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not attempt any changes. However, with the election of the new coalition government in March 1983, a modification of the current political guidelines—both in theory and in practice—has begun to appear. In the fall of 1983, the chancellor met several times with the Saudis, for instance, and they declared their intention to pursue closer cooperation in the defense field. While the Leopard II will not be sold, the Saudis are expected to purchase other arms. Such a loosening of the historically more restrictive area of defense armaments would indicate that the special consideration for naval exports may be expected to continue.
Under the new criteria, arms exports may be approved if such sales are in the vital foreign and security interests of West Germany or, especially in the case of coproduction, NATO. While potential employment may not be the preponderant justification for sales, it can be expected to become more important in a soft economy. Despite announced government intentions, the effect in the future could be a less restrictive policy for all categories of arms sales, especially naval exports.
'For a text of the Weapons Control Act, see Bun- desgesetzblatt. I (1961), p. 444; for changes BGB1. Ill (1978), p. 190-1. Also Foreign Trade Act, BGB1. I (1961), p. 481. The Foreign Trade Act of 1961 actually implements the NATO Coordinating Committee agreements which prohibit exports of advanced technology to any communist countries. Under this act, sales may not disturb the “security and foreign interests” - of the Federal Republic. For an English text, see Legal Basis of German Arms Export Policy, Auswartiges Amt, Bonn. 1982 (xerox).
2S. E. Finer, ed., “The Constitution (Basic Law) of the Federal Republic of Germany 1949,” in Five Constitutions (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1979).
3Bulletin des Presse und lnformationsamtes der Bun- desregierung, 17 February 1965, p. 225.
4Ulrich Albrecht, Peter Lock and Herbert Wulf, Ar- beitsplatze durch Riistung? (Reinbek, 1978).
’For text see “Beilage zur Ausgabe 6/4177,” Wehrdienst 13 June 1971.
6Intemational Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1981-82 (Londbn, 1982), p. 34. 7“Pulverdampf und Nebel,” Wirtschaftswoche, 14 May 1982, p. 19.
8 Actually, it would be wrong to imply that the sales to Argentina were approved without consideration for
the possibility of German arms being used in c° ^ The ironic fact is, however, that the debate on the sale of submarines to Chile bceause Argentine/Chilean dispute over the Beagle C 9For text of 1971 guidelines, see "Neue 4
fuerden Ruestungsexport,” SueddeutscheZe,m
May 1982. See also “Leitlinie fuerden RuestuOS^ port: Das Sicherheitsbeduerfnis der ^
desrepublik,” Frankfurter Allgemeine, 4 May
Dr. Krause earned his Ph.D at the University ^ lin in international relations, and is an expert > area of arms transfers. He has published w German on both German and Soviet arms ^ policies. Currently, he is an analyst with the n ^ for International Affairs at Ebenhausen in the Republic of Germany.
Professor Mattox earned her Ph.D in foreign a ^ at the Woodrow Wilson School of Governmen ^ Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia. S ® worked as a foreign policy and security anaty the U. S. Congress, and has spent several ye Europe conducting research and lectures. ^ulT^t the she is an assistant professor of political science U. S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Marylm •
Japan’s Stalwart Seaplanes
cable as close to vertical as poss During localization, a 20-minute
,ible-
dip
By Lieutenant Ralph J. Dean, U. S. Navy
The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) operates Shin-Meiwa PS-1 flying boats and US-1 amphibians from its base at Iwakuni in western Japan. JMSDF aviators insist proudly that the open-ocean capability of the PS-1 so far surpasses that of its rivals (such as the Soviet Be-12 “Mail”) that the Japanese aircraft is in a category by itself.
Able to land in seas of up to three meters in height, the aircraft’s short takeoff or landing water distance is only 720 feet at a moderate weight of 79,400 pounds (no wind), and an amazing 500 feet into a 15-knot wind. The aircraft is operationally seaworthy under conditions prevailing 65% of the time at any given spot in the Northwest Pacific, compared with a 25% figure for conventional flying boats.
This capability was not come by easily. Research and development began in 1960 with the aim of incorporating a legacy of seaplane technology from the Imperial Navy, advanced hydrodynamic hull design, and a unique dipping antisubmarine warfare (ASW) sonar. Meeting target specifications proved difficult, and research and development continued for nine years, eventually including cooperation with U. S. Navy technical experts. The prototype PX-S was first flown in October 1967, but the PS-1 did not become operational until the formation of Fleet Air Wing 31 (FAW-31) in 1973.
One of the keys to the PS-l’s open- ocean landing capability is its hull, which incorporates groove-type spray suppressors along each side, reducing both spray interference with the airfoil and water ingestion by the four Japanese-built GE IHI T-64-10E turboprops. The sheer size of the hull distributes stress on landing. The PS-1 is 109 feet, nine inches long overall, and has a wingspan exactly one foot less.
Low-speed flying (and landing) capability is the other key to the PS-l’s seaworthiness. Leading edge slats can be deployed manually or extended automatically when the huge trailing flaps are extended to 40°. Boundary layer control (BLC) is provided, not by engine bleed air but by high-pressure air from a separate BLC turbine. (This engine is carried in addition to a separate on-board auxiliary power unit, which is used for engine starts and auxiliary electrical power.) The BLC reduces landing speeds to as low as 55 knots.
Controllability was probably the toughest problem for the Japanese engineers to solve, especially trying to keep aileron control forces from becoming impossibly light at such low speeds; a variety of methods and gimmicks were incorporated in the final design. When extended, the flaps move in conjunction with the ailerons to provide more control.
Pilots can, through a “feel” switch ( gage an electromechanical system artificially stiffens aileron feel, vV providing twice the aileron surface m ment for a given control input.
A third device, called automatic sta ity equipment, is a wing-leveling aU(0 pilot which can be used at speeds up 130 knots, primarily to counteract slight left drift tendency the aircraft haS^ low speed. JMSDF pilots are trained to get caught “fighting” this system their own control inputs, a situation easy for novices to recognize.
The Japanese refer to the PS-1 aS,, “special ASW aircraft.” The “spec* is no doubt justified by the a'rcra. „ ASW centerpiece, the HQS-101 dipP1^ sonar, usually operated in the aCtl mode when the seaplane is waterbom Passive operation is possible but som what hampered by aircraft engine not . While dipping, the engines are kept m ning to enable the pilots to keep the a craft located directly over the sonar tra ducer, ensuring the transducer’s Pr0?js orientation. A “sonar driftmeter” 31 ^ the pilots as they work the engines in a out of reverse thrust, keeping the son
cycle is used; dip information is supp mented by sonobuoy information Pr° essed and displayed by a pair of d>reC
182
Proceedings / March
19»*
SHS
I
!'°nal low-frequency analysis and record- mg (Difar)-capable AQA-5/5N signal
Processors.
, PS-l crews still practice difficult Jezebel”* tactics (including “Julie”) Characteristic of the mix of rather dated ehniques and equipment which coexist 'In the still-modem airframe technol- °§y- The aircraft uses an APS-80J search ^ar no ah_ra<Jar capability; the blind area makes ladder searches the Referred radar search tactic. The remain- er of the tactical equipment suite closely resembles that found on the P-2J, and deludes the fine ASQ-10A magnetic ‘*n°maly detector. Tactical navigation is 0tle on dead-reckoning tracers, GTP-4 ^ AN/ASA 16, while general naviga- 10n gear includes Loran A1C and Dopp- er> but no inertial system. The aircraft as both ultra-high frequency (UHF) and 'gh-frequency equipment, but, as is strangely true even of surface units in the ^SDF, only a part of the PS-1 fleet has Secure UHF capability. All this rather uianpower-intensive gear is run by a standard crew of two pilots, two flight ^gineers, one tactical coordinator, one navigator, three sensor operators, two ordnance men, and one radio operator.
Armament is pod-carried and can include ASW torpedoes (until recently, ”|k-44s or Japanese-made Mk-73s, but •vtk-46 torpedoes are coming into the sys- ern), or depth bombs and five-inch rockets- The PS-1 has no mining mission, vvhich is rather surprising, given the importance of aerial mining to the defense of Japan.
FAW-31 operates 17 PS-ls, all based at Iwakuni, and eight US-1 amphibious Versions of the aircraft in its assigned Missions of search and rescue (SAR), HUedical evacuation, ocean pollution ^onitoring, and oceanographic research. Carrying no ASW gear, the US-1 has litter space for 12 or seating for 20, an out-
roJCct name for detection and identification by ^ans of low-frequency analyzing and recording.
board motorboat, rafts, rescue kits, and rescue lines. A standard crew includes three rescue scuba divers and two medical technicians, as well as two pilots, two flight engineers, a navigator, and radar and radio operators. For a mission radius to 400 nautical miles, the US-1 can remain on station for almost eight hours at an altitude of 1,000 feet.
A typical open-ocean landing pattern begins with a 90-knot downwind at an altitude of 700 feet, with boundary layer control engaged. The base leg is turned as the aircraft is slowed to 70-80 knots, and a 150 feet-per-minute rate of descent is commenced. The aircraft arrives on final at 300 feet and 70 knots, the descent rate slowed going through an altitude of 50 feet. The touchdown is at 50-55 knots.
Even with all its low-speed gimmickry, the PS-1 can be a handful for any pilot, especially in sea and wind conditions near the edge of its operating envelope. In 1977, a PS-1 went out of control during a water landing, split in two and sank, killing one and injuring 13 crewmen. Three other accidents have resulted in damage during water landings; two of these were caused initially by engine problems. Most tragically, a PS-1 crashed at Iwakuni while pulling out of a low-speed, low-altitude pass during a training flight in early 1983. Of 14 men on board, only three survived. FAW-31’s pilots average about ten practice landings a month (a number which some believe is only adequate), and get valuable training on an excellent simulator as well.
Has all the effort in research, development, and training paid off? An objective look reveals that the PS-l’s ASW performance has not been outstanding, limited in particular by the early-1960s’ Jezebel gear and its buoy-monitoring capability which necessitates time sharing or restricts pattern size and coverage. On typical barrier and straits patrol operations, most initial submarine detections have been made with radar. The success of the dipping sonar is debatable.
The PS-1 flying boat, designed for antisubmarine warfare, has been less than outstanding in carrying out that mission. While the aircraft is excellent, its sensors are not.
The SAR performance of the US-1 amphibian is somewhat more impressive, averaging eight successful at-sea rescues per year since 1977. The US-1 also provides medical evacuation services ship- to-shore and between airports in Japan as well. No doubt an actuarial analysis could be done to determine the cost-effectiveness of the US-1 operation, but many of the rescues prevented loss of life, putting the sea-landing capability beyond price, at least in the eyes of those who were rescued.
Aircraft availability (224-hour mean time between structural failures) has been quite good, especially for an amphibian, boosted by typically-Japanese meticulous maintenance and corrosion control. The oldest PS-ls have now flown about 3,000 hours. At current rates of operation, all will have reached their 5,400-hour service lives in about seven years. With the introduction of the P-3C and many relatively low-time P-2J aircraft still on hand, the JMSDF does not plan a life-extension program for the PS-ls. The US-1 SAR aircraft should continue flying well into the 1990s. Although a replacement aircraft is not yet being studied, it will be interesting to see if the Japanese abandon seaplane operations and their capability, one which is as old as naval aviation.
Lieutenant Dean was graduated from the University of Pittsburgh and was commissioned as a naval aviator through Aviation Officer Candidate School. He served with Patrol Squadron Ten and on the Patrol Wing Five staff, and later as an exchange officer to the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force Officer Candidate School under the Personnel Exchange Program. His article “Eta Jima: Hallowed Halls” was published in the 1983 International Navies Issue.
Proceedings / March 1984
183