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Should China seek a military solution to the Taiwan issue, the Chinese submariner, oppo- Slte, most likely would be peering at mer- °hant vessels—including those flying the stars and stripes—through his scope, and deciding whether to seize or sink them.
For more than three decades, the fate of Taiwan has been the most important issue in the relationship between China and the United States. During most that time, the United States was committed by treaty to efend the capitalist island against attack from the Com- ^ttinist mainland. Since the abrogation of this treaty obli- §ation in 1979, the Taiwan issue has become even more Problematic. U. S. decision makers are tom between a>wan’s being part of China and their desire to help the People of Taiwan maintain their freedoms.
. The potential Chinese military threat to Taiwan underly- ln§ the political events in Sino-U. S. relations has been Usually pictured as the threat of invasion: hundreds of °usands of Chinese infantrymen wading onto Taiwan’s western shores from amphibious landing ships, junks, uierchant ships, and fishing boats. Thirty years ago, this reat was real. Today, it is unlikely. The Chinese threat to a*wan is the threat of naval blockade.
. Whatever U. S. policy toward Taiwan may be, now or ln the future, policymakers and military planners must Understand the likely course of events should China some ay elect to pursue a military solution to the Taiwan issue, ‘though the future of Taiwan is an internal Chinese af- air> a Chinese naval blockade of the island would have potential implications for the strategic balance in East Asia, extending far beyond Taiwan itself.
There are compelling reasons why, under present circumstances, China is unlikely to opt for a military solution to the Taiwan issue. But, as the past decade has demonstrated, seemingly permanent circumstances in East Asia are anything but permanent. Thus, in looking ahead to the strategic balance at the turn of the century and beyond, no possible evolution of events should be excluded from consideration today.
The Historical Perspective: As the Communist armies swept from north to south in 1949-50, the Nationalist Chinese Government fled to Taiwan, accompanied by thousands of prominent citizens and their families and as many units of the Nationalist armed forces as could be transported. In 1949, Taiwan was a province under control of the central Chinese Government, but Chinese control over the island had had a checkered history. At times, Taiwan has been integrated into China as a province, and at times, it has been virtually independent, as imperial authority waxed and waned. Taiwan, which the 16th century Portuguese christened Formosa, meaning “pretty,” was a colony of Japan from 1895 until the end of World War II. Therefore, native Taiwanese, though related to the mainlanders in many ways, had an ethnic and cultural identity of their own.
The Taiwanese did not welcome the mainlanders enthusiastically in 1949. But no one, including the Nationalists, expected they would be in control of the island for long. By June 1950, a massive, albeit ragtag, Communist invasion force had been assembled across the strait. Probing actions were to begin in July; the main assault on the demoralized and disorganized Nationalist forces on Taiwan was to begin in August. The United States made clear that it would not intervene in this end-game phase of the Chi-
nese civil war. It was only a mutter of time before China would be unified under Communist rule.
In late June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. This immediately changed the U. S. view of the importance of a Nationalist Taiwan. President Harry S Truman instituted the Seventh Fleet’s Taiwan Strait patrol, vowing that the United States would oppose any further expansion of what was seen as a concerted international Communist campaign for control of Eurasia. China s invasion plans were abandoned.
In the 1950s, there were two major crises in the Taiwan Strait, but both concerned Nationalist-held island groups immediately off China’s coast. There was no evidence of a Chinese intention to invade Taiwan. The situation in the strait was quieter in the 1960s. The final significant naval combat action occurred in 1965. Again, there was no sign of a planned invasion.
The development of Chinese naval forces during the 1950s and 1960s should have been proof that the mainland was not working toward a capability to invade Taiwan. The Chinese inherited about 30 U. S. World War II landing ships, as Nationalist naval forces defected or left ships behind in 1949-50. These ships were inadequate for a full-scale assault against Taiwan. Not until the latter 1970s did the Chinese Navy begin to build more landing ships, and then only enough to begin replacing the aging U. S.- built craft. Moreover, despite occasional allegations,
China had not developed the marine corps necessary for an j invasion. Nor were there adequate forces developed for shore bombardment or air superiority. Probably deterred g by the U. S. commitment to the defense of Taiwan, China J never began to develop a capability to invade the island.
But China did develop forces that would lend themselves to conducting a naval blockade of Taiwan. Since the 1950s, China has built a force of more than 100 attack submarines, about 40 destroyers and frigates, and about 200 missile boats. These vessels would not be a match for either the Soviet or U. S. navies, but they would be more than Taiwan’s 30-odd destroyers and frigates, now 40 years old, could handle. Certainly, the Chinese Navy’s primary mission is to defend its country against seaborne attack, but from force structure alone, it can be argued that p the Chinese Navy has been built with an eye to the blockade of Taiwan. Yet, there is even more persuasive evidence and logic that China has provided itself the option to blockade Taiwan.
The Rationale for Blockade: If China did indeed decide that military force was necessary or desirable to resolve the status of Taiwan, the rationale in favor of blockade becomes strong when the advantages—and dangers—of an invasion of Taiwan are compared to those inherent in a blockade of the island.
China will not adopt the invasion option for a number of
reasons:
► An invasion would confront Taiwan’s strengths head- on. Taiwan’s armed forces have been digging in and preparing for invasion for 35 years. Presumably, the Nationalists have formidable coastal fortifications and obstacles that would cause an invasion force serious difficulties. Taiwan’s ground forces are numerous, well-trained, and well-equipped. Taiwan’s air force would make it costly for
J
aircraft from the mainland to try to establish air superiority °ver the western beaches. Even if China were prepared to Pay heavy costs in men and materiel, an all-out invasion r°m the mainland could fail, especially if unfavorable weather intervened.
An invasion would require a large commitment of Chinese ground and air forces. The cost of the operation in jves, equipment, and other resources would be huge, particularly if China built enough landing ships and other assets to conduct the invasion properly. Many Chinese ground and air forces on the borders of the Soviet Union and Vietnam would be committed to the Taiwan campaign, leaving these borders vulnerable.
The effect of an invasion on Taiwan itself would be grievous. Most likely, many civilians would be killed, the surviving population would face grave hardships, and ere would be severe damage to Taiwan’s economic in- rastructure. The Chinese would be perceived by the Taiwanese and by a large segment of the world as brutal invaders, not as liberators. Moreover, the prize for which hina would have to pay such a high price would be badly damaged in the process.
in contrast, there are persuasive reasons why China to run an economy oriented largely toward the processing of imported raw materials and the export of finished goods. Free access to the sea-lanes is essential to Taiwan’s survival as a modern economy. A blockade would be a powerful lever to bring about the island’s capitulation.
► A blockade would cost the Chinese far less in lives, equipment, and operating funds than would an invasion.
► Ground and air forces facing the Soviet and Vietnamese borders would not be needed to participate in a blockade; indeed, forces from central China could be shifted to augment the border forces if necessary.
► A blockade would occasion little civilian loss of life. Taiwan’s industry would be brought to a standstill, but its infrastructure would be undamaged. As a result, any combat would occur at sea, far from the cameras of the world’s newsmen.
Thus, an invasion would be difficult and costly to mount, pitting China’s poor amphibious forces against Taiwan’s strong defenses. Indeed, it might fail altogether. It would make China’s borders with the Soviet Union and Vietnam vulnerable. It would destroy much of Taiwan’s economic value to China and would probably alienate both Taiwanese and world opinion. In contrast, a naval block-
searching for elusive naval targets with sensors,
lanes.
eapons, and training ill-suited to antisurface and antisub- arine warfare. Taiwan’s 30-odd aging surface combat- ^ w°uld be easy marks for China’s 100 submarines.
Taiwan’s fundamental vulnerability is economic, and a °ckade would strike at the economy’s heart. Though J" Sufficient in food if necessary, Taiwan depends al- 0st exclusively upon oil imported from the Persian Gulf
ade would be an almost bloodless, virtually risk-free but effective political and economic lever by which the issue of Taiwan’s future could be resolved in China’s favor.
A Blockade Scenario*: The time is somewhere between 1985 and the end of the century. In the years since the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek’s son, there has been no strong mainlander hand guiding the *This scenario is a plausible illustration of how China’s blockade option might be applied. It is not a prediction of what necessarily will happen. Rather, it is intended to provoke reflection on the potential implications of a Chinese decision to resolve the Taiwan issue through military means.
Nationalist Government. In this vacuum, the native Taiwanese, comprising 85% of the population, agitate ever more actively for full representation in the government. Extremists foment disorder, and slogans favoring the formal independence of Taiwan from China gain currency. The Nationalist mainlanders in control since the flight from China in 1949 are losing their grip.
China views the deteriorating situation on Taiwan with concern. If the Taiwanese majority proclaims an independent “Republic of Taiwan,” formally separate from China, it is bound to receive eventual world recognition, and China’s errant province would be lost permanently. China’s warnings to Taiwan produce no effect, thus China considers activating its long-standing contingency plan for a naval blockade of the island. The force levels on each side of the strait continue to favor China.
Beijing estimates that the United States will not intervene militarily on behalf of the Taiwanese. Previously, China won recognition from the United States that Taiwan is a province of China, and under persistent Chinese pressure, U. S. arms sales to Taiwan finally ceased. Beijing also believes the United States values its military cooperation with China, and China’s resulting strategic value against the Soviet Union, too highly to risk war with China over Taiwan. Besides, the United States is militarily engaged in both the Middle East and Central America, and is judged to be spread too thin to confront China.
Beijing announces that because Taiwan is a province of China, all foreign trade with the island must be approved in Beijing. Any ship approaching Taiwan without such authorization will be intercepted by Chinese naval forces and requested to turn back. Ships persisting on course will be seized or, if necessary, sunk. China’s submarines, destroyers, and frigates take station along the sea-lanes leading to Taiwan, but at a sufficient distance from the island
to avoid contact with Nationalist naval and air forces.
Chinese diplomats around the world consult with laiwan’s trading partners and assure them their trade rela- honships will remain intact after this internal political mat- tor is resolved; their cooperation will speed this resolution and would be much appreciated by the Chinese Govern- toent. Meanwhile, Lloyd’s of London suspends insurance 0r ships conducting trade with Taiwan. Taiwan’s trading Partners decide they have no alternative but to accept China s promise that they may resume business as usual in the near future.
As the blockade is imposed, China mounts a propaganda campaign aimed at the Taiwanese populace. The Chinese state they regret being forced to impose this temporary quarantine, but they could neither allow the disorders to continue, nor could they allow an extremist ringe to separate Taiwan permanently from China. The Populace should not be alarmed, the broadcasts proclaim, aiwan will become an autonomous region of the People’s Republic, maintaining its current economic identity. Prieto property will be protected; personal freedoms will be guaranteed; local leadership will remain in office. The ockade will be lifted immediately if the authorities on aiwan recognize the sovereignty of the People’s Republic °r China.
Taiwan
toeaking
Taiwan’s economy grinds to a halt. Island oil stocks are tuIZed for military use. Manufacturing ceases, because ere is no outlet for exports, and raw materials can no °nger be imported. The financial markets panic.
Most foreign-flag ships en route to Taiwan divert to other ports. A few ships nearing the island are intercepted . y Chinese warships. No shots are fired, but the message is dear: “China’s province of Taiwan is closed to shipping Unjil further notice; please proceed elsewhere or your ship W>11 be seized or sunk.” Meanwhile, sightings of Chinese I marines become a daily occurrence in the shipping anes distant from Taiwan, as merchant ships turn north ,r°m Singapore, head south from Japan, or cross the Phil- •Ppine Sea bound from the United States.
Shipping to Taiwan is reduced to the Taiwan-flag fleet ships under charter to Taiwan-based companies. Some
0 these ships run the blockade successfully, but contrib- e little to normal economic activity. Several are seized
tord taken into mainland ports; a handful are sunk. The stranglehold is in place.
At this point, events could proceed in one of a few 'toctions. Taiwan’s leadership might judge the situation menable and the Chinese offer of economic autonomy as cceptable. Or the leadership might flee the island. In ei- er case, capitulation would soon follow, and Taiwan ould become a part of China in fact as well as theory.
1 ut suppose the island’s population rallied around the eadership, whether Nationalist or Taiwanese? Suppose
toe was a popular mandate to resist the Chinese blockade sn(l pursue the independence of Taiwan? If Taiwan rem ved to resist absorption by the mainland, it could do so p-essfu„y only with the assistance of a major foreign
Taiwan seeks assistance from the United States in ; the Chinese blockade, citing its desire to maintain its freedoms as well as the security of U. S. investments on the island. Washington faces a difficult dilemma. It can task the Seventh Fleet to escort merchant ships bound for Taiwan, thus probably breaking the blockade without a shot being fired. Taiwan’s independence would be guaranteed, but at the cost of America’s strategic relationship with China. Sino—U. S. relations would enter another ice age, which would perhaps lead to a renewal of the Sino-Soviet alliance.
But suppose Washington declines the Taiwanese request for assistance? Taiwan is again faced with the prospect of capitulation. Perhaps it surrenders. Or perhaps Taiwan seeks foreign assistance elsewhere.
Faced with the loss of independence, anticommunist Taiwan warily and distastefully explores Moscow’s terms for assistance in breaking the Chinese blockade. Moscow is eager to talk. The prospect of naval and air basing rights off the coast of China is tantalizing. Soviet encirclement of China would be complete, and the Soviet Pacific Fleet would sit astride the Seventh Fleet’s Yokosuka-Subic axis and the East Asian shipping lanes. Taiwan is bargaining from a desperate position and cannot resist the Soviet demands. The deal is struck when Moscow solemnly promises it will not engage in any subversive activities designed to turn Taiwan into a Communist state. Elements of the Soviet Pacific Fleet sortie from the port of Vladivostok and rendezvous with several merchant ships en route to Taiwan.
Once again, the United States faces a policy decision. Does it allow the Soviets to break the Chinese blockade, maintaining at least the facade of Taiwanese freedom and independence but permitting the Soviet Union to gain a major strategic advantage in East Asia? Or does the United States attempt to deter the Soviets from helping Taiwan, risking war at sea with the Soviet Navy and, in effect, helping China to take control of the island?
Lessons to be Learned: The foregoing scenario does not purport to be a prediction of the future. It has several purposes. It demonstrates that should China someday opt to try to settle the Taiwan issue through military means, a naval blockade of the island would be a more likely and effective course of action than an amphibious invasion.
If the fate of Taiwan could be resolved in a vacuum between Taiwan and China, then it would indeed be an internal Chinese matter, as Beijing characterizes it. In fact, however, Chinese military action against the island could have serious implications for U. S. interests in East Asia and even for the security of the United States itself, because of the potential for U. S. and Soviet involvement in the repercussions of such a campaign.
Finally, the scenario provides some of the strategic background against which U. S. policymakers and planners should view issues concerning Taiwan and the island’s relationship to China.
Stationed in Washington, D.C., Commander Muller is the author of China as a Maritime Power, recently published by Westview Press. His article, “The Missions of the PRC Navy,” was published in the November 1977 Proceedings, and his professional note, “China’s SSBN in Perspective,” was published in the March 1983 issue.