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Repairing the Major Staffs
After quarters, you dive into a stack of messages received the previous night. The first “action” item is a request from the type commander (TyCom) for an inventory of special shop equipment, despite the fact you submitted master inventory data tapes a month previously. You think to yourself: “Why can’t they go down the hall to the terminal and look for themselves?” The next item that gets your attention is a TyCom request to the commodore’s staff to explain why you didn’t expeditiously pull a particular component for repair. Immediately below this message is one from the commodore requesting an answer to the TyCom’s question no later than the next day. You say to yourself, “Why didn’t the staff just call and ask me? Or, better, why didn’t TyCom pick up the phone and ask?” Now that all concerned have transmitted data requests, you must respond in kind.
Below the Chief of Information’s Newsgram touting the fleet being manned at 100%, you find an answer to your request for upgrading the vacant division chief billet. The TyCom staff says if it does this for you, it must do it for other commands. Even with the knowledge that a sister command is manned at 150% in this rate/ rating, the TyCom’s answer is a resounding “No!”
Your blood slowly begins to boil.
The TyCom’s staff simply had to transfer one excess chief petty officer from the sister unit since both outfits share the same commodore, eliminating excess administrative steps in the process. You are left with an old fix: “Well,
I’ve done without a division chief for nine months, looks like I’ll have to tough it out for awhile yet.”
Reminding yourself that a sense of humor is necessary to survive, you persevere. Now you come across an item that will have a negative impact on morale. Two months ago, a hard-charging young petty officer first class came
to you with a sound idea for increasing productivity by 50% and saving scarce depot rework dollars. After researching equipment and materials required, you put a package together and mailed it to TyCom for evaluation. The answer to your speedletter has finally arrived.
Your expectations are dashed by a bottom line stating that since fellow commands aren’t doing this repair now, then you won’t be permitted to either.
“We don’t want to risk doing something somebody else hasn’t tried first.” The tone of the message is clear.
Ironically, failure of this component caused an accident recently. Only by chance, there were no personnel injuries. You had submitted a request for an engineering investigation, carefully detailing why a mission was lost and personnel were endangered. The answer downgrading the investigation from Category I (urgent) to Category II (routine) is in the traffic. But, to your chagrin, you notice that the answer was released by TyCom’s supply branch, not the engineering code you passed the message to for action.
Given this small sampling of messages, it is small wonder that detailers have a difficult time convincing fleet personnel to accept assignments with TyCom or on functional command staffs. Many of us wonder if a lobot- omy is prerequisite for such an assignment. Consequently, we go to extremes to avoid such billets. Despite these tongue-in-cheek observations, solutions to such shortcomings do exist.
Bureaucratic Timidity: Many of us grew up in a Navy of highly detailed instructions for special programs which came forth from the highest levels of command. This was especially true of human relations and discipline programs, where “do’s and don’ts” were outlined in elaborate detail and imple- menters given little flexibility. Combined with strong emphasis on “management" instead of “leadership,” characteristic of the tenures of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo
Zumwalt, we now have a sizeable cadre of middle- to senior-grade officers and enlisted personnel who have never made a morally challenging decision. Those who advanced during this period find it difficult to permit their subordinates to attempt new ventures, giving them the opportunity to succeed or fail. They cling to the safety of the status quo and avoid innovations and uncertainties.
The answer to this problem, although not an easy one, is to emphasize “moral leadership,” as espoused by Admiral James Stockdale. We must have the courage to evaluate situations and make decisions based on their moral propriety. This is the first step required to build dynamic leadership.
Over-Bureaucratization: It seems that in many cases we have more command echelons than required to perform our mission. For example, each Naval Air Training Command station has separate training air wing commanders and naval air station commanding officers. Nearly every functional billet of the air wing is duplicated by station department heads. This produces a command structure burdened by long communications channels and duplication of effort- Other than providing two major shore command billets for the captains assigned, little justification can be found for having two operations officers, two aircraft maintenance officers, two administrative officers, or two command master chiefs at the same site.
Combining these responsibilities and assigning only one captain per site would enhance the prestige of the “major command ashore” designation and reduce bureaucratic turf disputes between organizations. Elimination of redundant staff billets and assignment of responsibilities to station department heads would free personnel for placement in critical billets currently vacant- With such a streamlined command structure, supported squadrons could conduct their operations more effectively since they would have shorter communications lines, decreased re-
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Proceedings / September I
how
much authority and expertise
TyCi
tion
°m. All maintenance and inspec- actions, especially in aviation, are
sPonse times, and a clearer statement °f their responsibilities. Similar opportunities for streamlining abound throughout the Navy structure.
Authoritative Action: Too often those attached to major staffs fail to realize exist within their commands. TyCom staffs have within their purview naval Personnel who have the ability to alter utunning priorities to eliminate short- a§es, to expedite material requisitions to those in need, ferret out technical expertise from contractors and the Navy activities to resolve equipment utlures, and communicate service requirements to support staff. Even if ueir only contribution is to pass information through proper channels, the act of their involvement shows interest aud assists in expediting matters ■trough the bureaucracy.
It is demoralizing for subordinates to Petition TyCom for assistance, help §enuinely needed, only to have staffs resPond with inaction or denial of any
responsibility.
Proper definition of TyCom support responsibilities—administrative and utaterial—and dissemination of such nroughout the command structure are Mandatory. Only then will subordinates aPproach TyComs with reasonable exPectations of assistance.
One-Man Show: A good indicator of °w little operational control naval Units have is the high volume of report- !n§ requirements mandated by the
f lull J 111 Cl V 1C11IV71I , ell V
ed daily into an extensive data base, taking periodic reporting requirements j^edlessly redundant. The only plausi- e reason for establishing parallel rePorting systems within the TyCom is a Psychological need to exercise complete c°ntroI over subordinates’ daily operations. Reporting such things as each aircraft launched, the lighting of individual boilers, the transfer of department heads, and the number of components on supply’s shelves serves only to stifle initiative by making administration more important than innovation. By limiting the issue of reports to emergencies or to items not covered by the maintenance and material management and supply systems reporting formats, on-scene leaders would be able to concentrate more effectively on planning or more immediate priorities. This would lessen the administrative burden at all levels and increase operational efficiency.
Muddled Communications: Quite often, the quality of communications is a function of the quality of directions issued by seniors. Asking for reports consisting of crude numbers, not explaining what the numbers mean, yields reports of crude numbers. Asking for reports without supporting statistics produces incomplete reports that raise additional questions, often generating additional paperwork. Too often reporting requirements are added to satisfy the uneasiness of seniors, to correct staffers’ inabilities to use available and numerous data products, or to supplant existing data systems.
Once a genuine reporting need is established, then clear, concise, accurate directions to subordinates are mandatory. If the report is to stand for prolonged periods, then publish a brief notice written in simple terms. As one former commanding officer said,
“Write it so any ensign can easily understand it. That way any flag officer or staffer who sees it won’t be confused either.” Only in this way will messages moving up and down the chain of command be meaningful to all concerned.
The Challenge: Assignment of quality personnel, officer and enlisted, is a key to ensure TyCom and functional commander staffs operate effectively. If detailers are to attract this talent, the Navy must ensure TyCom representation on promotion boards, eliminate meaningless administrative requirements, allocate sufficient manpower and funding resources for tasks assigned, space road trips to visit subordinate commands, and establish effective public relations.
Staffs must be seen as opportunities to excel, not places to be exiled to. Talented individuals from operational environments will, given proper support and encouragment, rapidly make the transition to superior staffers. When searching for men and women to fill these crucial billets, detailers should be guided by one additional admonition, “no yes-men need apply.” They should look for aggressiveness, creativity, professional expertise, and individual courage. Given the visibility of staffs, nothing less should be accepted.
The Solution: Tired of non-answers, extraneous reporting requirements, lack of staff operational familiarity, and insufficient logistics support? Think you are at the top of your professional specialty? Willing to present innovative, controversial solutions to seniors? Do you possess the intellectual honesty and personal courage to dispassionately evaluate peers? Are you willing to sacrifice self and time to ensure that others receive quality support and direction necessary for safe operations?
Then you can be part of the solution.
Take time when filling out that next duty preference card, giving consideration to major staff requirements and your qualifications. If you meet the standards, then lobby your detailer for a chance to make your mark on the Navy.
Nobody asked me either, but . . .
^ Captain Carl H. Amme, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)
Should We Invade Nicaragua?
^hen the revolution in Nicaragua ta^S. °ut the dictator, President Anas- q 10 Somoza Debayle, the Sandinista tj°Vernment promised democratic elec- °ns. liberty for the people, land re-
°ceMtings / September 1984
form, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press.
The United States Government provided $150 million in direct aid, and $200 million in indirect aid to the San- dinistas. Since then, the Marxist-Lenin- ist leaders have seized control of the
government and ousted the genuinely democratic Sandinista members, who are now revolting against the government in order to gain the liberty that was promised. The motto of the Sandinista Government, “A revolution without boundaries,” exemplifies its
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