun<k standing of the law of war, myriad JCS docum^ require a legal review of all contingency plans, ation plans, and rules of engagement. In some mands, such as USCinCPac, the staff judge advoca has become an integral part of the operations ning staff. Those legal reviews are resulting in feVV rather than more restrictions as many mispercepb0^ by members of the line community about the la'*' war are corrected.
Lieutenant Colonel Parks (a colonel selectee) is ^ of International Law in the Office of the Judge cate General of the Army, where he is responsible providing politico-legal advice to the Army Staff operational matters ranging from special operate to nuclear targeting. He will occupy the Charles Stockton Chair of International Law at the Naval W College during the 1984-85 academic year.
Ersatz Warfare
By Ralph Davis
Like it or not, we’re going to have to satisfy ourselves with simulated warfare until the real thing comes along. One of the most realistic, advanced pieces of hardware is the training simulator being built in San Diego under a $50 million contract for the Naval Training Equipment Center (NTEC). All facets of surface, antiair, subsurface, electronic, and special warfare are involved. The MultiEnvironment Trainer (MET) is designed to prepare naval officers and enlisted personnel for operational and combat duty on board patrol missile chaser (PCG) and patrol gunboat (PGG) ships. MET simulators can be used to train personnel for
Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class (Ne ates and similar small ships.
The MET system consists of two i^6^ tical training areas, each including combat information center (CIC), bridge' and sonar mockup. This high technolo^ training system enables equipment of1 j major shipboard control and comma11
, raining devices and simulators have bef0 USeC* 'n t*le Navy since well desi^6 War II. However, most are a s'8ned to train individuals or, at most, mo,?.11" tact'cal team to operate equip- meTn‘ ^ a vehicle.
a|| e I^IET is unique in that it combines ,,l<>(jCS<'en"i" operational elements of a ves„e.n?'^ay» high-performance military °r ® mto a master system calling for 20 duri °rC Personnel actively participating ,V|p-j,? a simulated training mission. The com ? tW° Gaining arenas simulate all 0nemand and control areas of not just trainSh'P’ bu' two. Thus, the MET can t\vo- ?Perat'onaI personnel as part of a anoth *P tCam’ one ship pitted against basiser’ °r on a single_ship operator c°m |0ng the scenarios available is a stude 6X muhi-threat exercise to train enga nts to detect, identify, evaluate, and gets jje a'r> surface, and subsurface tar- mUstUring wartime conditions. Students gatj0SllTmhane°usly perform safe navi- empr anc* correctly respond to shipboard ^rgencies.
c°ntro||SCenar'° begins with the student- Whene<d ship on patrol off a coastal area s e is fired on by a land-based missile station. CIC personnel will need to evaluate the threat and engage with the close-in weapon system. During missile engagement, the ship will detect a sonar and an electronic support measures (ESM) contact. The students should quickly evaluate the incoming ESM contact to be a high-speed hostile aircraft.
Based on the outcome of these attacks, the instructor may insert various malfunctions to limit the ship’s operability or delete both ship and crew from the scenario. At this point, a debriefing would be conducted. If the instructor determines the combat team has done a good job, the exercise will continue.
The variety of available scenarios enables students to progress from basic tactics to advanced maneuvers and to develop expertise, both in ship’s systems handling and situation assessment.
The MET can function in three operational modes. Its coordinated mode defines which targets and support vehicles operate together—or in direct opposition—in a common problem exercise. In the independent mode, each of the CIC, bridge, and sonar trainers can operate independently. Finally, in the system discrete mode, MET can provide individual operational training for each subsystem (i.e., sonar, radar, Harpoon, etc.).
MET training missions are recorded on magnetic tape, then projected on a large
Is what you think you see really what you’ve got? This may look like a modern ship’s combat information center, but it is the Multi-Environmental Trainer. The MET can simulate the command and control area of two ships.
screen for operational training personnel in a debriefing and instructor station area. These post-mission sessions provide trainees the opportunity to “Monday morning quarterback” their own training exercises—all without using high-cost sophisticated ships.
In addition to the tactical scenarios programmed in support of multi-threat and multi-tactics training, there is instructor and maintenance training for a cadre of naval personnel who will operate and maintain the trainer.
One of MET’s unique features is its massive “gaming area.” Trainees carry out realistic operations in a simulated ocean area with sides up to 640 nautical miles long and extending to 100,000 feet above sea level. The gaming area also extends to an ocean depth of 2,000 feet and a bottom depth of 26,500 feet to achieve various acoustic conditions.
Within this massive gaming block, MET trainees can be pitted against such variables as wind speed and direction;
reverberations, including the variable effects of volume, surface, and bottom conditions; own-ship noise; cloud mass as a component of radar video; landmass simulation, including more than 4,000 miles of coastline, mountains, buildings, and navigation aids; range attenuation for both radar and radio telephone communications; and marine objects, modeled to present sonar echoes of such things as pilot whales and snapping shrimp.
Within the gaming arena, in addition to natural elements and the two trainee “ships,” the program includes six support ships, a helicopter, an antisubmarine warfare multi-engine aircraft, a high-performance jet, and two submarines.
With the ability to train teams of 20 or more, the role MET performs would be difficult—if not impossible—to duplicate at sea under actual conditions. First is the danger involved in operating under real-life conditions with relatively untrained personnel. For example, for students being trained in bridge operations, it is possible to simulate a much closer collision course than would even be considered under operating conditions.
Even for an all-out training exercise, it would be nearly impossible to assemble the ships and equipment that are available in the simulation training programs. In addition, it is possible for trainees to “fire” Harpoons and Phalanx close-in weapon systems, gaining practical experience with these sophisticated weapons without the enormous expense of using ordnance.
Because MET is a modular system, individual components—the bridge, C1C, sonar, and their subsystems—can be used to train a wide variety of specialities. Thus, when the system is not being used as a total operational training device, components can be used for concentrated training of officers and enlisted personnel in specific assignments.
Using a standard Navy ratio of actual cost versus training cost—each hour ot training costs one-tenth of actual operation—the MET system has the potential of saving billions of defense dollars* while simultaneously producing more skilled, professional ship-handling operational personnel.
In training Navy personnel, the ME! could be established as a generic trainin? system—using simulated actions of destroyers, missiles, submarines, and high' speed jets.
For today’s sophisticated, electron^ Navy, the MET could become the ultimate training device.
Mr. Davis began his career at Honeywell, and move to Emerson Electronic. Currently, he is vice preS1’ dent of Simulation Systems, Cubic Defense System5, San Diego.
Safekeeping Our Tenders
By Lieutenant Robert M. Warling, Medical Service Corps, U. S. Navy
health officers as part of the ship’s con1' pany, rather than in their traditional rol^s of consultant or inspector, is unique.
The responsibilities to manage Pr°' grams in a complex occupational heal111 setting should not be delegated to, °f expected from, an officer with an on- proven track record of service. High aca’ demic achievement and so-called equiv;1' lent experience should not be acceptable substitutes.
An important area of health concern >s poorly designed industrial ventilation Vent ductwork-size constraints and iM'1' functions dictate whether the chernic11 substance level will be harmful or safe' Crew members’ ignorance or noncompb ance with proper work practices has cob'
Tl16
id
The occupational health issue has sparked much discussion and controversy on Navy ships. Efforts to assess shipboard work center hazards have met with mixed reactions and results. Incorporating experienced industrial health officers as part of each afloat intermediate maintenance activity (IMA)' could alleviate much command apprehension and effect better hazard control in the work centers.
Navy policy requires that work centers, food facilities, and berthing areas are free from untoward biological agents, chemical exposures, and physical stresses. Also, personnel must receive appropriate hazard awareness training. Personal protective equipment should be available in serviceable condition and used when indicated. To complement these efforts, the medical department has developed occupational health programs to identify health hazards through annual work site surveys, biological monitoring procedures, and periodic physical examinations. The interim result has been an improvement in hazard awareness, occupational health support services, and better worker compliance.
A major stumbling block, however, is the lack of an effectively managed occupational health program for active duty personnel assigned to ships—especially ships whose mission is heavily directed toward industrial support of other vessels. This ongoing problem has certain complexities which preclude quick solutions. Afloat activities are rarely static. Training, numerous inspections, and frequent deployments often overshadow occupational health implementing requirements. Misunderstanding of the importance of preventive aspects related to chronic diseases has often been responsible for a command’s “weakly committed” attitudes toward occupational health programs.
The improper use of chemical substances and the lack of local exhaust systems for welding and protective equipment for thermal insulators are typical examples of discrepancies frequently found during shipboard surveys. Varied reasons are offered for not complying with recommended corrective actions. Some are related to increased changeover of shipboard personnel. Other deficiencies are frequently viewed as not serious enough to adversely affect the ship’s mission and subsequently are not given high enough priority.
The Naval Medical Command and the Navy Environmental Health Center are currently evaluating a proposal recommending the assignment of industrial health officers to selected tender/repair- class ships. This proposal was discussed in an open forum during the Navy Occupational Environmental Health Conference at Virginia Beach, Virginia. Although assigning Medical Service Corps officers on board ship is not a new concept, placing experienced industrial tributed to excessive exposures, numerous, more recently develops chemicals on board ships also increa-se the importance of better-engineered 1(1 dustrial vent systems. Although son11 limited toxicological studies of thos^ chemicals may indicate low risks 0 harmful effects, such research show never be considered the last word 0,1 product safety assurance. New evident on toxicity and better-designed stud>e can significantly alter earlier percepti°n and conclusions.
The ship’s industrial health off>cl\ could systematically evaluate variou. shop operations and determine wlnc require local exhaust ventilation. gether with a timely support effort fr°
ectively
^should be well within the capabil
Im- ~‘J engmeered controls. These so-
, Pilters
which are dirty or improperly
pr^a'r t'ef>artmcnt personnel, this survey fecHi i*fe Can dev*se and implement ef-
•he r rePa'r ships. Another benefit is shi 6 lm'nat>on of waiting periods for for ■ a'terat'°n approval. Most requests unn'n^UStr*a* vent'*ation alterations are notCtessary since the modifications do C()reciu're major structural changes or nf, Pr<)rn'se damage control effective' ln any way.
niai SCCOndary concern is the preventive terriateaance aspect of local exhaust sys- sati f Many systcms tested as marginally CateS act°ry are pushed into the “unsat” misfry through poor maintenance and braS®' Inspection ports of main and belief l*uctwork are often left open in the incre cornfort within the space will fec(. ase- This practice is not only inef- /\nhut could result in tragic mishaps. c0rrer *ess frequent occurrence is inPlan Ct ^ w'red fan motors following a rioj maintenance system (PMS) pe-
in his situation causes fans to rotate eff;„- Wr°ng direction, decreasing their lency by at ieast 40%.
thesee<^ ^Ur’n8 the PMS cycle compound cent ^ent'lation discrepancies. Reminis- the p,0 *he "for loss of the nail holding ofpa°rSeSh°e” story» the chronic buildup latio^1011^16 material in a general venti- Uati0S^stem could lead to disastrous sit- verse,1S: The tender with her large, di- vuineladustrial complex is especially sitUatrah*c- One early indication of this 10n °ften observed is when galley and laundry personnel arrange pieces of cloth as filters over supply air terminals to prevent contamination of food and a clean laundry.
A prevalent misconception regarding the vent systems in paint lockers and flammable liquid storerooms is that they are effective in controlling toxic vapors and gases. These systems often appear to have been designed primarily to reduce explosive vapor concentrations to below the lower explosive limit and to provide an oxygen concentration of 19-21% in the space. Open storage or spillage of some toxic substance was not considered in the design criteria for air volume exchanges. Frequently, these dilution systems are turned off, and access to the switches which activate the motors and fans is limited. This naturally leads to concerns about confined space entry policies. Naval Ships Technical Manual (NSTM), chapter 074, volume three, adequately explains policy and procedures. Misunderstanding of what constitutes a confined space as opposed to a poorly ventilated area results in potential harm and possible poor compliance with NSTM-074 guidelines. Measuring concentrations of toxic substances has been difficult because the instruments are expensive, accuracy is dependent upon proper calibration, and some operators are unaware that other chemical and physical agents interfere and alter the device’s precision. The equipment provided on board is only as useful as the crew members’ ability to operate it.
With the increased use of various halo- genated hydrocarbon gases and liquids on board our vessels, more attention is required to ensure that workers who handle—or who may inadvertently come into contact with—the fluorinated, brominated, and chlorinated compounds are not running unreasonable health risks. Awareness training is partially effective. However, some commonly used audiovisual presentations tend to lessen the impact of the hazard’s seriousness. Smaller discussion groups at the division level, led by an industrial health officer, are more likely to promote better subject interest, understanding, and compliance.
The chemicals mentioned earlier and others with flammable and explosive tendencies must also be better segregated on board. This control precludes accidental mixing of highly volatile agents which can produce a violent or toxic effect if allowed to react. Experienced health and safety professionals can easily recognize most of these incompatible chemicals.
Relying solely on the availability and usefulness of Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) and the accuracy of other ready reference publications may not provide the expected margin of safety to which the command is entitled. This problem becomes more complicated when work centers are given authority to obtain solvents and cleaners through open purchase, usually from local vendors not subject to interstate commerce regulations for product labeling and packaging. Ship personnel may be impressed by demonstrations of a product’s usefulness and fail to question sales personnel about the product’s content, which retailers can be required to disclose. In this day of high technology, access to a gas chromatograph-mass spectrometry instrument, through a recognized industrial laboratory, will identify almost any chemical substance hidden under the guise of “a proprietary compound.” A number of these chemicals are found to be prohibited from shipboard use. Some are even substances already available for use and present in the stock system. However, some vendors’ products retail for several times the same stock product cost. This information is not new but is usually poorly communicated to new division officers and others, and they are left unaware and uninformed. A repair ship having the on-board expertise of a resi-
dent industrial health officer should be able to prevent such costly and unnecessary mistakes.
Chemical storage problems are common on many ships, and tenders are not exempt. Owing to the nature of the chemicals involved, however, and the vast quantities required to perform assigned processes, it is especially prudent to have an officer available to assess chemical storage requirements. Too often, toxic or flammable solvents and paints are not returned to their respective storerooms. Complacency sets in, and the situation is created for a serious fire, an explosion, or some other mishap or near miss. Zone inspections conducted by personnel trained and alert for hazards such as improper chemical storage can help preclude these avoidable incidents.
Compressed gas cylinders are another form of chemical storage which merits more consideration. The recent and timely revision of NSTM-550 provides ample information on safety precautions for industrial gases. The industrial health officer can use that chapter as a reference in developing specific implementing guidelines for ship’s personnel to follow, which safety petty officers can use as lesson plans within their divisions. Other NSTM chapters and numerous health and safety instructions could be similarly abbreviated.
The terms “safety hazard” and “health hazard” have- been used interchangeably so frequently on board ship that it has become difficult to separate the definitions. However, if the two terms are dichotomized, the spirit of teamwork is often inhibited, and command unity for safety consciousness becomes diminished. It is not important whether it is a safety or a health hazard but whether the hazard exists and what risk it poses for the crew and the ship’s safety. When a safety or health hazard occurs on board a ship located in a remote area, there may not be time to send a message for guidance. A responsible industrial health officer on board a tender operating in the vicinity might alleviate the uncertainty much faster than is possible through exchanging priority messages.
There are also the topics of heat stress, asbestos, and noise control. Each of these areas is covered in lengthy instructions. In the case of asbestos, NSTM-635 provides thorough details and specific directions for compliance. The engineering department has been given greater responsibility in managing the heat stress program and in proper asbestos removal procedures. The hearing conservation program remains a medical department responsibility. Better audiometric testing capabilities and frequent hearing conservation awareness efforts are making a noticeable difference. An experienced industrial health officer assigned to a tender can add to the effectiveness of current program efforts.
Improper use of personal protective equipment (PPE) is one of the most common discrepancies cited in shipboard industrial health surveys. PPE’s availability on board does not mean it is being used properly. Respirators are occasionally found in paint lockers or hanging from a hook near a welding bench. Many of them have missing parts or are contaminated with some substance, rendering them unserviceable and suggesting the lack of a program of PPE maintenance. Worse yet, even with serviceable respirators, the workers and some supervisors do not know which filters are appropriate for which operations. Also, many crew members do not know the limitations of air-purifying respirators. The four Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Units (NEPMUs) are attempting to improve this situation by offering Shipboard Respiratory Protection Program courses each month. This approach is only partially effective; without the more senior shop center personnel and their division officers in attendance, the impact is usually only temporary.
Another major problem is confined space entry. There are many areas on board ship which can be classified as confined spaces. They have inadequate ventilation to accommodate a worker, especially if he is engaged in a process which generates contaminations if the proper PPE is not worn, and the hazards, for example, from welding fumes and their associated gases, accidental spillage of mercury in a fuel pump room, or painting a space with a powered sprayer. The unanswerable question is, “How many episodes of chemical insult does our body permit before a chronic, debilitating, and ultimately fatal disease will develop?” The many variables include age and health status, prior history of toxic exposures (e.g., smoking and drinking habits), genetic predilection, and socioeconomic status. One variable which does not have to occur is worker or supervisor ignorance of the hazards. An integral facet of Navy policy has always been that the service member is not allowed to perform any potentially hazardous tasks without first being oriented to the operation or procedure, and then given adequate training in the proper safeguards. This same emphasis must be placed on the knowledge and use of PPE.
The tender’s size and the complex industrial processes on board cry out for better precautions. Command priorities tend to shift quickly, and problems may go unresolved unless a qualified industrial health officer is assigned on board to help facilitate the necessary changes. Too often, inexperienced industrial health officers report long lists of discrepancies but are unavailable and nonsupportbe when specific actions and timely solutions are requested.
Perhaps the biggest plus for the assignment of this type of naval officer is timeb and regular access to the command. A knowledgeable, middle-grade health and safety person is unlikely to abuse that privilege since lateral communication among the department heads should suffice for resolving many problem areas' The proposed sea duty billet would als° allow the Naval Officer Billet Code <!l 0862 to be more consistent with the rotation tours afforded other staff corps off1' cers, which should clarify a role for the industrial health officers relevant to then prospective contingency planning func' tions. In addition this officer could assume or support duties relating to safety environmental protection, and habitabil' ity. An appreciation of insidious, occupa' tionally related diseases is not only aC" quired from textbooks or guest lecture^ but is enhanced by field experience >n evaluating many kinds of industrial pr°c' esses. Those officers with recogniz®® qualifications should be assigned to posl' tions where they can contribute mean in?' fully and directly to the fleet.
Compliance with safety factors has been costly administratively. A dispr°" portionate amount of resources has bee” directed toward the civilian side of lb- naval labor force. Efforts to ascertain 1®V' els of hazards on board ships have bee<l delegated to a few industrial health off1' cers assigned to NEPMUs and naval ho11' pitals. Some of these officers have lib' ited professional experience, and man) are entry-level personnel with an inad®' quate understanding of naval policies-
Constant turnovers of crew rnernb®1* have hindered efforts in establishing fective shipboard occupational safety an health programs. The assignment of perienced industrial health officers 10 tender/repair-class ships would be an in1 tial step in providing resources to the flee consistent with those serving ashore.
Lieutenant Warling received a bachelor of scic^ degree from California State University, L° * Beach. He served as Head, Fleet/Facilities SupP0 Branch at the Navy Environmental Health Cent Norfolk, and as an industrial health officer with ronmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Nun1 Five. He is currently with the Occupational Envif0 mental Health Department, Camp Pendleton.
19»J
^ore Up the Indian Ocean
By L|eutenant Steven J. Dunn, U. S. Navy
q 0r“r°l of the sea-lanes in the Indian in?630 ^3S *3ecorne recognized as a vital e‘es‘ °f the United States. To that end, e 6 aave established the continuing pres- Ce at least one carrier battle group an amPhibious ready group in that Ca’ are building up Diego Garcia as a vlJUrc base for our forces, and have de- (RDpCC* tBe Deployment Force
_ F), the first unified command to be
Seated
in more than 20 years
f le difficulties in maintaining an ef- ctlve presence and projecting military world are not really
ewer halfway around the sUiu?°US’ Diego Garcia is iM non; stall ^>r a maj°r military or naval in- a ation and js practically undefended. frj lrila‘es of the number of stable, endly countries that would welcome a raiilllanent base w*‘h*n their borders ati ^eProm few to none. The logistic situ- rin°n ‘s SUch that, although a U. S. Ma- heC ,<“orPs battalion landing team could P aced ashore within two days and be Rented ‘hereafter
by airborne forces shortly the heavy infantry and their
fiv 'Prnetit would not arrive for four to
As it now stands, one nuclear
defICf must Provide not only for her own
in th186 ^Ut a*so P°r ‘^at °f aP friendlies
the C 3rea—‘n a highly volatile part of
gen W°r^ ‘hat could go from peace to
rip Cral War at the crack of an assassin’s
Ir.,6 ?r tPc further escalation of the Iraq- tran War.
‘he fa‘^er cornPhcating the situation is SV-±pin8 antiship missiles with ranges
r •
that our potential adversaries are
hieh ” na“tical miles or more. Flying at vicj SUPersonic speeds and guided to the Sov'°* ‘f16 target by sensors or the Sj[|()le‘ version of our NavStar global po- a tpj11111® system, these missiles constitute the CUt Wp'ch can be countered only by tor 111081 carc‘u‘ conservation of intercep- theUnt* ‘ar|fer assets. Further, destroying 0neWeaP°n platforms before launch (the Win •rUly effective “defensive” tactic) soclnv°lve the battle group’s defenses frnn?mp*ete*y as to leave it open to attack pother threats.
Weanere are proposals for innovative vide ,°-n systems which could help to pro- air superiority over the entire Indian
Royal Navy in the 1930s), and embarrassed entire nations (remember Sputnik?). In this age of limited budgets, we cannot afford to waste money, resources, or time.
Since it was formed for use in the Indian Ocean/Mideast area, the RDF should have overall command of all U. S. forces in Southwest Asia. A permanent detachment of the command staff should be located in Diego Garcia with appropriate command facilities, including satellite secure communications and data link. Though certain other bases may be more conveniently located and have better provisions and accommodations, “Fantasy Island” is owned by a longstanding ally (the United Kingdom) which is unlikely to toss us out for governmental changes or U. S. foreign policy initiatives.
The U. S. Air Force is considering a modification of the B-l as a long-range bomber-destroyer for continental air defense. Equipped with the AWG-9 weapon system (presumably with enhanced performance), this Mach 2.2-class aircraft would carry 24 Phoenix missiles internally and 14 forward hemisphere launch- and-leave missiles externally. See Figure 1. Another interesting concept is the ballistic intercept missile. This device reminds one of the super-duper, do-every- thing missile described in the novel Show of Force (Ace Books, 1981). This silo- or air-launched missile is designed to use terminally guided reentry vehicles with phased-array conformal antennae for nonnuclear intercept at Mach 8 speeds.
Let us use the scenario that is the basis for war games and tactical guidance instructions: rising tensions leading to hostilities. Specifically, let us assume there
will be some indication that an attack may be contemplated—an assassination, a new border war, threats, recalling of ambassadors, an embargo, etc. Such an indication would provide enough time to station long-range interceptors at Diego Garcia, send Air Force E-3 Sentry aircraft to Egypt or Saudi Arabia, and put the RDF on alert.
One or two B-ls should patrol continuously over the carrier battle group deployed, perhaps leaning toward the direction of the expected threat, but always within AIM-54 range. An E-3, which will act as outer air commander as well as augmenting the battle group’s airborne early warning, will also remain airborne. The Sentry can also provide relays to the air defense commander, who will by necessity be located on Diego Garcia. As sensors begin to indicate that an attack is being marshaled, additional B-ls can be launched to augment those already on station, or to cover a wider arc against “Backfire” end-around tactics. The carrier’s long-range combat air patrol would also be catapulted about this time. The Soviets would need to muster a multiregimental-sized force with fighter escorts to have a hope of penetrating this barrier. Some battle group F-14s can also be configured to provide cover for the Air Force aircraft against the escorts.
Depending on their range, the ballistic intercept missiles could be used either to reduce the enemy force before it comes in range of the interceptors, or to take care of any bombers which leak through the forward air screen to strike Diego Garcia. Perhaps the warhead could be made compatible with a range of boosters or a simple, timed ranging system could be used.
0,
Cean if
guard
properly employed and if we
ugainst the old evil of interservice
rnen|ry from preventing their develop- ‘itud Procurement. This union-like at- iu ^bat’s our job, not theirs” has
194-^ Past destroyed armies (Stalingrad, °bsoi ’ S6nt can"iers into battle with sadly ete aircraft (Royal Air Force vs.
The space-based sensor system projected for use with the ballistic intercept missile could also supply information to the airborne early warning units.
If the missiles were permanently situated on the island, they could help alleviate possible political problems involved with the reactive deploying of B-Is to the area; intelligence may be considered too shaky to risk the heightening of tensions which the presence of modified bombers might create. The missiles would cover the battle group at its northern sector, limited by the unlikely target discrimination capability of the warheads. Figure 2 gives an indication of the amount of overlapping coverage that could be available to a battle group operating on “GonZ° Station.”
Now, one can hear the rumblings fror11 the fighter community already: “So the Air Force can build these things. So what? After all, on a carrier you’ve got 24 Tomcats with six Phoenix missiles each. That ought to be able to handle any attack. All we really need are some KC' 10s, or perhaps a KS-3 tanker detachment. True. But—ignoring the facts limited availability of missiles and probability of failure—look at it another way- Those Soviets have a lot of airplanes- enough to produce multiwave, mul' tiregimental attacks. How many cycles do you want to stay up there? How effec' tive will you be after eight hours in the cockpit ? And if we want to knock down these characters 400-500 miles away- how many Tomcats can you keep out at those kind of ranges? Are you saying y011 couldn’t use some help? Why go it alone unnecessarily?
These new weapons have such potential that if the Air Force does not buy them, the Navy should.
Lieutenant Dunn was graduated from The Linen11 University in Pennsylvania in 1974. He was comma5 sioned through Officer Candidate School in 1976. oc served on board the USS El Paso (LKA-117) and tfe USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67). He is at the Flee' Combat Direction System Support Activity, PaI11 Neck.
spice traders began to penetrate the In' dian Ocean. In December 1810, during the Napoleonic wars, Mauritius, then 11 French possession, surrendered (with i1* outlying islands including Diego Garcia, to the British. England’s domination 0 India, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Persian Gulf virtually ensured that 1^ Indian Ocean remained a British “lake-
Diego Garcia
By Captain Paul B. Ryan, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Diego Garcia, part of the British Indian Ocean Territory, is a small (11 square miles), flat, wishbone-shaped atoll in the center of the Indian Ocean at 7°21’S, 72°28’E. Lying some 1,200 miles northeast of Mauritius, it is the largest and most southern of the coral islands of the Chagos Archipelago. It is also a most important U. S. naval “facility” (meaning a relatively small base providing limited operating support to combat forces).
Situated between the Persian Gulf and the South Atlantic, its position near the sea-lanes where scores of oil tankers steam en route to Western Europe and the United States adds to its suitability as a base for combat ships and long-range reconnaissance planes. It is clear to U. S. naval strategists that whoever controls these vital commercial arteries will ultimately affect the national destinies of the West and Japan.
A northwest monsoon season extends from October to March in the area where Diego Garcia is located. The annual rainfall may rise to as much as 145 inches, but rainfall in any month may vary from four to 14 inches. According to British records, months with less than one inch of rain are rare. The weather is generally sunny with occasional showers and light winds. Monthly maximum temperatures average 85° with a monthly minimum of 76°; the prevailing breeze mitigates the humidity.
Newcomers invariably are impressed by the variety of sea and land birds, the sport fishing, the huge land crabs, and beaches with exotic sea shells. Less attractive are the flies that attack sightseers at the old copra plantation.
Diego Garcia’s name is attributed to a 15th-century Portuguese navigator who discovered the island when European
However, in the post-World War II yeaP" because of a failing British defend budget, the Royal Navy progressively shrank. By 1981, it numbered only 75,000 personnel manning some l1’, major ships (destroyer types and above)- The passing of British sea power spellc the end of its control in the Indian Ocean In the world of power politics, over seas bases such as Diego Garcia g*v.e operational flexibility to naval and a'r forces. They are also important in a psV chological sense because potential adver
as a % to
Prime site for a strategic naval facil-
for warships whose presence would y to littoral nations that the United
es Would not let the Indian Ocean
sanes and neutral nations react to the Power—or lack of it—emanating from *Uch bases. Thus, after the U. S. Navy egan to build a naval base on Diego arcia in the 1970s, the Soviet Union m°ved to use Socotra Island, at the east- end of the Gulf of Aden, as an an- j, 0rage, and develop fleet facilities at erbera, Somalia, Aden, the People’s eniocratic Republic of Yemen (South ly^nen)> and Dahlak Island, Ethiopia. In . ’ Ihe Soviet Navy began to maintain a sizable squadron in the Indian Ocean "'ith a view toward filling the power vac- nUm Cfeated by the withdrawal of the °yal Navy. These Soviet moves generic growing concern within the U. S.
avy which, since 1949, had maintained ofSlT|al 1 Middle East Force in the vicinity o the Persian Gulf to serve as a naval Presence in that oil-rich area.2
1 ls a matter of record that, when orld War II ended, American strategists ere aware of the need for foreign naval (ases- Among those who sensed this fu- Q„r® requirement were Paul H. Nitze, an lcial in the Foreign Economic Admin- g rat'on and then-Captain Arleigh A. rke, U. S. Navy. A driving force in the avy Department was Stuart B. Barber, ■eruor civilian staff member of the Long ^ange Objectives Group (LROG), who aas convinced that the U. S. Navy must ^equine a simple logistics base in the Inn Ocean. Such island bases were es- (fntla* because it was obvious that upon United States would fall the burden of a,ntaining peace in the postwar dis- * .er: Barber recalled that, in 1960, q m'ral Burke, by now Chief of Naval Rations, was advised by the LROG of e desirability to acquire Diego Garcia
,l support contingency operations in ne Indian Ocean.3
S0AI'h°ugh the Navy did not openly say firs ”e ^aSe cou'd serve three purposes: , . ’ as a communications station for Pat ’ a'rcraB- and nuclear submarines on r°l in the area (these submarines pre- ^rnably would deter potential Soviet for]'6* making); second, as an airfield ong-range reconnaissance planes to base1! °n ^OV'et sb'Psi and third, as cottve- stati ^1 • ■
1 c to Soviet control by default. lego Garcia met the major U. S. re- ^•rements; the site should not be too p0|ly'y Populated; there should be no sha" k^ restrictions of the type that had 0C . ^ or even terminated American e|s^rat'°nal flexibility at foreign bases , Where; the site should be strategically ed; last, no endangered species of
flora or fauna should be present.4
It so happened that, in 1960, Nitze became Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. His good friend, Admiral Burke, recommended Rear Admiral John M. Lee, U. S. Navy, to be a member of Nitze’s staff. At the time, Nitze was developing plans for U. S. conventional combat forces. He recalled that Admiral Lee’s ideas on the need for strategic island bases corresponded with his own. Happily, in a previous post, Lee had worked up a list of such base facilities— including Diego Garcia, a site which Nitze incorporated in his plan. From this point on, according to Barber, the concept of Diego Garcia received strong support from all directors of the LROG, notably rear admirals Thomas H. Moorer, George H. Miller, and E. P. Aurand. Significantly, Admiral Arleigh Burke’s firm advocacy made the acquisition of the atoll an article of Navy faith.
Political reasons favored the choice. Britain’s participation in a joint defense base would demonstrate that it would continue to maintain residual forces in the area. Furthermore, a shared U.K.-U.S. facility would indicate to cautious members of Congress that the United States did not plan to “go it alone” in the Indian Ocean. Finally, Prime Minister Harold Wilson expressed approval of the site and moved swiftly to remove political impediments, such as that posed by Mauritius.5
Mauritius, like many British colonies in the post-World War II era, was scheduled to attain its independence from Britain in 1968. Diego Garcia, since 1810, had been tied administratively to Mauritius. Consequently, the British Government arranged with Mauritius for Diego Garcia to be ceded to Britain and remain under its sovereignty. As compensation, Britain paid Mauritius $8.4 million. Total detachment costs amounted to some $31 million, including resettlement expenses for the plantation workers of Diego Garcia. On 10 November 1965, Diego Garcia, as part of the Chagos Islands, was incorporated into the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), and the stage was set for a formal British-American pact.
Spirited opposition by certain Labor members in the British Parliament against the atoll’s use for defense purposes did not succeed in reversing the Crown’s decision. Mauritian political spokesmen raised charges of fraud over the manner in which the transfer of Diego Garcia presumably had been effected. In international forums, they accused London of political trickery in persuading them to accept only $8.4 million. When Britain rejected the charge, the Mauritians invited the United States to negotiate directly with them, hoping to persuade Washington that the atoll was rightfully its national resource and that Washington should pay an annual “rent” for its use.6 But these arguments did not stop the British and U. S. governments from carrying out their original plans.7
British and U. S. representatives signed an executive agreement on 30 December 1966 that authorized the United States to build a communications station for joint use; it also affirmed that both nations would use the island for defense purposes for 50 years. An executive agreement, unlike a treaty, does not require approval (with inevitable delay) by the U. S. Senate, a fact of which President Lyndon Johnson was well aware.8
News later leaked out that the United States secretly had helped to pay part of the costs incident to the “transfer” of Diego Garcia from Mauritius. In fact, as a quid pro quo, the U. S. Government picked up $14 million of the cost of research and development incident to Britain’s Polaris submarine program. In order to expedite the detachment of the island, the Pentagon had arranged for this costsharing without obtaining congressional approval. Sharp-eyed auditors from the U. S. General Accounting Office (GAO) subsequently labeled the transaction a clear circumvention of the congressional role to authorize expenditures. Nevertheless, the GAO concluded that no legal irregularity occurred.9
In 1968, the Navy received new support for Diego Garcia when Clark Clifford relieved Robet McNamara as Secretary of Defense. In the resultant shift,
'
The airfield—shown here with a carrier’s S-3A, an Air Force C-5A, and a P-3—and the pier are Diego Garcia’s primary facilities.
Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze was promoted to Deputy Secretary of Defense. During this time, Admiral Thomas Moorer, U. S. Navy, held the post of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Both Nitze and Moorer now wielded more clout with Congress in pushing for the island base, and in June 1968, the Navy’s recommendation to construct a modest base was approved.
Moorer was appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the summer of 1970. He was succeeded as CNO by Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., U. S. Navy. Both officers frequently expressed concern that as the U. S. Navy continued to shrink, the Soviets were commissioning new warships at a record rate. Consequently, distant bases, such as Diego Garcia, attained even more importance for the hard-pressed Navy to carry out its overseas responsibilities.
The Navy’s drive to acquire the island base came under intense scrutiny by congressional committees and certain Pentagon officials. The Defense Department’s office of systems analysis argued that, on the basis of cost-effectiveness, the atoll was not needed as a logistics base to refuel warships sailing from the U. S. East Coast to Vietnam, since oilers could refuel them at sea. Moreover, they claimed that Diego Garcia was too distant from any threatened area on the shores of the Indian Ocean to be of any value to the Navy. Other critics believed that a U. S. presence on Diego Garcia would provoke the Soviets into beefing up their naval bases. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reasoned that the island was most essential if U. S. forces were to respond to crises in the area. In the end, the Chiefs’ views prevailed, but at the cost of long delays and cuts in congressional appropriations for the base.10
In December 1970, Congress finally authorized a modest $5.4 million for the construction of a naval facility, whereupon an advance party of U. S. Navy Seabees (Naval Mobile Construction Battalions) landed at Diego Garcia in January 1971. About six months later, the Seabees had built a modest port facility, fuel farm, church, and had lengthened the old Royal Air Force landing strip to permit C-130 cargo planes to land. However, most construction support material was brought by ships sailing 11,000 miles from the United States. Meanwhile, the British gradually had resettled some 1,200 plantation contract-workers and their families on Mauritius or the Seychelles.11
A growing Soviet naval build up in the Indian Ocean generated further changes on Diego Garcia. On 24 October 1972, Washington and London, by an exchange of diplomatic notes, expanded the original executive agreement of 1966. It gave the United States new authority to improve the lagoon anchorage and the air facilities, enlarge logistic support capabilities (e.g., shops and warehouses), and build quarters for personnel. The United States also was empowered to use Dieg° Garcia for the duration of British ownership or until the atoll was no longer needed. Congress approved $48 millin'1 for the expansion of the base from 1971 to 1974.12
The upgrading of the atoll from an austere communications station to that of a logistic support base meant that the U. Sand Royal Air Forces would have a midocean airfield available for their long- range aircraft and air tankers conducting in-flight refueling on Middle East runS' For the navies of both nations, it meant that ships and aircraft, such as the U. S- Pacific Fleet’s long-range P-3 Orion surveillance planes, could be based on the island. Moreover, carrier battle groups eventually would have a supply port relatively nearby, thus reducing their reliance on replenishment ships temporarily assigned from the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific.
By December 1973, the facility was in full operation as part of the defense gl°" bal communication system which included communication satellites. In addition, the Navy had dredged the channel and anchorage area to accommodate aircraft carriers. The 8,000-foot airstrip had been strengthened, and fuel oil storage facilities enlarged. Cargo ships and oilers on visits to fill the atoll’s warehouses and oil tanks made it possible for Diego Garcia to provide limited logistic support to
submarines, surface vessels, and aircraft ln transit.
The construction of Diego Garcia as a j.e ense base did not find favor with many °reign governments, or with certain j^mbcrs of Congress. Predictably, adio Moscow routinely castigated the tited States for its threatening presence ,11 ® Indian Ocean and for its “strong- p° d on Diego Garcia. British Labor politicians and spokesmen for s,an nations deplored the U. S. military b,u,1dnp on the c|aimed-
'bust
,nc°unter this Soviet move by build- SeUp Diego Garcia, and the Senate sub- ently approved the appropriation.16
UnH° yCarS later’ in June 1977’ at a n,e0n meeting of the heads of govem-
Nat' tbc British Commonwealth of oUs °ns> representatives expressed seri- eoneem over the establishment of (j 5a[y installations (both Soviet and I971 ln the Indian Ocean. (As early as the t tbe ^tiled Nations had declared Peac "C!ian ®cean to be a “zone of ^mrn ^ ®ach 'n Washington, President Mei, 7 barter, in his State of the Union he ^,a§e of 19 -lunuary 1978, stated that as seeking agreement to prevent
on the island, which—they ^ - —would upset the equilibrium of
1 Indian Ocean region. India, a soli Professional neutralist,” contin- e to oppose construction of the base, ^ations which supported U. S. efforts on the^° ^arcia included Iran (then ruled by ® Shah), Pakistan (an adversary of rg |'a^! an<l’ paradoxically, China. Ever 'Stic, China favored any move which a °u ^ hinder Soviet naval superiority in n ocean close to its borders.
£ 'owever, the Director of the U. S. q6!’*1'3* Intelligence Agency, William by, informed a congressional panel in st Ihat if the United States made a sub- ntlal increase in its naval presence [on le8° Garcia], the Soviets would corre- jPbndingly increase their naval strength Cl •i? *nc*lan Ocean.13 Similarly, Senator thT'Ome °f Rhode Island warned n,at the United States first developed a j,aval base in the Indian Ocean, then the vtet Union would be provoked into th ^^hcning its position.14 Meanwhile, aj® Soviets continued their buildup of the rJJn<l naval base at Berbera, Somalia. Sen °rC P°htical opposition came from w "tor Mike Mansfield of Montana, luti° °n '9 ^ay 1975, proposed a reso- „r °n to disapprove funds for the pro- °n the grounds that the White In(,Usc was starting an arms race in the Sch|an^Cean’15 Defense Secretary James cha CS'n®er subsequently turned the gra ®e aS'de by displaying aerial photo- Schl S- °f the Sovlet base at Berbera. mh,.eS'n8cr argued that the United States
major military competition in the Indian Ocean. Giving international support to the movement, the United Nations General Assembly again adopted a zone of peace declaration on 12 December 1978. One year later, the Soviet Union suddenly invaded Afghanistan, an act which silenced further talk of maintaining the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.17
U. S. relations with the British regarding the base remained smooth. On 25 February 1976, the two governments completed a third agreement to expand the facility by adding more logistic element and improvements to the anchorage and airstrip. All of this was essential, the document made clear, in order to provide improved defense measures and to serve ships and aircraft of both governments. The agreement also required that both nations periodically consult on joint plans and policies in the Indian Ocean. One could conclude that the British Government would be prepared to refuse the use of the Diego Garcia facilities during certain crises.18
To mark the urgency of Diego Garcia’s completion as a forward base, Secretary of the Navy W. Graham Claytor, Jr. announced in October 1977 that the island was a U. S. Navy support facility to provide assistance to U. S. and British forces as required. The list of assigned tasks was formidable and included: air terminal operations, air search and rescue, weather service, aircraft maintenance, and fuel and supply support.
Revolutionary chaos in Iran in the later 1970s spotlighted the fact that the supply of oil from the Middle East to the West could no longer be considered sacrosanct. The flight of the Shah in January 1979 meant that Iran’s defense of its border against the Soviet Union was no longer assured. Equally ominous, the threat to the maritime oil lines of supply in the Indian Ocean meant that the U. S. naval presence in the region had to be sufficient to present a rough balance of power with the Soviets. In this equation, a strong Diego Garcia presumably would play an important part.
By 1981, construction workers at Diego Garcia had produced a large L- shaped pier where ships could fuel and replenish their stores. A power plant, ammunition magazines, workshops, and air-conditioned personnel quarters had been built. The runway—now extended to 12,000 feet with parking aprons and hangars—was in full operation. To man the base, the Navy had assigned 450 communications personnel and another 450 support personnel, plus a varying number of Seabees, vendors, contractors, and civil servants. To these numbers must be added the crews from visiting ships and transient aircraft. Excellent cooperation prevailed between the Royal Navy and its U. S. colleagues. By 1982, the population of Diego Garcia on any given day numbered as much as 5,000 people, including some 35 Navy women.19 Overall administration of Diego Garcia is a joint affair. The Royal Navy senior officer, in addition to his naval responsibilities, also serves as the British Indian Ocean Territory Representative. The senior U. S. naval officer, a captain, commands the naval support facility.
The Pentagon’s need to shuttle troops swiftly to distant trouble points created strong enthusiasm in the Pentagon for the concept of the Rapid Deployment Force. To test the ability of U. S. forces to respond to crises, the Pentagon directed in March 1980 that seven cargo ships sail to Diego Garcia with combat equipment to support a U. S. Marine Corps amphibious force. Thus, troops could be flown to Diego Garcia to “marry up” with their heavy ordnance, vehicles, and other equipment. Diego Garcia now acquired a new role as a base for prepositioned, combat-loaded cargo ships.20
Because of the emphasis on the Indian Ocean theater, the U. S. Government, in a series of 1980 diplomatic agreements, obtained authority from Oman, Kenya, and Somalia (from which the Soviets were dismissed in November 1977 because of their collaboration with Ethiopia) to use their airfields and ports. However valuable these bases are, they are not comparable to the substantial complex at Diego Garcia. By 1984, because of the facility at Diego Garcia, the ability of U. S. military forces to project power in its Indian Ocean operations was measurably increased. Nevertheless, in the uncertain future, the safety of Diego Garcia rests upon the U. S. Navy’s ability to maintain air and sea control of the Indian Ocean and to project power, if needed, into the troubled Middle East.
from Admiral T. H. Moorer, then head of the Long" Range Objectives Group.
5Bezboruah, U. S. Strategy, pp. 60-61, gives details of the detachment of Diego Garcia from Mauritius and Washington’s assumption of $14 million as ha'! of the detachment cost, "but not to exceed $14 mil" lion.” "Financial and Legal Aspects of the Agree' ment on the Availability of Certain Indian Ocean IS' lands for Defense Purposes,” Report B-18491^- 1976, (Washington: General Accounting Office' 1976), p. 1.
6Joel Larus, “Diego Garcia: Political Clouds over* Vital U. S. Base,” Strategic Review, Winter 1982, P 45.
’Department of State, Treaties and Other International Agreements Series (TIAS) No. 6196, (Wash' ington: GPO, 1973).
8For a discussion see Bezboruah, U. S. Strategy, PP' 61-62.
’For an analysis see Larus, "Diego Garcia,” pp.
50.
10U. S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Af' fairs, subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia- Hearings, Proposed Expansion of U. S. MilitaO’ Facilities in the Indian Ocean, pp. 21-65, 66-87129-162.
UU. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed SeO' ices, subcommittee on Military Construction, Hear' ings, Military Construction Authorization, FY 19A on S. 1164, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 5-6 April 197V. (Washington: GPO, 1977), p. 129, sets forth Dieg0 Garcia construction program for 1971-1976. 'TlAS, No. 7481, Article 20. Details on congic" sional appropriations for the base are set forth in Be2' boruah, U. S. Strategy, pp. 66-82 and 99-100;;1[1 in U. S. Congress, House Committee on Approp213 dons, Second Supplement Appropriations for r 1974, Hearings on H R. 14013, 93rd Cong. 2nd sess., 1974, (Washington: GPO, 1974), p. 2114. 13U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropda tions, Hearings, Military Construction Author tion, FY 1975, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, (Wash' ington: GPO, 1974), pp. 163-168. l4Ibid., p. 485.
l5Congressional Record, 19 May 1975, pp. S 14996" 14999, and 28 July 1975, pp. S 25317-25363. For a discussion see Bezboruah, U. S. Strategy, pp- 118.
,6U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Sef' vices, Hearings, Disapprove Construction Prof on the Island of Diego Garcia, Report No. 94-^’ 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, (Washington: GP^’ 1975), p. 2; Bezboruah, U. S. Strategy, p. 75. 17See Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1977, P' 28505, for the complete statement by the Comm0*[1][2] [3] [4] wealth members. ,,
l8TIAS, No. 8230. See Joel Larus, “Diego Garcia, for a discussion. Chief of Naval Operations OPNA Notice 5450 of 3 November 1977 and Commander in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Instruction 5451.30 of December 1977, available from Navy Department- l9Larus, p. 47. See also J. Clemcntson, “Diego Gaf cia,” Journal of the Royal United Services Instil for Defense Studies (RUSI), Vol. 26, no. 2, Jullt 1981, pp. 36-38.
20Clementson, “Diego Garcia,” describes the e*ef cise and concludes that although the island is sma and far from the United States, it is of incalculab strategic significance. See also Norman L. Ston^; “An Indian Ocean Fleet-The Case and the Cost. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1981, pp. 54-5’ Georg Johannsohn, “Needed: A Defensive Capab1 ity for Diego Garcia,” Naval Institute Proceeding ' January 1981, pp. 17-18.
Captain Ryan, a 1936 graduate of the U. S. Nav^ Academy, is a line officer turned historian, am* 1 currently a research fellow at the Hoover Institution^ His book Disaster at Desert One: Why the RQ& 1 Iran Failed, will be published next year.
pandering Mines
Lieutenant Commander Thomas Q. Donaldson V, U. S. Navy
On 15 ju]y 1983, an article in the Wall
tidal
range in excess of 10.5 feet is be-
n°rthern Gulf normally range between and 1.7 knots, and spring tidal cur-
i was at perigee— Point at which it is closest to the cen-
the
^hat problem do Lloyd’s of London and Commander, Middle East Force have I? COmmon? Drifting mines in the Persian ('JUlf. of course.
,r<-et Journal reported that a sea mine detonated near Saudi Arabia’s major Port of Ras Tanura on 8 June, and that second mine had been discovered near e 'stand of Bahrain a week later. The ^hcle went on to mention that Lloyd’s ar-risk rating committee would meet to ssess the insurance implications. On that ^anie day, the Naval Oceanography j 0rtlrnand Center on Guam began study- 8 the Persian Gulf region’s oceanogra- P y and meteorology in an effort to deter- !ne the mechanisms influencing the lnes’ drift. The conclusions it reached e excellent examples of applying basic eteorology and oceanography to solve a eet problem.
f ;rhe m'nes’ suspected origin is a mine- le d in the northern gulf laid by Iraq or cratl during late 1981 or early 1982. A '"bination of spring tidal currents and a
r
'eyed to have set the mines adrift. The •hes were probably transported by the ,®an surface current drift complicated by eddy entrainment.
these theories were based on certain tcts- Gulf bottom slope and sediment ype ruled out the possibility of moored “walking.” The mean tidal range the northern gulf is 7.0 feet; however, rn 12-13 May 1983, a 10.8-foot tide an8e occurred. Tidal currents in the
1-0;
rem ... ’--- r * “‘c, «•“*
l-1' sPeeds of 2.4 knots are common. On "lay 1983, the moon'
. ii io V1WOV.OI IU 11.
r °f the earth—which produced
mum tidal currents in the gulf.
Currents flowing from the Gulf of Oman and the rivers, monsoonal wind flow, and evaporation were considered when estimating the Persian Gulf’s mean current flow and surface circulation. The maximum river runoff of the Tigris and Euphrates river basins, which occurs in May and June, also enhanced the ebb tidal flow. The 12 May surface pressure analysis depicted an enhanced northerly wind flow over the northern gulf which would have reinforced the southward-setting ebb tidal current.
The corrosive effect of warm saline water was another contributing factor in the release of the mines. The northern gulf is estimated to be a moderate biofouling environment, resulting in marine growth and corrosion. The length of time the mines were in the water may have been the critical factor, since an 11.8-foot tidal range on 30 January 1983, with springlike tidal currents, failed to break free any mines. After 18 months in such an environment, however, the environmental conditions on 12-13 May 1983 may well have caused the minemooring chains to break.
The surface circulation of the Persian Gulf sets to the northwest along the coast of Iran and to the southeast along the coast of Saudi Arabia. The inflow from the Gulf of Oman is on the surface, while the outflow of denser, highly saline water occurs toward the bottom 30 meters of the water column through the Strait of Hormuz, implying that free-floating mines caught in the surface circulation have little chance of exiting the gulf via the Strait of Hormuz.
Mine drift calculations were further complicated by the presence of coastal and offshore eddies. Figures 1 and 2 depict the eddy and current features analyzed by satellite imagery from 26 May and 11 June 1983. The anticyclonic eddy north of Bahrain and the eddies off the coast of Saudi Arabia are semipermanent features and were considered when estimating mine drift speed and location.
The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most heavily transited areas of the world; an estimated eight million barrels of oil pass through the strait daily. Each commercial tanker or freighter, as well as naval ship, is vulnerable to severe damage, or sinking, if she were to collide with a drifting mine. The Naval Oceanography Command Center will continue to monitor the gulf environment particularly into late 1984 because more mines could appear in the mid-gulf region as the result of predicted extreme tide ranges and spring tidal currents. More mines appeared in the mid-gulf region between late January and late March 1984 as the result of an 11.8-foot tide range and spring tidal currents which occurred on 23 December 1983, or similar conditions which occurred on 19 January and 17 February 1984. Reports of minesweeping activity added another dimension to predicting mine movement since there is always the possibility of a mine having been swept and inadvertently set adrift.
These types of fleet problems point dramatically to the need for a more capable surface drift computation capability to support tactical operations as well as search and rescue requests; development of evasion tactics for steaming through, or patrolling in, high probability areas for drifting mines; studies of drift characteristics of mines and a real-time understanding of the environment and its effects on mine drift; the development of minefield loss statistics as a function of mine-mooring material corrosion; and better information flow among the mine warfare, intelligence, and geophysics communities.
Commander Donaldson was graduated from the
U. S. Naval Academy with a bachelor of science degree in oceanography. He served in the USS Claude
V. Ricketts (DDG-5) as Main Propulsion Assistant before attending the Naval Postgraduate School. He was stationed at the Naval Oceanography Command Center on Guam and is currently an instructor at the Antisubmarine Warfare Training Center, Norfolk.
While many people associate mine warfare as a tactic of the past, it is a real problem today in the Persian Gulf. The key to preventing an international disaster as the result of a ship colliding with a drifting mine may well lie in our ability to understand the Persian Gulf environment.
The Helo: Potential Ship Killer?
By Lieutenant John F. McGowan, U. S. Navy
Why do we limit our thinking about helicopters to antisubmarine warfare (ASW), mine countermeasures, search and rescue, and logistics? What about antishipping warfare?
Many other navies employ helicopters in an antishipping warfare role, both in coastal and deep water operations. The British campaign in the Falklands Conflict demonstrates the effectiveness of helicopters against warships and surfaced submarines. Royal Navy Lynx helicopters armed with Sea Skua air-to-surface missiles sank an Argentine patrol boat and damaged another, along with a surfaced Argentine submarine, the Same Fe.
The British helicopters were able to contribute to the success of their fleet operations because they were properly armed. The United States should consider
■ -..... —------------- ---- --------- —
WESTLAND HELICOPTERS
Sea Skua-armed Lynx
introducing an effective helicopter- launched antishipping missile into the fleet.
For maximum cost-effectiveness, all of the fleet’s helicopters should be equipped to accommodate the same missile. By necessity, this will reduce the size of the missile to that which the smallest of the current helicopters can carry. For further simplification of operations with our allies, it would be desirable to use a NATO missile. If a missile is to be obtained soon, a current production missile would probably have to be used, although there are some U. S. missiles that have potential for use with modifications.
Many factors must be considered in selecting a suitable missile. Weight is a major concern. Most fleet helicopters are very much constrained by maximum
gross weight limitations, and the missile must be as light as possible while still allowing for the necessary range and striking power for use at sea. The length and diameter must be compatible with existing external stores stations. It is unrealistic to expect a helicopter-launched missile to inflict serious damage on a cruiser or frigate, but even a small missile can be effective against a patrol boat or the search and fire control radars and weapon systems of a larger ship.
The launch envelope of the missile would have to be compatible with a helicopter’s flight regimes. Missiles that require launch speeds much in excess of 100 knots can be discounted. This would eliminate ram jets or turbine-powered missiles unless a rocket booster is used to achieve the necessary speed to start the motor, but this would add weight. Most helicopter launches would occur at comparatively low altitudes—below 1,000 feet—and a launch below 100 feet should be achieved for maximum aircraft survivability. Thus, long “fall away” times would be unacceptable, and yet the missile must be designed so that the exhaust will not damage the helicopter during launch.
Careful consideration must be given to the missile’s guidance and flight profiles. Many guidance options are available: active and semiactive homing, wire-guided, home-on-jam (HOJ), infrared, or combinations of these, to name but a few. Wire-guided missiles require a simple optical sight and “joystick” control unit but have very short ranges for use in naval engagements and require the helicopter to keep the target in sight, limiting evasive maneuvers. Active homing requires a self-contained radar in the missile and adds greatly to its cost and complexity. Semiactive homing requires the helicopter to illuminate the target with its radar, and the missile seeker head then homes in on the reflected radiation; therefore, the helicopter must be radiating its radar and is subject to early detection by the target. Stealth and surprise would be reduced by this option. The best option appears to be an autogyro that directs the missile out at a preset bearing with a terminal infrared seeker head that will activate at a preset time after launch to keep it from hitting an unintended target. This seeker is susceptible to countermeasures, which are effective however only if the target has sufficient time to activate them.
To reduce the warning time, the missile should fly a sea-skimming profile using a radar altimeter. If feasible, a terminal “pop-up” maneuver should be incorporated to reduce the effectiveness of any counter-fire. The range of the missile will be limited by its size but should be ten miles at a minimum and 20 miles as an optimum to enhance aircraft survivability and the element of surprise.
The weapon should not require any preflight assembly by the user except for a simple go/no-go test. This will not overload the ship’s existing ordnance capabilities, especially in the case of the light airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS) helicopters. Storage should be in containers with long shelf lives that will require no preventive maintenance-
Operationally, the missile could be swiftly loaded when the helicopter is likely to be in close proximity to any enemy surface vessel or against enemy missile-firing submarines that must surface to fire their missiles. Using electronic emission control (EMCON) and adequate electronic surveillance measures (ESM) and by flying as low to the water as possible, the helicopter may detect the enemy before being detected itself. After relaying the targeting information to the battle group, the helicopter may engage the enemy immediately °r wait until just prior to the arrival of the surface- or air-launched weapons. The helicopter-launched missile will probably “soften” the target by disabling some of its sensors and/or weapon systems or win increase its counter-fire problem by adding another incoming weapon from close range.
For the helicopter to become a viable air-to-surface platform, adequate radars- ESM equipment, and chaff dispensers for self-protection after launching the missile must be installed as well. Of course- these improvements will not allow the helicopters to take a place alongside the A-18 or A-6 as a tactical strike aircraft* but they will make full use of the helicopters’ capabilities and give them sorfle means of defending themselves in the hostile environment into which they are being thrust daily now that helicopters are being used as “eyes” for the fleet in pr0' viding targeting information.
Lieutenant McGowan was graduated from the Nav:' Academy in 1977. He then attended flight school an was designated a naval aviator in 1978. His first dp erational assignment was with HSL-36. He is cllf rently attending the Naval Postgraduate School in antisubmarine warfare curriculum.
Stop the Corrosion of Our Fleet
Lieut,
enant Commander Larry W. Brown, U. S. Navy
As
we move into the tenth decade of
• 6 S. steel Navy, we find most blue- e ets fighting corrosion in much the f th6 [ab°r-intensive way their grand- ahers’ generation of bluejackets did. ake a tour around a ship looking for rros'°n-related problems, and here are rme things you may find: limit switches acred inoperable by moisture-fouled na, acts or operating mechanisms, termi- a boxes with nonfunctional moisture barriers
"'ith t
electric quick-disconnect plugs
1 corroding pins or connectors, deteri- niatC(J label and identification tags anted onto dissimilar metals forming
Salvai
^ations inaccessible to the paint scraper rnsh, fasteners and cable clamps of ttoded carbon steel, exterior aluminum an I ^bb’bbng up in layers of aluminum sul Px'^at'on- and battery racks in which Pnuric acid systematically prevents PaiaJ adhesion.
har sophisticated techniques for Cali? o^ati011 have increased dramati- C0 y in number and availability, the in- j Ration has not reached the man on the j/Mates. Contrary to their counterparts he aviation community, which has a hiprehensive corrosion control pro- the shipboard sailor is unprepared a‘t this nemesis; the most he can hope
,n*c cells, corroded equipment foun-
f°r is
to slow its progress.
he Navy appears to believe that cor-
r°sion
s- is only a weather decks problem Ce boatswain’s mate is the only rating requires any knowledge of preserva- n techniques for promotion. But, in the It)S 20 years, the volume of boatswain’s ate coursebook material devoted to tj CSerVation has dwindled to a paltry sec- Svvn. Covering only fundamentals. Boat- am s mate advancement is keyed to ,foncie c°ntrol.
■ciency in seamanship and damage These subjects are unquestion-
j
ancl V'ta*’ *1ut Poor Preservation of hull, c0 ^chanical and electrical equipment fUn ,S the Navy dearly in maintenance tviliS aiK* man‘hotirs. A job done poorly inevitably have to be redone. nier°me might argue that corrosion is re|y a cosmetic problem. But our ships
ave
exPlosion, and legions of men have elec* reP*ace£i by mechanical, pneumatic,
witnessed two decades of technol-
troubleshooting or maintenance and fails to reseal them.
Every rating is responsible for a section of the ship and some of her equipment. The lack of in-rate training in preservation procedures and meager shipboard expertise guarantees the problems will get worse, not better.
As we continue to increase our equipment’s sophistication while reducing the number of personnel, we must become more intolerant of maintenance practices which cause periodic repetition. There are other more important tasks on board our warships. Every man-hour spent on maintenance is subtracted from those available for operational training.
Progress is being made. In the past ten years, the academic and industrial communities have instituted a significant research effort which has produced a wide range of corrosion-resistant sealers. Many of these are being applied to shipboard applications under the supervision of Naval Sea Systems Command (Nav- SeaSysCom) and the naval shipyards.
On the waterfront, type commanders are attaching priority to corrosion prevention and assigning oversight responsibility within their staffs. Tests have been conducted on some of the more innovative fleet-generated ideas, and the most notable success has been the application of aluminum flame spraying to the valve maintenance programs.
With the growth of intellectual activity on this subject comes a plethora of information. The Naval Ship System Engineering Station, Philadelphia, is preparing corrosion control handbooks for some ship classes to document the location of protective coatings and problem areas and providing written procedures for their maintenance. NavSea will soon publish a new facilities’ maintenance manual (NavSea T-9040-HBK-010/FMS), and product manufacturers are bombarding ships with sales pitches and brochures concerning miracle cleaners and sealants. For the interested student, there are the Naval Postgraduate School Corrosion Control Conference and Norfolk Naval Shipyard evaluation reports.
The Navy Ship’s Technical Manual (NSTM) has been used for many years, but it is out of date. Many of the procedures currently being used with NavSea- funded corrosion control packages are not discussed, and many of the NSTM-rec- ommended products have either been dropped from the supply system or the listed stock number is invalid.
Is it reasonable to expect that new publications and manuals will change shipboard habits developed over decades? Who will be responsible for passing this information to the crew? How useful is knowledge without experience? Success will be limited by how widely the subject is taught and understood.
As we move into the 1980s, we must be capable of wisely choosing between the wide variety of products being offered. In the final analysis, the man on the ship is the one who identifies the problems, initiates the solutions, monitors each step of the method, and is responsible for the result. Knowledge of what is available must be tempered with the realistic expectations gained from experience.
There is an avalanche of new treatments, coatings, and systems from which to choose, including polysulfides, serme- tal, fluidized bed epoxy, ceramic, vapor
These sailors seem to be making every effort to reach every inch of this hull— but unless they get a longer ladder and more encouragement, corrosion will continue to cost the Navy in lost man-hours and dollars.
ctrical, and electronic watch standers. hiost durable of these sets of equip-
T’he ,
'em
vitot
er$ pw -
5j ’. :ne °f the greatest threats to their 0lce life is the repair technician who hs the moisture barriers during routine
blent
are protected from their marine en-
b'licnt by a system of moisture barri-
phase inhibitors, acid cleaning and etching (citric and phosphoric), and wire flame spraying. How will shipboard personnel decide which method to apply or request? The choice must be made judiciously, and there must be careful preparation or the effort will be for naught.
Therefore, the level of knowledge and experience must be improved at the shipboard level. Whatever system is chosen, it must at some point reach across all ratings and should provide a means for incorporating new technology. One method consists of three elements: a trained shipboard expert, a shipboard training package, and a comprehensive and dynamic reference library.
The trained shipboard expert should come from the boatswain’s mate rating because boatswain’s mates have traditionally been charged with shipboard preservation. An advanced course of instruction for boatswain’s mates who are E-5s and above should be established to provide the knowledge and a baseline level of experience. This career petty officer’s shipboard functions would be to advise the command on methods for correcting corrosion problems, assist in the preparation of external work requests, provide the necessary expertise to inspect industrial and shipboard workmanship, oversee the shipwide training program, maintain the reference library, and be the resident expert on safety.
Since new responsibilities would be added to an already fully employed rating, a training aid package should be provided to ease the impact upon his workload. The commercially available sound- slide projectors are probably the most versatile format available to the shipboard instructor. Besides the obvious audiovisual advantages, it is easily tailored to special circumstances, can be interrupted to emphasize specific points or answer questions, or the program can be run without an instructor.
The library of reference materials available on board ship will play an essential part in any program. Bulletins highlighting changes to these publications could be issued by the proposed corrosion control school, avoiding the normal administrative delays in altering a publication. The school bulletins could also provide a clearinghouse for fleetgenerated ideas, new products, and procurement procedures.
This three-part program, while not a panacea, offers the opportunity to bring our shipboard preservation methods out of the 1940s and into the 1980s, to start solving problems instead of painting ovef them, and to provide a means of funnel' ing current information on new tech' niques and products directly to the fleet- Vice Admiral Robert L. Walters, Dep" uty Chief of Naval Operations, Surface Warfare, issued the challenge: “Let’s use our uncommon ingenuity in improving our leadership of people and our manage' ment of resources to do more with less. Controlling or eliminating the debilitatW6 effects of the ocean environment by the proper application of corrosion-resistanj
sealers to mechanical, electrical, and electronic equipment offers the potenth’1 for creating significant savings in oper3' tions and maintenance funding whHe improving the ratio of crew training vef' sus equipment maintenance time.
Lieutenant Commander Brown was graduated U01’1 the University of Colorado in 1972 with a degree physics. He has served in two nuclear-powered attaC submarines, a combat stores ship, a guided-in'ssl destroyer, a frigate, and an oiler. He is currently 3 exchange officer serving at the Joint Maritime Operil tional Training Staff, Edinburgh, Scotland.
Submarine Tank Carrier
By Clark C. Abt
of
immersion fluid, much, but not all,
,d
You can’t airmail tanks to trouble spots. If all of our 100 C-5s were to make a delivery every two days to, for example, the Persian Gulf, after ten days there would be only 500 tanks deployed—not enough to take on even one Soviet armored division.
It isn’t a very good idea to send our armor on slow surface ships, despite superior cargo capacity. Even if the alternative of an expanded C-5 air cargo fleet were considered, how could it be reliably defended against Soviet air army interception near its landing areas?
So, if we rule out air and surface shipment, what’s left? The quick reaction capacity (QRC) submarine landing ship tank (LST).
The design proposed for the QRC submarine LST would consist of two identical and parallel large submarine hulls, such as the 560-foot Ohio (SSBN-726)- class hull, connected by a 40-50-foot high, 500-foot long three-deck steel girder structure with a 10,000-ton capacity for about 120 heavy tanks, 100 armored personnel carriers, and 100 jeeps.
The connecting structure would be faired into the streamlined submarine bow and stern hulls to minimize drag. The structure would not necessarily have a pressure hull enclosing it; one possibility would be to have a pressure hull with large vehicular transit hatches strong enough for shallow—100 feet—submersion. This important design issue would have to be resolved in favor of the computed optimum trade-off between the operational cost of protecting the vehicles from fresh water or fuel immersion by “plastic bagging” and being able to run deep, as opposed to storing the vehicles in a form more quickly ready to land inside an air pressure hull allowing only for shallow submersion.
The advantage of immersing the stored tanks and other vehicles in fluid inside a thin pressure hull is not only the deep- submersion capability at modest structural cost, since the external seawater hydrostatic pressure would be compensated for by the internal stored fluid hydrostatic pressure, but also the substantial fuel and fresh water transport afforded.
On landing at the deployment site, the fuel and/or fresh water stores immersing the tanks and other vehicles could be pumped out into large flexible collapsible plastic fluid storage tanks on board f°r that purpose and placed in protect!'1 shallow water or flat shoreline location5' If rapid, contested landings were contd" plated, it would be best to use fresh wa*1?
which could be sacrificed by quick je tisoning. At least three feet of fresh wate storage could be retained on the loWe,s vehicle deck and still permit the tanks 13 it to be driven out by their crews. As 3l’ alternative, fuel might be stored on. around the tanks on the lowest deck, 'vl the jettisonable fresh water stored only 0 _ the top two decks, allowing rapid deploy ment of the top two decks’ contents 311 reserve backup tanks and fuel for latlj deployment to a secured beachhea Many combinations of fuel and consort? ables storage are also possible. (It , resupply were a problem, much ot o\ vehicle-immersing pressure fluid coo even be nutritious soup!) .
For Arctic deployments, if fresh wal is used as the immersing fluid, it have to be heated to avoid freezing mixed with alcohol to lower its frecz1'1-' point, or replaced by fuel on the top de at least.
Quarters for the roughly 500-man skel- °n crew for the tanks and other vehicles
cmld be at ^ cost grea( cramping jn
e two submarine crew quarters, assum- 8 that only one submarine’s crew is paired to operate both hulls. Altema- Ve loading for the shallow pressure hull ersion of this design might allow for wer vehicles and more personnel.
„ For the tank transport-maximizing, ( 'u-immcrsed cargo version, however, her transportation must be provided for e lull complement of vehicle crews; one Possibility is large troop-transport submarines using the Ohio-class hulls with 1116 of the Trident missile storage tubes
replaced by troop transport quarters. Also, air transport and airdrops of tank crews to beached deployments might be organized within existing capabilities. Many organizational design issues still have to be resolved.
A single submarine LST of the type proposed could provide fast, secure, submersible global transportation for the heavy vehicles of an entire armored battalion and associated port of loading, and be available for service within two to three years of the program’s initiation. The estimated cost per submarine LST, assuming use of already developed Ohio- class hulls and nuclear power plants from an increased production run, would be about $1.5 billion each.
This unit cost compares favorably with the cost of current alternative survivable global rapid armor deployment. Using C-5s, a ten-day deployment of a large armored division’s vehicular complement of 20 heavy tank battalions, consisting of 2,400 tanks and 2,000 armored personnel carriers, would require five round trips by a fleet of some 600 C-5s costing at least $60 billion versus a single trip by 20 submarine LSTs costing $30 billion, half as much as the C-5s for the same mission, with much greater survivability. The survivable ten-day delivery capacity of the fast submarine LSTs is probably about five times as cost-effective as the C-5s.
If only five days were available for the emergency deployment, the submarine LSTs would still be competitive with the C-5s, provided the submarines were based in the Indian Ocean as well as the U. S. East Coast and the South Pacific. If 20 or more days were available, both submarine and fast surface ocean transport become even more competitive with C-5 airlift of armored divisions, partly because of lower total fuel and maintenance costs.
Dr. Abt is president and founder of Abt Associates, an interdisciplinary policy research planning and evaluation organization of social and physical scientists. He recently completed a book entitled Nuclear War Termination Strategy. He is editor-in-chief of Abt Books. His professional note "The Submarine- Aircraft Carrier” was published in the October 1963 Proceedings.
jj^Loss of HMS Coventry
By Brenda Ralph Lewis
Pt to defuse it.
I On 2 April, the day of the Argentine asion, the Coventry was in the eastern ^ antic off Gibraltar, where the Royal Tavy was exercising in Operation Spring ra,n. The Coventry’s orders were to pro- ^ed south “with all despatch.” As with £ lFc other ships with similar orders, the t,(>Ventry had to store the ship rapidly by tabbing bits and pieces” from vessels
°n 25 May 1982, the “Type-42” Ulded missile destroyer HMS Coventry seca'iie the fourth Royal Navy ship to i Ccumb to smoke damage in the Falk- ^nds Conflict. Her sister ship, HMS ’effield, struck by an Exocet missile, . d Preceded her three weeks earlier, fol- ^Wed by the Ardent on 21 May. On 23 ay> the Antelope sank after an un- Ploded bomb detonated during an at-
not assigned to the South Atlantic. She then went straight toward the Falklands with two other “Type-42s,” the Glasgow and Sheffield, the frigates Brilliant and Arrow, and a Royal Fleet Auxiliary ship. They stopped off briefly at Ascension Island around 11 April, by which time the diplomatic shuttling of Alexander Haig, then-U. S. Secretary of State, was in full swing, and the maritime exclusion zone imposed around the Falklands by Britain was about to come into operation.
After leaving Ascension, the Coventry proceeded with the other ships to the South Atlantic, taking up a holding position equidistant between the Falkland Islands and South Georgia, which the Argentines had seized on 3 April. Argentina did not keep it long. South Georgia was recaptured by British Marines on 25
April, by which time the Coventry and two other “Type-42” destroyers, the frigates Arrow and Brilliant, and a Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessel had formed a small task force in their own right. On 27 April, the Coventry and her companions joined up with the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes, flagship of Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, the South Atlantic Task Force Commander.
At the end of April, efforts at a diplomatic solution were foundering, and President Ronald Reagan abandoned his evenhanded approach to push for Britain. The fireworks followed immediately. On 1 May 1982, Port Stanley was bombed for the first time by Harriers and Vulcan bombers. Early that day, the Coventry, with the rest of the task force, which consisted of 13 vessels, entered the total exelusion zone. The Coventry, with the Sheffield and Glasgow, formed an advance air defense screen protecting the aircraft carriers Hermes and Invincible. From then on, the Coventry was fully involved in the onslaught put up by the Fuerza Aerea Argentina. The “Type- 42s”’ far-seeing radar could spot an Argentine air attack developing at considerable distances, call up Sea Harriers off the carriers’ decks, and control them in the air, positioning them to take on the enemy as they came in. On 1 May, when at least 12 Argentine aircraft, including Mirages and Canberras, and possibly Daggers, approached the task force, the Sea Harriers under the Coventry's direction shot down four or five of the aircraft in a contest fully audible on board the “Type-42.”
HMS Coventry took on and helped beat back many Argentine air attacks— but she was finally overcome on 25 May when three 1,000-pound bombs hit the ship.
On 3 May, the Coventry's Lynx helicopter achieved a Royal Navy “first.” Two Argentine 700-ton fast patrol boats, the Alfarez Sobral and Comodoro Some- llera, had been spotted, apparently heading for Port Stanley. The Coventry’s Lynx, piloted by Lieutenant Commander Alvin Rich, scored two direct hits with the untried Sea Skua missiles and destroyed the Somellera. The Argentine boat blew up with such force that the explosion was seen by task force vessels 30 miles away. The Alfarez Sobral was later badly damaged by missiles from the Glasgow’s Lynx.
On 9 May, Admiral Woodward decided to employ the long, 40-mile reach of the “Type-42’s” Sea Dart missiles to dissipate some of the Argentines’ lively air activity. The Coventry teamed up with the Broadsword, a “Type-22” frigate, whose Sea Wolf missiles could make up for the Sea Dart’s lack of effectiveness at low level, and provide close-in air defense. Destroyer and frigate were directed to a position within 12 miles of Port Stanley. Their first victims, brought down early that same morning, were two
Argentine Skyhawks escorting a Hercules transport on its nightly blockade-running shuttle to the Falklands’ capital—another “first” for the Coventry, for the Sky- [ hawks succumbed to the first operational Sea Darts which were fired at maximt®1 range. An hour or two later, the Coventry fired the Sea Dart at 13 miles’ range to bring down an Argentine troop-carrying - helicopter. This success caused the Argentines serious inconvenience: they were obliged to seek the safety of grass ; strip landing fields in West Falkland to bring in their supplies.
The contest was taking its toll on the British as well. HMS Glasgow was severely bomb-damaged on 12 May whi'e operating with the frigate Brilliant in a second “22-42 combo” and was unable to take further part in the action. This- combined with the loss of the Sheffield on 4 May, left the Coventry the only “Type- 42” still operating air defense until two more destroyers of the class arrived on 2' May. That day, the conflict moved into a new phase with the troop landings at San Carlos on East Falkland.
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not reflect simply the desire to throw
Operating in support of the vessels in •kland Sound and the troops ashore, at
J^as we]) aware of the Coventry’s per- b°us position, but the only way to avoid
'he Argentine Air Force to a vigor which
e British off the beaches. Previously, ne task force targets had been out at sea, ®nd the Argentines had spent much of e'r limited “loiter time” searching for ern. The Argentines knew where the ntish ships were. Further, they were ‘,’ e to make their final approach across est Falkland, where the hills protected ne,ri from early detection by providing radar “clutter.”
^n 22 May, the Coventry and Broad- i1’’0rd were posted to the northwest of Carlos, acting as what Admiral oodward termed a “major missile ap.” The first Argentine flies caught in ls deadly web met their fate two days ;Cr- On 24 May, after an early fiasco in nich the flash doors on the Coventry’s ea Dart refused to open, allowing the a Boeing-707 reconnaissance ar>e, to escape, the destroyer’s deft con,, °f the Sea Harriers resulted in the . flashing” of three out of four attacking Skyhawks and Mirages. Six more ere destroyed by ship and shore defenSes °n Falkland Sound.
On 25 May, Argentine reconnaissance vealed a “very large” British ship fading west, toward Falkland Sound, ne Argentines believed she was either !'nc °f the British carriers or one of the Bners, the Queen Elizabeth 2 or Can- perra- However, standing between the , Ucrza and its target were the Coventry nd Broadsword. The Argentine pilots king off from their mainland airfields morning of 25 May had the mis- .°n of neutralizing the destroyer, the r'gate, or, better still, both.
That day, the two ships were again
Position some 12 miles due north. This °sition was exposed, yet the Argentines r ere finding the two ships difficult to ach. Two attempts in the middle of the d y failed*when the Coventry’s Sea Darts l|)"vncd three Argentines. Captain David art-Dyke, commander of the Coventry,
j ein8 targeted for direct attack—running shore to safer water—was out of the jnestion. It would have exposed the ships p 'he Sound and the troops ashore at San arl°s to direct Argentine bombing.
^ group of four Argentine planes, ap- p°aching overland and undetected by Uaentry's rac'ar’ arr'ved shortly after , when the destroyer was running at g knots about half a mile ahead of the J°adsword. The Sea Dart got a brief fix . . 'hem, but it disappeared, leaving Cap- n Hart-Dyke peering at a blank radar screen. Two Argentines suddenly burst into view from Pebble Island and streaked for the ships at deck level, spitting cannon fire. The Coventry opened up with Sea Dart missiles, her 4.5-inch gun, 20-mm. guns, machine guns, and even rifle fire. The Argentines veered off and headed for the Broadsword. The frigate’s Sea Wolf missile system was switched on, but its computer became confused at having to decide which of the two targets to pick; it gave up and switched itself off. The Broadsword’s guns continued firing, but a 1,000-pound Argentine bomb found its target: failing to explode, it clanged into the starboard side, surged through the ship’s helicopter flight deck, and out again, destroying the frigate’s Lynx on the way.
The second pair of Argentine Sky- hawks was coming in fast, but far enough apart this time for the Broadsword’s Sea Wolf to gain a solution on them. Then, just as the missiles were about to be fired, the Coventry blanked off the Broadsword’s forward firing arcs by a sharp turn to starboard, preparing to set her weapons systems to bear on the incoming marauders. The Broadsword’s Sea Wolf was stymied. The Coventry’s Sea Dart was still hot in action, but the missiles went wide. The 4.5-inch gun, firing from a perilously exposed position, was blazing away along with every automatic weapon on board. Although at least one Argentine plane was hit, the others came through to aim four 1,000 pounders at the Coventry’s port bow. One fell astern, but the other three struck home, crashing into the destroyer’s side and burying themselves deep in the ship before exploding.
One of the bombs blew up immediately aft and below the operations room, killing nine men in the forward engine compartment. There was immediate flooding and fire, accompanied by a loss of all power and communications. The operations room, where 30 men had been directing the battle, was devastated in the full force of the blast and at once began to fill with smoke. Captain Hart-Dyke was momentarily knocked senseless and came around disoriented, his face burned and flesh hanging from his right hand. At least ten men lay dead in the wreckage around him. The exit through the port hatch and the ladder up to the bridge was gone. Somehow, Captain Hart-Dyke managed to reach the starboard hatch of the operations room and emerge into clearer air. From there, he climbed up the twisted ladder to the bridge. He was still so stunned that he ordered his warfare officer to move the ship fast to the east, the escape route to the task force. As he soon came to realize, the order was impossible; the Coventry had no power. The fire started by the bombs was spreading rapidly, and the destroyer was already listing 50° to port.
The Coventry’s 4.5-inch gun crewmen were still at their posts, watching for further air attack; they remained there until ordered to save themselves. The ship was listing more and more sharply, and, before long, she began to roll over. The life rafts were prepared by senior ratings. After watching the last crewman jump into the water and reach life rafts, Captain Hart-Dyke walked down the side of the ship and into the water. He swam to a life raft. Before long, the raft brushed against the still-hot barrel of the 4.5-inch gun and took a puncture from the nose of a Sea Dart missile which was still in the launcher. The raft sank, throwing Captain Hart-Dyke and some 35 men into the freezing water. Several were badly burned and had to be held up until helicopters arrived to winch them to safety. Every available Sea King and Wessex came to the rescue.
Chief Petty Officer Aircrewman Malcolm Tupper, the winchman on a helicopter from the amphibious warfare vessel Fearless, detached his own lifeline so that he could guide the rescue of some 50 Coventry survivors. In all, 283 men, 20 of them injured, lived through the disaster. The ship sank a half an hour after she had been bombed. Nineteen crewmen were killed in that time.
The loss of the Coventry was not announced in Britain for more than 24 hours. Announced at the same time was the loss, by Super Etendard Exocet attack, of the 14,946-ton containership Atlantic Conveyor—the “large ship” the Argentines had been seeking when they went after the Coventry and her escorting frigate.
The shortcomings revealed by these events eventually produced more than 200 modifications and a new design of frigate, the “Type-23,” announced on 19 October 1983, almost 17 months after the Coventry was lost. The “Type-23,” the prototype of which should be completed by 1988, incorporates a system to prevent smoke spreading through the ventilation trunking and armor protection for the operations, main communications, and machinery control rooms.
Brenda Lewis currently resides in Buckinghamshire, England. She has been a writer on military and other subjects for 20 years and contributes to publications in Britain and the United States. Her professional note, “Fortress Falklands,” was published in the March 1984 Annual International Navies Issue of Proceedings.
[1]The Military Balance, 1981-1982 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), p. 28.
[2]T. B. Millar, The East-West Strategic Balance (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), pp. 21, 130. For a survey of geostrategic elements, see 1977 typed study, “Environments for U. S. Strategy in the Pa- cific-Indian Ocean Area, 1985-1995,” available at the Naval War College, Center for Advanced Research, Newport, Rhode Island.
Conversation with Rear Admiral C. A. Hill, USN (Ret), and letters from Stuart B. Barber dated 16 March 1974, printed in U. S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, Hearings, Proposed Expansion ofU. S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 21 February, 6, 12, 14, and 20 1974, pp. 174-175 (Washington: GPO, 1974).
[4]lnformation obtained by Rear Admiral C. A. Hill